

# OPUS2

The Cranston Inquiry

Day 1

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20 The focus of that work, of course, has been the  
21 tragic events of 23 to 24 November 2021, when over 30  
22 people died attempting to cross the English Channel  
23 from France in a small boat. This is by far the  
24 greatest loss of life from a single small boat in the  
25 Channel since the small boat problem was first

1 identified in 2018. The Inquiry's Terms of Reference  
2 required me to conduct an investigation into these  
3 events in order, first, to ascertain who the deceased  
4 were, secondly, when, where and in what circumstances  
5 they came by their deaths and, thirdly, to consider  
6 what lessons could be learned from those events and, if  
7 appropriate, to make recommendations to reduce the risk  
8 of a similar event occurring.

9 Before summarising the conclusions of the report  
10 and the recommendations which I've made at the end of  
11 that investigation, I'd like to say something about the  
12 way in which my team and I have gone about our work  
13 since my appointment just over two years ago in January  
14 2024. The first thing to stress is that the scope of  
15 the investigation has been defined and limited by the  
16 Terms of Reference. They focus specifically on the  
17 events of the 23 and 24 November 2021. The Inquiry has  
18 had no wider remit to investigate the issues of small  
19 boat crossings generally, nor to enter the political,  
20 humanitarian and legal debate concerning that topic.  
21 It is, of course, the focus of much understandable  
22 attention and concern.

23 Next, I should emphasise again, because it's such  
24 an important point, that this has been an independent  
25 Inquiry — independent of Government and of the various

1 public bodies we have investigated during the course of  
2 our work. Thirdly, it's been a non-statutory Inquiry.  
3 Consequently, all the questions about the conduct of  
4 the Inquiry and the nature of its processes and  
5 procedures have been for me as Chair, subject, of  
6 course, to the applicable principles of law, in  
7 particular the overriding duty to act fairly. Against  
8 that background, the overarching question in my  
9 decision making has always been, "What would best and  
10 most effectively assist the Inquiry in its work and so  
11 enable me to discharge the task conferred by the Terms  
12 of Reference?"

13 That leads me to the next key point. The  
14 Inquiry's processes have been inquisitorial and not  
15 adversarial. There have been no parties to the Inquiry  
16 and nobody has had a case to make or allegations to  
17 defend. Moreover, I've had no power to determine  
18 liability , whether civil or criminal. Rather, the  
19 Inquiry's purpose has been to find out the truth. The  
20 role of all of those who have engaged with us during  
21 our investigation has been to assist in ascertaining  
22 the truth of what happened on the night of 23 to 24  
23 November 2021.

24 In order to reach conclusions on that fundamental  
25 question, my team and I have conducted a thorough and

wide-ranging investigation. For example, we have obtained disclosure of thousands of pages of material relevant to our work from a wide range of individuals and organisations. We then disclosed material which we deemed relevant to those with the closest interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry, whom we call Full Participants. Having analysed the material which we received, we obtained over 70 witness statements from people and institutions with evidence related to the events being investigated. We also engaged experts to prepare reports in specific areas relevant to the investigation and disclose these statements and expert reports to the Full Participants. In due course, this material has also been placed on our website, where full transcripts and videos of our hearings can also be found.

As a result of months of hard work on the part of my team, and thanks to the consistently high levels of constructive cooperation on the part of the Full Participants and others such as the RNLI, we were able to start our Full Hearings at the beginning of March last year and to complete them within four weeks. During that time, I heard live evidence from 22 witnesses, who were questioned on my behalf by the Inquiry's Counsel team. I also heard opening

1 submissions from Counsel to the Inquiry and opening and  
2 closing submissions from Counsel on behalf of the Full  
3 Participants .

4 In the final weeks of the Full Hearings, I heard  
5 impact statements from family members of some of the  
6 deceased. Those statements were recorded in the family  
7 members' own language and the recordings were played in  
8 the hearing room. A member of the Inquiry team  
9 followed each recording with a reading of it in  
10 English. I should again express my gratitude for the  
11 evidence given by those family members. Part of my  
12 report is dedicated to those who died in the Channel  
13 tragedy and to the impact it had on people's lives .

14 That has been a consistent feature of the  
15 Inquiry's approach. We've always tried to keep the  
16 families of the deceased at the centre of our work have  
17 always sought to bear in mind that for those who lost  
18 their lives on 23 to 24 November 2021, and for their  
19 families and friends, this is, above all, an  
20 immeasurable human tragedy.

21 Before turning to the report, I should deal with  
22 two other important matters. The first relates to the  
23 Marine Accident Investigation Branch, the MAIB.  
24 Following the incident, the MAIB began a safety  
25 investigation into it . Their report was published on 8

1 concerned in such investigations. The result is that  
2 the Inquiry has had no access to material relating to  
3 the ongoing French investigation.

4 However, the Paris Prosecutor kindly provided the  
5 Inquiry with a list of the identities of the deceased  
6 and those missing who could have been on board the  
7 small boat. I should add that the Inquiry has kept the  
8 French authorities informed about the progress of our  
9 own work.

10 I now turn to the report. First, I should say  
11 something about the drafting process. Following the  
12 conclusion of the Full Hearings in March last year, my  
13 team and I began work on the draft report. At that  
14 stage, we sought further evidence from a number of  
15 parties as a result of matters raised during the Full  
16 Hearings. During the summer of last year, once the  
17 draft report had reached an advanced stage, the Inquiry  
18 shared details of proposed criticisms with those  
19 organisations directly affected. We also shared draft  
20 recommendations with relevant organisations, inviting  
21 comment on their ability and deliverability . After  
22 reviewing the responses in both cases, I've modified  
23 the original draft text in appropriate circumstances to  
24 accommodate what I regard as helpful suggestions and  
25 justified responses to both the provisional criticisms

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1 November 2023, some months before my appointment was  
2 announced and this Inquiry's work began. My Inquiry  
3 has had a different remit to that of the MAIB. It was,  
4 for example, no part of the MAIB's task to answer  
5 questions about those who had died. As I've indicated,  
6 that has been fundamental to the Inquiry's work.

7 However, my Terms of Reference specifically  
8 require me to consider the MAIB's investigation. My  
9 team and I have done that with great care and drawn on  
10 it again and again in the course of our investigation .  
11 Moreover, as I'll explain, one of our recommendations  
12 in the final part of the report relates to the wider  
13 publication of implementation measures which parties  
14 put in place in response to the MAIB's own  
15 recommendations following an investigation.

16 The second matter I should deal with at this stage  
17 relates to the position of the French authorities.  
18 Following the events of 23 to 24 November 2021, the  
19 French authorities started a criminal investigation  
20 arising out of the incident, led by an investigating  
21 magistrate. The Inquiry asked the Paris Prosecutor for  
22 access to evidence held by the French investigation,  
23 but was informed that this would not be possible due to  
24 the principle of judicial secrecy. French criminal law  
25 imposes a duty of confidentiality on all those

1 and recommendations.

2 There are a number of core principles which I've  
3 taken into account when producing the report. First,  
4 as I've said, I have no power to and have not made  
5 findings of civil or criminal liability . Rather, my  
6 task has been to get to the truth of what happened on  
7 23 and 24 November 2021 and to make such  
8 recommendations as seem appropriate in the light of the  
9 Inquiry's investigative work and my conclusions about  
10 the facts.

11 Secondly, under the Inquiry's inquisitorial  
12 process, there was no burden of proof and no fixed  
13 standards by reference to which findings of fact were  
14 to be made. I adopted a flexible approach with  
15 conclusions in terms of the likelihood that an event  
16 did or did not occur. In many cases, the evidence is  
17 clear and there can be no dispute that a certain event  
18 did occur. In other cases, my conclusion is that it 's  
19 more likely than not that an event occurred or,  
20 alternatively , that it 's possible that an event  
21 occurred. In a few cases, uncertainty remains but, in  
22 my view, this has no bearing on the central issues for  
23 the Inquiry.

24 Finally , in making conclusions, I've been mindful  
25 of the dangers of using hindsight when considering the

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1 actions of those involved in the events of the night.  
2 Although I've identified failings by people on the  
3 night, I've considered each of these in the context of  
4 what was known at the time, the resources available,  
5 the preparations made, the procedures then in place.

6 Overall, my conclusion is that the underlying  
7 causes were systemic in nature, even where failings are  
8 attributable or potentially attributable to  
9 individuals. An analysis of these in their full  
10 context provides the basis for the recommendations in  
11 the report.

12 The report is over 450 pages long. Before giving  
13 a brief summary of the conclusions and recommendations,  
14 I should first say that, in order fully to understand  
15 and appreciate the findings, there's no substitute for  
16 reading the full text. However, we have provided a  
17 15-page Executive Summary at the outset of the report.

18 The important point to stress is that what follows  
19 in these remarks is by definition an extremely  
20 compressed and highly abbreviated version of the report  
21 itself, shorn of all supporting detail and evidence and  
22 without the detailed reasoning which underpins the  
23 conclusions.

24 With that qualification, I turn to the first  
25 question in the Terms of Reference, namely who were the

1 We can begin when people smugglers dispatched an  
2 unseaworthy and overcrowded small boat from the French  
3 coast at about nine in the evening of 23 November 2021.  
4 It had on board, as I say, at least 33 people. They  
5 were in overcrowded conditions. They had paid the  
6 people smugglers thousands of pounds for their place on  
7 the boat and had been assured of safe passage to the  
8 United Kingdom. Only two of those on board would  
9 survive the journey.

10 We can't now be certain what caused the boat to  
11 fail. However, about three hours into the journey, the  
12 boat began to take on significant amounts of water and  
13 later became swamped. Those on board tried in vain to  
14 bail out the water and made panicked mobile telephone  
15 calls for help. One of them called a smuggler who had  
16 arranged the journey and sent him their location. He  
17 did nothing to help.

18 Just after 1 a.m. on 24 November 2021, His  
19 Majesty's Coastguard was notified by the French  
20 Coastguard that there was a small boat around half a  
21 nautical mile from the middle of the Channel with 33  
22 people on board.

23 HM Coastguard called this incident "Charlie".  
24 Shortly afterwards the French authorities transferred a  
25 mobile call from a 16-year-old on board. He spoke to

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1 individuals who lost their lives in the Channel on 23  
2 to 24 November 2021?

3 The Inquiry has been able to determine with  
4 confidence the identities of 26 of the 27 people who  
5 lost their lives, and of four people who are believed  
6 to have been on the boat but whose bodies have not been  
7 found. While the identity of the 27th person whose  
8 body was found can't be conclusively ascertained, the  
9 Inquiry has been able to suggest his identity. The  
10 report also identifies two survivors of the incident.  
11 One of them gave evidence at the Full Hearings.

12 On this basis, there were at least 33 people --  
13 men, women, and children -- in the small boat which set  
14 out from France on that evening of 23 November 2021.  
15 The Inquiry can't be certain that there were no other  
16 people on board, including children whose families may  
17 never know their fate.

18 Most of the report -- in fact all of it except for  
19 the first and final two chapters -- is devoted to the  
20 remaining key questions in the Terms of Reference,  
21 namely when, where and in what circumstances did the  
22 deceased come by their deaths? By way of introduction  
23 to the conclusions in relation to these questions, I  
24 think it's helpful to give the briefest outline of what  
25 happened that evening.

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1 HM Coastguard for about 20 minutes. He said they were  
2 "in the water" and required immediate assistance.  
3 Geolocation information was then sent to HM Coastguard  
4 which showed the boat was in the Sandettie area of the  
5 Channel, close to the median line, but on the UK side.

6 More desperate calls were made and messages sent  
7 from the stricken small boat, though some calls and  
8 messages were missed. HM Coastguard issued a Mayday  
9 relay broadcast, but a nearby French naval vessel, the  
10 Flamant, did not respond. Meanwhile, at around 1.30  
11 a.m., HM Coastguard had tasked a Border Force cutter,  
12 the Valiant. The Valiant did not leave the port of  
13 Dover until 2.22 a.m. and took another hour to reach  
14 the last known location of incident "Charlie". Just  
15 before 3 a.m., HM Coastguard also tasked a helicopter,  
16 R163, while the Valiant was en route.

17 When the Valiant arrived in the Sandettie area at  
18 around 3.24 a.m., it was unable to locate the boat.  
19 The coordinates had been given to Border Force more  
20 than an hour and a half earlier, so that by the time  
21 the Valiant arrived, it seems very likely that the  
22 small boat had drifted away. Between 3.30 and 7.20  
23 a.m., the helicopter and the Valiant located three  
24 small boats. The Valiant embarked 98 people in all.  
25 None of the boats found by the Valiant matched the

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1 description of incident "Charlie".

2 Dawn came around 7 a.m. One of the two survivors  
3 told the Inquiry that when the sun rose over the water,  
4 there were some people still clinging to the remains of  
5 the small boat. The bodies of others were floating  
6 around them. He recalled a mother screaming as she  
7 searched for her children. By this time, the  
8 helicopter had been stood down, and the Valiant was  
9 returning to Dover with its 98 people that it had  
10 embarked. No one in the UK was looking for the small  
11 boat, and no one came to its rescue.

12 At around 12.30 p.m. that day, 24 November 2021, a  
13 French fishing vessel sailing approximately 9 nautical  
14 miles off the coast of Calais found the first of the  
15 bodies floating in the water. HM Coastguard were  
16 notified at around 1 p.m., nearly 12 hours after they  
17 had received the first calls for help. Ultimately,  
18 bodies of those who had been on the small boat were  
19 recovered to France and two survivors were rescued.

20 This, as I say, is the barest outline of what  
21 happened that night, but I hope it goes some way to  
22 explaining why the Inquiry was established.

23 In Part 3, chapter 8 of the report, there is a  
24 minutely detailed narrative of the events of that night  
25 which draws on the huge amount of documentary material

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1 and evidence which my team and I have considered during  
2 our investigation .

3 In order to set that narrative account in its full  
4 and proper context, the preceding chapters of the  
5 report, chapters 2 to 7, address the relevant legal  
6 framework and the UK's legal obligations for search and  
7 rescue at sea. These chapters then set out the history  
8 of small boat crossings since they rose to prominence  
9 in 2018 and identified the challenges which small boats  
10 present for search and rescue. These chapters also  
11 describe the key UK and French organisations involved  
12 in responding to small boats before turning to the UK  
13 government's approach to the many challenges posed by  
14 the increasing number of small boat crossings over the  
15 years and the specific systems in place to meet them  
16 before November 2021.

17 Following on from the detailed narrative of the  
18 night in chapter 8, the report in chapters 9 to 12  
19 analyses what occurred by focusing on the resources  
20 that were available to the UK search and rescue  
21 services that night before considering the initial  
22 response to incident "Charlie" and, in particular , the  
23 information gathering about the nature of its distress .  
24 Subsequent chapters analyse the search response to the  
25 incident and the events which led to the erroneous

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1 conclusion that the small boat involved in incident  
2 "Charlie" had been rescued.

3 On the basis of this analysis , I stress again that  
4 the full details are set out in the report itself .  
5 Chapter 15 of the report concludes that some of the  
6 deaths which took place that night and during the  
7 following morning were avoidable. In very broad  
8 outline, the analysis is as follows .

9 First , I accept the conclusion of the MAIB in its  
10 report that:

11 "By providing an unsuitable craft and inadequate  
12 safety equipment for the crossing and by crowding 33  
13 people onto the boat, the people who facilitated the  
14 attempted crossing put the occupants of the boat at  
15 high risk of coming to harm."

16 Secondly, the Inquiry's expert on survivability  
17 concluded that those on board who survived cold water  
18 shock when entering the water would have eventually  
19 drowned when they could no longer hold onto the buoyant  
20 remains of the small boat. That was, as a result ,  
21 either a physical incapacitation due to cooling of  
22 their hands, arms and legs, loss of consciousness, or  
23 of cardiac arrest due to hypothermia.

24 Therefore, it 's likely that the majority were  
25 still alive when the Border Force vessel Valiant

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1 arrived at the Mayday relay position at around 3.24  
2 a.m. on 24 November 2021. I also accept that some of  
3 those on board the small boat were still alive at  
4 sunrise at about 7 a.m. that day, although they would  
5 have died between then and the time of rescue in the  
6 early afternoon that day. I note the consistency  
7 between this expert view and the evidence of one of the  
8 survivors . He told the Full Hearings that people  
9 survived after entering the water and that around 10  
10 people were still alive in the morning.

11 Thirdly, so far as HM Coastguard is concerned,  
12 I've carefully examined the staffing situation at the  
13 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre -- the MRCC -- in  
14 Dover and its impact on the events of the night.

15 Specific issues with resourcing had repeatedly  
16 occurred and been identified within HM Coastguard. It  
17 had been expressly linked to risks , including the loss  
18 of life through a flawed response, the loss of  
19 situational awareness, and an adverse impact on staff  
20 well-being and morale. The reality is that the staff  
21 at Dover were overwhelmed on the night of 23 to 24  
22 November 2021. As I say, HM Coastguard were aware of  
23 the issues and risks . The Inquiry has received little  
24 evidence explaining how, if at all , these had been  
25 addressed before November 2021.

16

1 I've also concluded that there was defective  
2 oversight of the Marine and Coastguard Agency by the  
3 Department for Transport and in turn by the MCA of HM  
4 Coastguard both before and after November 2021.  
5 Without effective oversight, the extent of the need for  
6 change was not adequately identified or addressed.

7 Turning to the search and rescue efforts on the  
8 night, I've highlighted two key aspects. One is the  
9 Mayday relay which HM Coastguard decided to broadcast  
10 at 2.27 a.m. on 24 November. This indicated that the  
11 small boat involved in incident "Charlie" was in  
12 distress and mandated a response from all vessels in  
13 the area. The closest vessel to incident "Charlie" at  
14 the time of the Mayday relay was the French warship,  
15 the Flamant, being used by the French Coastguard.

16 According to evidence provided to the Inquiry by  
17 HM Coastguard, the Flamant was approximately 3 nautical  
18 miles — or 15 minutes — away from the broadcast  
19 co—ordinates. By contrast, the Border Force vessel,  
20 the Valiant, was about 9 nautical miles and 40 minutes  
21 away. Yet the Flamant did not respond to the Mayday  
22 relay.

23 Its acts and omissions remain subject, as I  
24 mentioned earlier, to investigation by the French  
25 authorities. However, given its proximity to incident

1 operating procedures, HM Coastguard made limited  
2 efforts to extract full information from later callers ,  
3 and information from the small boat itself was not  
4 treated at face value. HM Coastguard missed  
5 opportunities to gather updated geolocation information  
6 during calls made with the boat.

7 Further opportunities were lost in the searches  
8 that were carried out under the direction of HM  
9 Coastguard by the Valiant and by helicopter R163.  
10 Neither was made aware that the small boat was sinking  
11 or that there were potentially people in the water.  
12 Neither was given full search parameters. Indeed, HM  
13 Coastguard did not undertake formal search planning for  
14 incident "Charlie".

15 No one on board the small boat was located in the  
16 UK search and rescue operation. The meteorological  
17 conditions on the night provide only a partial answer  
18 to the question of why the people on board the small  
19 boat were not located. As explained in detail in the  
20 report, these flaws in the search and rescue operation  
21 are attributable to HM Coastguard. They're not  
22 attributable to the captain or crew of either the  
23 Valiant or the helicopter R163. That, in barest  
24 outline, was the search and rescue operation during the  
25 night.

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1 "Charlie" at the time of the Mayday relay and the fact  
2 that the small boat was intact at the time, if the  
3 Flamant had attended incident "Charlie", many more —  
4 and possibly all lives — would have been saved.

5 A further aspect of the search and rescue efforts  
6 relates to HM Coastguard's decision—making that night.  
7 The report gives this detailed attention. I accept  
8 that HM Coastguard faced significant challenges in  
9 getting robust and reliable information about small  
10 boats attempting to cross the Channel, although it was  
11 aware of the difficulties in that before November 2021.

12 From the start of the night shift on 23 November  
13 that year, HM Coastguard were hampered by a lack of  
14 real—time information about small boats crossing the  
15 Dover Strait. No surveillance flight was undertaken  
16 that night because of the weather. There was limited  
17 and late information provided by the French authorities  
18 and a lack of meaningful response to the Mayday relay  
19 by vessels in the vicinity .

20 However, when HM Coastguard's Search and Rescue  
21 Mission Co—ordinator at Dover took the first call from  
22 incident "Charlie" at 1.48 a.m., he believed,  
23 correctly , that this was potentially an emergency  
24 situation .

25 Despite this assessment, and contrary to standard

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1 Then there was the premature closure in the  
2 morning of 24 November 2021. As explained in the  
3 report, HM Coastguard at Dover misidentified the second  
4 small boat embarked by the Valiant as incident  
5 "Charlie". This was despite an obvious conflict  
6 between the information held about incident "Charlie"  
7 and that second small boat. The reasoning behind this  
8 decision was not recorded in writing and other mistakes  
9 were made in record keeping. Record keeping failures  
10 led the day shift to believe that incident "Charlie"  
11 had been resolved. Therefore nothing was done by HM  
12 Coastguard to search for those people who were still  
13 alive and in the water between 6.46 a.m., when the  
14 Valiant ended its search, and just over six hours later  
15 at 12.57 p.m., when HM Coastguard was notified that  
16 bodies had been discovered by the fishing vessel in  
17 French waters.

18 Otherwise the search would have continued until  
19 the upper limit for survivability calculated by HM  
20 Coastguard had expired, and therefore at least  
21 throughout 24 November 2021. Neither visibility nor  
22 nighttime conditions would have impeded the search.  
23 The helicopter R163 was readily able to locate bodies  
24 from the air that afternoon. If a search for survivors  
25 had been adequately undertaken that day, including

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1       during daylight hours, more lives would have been  
 2       saved.  
 3       As the report's analysis makes clear, the flaws in  
 4       HM Coastguard's decision making were systemic in  
 5       nature. In particular, they are attributable to: (i)  
 6       the inordinate pressure on HM Coastguard staff at Dover  
 7       handling small boat search and rescue, who were placed  
 8       in an intolerable position because of staff shortages  
 9       and other deficiencies; (ii) the absence of effective  
 10      supervision of those staff; (iii) the limitations of  
 11      the remote working model, which was an operation to  
 12      assist them; and (iv) fourthly, the belief within HM  
 13      Coastguard that callers from small boats regularly  
 14      exaggerated their level of distress.

15      I turn finally to the report's recommendations. I  
 16      should acknowledge at the outset that much has improved  
 17      since November 2021 in terms of the personnel and  
 18      assets available to HM Coastguard. Moreover, as I  
 19      record in the final part of the report, progress has  
 20      been made in implementing the recommendations of three  
 21      previous reports about the incident, namely the MAIB  
 22      report, which I've already mentioned, a peer review by  
 23      the US Coastguard dated July 2023, and an internal  
 24      review by HM Coastguard, which reported in draft in May  
 25      2024.

21

1       All three reports contain recommendations, some of  
 2       which have been accepted and implemented. However,  
 3       others have been rejected, including a number made by  
 4       the US Coastguard. Furthermore, HM Coastguard's  
 5       internal review did not address some of the more  
 6       substantial failings which the Inquiry had uncovered.

7       In the final chapter of the report, I've set out  
 8       my recommendations. These take fully into account the  
 9       progress which has already been made in the years since  
 10      the incident. These recommendations are divided into  
 11      four categories. They're intended, in line with the  
 12      Inquiry's Terms of Reference, to reduce the risk of a  
 13      similar event occurring again. The categories are as  
 14      follows:

- 15      (1) Recommendations relating to search and rescue  
 16      operations for small boat crossings;
- 17      (2) Recommendations relating to search and rescue  
 18      operations for mass casualty incidents more generally;
- 19      (3) Recommendations to address structural and  
 20      legislative issues in maritime search and rescue  
 21      activities; and
- 22      (4) A general recommendation relating to the  
 23      publication of information about the implementation of  
 24      what MAIB recommends in their investigative reports,  
 25      which I foreshadowed earlier.

22

1       Now, full details of the recommendations are to be  
 2       found in chapter 17 of the report. As I've indicated,  
 3       one of the aims of the Inquiry has been to reduce the  
 4       risk of a repetition of a mass casualty event like that  
 5       which occurred on 23 to 24 November 2021. The  
 6       recommendations I've made are designed to achieve this.  
 7       However, they will only do so if they're implemented.  
 8       Since there's no mechanism for the Inquiry to monitor  
 9       the implementation of its recommendations following the  
 10      publication of the report, it's vital that the  
 11      Government takes on the responsibility with public  
 12      reporting of the progress made in implementing them.

13      As I say in the report, I would make myself  
 14      available to support this process in any way that's  
 15      appropriate. Reporting on progress and independent  
 16      monitoring are means by which public trust and  
 17      confidence in the Inquiry's process can be maintained.

18      Finally, as I say in the foreword to the report,  
 19      the practice of small boat crossings must end. Apart  
 20      from other reasons, it's imperative to prevent further  
 21      loss of life. Travelling on board a small, unseaworthy  
 22      and overcrowded boat and crossing one of the busiest  
 23      shipping lanes in the world is an inherently dangerous  
 24      activity.

25      Thank you very much.

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