



HM Coastguard

Tier 3 Detailed Incident review:

Review of small boat migrant incidents, coordinated by HM Coastguard in the UK Search & Rescue Region, which occurred on 24 November 2022. VERSION 1.1

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Date: 11 May 2022

Executive Summary

At 1258UTC on 24 November, Her Majesty's Coastguard (HMCG) received a call from Gris-Nez MRCC requesting air support to an incident they were coordinating in the English Channel in the French search and rescue region, where a French Fishing Vessel discovered multiple persons in the water. A total of 29 persons were recovered, including 2 survivors. A rescue helicopter from the UK was tasked immediately to support the search.



On 24 November 2021 the HM Coastguard network recorded 99 incidents emanating from small boat migrant activity in the English Channel. These calls were received and coordinated by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Dover and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC).

This report into the review of the small boat incidents which occurred between 24 November 2021 from 0001 to 1258 hours but primarily focusses on the incident which HMCG referenced as CHARLIE, which HMCG now believe is the small boat which later sank in the English Channel, (exact location of the sinking unknown). HMCG have been able to identify incident CHARLIE through receipt of telephone numbers received on the 22nd March 2022 by Duncan Lewis Solicitors that confirmed that those onboard the small boat (CHARLIE) did make calls to UK Authorities including HMCG and the French Coastguard.

The French Coastguard informed HMCG that the small boat was thought to be making way to the UK search and rescue region, at which point HMCG instigated an immediate SAR response, by tasking HMC Valiant. Once HMCG were notified that the small boat was in the UK search and rescue regions they assumed coordination from the French Coastguard.

During the coordination of the incident, the SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) using the only positional data available to him (WhatsApp), placed the small boat relating to incident CHARLIE in the UK Search and Rescue Region.

The known confirmed position of where the casualties were found in the French Search and Rescue Region has allowed me to identify an estimated position with a higher

degree of confidence using conventional backtrack search planning methodologies. This includes the use of hindcast environmental factors and a drift elapsed time period. These methodologies are internationally recognised.

In order to establish the estimated location of the small boat when the emergency calls were made to both the UK and French Coastguard, I have used manual calculations using weather and drift data. I have also used Search and Rescue Information System (SARIS) planning software with built in computed meteorological and hydrodynamic files and then an additional calculation to override those meteorological files by applying Hindcast data. I can therefore confirm that in each estimated calculation, the targets associated with incident CHARLIE were within the search area created by the SMC which encompassed both UK and French Search and Rescue Regions for the duration of the Search regardless of which Search and Rescue Region the targets were in.

The estimated positions using SARIS calculated Grid Files for Meteorological and hydrodynamic data, places the downwind drift of the targets related to Incident CHARLIE predominately within the French Search and Rescue Region with the exception of the time period from 1000 UTC to approximately 1220 UTC. The estimated drift start position for the targets relating to incident CHARLIE is also in the French Search and Rescue Region.

Again, using SARIS but applying Hindcast data (real time wind readings from the Sandettie Light Vessel) to override the computed meteorological data, the estimated position of the targets related to Incident CHARLIE are predominantly in the UK Search and Rescue Region with the exception of the time period 1157 UTC to 1257 UTC. The estimated drift start position for the target related to Incident CHARLIE is also in the UK Search and Rescue Region.

Then using manual calculations of tidal stream and hindcast data, the estimated positions of the targets related to Incident CHARLIE were predominately in the UK Search and Rescue Region with the exception of the time period from approximately 1120UTC until 1257 UTC. The estimated drift start position for the targets related to Incident Charlie is also in the UK Search and Rescue Region.

There are now 4 key issues that needed to be established within my review.

Key point 1: Was the search area created by the SMC valid?

Key point 2: Was it likely that the targets associated with the small boat relating to incident CHARLIE were in the search area for the duration of the search period?

Key point 3: Were there sufficient response resources allocated to the small boat related to incident CHARLIE?



Key point 4: Why were the casualties not found until 1257 UTC?

Key point 1. The SMC created a search area using his experience of small boat operations and local knowledge rather than conventional Search Planning methodologies. I have since validated the credibility of this search area using conventional datum point search planning methodology.

Key point 2. To establish this, I have used manual calculations using weather and drift data. I have also used SARIS planning software with built in computed meteorological and hydrodynamic files and overrode these files by applying Hindcast data. I can therefore confirm that in each calculation, the targets associated with incident CHARLIE were within the search area created by the SMC for the duration of the Search.

Key point 3. With regards to search and rescue assets in relation to the small boat linked to Incident CHARLIE, I have determined the following:

1. A rescue asset (HMC Valiant) was tasked to intercept and rescue persons on a small boat relating to Incident CHARLIE based on information received from the French Coastguard whilst the small boat was still in the French Search and Rescue Region. I believe this rescue asset to be suitable because, the tasking was related to a single small boat, the rescue vessel had suitable experience, knowledge and capability which has been proved to be successful for the last 5 years.
2. When it was established that there was the protentional for a search, the SMC tasked the best search asset, Helicopter R163. This is the most suitable search asset because it can get on scene quicker, it has higher height of eye, has far superior search equipment i.e radar, night vision, forward looking infrared cameras, search lights, can drop life rafts to survivors, has a higher probability of detection and can conduct multiple searches quickly over larger areas.
3. I have also considered whether additional search and rescue assets would have materially made a difference in the SAR response. With regards to search, the fixed wing had the weather been favourable enabling the aircraft to fly, it would in my opinion of increased awareness of the surface picture. With regards to rescue assets, the SMC attempted to illicit an immediate response from vessels in the vicinity via a mayday relay broadcast and a call direct with the French Coastguard for the French Warship Flammant to respond because SMC calculated that the Flammant was 3 nautical miles away from the WhatsApp position and therefore the closest asset. There is no doubt this would have resulted in a rescue asset being on scene approximately 30 minutes prior to the arrival of HMC Valiant.
4. I understand why the SMC made the decision that HMC Valiant provided sufficient rescue response because the vessel has a greater survivor capacity



than an RNLI all weather lifeboat and therefore would have been capable of being able to rescue the occupants of more than one small boat during the search period. I also understand why he did not task additional rescue assets because he believed that all targets had in the search area been rescued (1 original target plus 2 others). Whilst I acknowledge that additional rescue assets could have increased the possibility of detection, I cannot say with any degree of certainty that additional rescue assets would have changed the outcome of this incident.

Key point 4. This question is difficult to answer even with the benefit of hindsight. However, there are clear contributory factors that may have affected the outcome of this incident. It is well known that small boats launch from France under the cover of darkness covertly as they do not want to be detected by the French authorities. Small Boats are ill equipped because they have no navigation lights, no safety, navigation or communication equipment such as personal locator beacons/EPIRBs, VHF radio, AIS and on the rare occasion lifesaving appliances are provided, they are often improvised and not fit for purpose (no reflective tape, poor buoyancy, no lights, no whistles). Maintaining communications with a small boat is challenging as they are often told by organised criminal gangs to dispose of their mobile phones. This incident occurred during the hours of darkness; the small boat was ill equipped making it extremely difficult for SAR assets to detect them. Even in day light, in the second busiest shipping channel in the world, it was five and half hours before the casualties were found by a passing Fishing Vessel. This leads me to conclude without doubt that had the small boat related to incident CHARLIE been suitably equipped to make this journey and if they had appropriate rescue equipment on board, the outcome of this incident would have been different.



1 Introduction to the Review

1.1 Commission

1.1.1 The review was commissioned by the Director of Her Majesty's Coastguard and Chief Coastguard in accordance with the Tier Three review requirements as laid down in the Coastguard Operational Detailed Incident Review process as the small boat incident may have met one or more of the following criteria:

- A fatality occurred during an incident coordinated by HM Coastguard and/or,
- another agency or service intends to investigate, e.g. Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), Police, Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB)

1.1.2 The Terms of Reference can be found at Annex A. Julie-Anne Wood was appointed as the Lead Reviewer.

1.2 Analysis Methodology used in the review

1.2.1 The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance contained in "HM Coastguard Operational Detailed Incident Review Process Guidance and Process Checklist."

1.2.2 This will include but not be limited to:

- Review of the Coastguard Incident Management System narrative records (currently ViSION)
- Review of any other records kept (chart plots, print outs, documents)
- Voice recording system records
- Interviews with those involved including external stakeholders (face to face or video conference/telephone)
- Questions and answers provided by exchange of email or other written correspondence
- Inspection of equipment and systems (any associated electronic records kept by those systems e.g. Digital Selective Calling (DSC))



- Visits to sites (where necessary)
- Photographs and video evidence
- Informal Mission Review (IMR) and Operational Learning Review (OLR)
- Review of documentation (paper and electronic) e.g. procedures, processes, instructions, training materials, etc.



Background to Small Boat Migrant Operations



2 Background

2.1.1 HM Coastguard is responsible for the initiation and coordination of UK civil maritime search and rescue. This includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of adequate resources to respond to vessel, persons and aircraft at risk of death or injury at sea or on the coast of the UK. HM Coastguard is the UK's only national emergency service. It operates a network of Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres and Sub Centres throughout the UK, which respond and coordinate six of the ten internationally coastguard functions – search and rescue, vessel traffic monitoring, maritime security, pollution response, maritime safety and disaster and emergency response.

2.1.2 The UK is a signatory of:

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) 1974

International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue Convention 1979

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982

HM Coastguard discharge the function of civil maritime search and rescue for the UK. Conventional SAR operations can involve calls from persons, vessels or aircraft at sea or along the coastline of the UK. With incidents from vessels at sea, non-small boats, they will usually have life-saving apparatus, means of communications other than a mobile phone (VHF radio, Digital Selective Calling, Emergency Position Indicating Beacon EPIRB). When they call they are usually able to provide a position or a general location of where they are – GPS position, distance and range from a bearing or say where they believe they are. They will also say what the nature of their situation is – they are sinking, they are broken down, etc – but in the main there is no reason to doubt the information being provided.

This allows the SMC to evaluate the situation and identify suitable and adequate SAR resources to affect an appropriate rescue.

When HM Coastguard receive calls for assistance from conventional routes, these are processed using the internationally agreed principles laid down in SOLAS and the maritime SAR convention, as they generally will correlate with the emergency phases and classifications (see below). Small boat



incidents deviate from these conventional processes as will be explained later in this section.

The International Convention for Maritime Search and Rescue use the following definitions:

Emergency phase. A generic term meaning, as the case may be uncertainty phase, alert phase or distress phase;

Uncertainty phase. A situation wherein uncertainty exists as to the safety of a person, a vessel or other craft;

Alert phase. A situation wherein apprehension exists as to the safety of a person, a vessel or other craft;

Distress phase. A situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.



2.1.3 All HM Coastguard JRCC/MRCCs/MRSC are connected through data centres which create a national network. This results in all routine and emergency telephone lines and the 166 radio communications sites positioned throughout the coastline of the UK, being available to all MRCCs/MRSC. This provides resilience within the operation to enable support from locations which are routine working to support emergency work when required. For example, if MRCC Dover require support from the network to respond to an increase in the number of calls received, these calls can be answered by officers who are based at the JRCC. Small boat incidents in the UK search and rescue region fall under our response to search and rescue (SAR).

2.1.4 HM Coastguard first became alerted to small boats crossing from France in 2016. During 2018 the number of crossings became more frequent seeing an increase in the number of people rescued in incidents coordinated by HM Coastguard. HM Coastguard incident figures for 2019 recorded 142 incidents involving migrant small boats, with 1,695 persons rescued. 2020 saw an increase with 611 incidents recorded and 8,319 persons rescued. In 2021 the incidents increased dramatically with 980 incidents and 27,046 persons rescued to the UK. In the period January to May 2022, the crossings and subsequent rescues have increased when compared to the same period in 2021.



- 2.1.5 When reports or calls are received by HM Coastguard alerting them to crossings of small boats in the English Channel, they immediately instigate SAR operations, and operators will attempt to get as much information as possible about the small boat, its location and those onboard. This is not always easy to achieve. People will leave France after “purchasing” their passage from an organised crime group, who will provide a rubber “small boat” which is sometimes constructed on the beach before departure. These “small boats” are often inflated rubber tubes attached with a soft rubber floor (sometimes glued to the tubes). An outboard engine is attached to a piece of wood at the stern of the vessel and fuel cans are provided. Often there is only sufficient fuel to get the small boat to within UK waters but not to complete the full journey. This is a deliberate ploy to ensure that the vessel will need to be rescued by UK authorities.
- 2.1.6 Persons making this journey are unlikely to have any background knowledge, experience or training relating to the perils they will face crossing the Channel in an unseaworthy small boat. Small boat crossings are predominantly organised between male family members and organised crime groups, and as such women and children would be unaware of the dangers they would face during the crossing. As such, clothing worn by those onboard is not suitable for making the crossing in cold air and sea temperatures (even in the summer), often at night and provides little protection against sea spray or precipitation. It is highly likely that persons onboard a small boat are already soaked through as to launch the boat from French beaches requires them to enter the water. They will have very little to no food or water for the passage. On the rare occasions when lifejackets are provided, they are not tested or fit for purpose as life-saving apparatus, and often only crude buoyancy aids are provided. There have been instances where people have been rescued with empty bottles of water or toy rubber rings strapped to them.






- 2.1.7 The main means of communication with small boats is via mobile phones often provided by organised crime groups to call the emergency services once a mobile phone signal is obtained. According to intelligence from Clandestine Channel Threat Command migrants are told to dispose of the phones once they have established contact and are close to rescue so that OCGs cannot be traced. There is no other communications equipment available to those onboard these small boats. Phones will often get wet, battery life is poor. The language barrier often coupled with hysteria displayed by migrants, poses significant challenges when communicating with small boats. The mobile phone signal is often so weak that calls continually drop out, adding further complexity to the situation.



Due to the distance offshore, there is no reliable technical solution available to establish the exact position of the small boats. The EISEC information that would normally be available from the 999 emergency calls is not always available due to the distance offshore and the use of foreign telephone numbers. Coastguard operators will use best endeavours to establish a position for the small boat, using information from the first informant, other vessels which maybe in the area and limited use of mobile phone applications (WhatsApp, GoogleMaps, etc), but it is not always possible to send a position pin to HM Coastguard as often there is no 3G/4G signal available or the mobile phone has no data capability.



- 2.1.8 In an attempt to establish a position via WhatsApp, the Coastguard assuming they have been provided a mobile telephone number, may send a text message and/or a WhatsApp message to a small boat asking them to download WhatsApp. WhatsApp is only available on a standalone mobile phone in the operations room and is not incorporated in our normal command and control systems, and as such is not visible or available to all operators within the operations room.



If this is successful, subject to 3G/4G network coverage, it may provide the Coastguard with a positional pin identifying the position of the small boat. The accuracy of establishing a position using this method is unknown. Attempts have been made to contact WhatsApp to determine accuracy however responses have not been provided. If a WhatsApp position is



received it can be converted by the Coastguard from decimalisation to latitude and longitude, so that it can be relayed to the rescue units.



Even when rescue units are tasked to a small boat it is extremely difficult to confirm if the persons rescued were actually the persons that made the call. Small boats are often making way and OCGs inform migrants to throw mobile phones overboard making it impossible to confirm identity through telephone numbers.

- 2.1.9 When the people on board the small boat mobile phone connects to a mobile phone network, UK or France they will start to repeatedly call the emergency services. According to Clandestine Channel Threat Command, migrants are



told by the OCGs to deliberately mislead the emergency services by telling them that they are in distress, that could include the vessel is sinking, people are sick or dying onboard and that there are persons in the water. The operating model is for numerous individuals on each boat to contact the emergency services. This further confuses the operational picture by creating multiple incidents for each small boat, but the operator is unable to determine if these calls are emanating from one small boat or multiple small boats, resulting in further confusion relating to the number of persons actually at risk.

- 2.1.10 To confuse the picture even further, calls will be channelled through both the French and UK emergency phone networks and callers will be transferred to Coastguard, Police or Ambulance dependant on what they inform the BT operator. When this occurs information is then exchanged between emergency services, again confusing the information picture as to who is calling from what small boat and where from. Sometimes calls are received on routine lines at MRCC Dover as well as the emergency 999 lines, and occasionally calls are received at the Port of Dover, who will then try to connect the caller to MRCC Dover or relay the information they have managed to get before a line drops. Due to the volume of calls received operators are frequently not afforded any time to replay calls – resulting in the information gathered from the initial call being the only source of information to make an assessment and respond accordingly.
- 2.1.11 To assist with the exchange of information Tracker documents have been established between France and the UK. These are excel spreadsheets which provide a list of small boats and contains as much information as is available. The French Coastguard send them to the UK and these are visible to both HM Coastguard and UK Border Force. The UK also have their own Tracker (again an excel spreadsheet) and these are shared with the French Coastguard and visible to UK Border Force, who can also populate the live document. Often incidents are created upon the receipt of the French Tracker as this is the first-time information is received by HM Coastguard notifying them of small boat crossings. On the morning of 24 November 2021, the French Tracker was first received at 0037UTC, see below in the Timeline. The information displayed in the tracker includes reference numbers from all agencies (Dover/Gris Nez and UKBF), report source, phone numbers, position and date time group, Search and Rescue Region, description, persons on board, assets tasked and outcome. Examples of the tracker documents can be found in the timeline.



- 2.1.12 HM Coastguard will create an incident for every call received, unless it is obvious that the caller has called before, and their incident can be updated. In order to try to differentiate between each call a reference number is given to each small boat incident. In the UK alpha numeric references are given so a migrant incident will be ALPHA, BRAVO1, CHARLIE2, etc. In France they use numeric references – 1,2,3 etc. These references are shared between each MRCC in an attempt to cross reference information received and to manage the response to the volume of incidents created.
- 2.1.13 As stated, for each of the recorded incidents there can be a number of “repeat reports/calls” received by HM Coastguard Rescue Centres. During 2020 for the 611 confirmed incidents HM Coastguard recorded 873 incidents from reports of crossings, an additional 262 (30%) reports which required assessment and investigation. In 2021 for the 980 confirmed incidents by HMCG they recorded 1592 incidents, a difference of 612 (38%) incidents which were assessed as being repeat calls or multiple callers from the same vessel.
- 2.1.14 Since 2016, the UK have operated successful rescue operations in the Channel working closely with other Government Departments, predominantly the Home Office through UK Border Force. Until 2021 there had been no known fatalities from incidents coordinated by HM Coastguard in the UK Search and Rescue Region. In 2021, a report from rescued migrants stated that one person in their party had decided to swim for the shore, prior to the arrival of rescue units. After a search of the area nothing was found, and the search terminated.
- 2.1.15 In December 2018 the then Home Secretary, Sajid Javid declared a major incident in the English Channel due to the rising number of migrants attempting to cross the English Channel from France, with over 221 migrants crossing the English Channel on small boats between 3rd November and 28th December 2018. This led to the deployment of UK Border Force vessels to the area who were able to respond to search and rescue incidents, from calls received by HM Coastguard.
- 2.1.16 During the past few years there has been significant work in developing operational procedures, liaison with partner agencies and organisation in the response to small boat migrant incidents. This has included the sharing of information, regular multi-agency meetings, workshops and exercises.
- 2.1.17 There are regular meetings and sharing of information which has developed alongside the increase in the number of incidents being reported and



coordinated. This includes various operational documents to assist with predicting likely crossings, such as “Operation Deveran” reports, which is prepared and shared by the Home Office. This report looks at the forecasted weather and sea state in the area and then assesses the likelihood for crossings. These reports were in place throughout 2021.

- 2.1.18 There are also regular meetings between Gris-Nez MRCC and MRCC Dover. There are also two meetings per year between the UK and France under the umbrella of Anglo-French Accident Technical Group (AFTAG). Some of the outcomes from these meetings have been the sharing of trackers and the use of WhatsApp to determine the position of the small boats. There is an existing agreement between the UK and France regarding SAR incidents in the Channel, this is called the Mancheplan. The purpose of the Anglo-French Joint Maritime Contingency Plan for the English Channel or Mancheplan is to establish the policy and procedures for incident response management and co-operation in the event of an accident in the geographical sea area covered by the Plan and this document was last updated in 2018.
- 2.1.19 HM Coastguard to assist with planning for small boat incidents receives regular reports from Clandestine Channel Threat Command called Operation Deveran assessments. These assessments provide information via their intelligence picture the likelihood of crossings of small boats dependent on the weather. These reports provide a red, amber, green assessment. Red meaning Very Likely, Amber likely and green, highly unlikely. The Operation Deveran report (see below Fig 1) which was valid from 1200UTC Tuesday 23 November to 0600UTC Friday 03 December 2021 had the 23rd into the 24th November as follows: Western Beaches – Favourable, Central Beaches – Marginal and NorthEast beaches – unfavourable. The overall assessment on 23 November was that it was Amber - likely for crossings to occur. Fig 1:



Op DEVERAN Weather Assessment

Valid from 12UTC Tuesday 23 November to 06UTC Friday, 03 December 2021

Forward look 30 days issued each Wednesday

Issued by Met Office NSAG: 1150UTC Tuesday 23 November 2021


Next routine issue: 12UTC Wednesday 24 November 2021

Date and time	Minimum Forecast Temp (C)	Small boat launching conditions at 06UTC			Likelihood of crossing attempts due to weather
		Western Beaches	Central Beaches	Northeast Beaches	
20UTC Tuesday, 23 November to 06UTC Wednesday, 24 November	2	Favourable	Marginal	Unfavourable	Likely
20UTC Wednesday, 24 November to 06UTC Thursday, 25 November	3	Favourable	Favourable	Unfavourable	Highly Likely
20UTC Thursday, 25 November to 06UTC Friday, 26 November	-3	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Highly Unlikely
20UTC Friday, 26 November to 06UTC Saturday, 27 November	-2	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Highly Unlikely
20UTC Saturday, 27 November to 06UTC Sunday, 28 November	-2	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Unfavourable	Highly Unlikely
20UTC Sunday, 28 November to 06UTC Monday, 29 November					Highly Unlikely
20UTC Monday, 29 November to 06UTC Tuesday, 30 November					Realistic Possibility
20UTC Tuesday, 30 November to 06UTC Wednesday, 01 December					Highly Unlikely
20UTC Wednesday, 01 December to 06UTC Thursday, 02 December					Unlikely
20UTC Thursday, 02 December to 06UTC Friday, 03 December					Unlikely

This forecast is not subject to amendment

2.1.20 The following line graph demonstrates how activity had been increasing since 2020 and how there had been a steady increase in activity during the months of 2021. The yellow line represents 2021 and it highlights the steady increase each month in the number of confirmed incidents coordinated by HM Coastguard and the number of persons rescued.





NB: Total persons recovered per month means total persons rescued per month. For the four months up to November the graphs below highlight how incidents increased in 2021, bucking the trend from 2020 which had followed previous years and seen a decrease in crossings after September.

August

A total of 2969 people were rescued in 2021 compared to 1420 people rescued in 2020.



September

A total of 4,214 people were rescued in 2021 compared to 1,845 people rescued in 2020.




October


A total of 2,562 people were rescued in 2021 compared to 482 people rescued in 2020.



November



November 2021 was a particularly busy month and this was unusual as expectations were that traffic would decrease due to the colder more unfavourable weather. The total number of people who were rescued for the month of November 21 recorded that HMCG coordinated incidents that resulted in 6,480 people rescued compared to 700 people rescued in 2020.



2.1.21 In the days prior to the crossings on the night of the 23rd into the morning of the 24th the previous small boat activity was seen on the 20th November with 827 persons rescued. The highest number of persons rescued in one day was experienced on 16th November with 1,200 persons rescued from incidents coordinated by HM Coastguard.



2.1.22 As a result of the increased known and forecasted activity in the English Channel, the Chief Coastguard introduced enhancements to Dover MRCC from 10 August 2020. This included:

- The establishment of the Joint Control Room (JCR) in September 2020. This was an operations room situated beneath MRCC Dover which operated as a multi-agency hub. HM Coastguard also committed to a Coastguard Liaison Officer for the JCR to enable the transfer of information to Home Office colleagues.
- A dedicated Coastguard Commander to oversee small boat operations for MRCC Dover and to support officers on duty on “red days”. This was active from July 2021.
- Additional staff at MRCC Dover was agreed in August 2021 to establish a dedicated team to respond to small boat incidents and enable the existing team to undertake normal duties for their usual operational zones, supporting the small boat cell during peak times. This involved the creation of an additional 24 posts. The recruitment for the posts commenced as soon as possible.
- Secondments from the national network were offered in January 2022, for staff to temporarily relocate to MRCC Dover to support small boat operations.
- Live play exercise with RNLI and Bristow SAR Helicopter to assess the suitability of deploying life rafts from SAR helicopters, completed in October 2021. This resulted in additional life rafts being available in the helicopter and replacements available in the air bases.
- In addition to the additional staff for the small boats cell, a short-term solution to provide emergency call handlers was confirmed on 22 November 2021. These are temporary roles to alleviate pressure from current coastguard operators by taking 999 emergency calls from the small boats and recording the information.
- A new post – Assistant Chief Coastguard (Grade 6) post was created and an officer employed in January 2022 to ensure appropriate levels of strategic engagement between multi agencies responding to the small boat crisis.

2.1.23 AVIATION ENHANCEMENTS OPERATION CEASAR – Channel Emergency Aviation Search and Rescue

2.1.24 Due to the increasingly complex and demanding situation within the English Channel, in October 2021 a strategic direction was made by MCA Senior Management for additional aerial asset capability to be procured. The aim of these additional assets was to assist in relieving the ever-increasing



tasking burden placed on HM Coastguard's existing fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft and to also enhance HM Coastguards situational awareness in the English Channel. The workstream that delivered this capability was named the Channel Aviation Emergency Search and Rescue or CAESAR project.

- 2.1.25 Due to the speed in which this additional service was required, this uplift in capability was achieved through a contract change with Bristow Helicopters Ltd. HM Coastguard requested that they increase the 'search' capability of their existing search and rescue solution at their Lydd airbase. This additional capability provides dedicated aerial assets located immediately adjacent to the English Channel and is exclusively used to support HM Coastguard's SAR activity in the English Channel.
- 2.1.26 The first phase of Project CEASAR was delivered on the 1st of March 2022 where both a Schiebel S100 drone and a DA42 fixed wing aircraft provide a single line of tasking, 7 days a week for up to 8 hours a day. These assets are able to provide live video imagery into Dover MRCC to greatly increase HM Coastguards operational situational awareness. This then allows our Search Mission Coordinators to dynamically risk assess, verify the on-scene situation, and prioritise surface assets when multiple incidents are simultaneously occurring.
- 2.1.27 From July 1st 2022, this capability will be further enhanced with additional S100 drones and with the DA42 aircraft being replaced with larger and more capable DA62 aircraft, providing 2 lines of tasking available up to 16 hours every day. This project will provide this uplift in capability for the next 3 years at which point they will be replaced by assets being procured under the UKSAR2G contract which will replace all Coastguard aviation assets.
- 2.1.28 The network management logs state that for the period of duty for the night of 23 November into 24 November the following persons were on duty:

Tactical Commander: Name at the JRCC

Station	Number	Search Mission Coordinator (SMC)
Shetland	2	



Aberdeen	3	1 x SMC
Humber	3	1 x SMC
London	1	1 x SMC
Dover	2	1 x SMC
JRCC Maritime	9	2 x SMC
Falmouth	2	
Milford Haven	3	2 x SMC
Holyhead	3	2 x SMC
Belfast	3	1 x SMC
Stornoway	3	2 x SMC
MCC	1	

The total number of persons on duty in the network was 35. The recommended staffing levels for the network for this period was 22 persons.

- 2.1.29 There are a number of roles on duty each day/night in the network. The Tactical Commander assumes tactical control of an incident, when required, while the SMC holds operational coordination of incidents.
- 2.1.30 The network management brief which was discussed at 2100hrs on 23rd November states under significant events “Op Deveran – likely”. This is recorded in the ViSION network management log for this period. This makes the network aware of the potential for small boat activity for the Channel.
- 2.1.31 The network management log states on 24 November at 0011 that Dover Coastguard routines are back with Dover, SMC cover remains with the JRCC. The SMC cover was with the JRCC as the SMC who was on duty at Dover was covering breaks at Dover VTS, and therefore not available for SAR. There is no entry on when the SMC resumed SAR SMC at Dover in the network management log.
- 2.1.32 The weather conditions for the night are recorded in the ViSION incident log as follows:



North Foreland to Selsey Bill

24 hour forecast:

Wind: Northerly or northeasterly, becoming variable for a time, force 2 to 4.

Sea state: Smooth or slight.

Weather: Showers in east.

Visibility: Good.

The tidal high and low waters for the 24 November were:

DOVER

Low Water 0826UTC 1.6 metres

High Water 1318UTC 6.0 metres

Low Water 2041UTC 1.8 metres

Sea Surface temperature 13 degrees



Small Boat Incidents 24 November 2021 0001 – 1257 UTC



3 Timeline of All Small Boat Incidents 23-24 November 2021

- 3.1.1 On 23 November at 2315UTC the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC) function for Dover MRCC was handed over to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) so that the Dover SMC was able to provide cover to the Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) based at Dover MRCC, to allow the CNIS operator to their breaks. In addition the JRCC were also covering Dover MRCC VHF Channel 16 calls and providing support to routine calls also. There is an entry in ViSION network management log at 0011UTC on 24 November
- 3.1.2 On 24th November at 0024UTC HM Coastguard (HMCG) received the first report of migrant crossings. This call was received from the Port of Dover who informed HMCG that they had received a call with lots of voices in the background and believed it to be from a migrant small boat. They could make out “can you help me?” then the line cut out. This incident was given the reference ALPHA.

The telephone number Dover Port had recorded for the call was PD 523, this is a UK mobile number.


- 3.1.3 At 0032UTC an attempt was made to call the number from the ALPHA incident back, but it was not answered and had a foreign ring tone. This is a recording on NICE and this call was very short, as soon as it was obvious that the dial tone was foreign the call was ended.
- 3.1.4 At 0034UTC MRCC Dover called the French Coast Guard at Gris-Nez MRCC, to relay the information received from Dover Port at 0024UTC. Dover Coastguard inform Gris-Nez MRCC that it is likely that the small boat is in French Waters and the French Coastguard requested that the information be sent to them via email. This was completed at 0044UTC (see below).

Whilst on the call the Officer at Dover asked Gris-Nez if they had received any reports of crossings yet, to which Gris-Nez responded they had reports of four dinghies in the water. MRCC Dover requested a copy of the French Tracker, to which Gris-Nez MRCC agreed they would send. This was received and seen by the JRCC at 0057UTC (see below).



3.1.5 At 0037UTC a Migrant Administration Incident was created for 24 November. This was created based on the information received via telephone from Gris-Nez MRCC that they had reports of four dinghies crossing the channel and that the French Tracker was being sent to HM Coastguard.

3.1.6 At 0039UTC the Tactical Commander, based at the JRCC makes an entry which is a copy of information from the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) ViSION narrative, relating to a Heli brief due to the weather. The entry includes a screenshot of the forecast weather (visibility) at 0100UTC and states that there was poor visibility on both sides of the Dover Straits, see diagram below.




2Excel (fixed wing aircraft provider) had already postponed their sortie to the English Channel due to their concerns for suitable weather diversion airports along the south coast for the aircraft. The fixed wing sorties in the English Channel attempt to provide situational awareness for HM Coastguard who are dealing with the incidents as small boats cross the English Channel, get close or enter the UK search and rescue region. The information from the aerial assets assists Coastguard operators in their attempts to confirm how many small boats, the status – moving (making way or stopped), priority of rescue –



to assist with determining those that need urgent rescue from those who are underway, they can assist with confirming vessels which are logged on the French Tracker and can spot any vessels which may have gone undetected from French shores.

The JRCC commanders (maritime and aviation) discussed the situation at 0030UTC and were concerned that with poor visibility and the surveillance aircraft being limited to conduct their mission (not available until later in the day) they were effectively blind to activity, and that the situation of multiple vessels being reported as departing from France with no aerial surveillance had the potential of being very dangerous. The actions taken by the Commanders is captured later in the timeline at 0231UTC.

- 3.1.7 At 0044UTC the following email was sent to Gris-Nez MRCC as per their request at 0034UTC, it requested Gris-Nez MRCC trace the location of the telephone number. This is in accordance with the SAR convention/IAMSAR for the handing over of SAR and demonstrates that the UK was unable to trace the number to provide location information. The phone was connected to a French mast, therefore requesting that the French conduct the exercise. The incident was handed over in accordance with guidelines.



000005-24112021

Send Update

From Not Zoned by S DOWNS

To + @gris-nez@mrc CFR.eu

Subject

Attach

Message type Standard

Details changed from OPS CENTRE DOVER PORT

PD 523 - CALL FROM THIS NUMBER TO DOVER PORT OPERATIONS CENTRE

LOTS OF VOICES IN THE BACKGROIUND.

WIND NOISE IN BACKGROUND

CALLER SAID

"CAN YOU HELP ME" - THEN LINE CUT OUT

INCIDENT IS MIGRANT ALPHA - GIN 041381

HAVE TRIED CALLING NUMBER BACK, BUT IT CUTS OUT AFTER HAVING RUNG WITH A CONTINENTAL RING TONE.

MRCC GRIS NEZ

IS THIS A MIGRANT THAT YOU HAVE?

ARE YOU ABLE TO HELP TRACE THE LOCATION?

THAK YOU,



3.1.8 At 0057UTC the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) check that MRCC Dover has seen the email from Gris-Nez MRCC, which is the French Tracker. MRCC Dover confirm they have seen it and they are beginning to create incidents for the small boats crossing. The incidents were being created in anticipation of the small boats entering the UK search and rescue region, but at this time they were in the French search and rescue region. In this tracker it is recorded that the French Warship Flammant is with or has been with incidents 1, 2 and 3.

This email has six small boats listed on it:

Bonjour,
Point de situation relatif aux tentatives de traversée de migrants en zone de responsabilité SAR du CROSS Gris-Nez.
Tableau en heures UTC.

Ref FR	Ref UK	n° SITREP	Heure détection (UTC)	Secteur	Origine de l'alerte & Moyen de détection	Support embarquant les migrants (type, couleur, L, propulsion)	POB (H/F/anfants, avec/sans brassières)	SRU en ralliement ou en recherche	SRU au contact ou en sauvetage	Radar/vitesse estimée	Heure dernière position (UTC)	Dernière position connue	SRU GB pour relai (OU) Port FR de destination	Heure ou HPA du relai ou du débarquement (UTC)
1			2102	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	40	FLAMANT		284° / 6 NDS		51°07.40N / 001°42.67E		
2			2224	LEFFRINCOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		268° / 6 NDS		51°05.16N / 002°12.54E		
3			2224	LEFFRINCOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		272° / 6 NDS		51°04.70N / 002°24.50		
4			2236	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30			AT EARTH		AT EARTH - NO CROSSING		
5			2318	VISSANT	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	15			AT EARTH		AT EARTH - NO CROSSING		
6			0913	LEFFRINCOUCKE	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	30			276°NDS		51°04.58N / 002°25.06E		

Couleur des lignes:
 • vert: affaire close du point de vue SAR en SRR française
 • orange: embarcation en cours de sécurisation ou de récupération
 • blanc: ni close, ni sécurisée.

3.1.9 At 0101UTC BRAVO incident was created in ViSION by MRCC Dover and is linked to French Migrant 1 from the French Tracker. This was completed as the incident was created from the French tracker and the next available UK reference was BRAVO. This states that French Migrant 1, detected on 23 November at 2102UTC at Canal des Dunes. It was a semi-rigid boat, with 40 POB, course 284° speed 6 knots. It states that the French Vessel Flammant is rallying or searching and it gives a position of 51° 07.4N 001° 42.67E.

3.1.10 At 0101UTC UK Border Force Maritime Command Centre (UKBF MCC) called MRCC Dover regarding the French Tacker. UKBF MCC query the position for French Migrant 1, as if correct, it would put the small boat in UK waters. The operator at MRCC Dover confirmed that the French Warship Flammant was currently close to the French shores according to C-Scope, so would not be with the Migrant 1 small boat, as indicated on the French Tracker. UKBF MCC asked MRCC Dover to confirm the position with the French Coastguard.

3.1.11 At 0106UTC MRCC Dover call Gris-Nez MRCC to confirm the position of Migrant 1. Gris-Nez had no updated position for the small boat. Gris-Nez



confirmed that the Flammant was currently with Migrant 2 and 3. Gris-Nez also reported they had an additional dinghy (small boat) which was next to the UK area. The position for the additional dinghy (small boat) was 0.6 nautical miles from UK waters (when plotted this is 0.85nm from UK waters) (51° 06.51N 001° 46.21E). The small boat had 33 people onboard (13 females and 8 children). They had two telephone numbers for the dinghy (small boat): PD PD 095 and PD 666. These telephone numbers are linked to CHARLIE incident.

Dover Coastguard asked again if the Flammant was with Migrant 1 small boat, and the Gris-Nez operator stated that it was not, but that the dinghy (Migrant 1) was in good condition. Gris-Nez MRCC then passed an update to the Migrant 1 position (BRAVO) – 51° 04.5N 001° 58.24E.

Gris-Nez MRCC also confirmed that the additional dinghy (described above) was not yet on the French Tracker and had been given the French reference Migrant 7. The call between Gris-Nez MRCC and MRCC Dover lasts 4 minutes and 30 seconds.

The call was made to Gris-Nez MRCC at 0106UTC and was recorded in the ViSION narrative with the creation of incident CHARLIE at 0119UTC.

- 3.1.12 At 0108UTC the SMC (at the JRCC) enters a comment into the incident narrative for BRAVO (Migrant 1) incident that MRCC Dover are to confirm with Gris-Nez MRCC the position of the small boat. It was noted by the SMC, that if the information on the French tracker was correct it would put the small boat approximately one nautical mile from the UK – three hours ago (23 November 2218UTC). This is confirmed as being incorrect and the correct position is recorded at 0106UTC (the conversation with MRCC Dover and Gris-Nez MRCC).
- 3.1.13 At 0110UTC an entry is made into ViSION by the Maritime Operations Officer at Dover that they were in contact with Gris-Nez MRCC. This is an acknowledgement to the 0108UTC request above.
- 3.1.14 At 0115UTC CHARLIE incident was created by MRCC Dover based on the information received from Gris-Nez MRCC for Migrant 7. The information recorded is as follows:

French Migrant 7 is UK Migrant CHARLIE



30 persons onboard – 13 women and 8 children, 14 of the people have lifejackets.

Dinghy appears in good condition

Tel numbers: [PD] 095 and [PD] 166

- 3.1.15 At 0115UTC the SMC made an entry into BRAVO incident that the position from Gris-Nez MRCC puts the small boat in a different position to the Tracker which had been emailed.

The updated position for the small boat is in the French Search and Rescue Region and so BRAVO incident was downgraded to monitoring, as not in the UK Search and Rescue Region.

- 3.1.16 At 0120UTC a call was made to UKBF MCC from MRCC Dover and informed them that French Migrant 1 (BRAVO) was still in French waters, but the Flammant was no longer with it. Dover MRCC then informed UKBF MCC of the French migrant 7 incident which was not listed on the French Tracker, and in position 51° 06.5N 001° 46.21E. UKBF MCC asked what time they were in the position, and Dover MRCC informed them that it was now or possibly 10 minutes ago, so likely they were in the UK now as the position was 0.6nm away from UK Waters at the time of the report, and it was unknown if the vessel was underway or tidal drift would have put the vessel into UK waters if it was not making way.

UKBF MCC asked if there was a French asset with the small boat (Migrant 7) and MRCC Dover confirmed there was not. UKBF MCC asked for more details for the incident and Dover informed them that there was 30 persons onboard, 14 lifejackets, 13 women and 8 children and passed the telephone numbers [PD] 095 and [PD] 666. UKBF MCC asked if there was a description, to which MRCC Dover replied there was not, but they thought the vessel was in good condition, this was a misinterpretation as the information that was passed to MRCC Dover by the French Coastguard was relating to the condition of Migrant 1 small boat and not Migrant 7.

UKBF MCC asked where the sighting had come from, MRCC Dover replied that Gris-Nez had not provided that information. UKBF MCC asked if the information was passed from Gris-Nez MRCC to MRCC Dover and this was confirmed. UKBF MCC stated that they would plot the position and get an asset tasked if in the UK, then confirmed that Valiant was the primary vessel



for that night and they were currently alongside at Dover. UKBF MCC would confirm intentions once known.

3.1.17 At 0124UTC UKBF MCC are logged in the ViSION narrative as being informed of incident CHARLIE. A brief description of the call to UKBF MCC at 0120UTC is logged in the ViSION narrative at 0124UTC.

3.1.18 At 0125UTC Dover Coastguard made an announcement on VHF Radio Channel 16 to all vessels in the Dover Strait. This is an alert to a supplementary information service broadcast concerning search and rescue operations in the Dover Strait to listen to Channel 11.

3.1.19 At 0126UTC Dover Coastguard made the following broadcast on VHF Channel 11:

“All Ships this is Dover Coastguard. SAR Operations. Following confirmed reports of small boat crossings this evening, vessels are requested to post extra lookouts whilst transiting the south-west lane between the Interbank Buoy and the South Varne Buoy and report any sightings of small craft to Dover Coastguard on CHF Channel 16. The next routine broadcast by Dover Coastguard on Channel 11 is at 0147UTC. Ends. This is Dover Coastguard.”

3.1.20 At 0128UTC Gris-Nez MRCC call MRCC Dover with an update on French Migrant 7. They stated they had spoken to a male officer at Dover MRCC previously and reported the small boat to be 0.6nm from UK waters. Gris-Nez MRCC then state that the small boat is now in UK waters and the new position is 51° 07.25N 001° 45.22E. This position is 0.2 nautical miles inside the UK search and rescue region, and is 1 nautical from the 0106UTC position, so the vessel by my calculation was moving at approx. 2.7 knots.


Dover Coastguard ask how Gris-Nez have received the position and Gris-Nez advise it has been received from WhatsApp and passed the telephone number from the message received [REDACTED] PD [REDACTED] 879. Gris-Nez then ask if there is any updated information from the UK, and MRCC Dover confirm that Migrant 7 is UK incident CHARLIE and state it is not yet on the Tracker. Gris-Nez then confirm that it is 33 persons on board, with 13 women, 8 children and 14 of the persons have lifejackets. Gris-Nez also state that they were called from mobile number [REDACTED] PD [REDACTED] 095, from the same small boat.

3.1.21 At 0130UTC there is a ViSION entry that UKBF MCC confirm that HMC Valiant has been tasked from Dover.



- 3.1.22 At 0133UTC 2Excel report that they are planning a flight but that there are likely to be delays due to the weather.
- 3.1.23 At 0136UTC call collection for incident FOXTROT. This call was taken by an operator at the JRCC. It was transferred to HMCG from the Port of Dover. It was difficult for the operator to hear what the person was saying on the phone as there was a lot of shouting. The person on the small boat stated that they did not have any internet after the operator tried to pass the MRCC Dover mobile phone number to the caller in order for them to send a WhatsApp message and position. The operator also requested the caller's telephone number, but the call dropped before this was passed. The Port of Dover were contacted, and they confirmed the number to be [PD] 523, they also confirmed they had received three other calls from the same number previously. This number is attributed to HMCG incident ALPHA.
- 3.1.24 At 0138UTC a call from UKBF MCC was received at MRCC Dover asking if a course and speed was available for CHARLIE incident (French Migrant 7), as UKBF MCC were concerned how Valiant would lock on to the vessel as the small boat was heading to the UK. MRCC Dover explained that the only information available was from WhatsApp and that there were no aircraft available due to the weather. UKBF MCC confirmed that HMC Valiant would deploy soon and MRCC Dover stated they will try to get further WhatsApp messages from the small boat.
- 3.1.25 At 0140UTC incident DELTA is created from the French tracker, (French migrant 3) with 30 persons onboard, in position 51° 04.70N 002° 24.50E at 232224UTC.
- 3.1.26 At 0142UTC a text (normal) message was sent from the MRCC Dover mobile phone to [PD] 095.





The message provided a link to WhatsApp and an invitation to download the App. MRCC Dover also sent a second message stating “This is the UK Coastguard. Please download WhatsApp to send us your position”. No response was received on normal text messages. No messages were received via WhatsApp either for the MRCC Dover account for 24 November 2021 that is visible when I reviewed the mobile phone.


- 3.1.27 At 0143UTC the SMC at MRCC Dover has returned to SAR duty and makes an entry in the ViSION narrative that CHARLIE incident is upgraded to a distress incident as it is in the UK Search and Rescue Region, the condition



of the craft is unknown nor the persons onboard as there is no French asset with the vessel.

- 3.1.28 At 0144UTC call collection in ViSION for incident ECHO was created from the French Tracker. French migrant 6 in position 51° 04.58N 002° 25.06E at 240013UTC with 30 persons on board.
- 3.1.29 At 0144UTC call collection in ViSION for incident FOXTROT was created from a call transferred by the Port of Dover on the MRCC Dover routine telephone line.
- 3.1.30 At 0144UTC a text (normal) message was sent from the MRCC Dover mobile phone to PD 166.





The message provided a link to WhatsApp and an invitation to download the App. MRCC Dover also sent a second message stating “This is the UK Coastguard. Please download WhatsApp to send us your position”. No response was received on normal text messages. No messages were received via WhatsApp Dover MRCC account for 24 November 2021 that were visible when I reviewed the mobile phone


- 3.1.31 At 0148UTC Gris-Nez MRCC transfers a call to MRCC Dover from French Migrant 7 / UK CHARLIE. It is unknown how long Gris-Nez MRCC were on a call with Migrant 7/UK CHARLIE, prior to this call being transferred to MRCC




Dover. The call is taken by the SMC at MRCC Dover and lasts for 21 minutes and 14 seconds. The name of the caller is Mubin. It is very difficult to understand what Mubin is saying due to lots of shouting in the background. A WhatsApp number is requested by Mubin and the MRCC Dover mobile phone number is passed – again there is a lot of confusion and shouting making it very difficult, almost impossible to hear what Mubin is saying. The Coastguard operator asks for others to be quiet throughout the call and for only one person to speak. He confirms he is the UK Coastguard.

The following number is passed by Mubin Personal Data 879 – the operator tries to read it back but there is too much background noise and shouting. Mubin states that there are 40 persons on board and that they have no internet. The signal/connection is weak at times throughout the call. The Coastguard officer states that a WhatsApp message is sent to the phone number, then Mubin provides another telephone number for WhatsApp – PD 057. The Coastguard Officer confirms that he is sending a WhatsApp message to the number and a normal message also.







Mubin asks if a boat will be sent to them, which is confirmed by the Coastguard Officer, but he explains that it will take time for it to arrive.

Mubin confirmed he received a message from MRCC Dover, and he was then sending a live location on WhatsApp. Mubin asks if they are in UK waters and the Coastguard officer stated that he was just checking, and a boat was on its way to them. Mubin then stated that he could see a light and there was an increase in shouting and screaming for the next few minutes with people on the boat shouting "look left", and "can see the light". The coastguard officer




tried to explain that he was not on the boat and that he was trying to contact that vessel to request they keep a sharp lookout, and that the Coastguard were sending a boat to help. (Contact was made see further down the timeline). This continues for a few minutes and then the call drops out.

An entry is made into the ViSION incident narrative for incident CHARLIE at 0211UTC with a brief description that the call was unreadable with shouting, WhatsApp messages sent and there were 40 POB and a telephone number [PD] 057.

- 3.1.32 At 0148UTC there is a ViSION incident narrative update for FOXTROT incident, stating that a call was transferred by Dover Port. The operator was not able to get a telephone number from the small boat and that there was a lot of shouting on the call. The small boat was asked to call 999 so that a position could be obtained and then the call dropped. A call back to Dover Port Control confirmed the telephone number to be [PD] 523 the same number attributed to incident ALPHA, and the Port had received three calls that evening from the same number.
- 3.1.33 At 0149UTC a message was sent via WhatsApp from the MRCC Dover mobile phone to [PD] 879 saying "This is the UK Coastguard" and "Please send us your position".





A response to those messages with a position was received by the mobile phone at 0220UTC. The position received was 51.149422,1.754940 which converted to latitude and longitude is 51° 08.96N 001° 45.296E. This position is 0.75 nm in a north easterly direction from the position from WhatsApp timed at 0201UTC.

- 3.1.34 At 0149UTC Incident HOTEL was created from the French tracker in ViSION, with 30 to 40 persons on board and was French Migrant Incident 8, no other details were available.



3.1.35 At 0152UTC an updated French Tracker was logged in the Migrant Admin incident. No telephone numbers are recorded on the sheet from the French Coastguard.

Ref FR	Ref UK	n° SITREP	Heure détection (UTC)	Secteur	Origine de l'alerte & Moyen de détection	Support embarquant les migrants (type, couleur, L, propulsion)	POB (PEU-enfant, avec/ sans bébés)	SRU en relaiement ou en recherche	SRU au contact ou en sauvetage	Route/vitesse estimée	Heure dernière position (UTC)	Dernière position connue	SRU (G) pour relai (G) ou Port FR de destination	Heure ou HPA du relai ou de débarquement (UTC)
1			2102	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	40	FLAMANT		284° / 6 NDS		51°07.40N / 001°42.67E	possible MIG 7 et 9	
2			2224	LEFFRINKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		266° / 6 NDS	0023	51°05.16N / 002°12.54E		
3			2224	LEFFRINKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		272° / 6 NDS	0000	51°05.09N 002°02.53		
4			2238	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
5			2318	WISSANT	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	15			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
6			0013	LEFFRINKOUCKE	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	30			276/4NDS	0000	51°04.58N / 002°25.96E		
7			0048	Bouée MPC	SAMU G2	SEMI RIGIDE	33 13 femmes 6 enfants			305 / 4	0130	51°07.4N 001°45.4E	SRR UK à 0130 UTC Possible MIG 1 et 9	
8			0107	Berck	Police	SEMI RIGIDE GRIS	30 à 40							
9			0111	Dunkerque ?	Mi migrant		33 3 enfants 6 femmes						possible MIG 7 et 1	
10			0156				40							

3.1.36 At 0154UTC incident INDIA was created from the French tracker in ViSION, which was linked to French migrant 9. It was reported to have 33 persons onboard, 3 infants and 6 females. This is linked to incident CHARLIE as stated on the French tracker.


3.1.37 At 0155UTC Incident BRAVO ViSION narrative is updated from the French tracker as having the Flammant being informed of Incident BRAVO and DELTA.

3.1.38 At 0156UTC Incident JULIET created from the French tracker, linking to French incident 10.

3.2 Timeline 0200 to 0500UTC

3.2.1 At 0200UTC a WhatsApp message was sent to PD 057 which is linked to incident CHARLIE stating “please send us your position”.





A response was received at 0201UTC with a WhatsApp position.


The position is 51.146557, 1.748657 which converted to latitude and longitude is 51° 08.476N 001°44.552E.

A further message was sent from MRCC Dover at 0207UTC asking “can you re send your location”. At this time Mubin was still on a call with MRCC Dover which did not finish until 0211UTC.

A second position was received at 0221UTC. The position is 51° 09.045N 001° 45.568E




3.2.2 At 0206UTC Dover CNIS contact the LPG Vessel Gaschem Schinano. This is a result of the people on the 999 call that is still ongoing with Mubin, shouting that they can see a vessel. The vessel Gaschem Schinano state they have no targets or lights in sight, when asked by the Coastguard Officer. The image below is the AIS screenshot of the location of Gaschem Schinano when they were contacted by HM Coastguard. Their position is 0.9 nm away from the WhatsApp position, and is inside the UK search and rescue region.



3.2.3 At 0209UTC a text (normal) message was sent from the MRCC Dover mobile phone to PD 057.






The message stated “Can you share your google maps location. No response was received on normal text messages. This number did respond to WhatsApp messages previously, however no response was received to the text message.

- 3.2.4 At 0210UTC MRSC London created incident KILO, after they received information through Direct Electronic Incident Transfer (DEIT) from the Metropolitan Police. Persons on board were unknown but the report stated that it was a small boat in the water on the French border. No other details were provided or available.



3.2.5 At 0213UTC a ViSION narrative entry is made that a position was received from WhatsApp [redacted] PD [redacted] 057 – the position in the ViSION narrative is 51° 08.476N 001° 44.552E. This was received on the phone at 0201UTC. (Incident CHARLIE)

3.2.6 At 0220UTC a position was received from WhatsApp from [redacted] PD [redacted] 879 to MRCC Dover mobile telephone.




The message containing the position was not seen by Dover MRCC until 0328UTC. This position was not seen by the SMC on the mobile phone due



to him responding to other incidents, answering calls, creation of the mayday relay broadcast and tasking of resources.

3.2.7 At 0221UTC a WhatsApp position is received from PD 057 to Dover MRCC mobile telephone.



3.2.8 At 0224 the SMC at Dover creates the Mayday Relay broadcast; Small Craft with 40 persons on board in position 51° 08.5N 001° 44.5E this bears 244° 1.8nm from Sandettie Light Vessel, taking water and requiring immediate assistance any vessel that can assist to contact Dover Coastguard



- 3.2.9 At 0225UTC a 999 call is received from a small boat. The person said his name was Jonas and he was in the middle of the sea and they were sinking. They had lost their engine and the engine had stopped. They were halfway between France and England. They departed Dunkirk at 2100hrs on 23 November. He could see a vessel approximately 3km away, then the call dropped. No telephone number was available through the BT operator.
- 3.2.10 At 0225UTC the SMC at Dover sent an instant message to the JRCC that the Mayday Relay was ready for them to broadcast on behalf of MRCC Dover.
- 3.2.11 At 0227UTC the Mayday relay was broadcast. It was preceded by a Digital Selective Call but was an urgency alert and should have been a distress alert, it did however still go to all vessels.

The broadcast was:

Mayday Relay x 3

All Stations x 3

This is Dover Coastguard x 3

Mayday information number 1

Small craft with 40 persons on board In position

51° 08.5N 001° 44.5E, this position bears 244° distance 1.8 nautical miles from Sandettie Light Vessel

Taking water and requires immediate assistance

Any vessel that can assist call Dover Coastguard

Date Time Group 240224UTC. This is Dover Coastguard.

- 3.2.12 At 0228UTC the SMC at Dover notes in the ViSION narrative that according to C-Scope the Flammant is the closest vessel. According to my plot the Flammant is 4.3 nautical miles away from the Mayday relay position at 0230UTC. This is using data from AIS/C-scope in position 51° 07.768N 001° 52.345E.

At 0229UTC Dover SMC assumes coordination for Incident KILO.



At 0231UTC HMC Valiant call Dover Coastguard. They are 45 minutes away from the mayday relay position.

- 3.2.13 At 0231UTC the Tactical Commander made an entry into the migrant Administration incident having completed further discussions with the Aeronautical commander at the JRCC. A discussion had been completed with 2Excel and the issue was that when the sortie in the English Channel was completed there would be no airfield in the south or southeast corner of England for them to land due to incoming fog. The only option would be Manchester airport and that it would then make more sense for them to return to Doncaster, which would then give them very little time onscene.

The strategic response from the two tactical commanders at the JRCC was:

ARCC to speak to the duty captain of R163 – SAR helicopter based at Lydd, to look at using the aircraft early (weather permitting) and have them airborne between 0300 to 0530UTC, which would then provide a maritime picture, as there were at least 12 reports of small boats heading to the UK.

The issues the commanders could see were:

2Excel will not launch due to weather limits for refuel on the south coast of the UK

Tekever Drone due to launch at 0530UTC, however may be delayed due to the weather (fog), therefore likely this would not happen

R163 could provide a sweep of the median line from 0300-0530UTC to provide a maritime picture

UKBF have vessels on standby – Valiant are deployed and responding to small boats arriving in the UK.

The commanders summarised that the weather was not good in the Dover Strait currently, the forecast was set to improve around 1000UTC onwards. The concern was no assets were out at the current time to identify and track current vessels on their way to the UK. Visibility was decreasing and the danger was migrant vessels were a danger to themselves and other vessels who may not see them.

- 3.2.14 At 0232UTC another 999 call was received at MRCC Dover. The number provided: PD 187, 40 POB, departed from Calais, when asked what colour the boat was, to which there was no response. (I have listened to this



call multiple times and I can confirm the person said his phone was close to the water.)

They then shouted for WhatsApp and confirmed sent to the UK – the telephone number was **PD** 394 then unreadable. The Coastguard operator recognised the telephone number and then asked how many times they had called the Coastguard and Police. He stated that he had spoken to Mubin and told Mubin that a boat was on the way, at that point Mubin confirmed he was there also on the small boat.

They asked where the boat was and stated that they were dying. The Coastguard stated that they would have to wait for the boat it was on its way. They stated that the phone was close to the water. The coastguard officer explained it would take about 30 minutes and appreciated everyone was scared. They responded saying that it was too cold. They were told to stop calling as each time we get a call we may mistake them for another boat and it could prevent their rescue. The call then dropped.

3.2.15 At 0237UTC an update to the French Migrant Tracker was received. This had telephone numbers which had been received calls by the French Coastguard.

Raf FR	Ref UK	n° SITREP	Heure detection (UTC)	Secteur	Origine de l'alerte & Moyen de détection	Support embarquant les migrants (type, couleur, L, propulsion)	POB (H/F/enfant, avec/sans brassières)	SRU en ralliement ou en recherche	SRU au contact ou en survetage	Route/vitesse estimée	Heure dernière position (UTC)	Dernière position connue	SRU GB pour relai (G) Port FR de destination	Heure ou HPA de relai ou de débarquement (UTC)
1			2102	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	40	FLAMANT		284° / 6 NDS		51°07'40N / 001°42'07E	possible MIG 7 et 9	
2			2224	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		266° / 6 NDS	0230	51°07'16N / 001°55'54E		
3			2224	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		272° / 6 NDS	0230	51°07'09N / 001°50'50	ETA SRR UK 03:30	
4			2230	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
5			2316	VISSANT	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	15			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
6			0013	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	30			276°/NDS	0000	51°04'58N / 002°25'06E		
7	A		0048	Bouée MPC	SAMU 62	SEMI RIGIDE	33 13 femmes 8 enfants			305 / 4	0130	51°07'49N / 001°45'4E	SRR UK à 0130 UTC Possible MIG 1 et 9	PD 523 PD 196
8			0107	Berck	Police	SEMI RIGIDE GRIS	30 à 40							PD 87
9			0111	Dunkerque ?	tel migrant		33 3 enfants 6 femmes						possible MIG 7 et 1	PD 388 PD 05
10			0230	Bouée Sanddédé	Flamant	NOIR	40	FLAMANT		300 / 6	0230	51°00'N / 001°51'E	ETA SRR UK 03:30	

3.2.16 The telephone numbers that the French have recorded are:

3.2.17 French Migrant 7 - **PD** 523


3.2.18 French Migrant 7 - **PD** 296

3.2.19 French Migrant 8 - **PD** 187



- 3.2.20 French Migrant 9 – **PD** 388. We now know this phone number is associated with Incident CHARLIE. HM Coastguard were not contacted by this number only the French Coastguard were contacted.
- French Migrant 9 – **PD** 605
- 3.2.21 At 0237UTC incident LIMA is created. Black migrant vessel, 40 POB, reported by Flammant, in position 51° 08N 00° 51E at 0230UTC course 300° Speed 6 knots
- 3.2.22 At 0239UTC HMC Valiant request permission to proceed contrary to Rule 10 of the Collision Regulations (ColRegs) as responding to a SAR incident. This was confirmed by the SMC. Rule 10 states that ships crossing traffic lanes are required to do so "as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic flow." This reduces confusion to other ships as to the crossing vessel's intentions and course and at the same time enables that vessel to cross the lane as quickly as possible. By not following Rule 10 requirements Valiant was able to proceed to the last known position more quickly.
- 3.2.23 At 0242UTC Dover Port call MRCC Dover to say they had received a further call from a migrant vessel – it was the same number as before **PD** 523. Call had dropped prior to it being connected to MRCC Dover
- 3.2.24 At 0242UTC Gris-Nez MRCC call MRCC Dover to ask about incident ALPHA response which is French Migrant 7. MRCC Dover inform Gris-Nez that the French Warship Flammant is closest vessel and the SMC states it is 3 nautical miles (it actually was 3.2 nautical miles) to the small boat who has stated it was sinking. Dover also state they have put out mayday relay and reinforce that Flammant is closest vessel. Gris Nez ask about Valiant and they are informed that Valiant is responding at best speed and has 9.5nm to run so will be onscene in 35-40 mins again the Dover operator states that Flammant is closest. French CG respond that Flammant is with French Migrant 10 incident, Dover reply asking what the status of the small boat is, especially as the other small boat was reported to be sinking. Gris Nez respond that Flammant is with Migrant 10. C-Scope track of the French Warship Flammant 24 November





- 3.2.25 At 0243UTC incident FOXTROT was assessed as being incident ALPHA. This is because the mobile telephone numbers were the same.
- 3.2.26 At 0247UTC the JRCC make an entry in the incident narrative that the Search and Rescue Helicopter R163 will be airborne at 0330UTC for a 90 minute sortie.
- 3.2.27 At 0247UTC a further Mayday relay and DSC alert (Urgency again) was broadcast
- 3.2.28 At 0249UTC R163 call MRCC Dover to inform them that they should be airbourne at 0330UTC patrolling for small boats and asked if any distress calls were being received at Dover. MRCC Dover confirmed they were receiving distress calls and R163 requested coordination from MRCC Dover from the start, as they may struggle with the weather. R163 Captain stated they required MRCC Dover to tell them exactly what they were required to do, unless the search instructions were ready to be passed. The Operator then transferred the call to the SMC. The Captain then informed the SMC that he requested clear instructions and asked if it was possible to provide something



over the phone which they could start with and amend once they were proceeding


The SMC stated that there were numerous boats being reported, however he thought some were repeat calls. He requested R163 search from Mike Papa Charlie Buoy up to Sandettie Light Vessel and provided the latitude and longitude for Sandettie and a course and distance from Lydd. The SMC continued that the tide would be in a north east direction so the rectangle would be to the north-east to East Goodwin Light Vessel and for R163 to concentrate in that area. The SMC continued that HMC Valiant were proceeding to one vessel and another two small boats were reported to be heading to that area also.

R163 stated that the weather at Lydd was not too bad, but a risk at 0500UTC of shallow fog, and they would monitor conditions.

The SMC confirmed the mission was to search, no rescue as it would not be safe to winch from a small boat. The Captain confirmed they would take the life raft onboard. The SMC confirmed that visibility was good at Dover with a cloud height of around 750 feet approximately.

3.2.29 At 0257UTC there is a missed WhatsApp call from [redacted] PD [redacted] 057 on the Dover MRCC mobile phone





- 3.2.30 At 0301UTC A further Mayday relay is broadcast, with a DSC urgency alert.
- 3.2.31 At 0302UTC ALPHA incident was closed as a repeat of FOXTROT incident.
- 3.2.32 At 0306UTC a 999 call was received at MRCC Dover. They stated that they were in the middle of the sea on the way to England. They had lost their boat, half body was in the sea and it was very cold. They have children, women and a pregnant lady and there were 35 people on board. They were asked for a name, but the call then dropped. There was no telephone number asked for during the call and the operator had no number either.



- 3.2.33 At 0306UTC in CHARLIE incident the SMC states that ALPHA may be linked to CHARLIE as similar story and background noise, nothing further is recorded regarding this comment. I can confirm that the ALPHA and FOXTROT incidents are linked as they are using the same telephone number and I also agree with the SMC that there is a possibility that these incidents are the same as CHARLIE. There are no messages on the MRCC Dover mobile phone from or to the number for ALPHA incident.
- 3.2.34 At 0312UTC there was a missed WhatsApp call from PD 057 to MRCC Dover mobile phone.
- 3.2.35 At 0312UTC a 999 call was received at MRCC Dover. They stated they were in the water, finished and dying and requested help. There was shouting on the call and stated there were 40 persons onboard. The Coastguard Operator asked where they were – they stated in the water in English waters and continued their request for help. The operator could not get any other information and advised the caller to re dial 999 so that we might be able to obtain their position within the call collection information. The caller stated he had already dialled 999. The operator stated that if that had not worked, then it was possible they were still in French waters and advised to re dial 999 to see if position information could be made available.
- 3.2.36 At 0318UTC MRCC Dover advise Valiant that the French Coast Guard had advised that there may be other small boats in the vicinity to the north of the Sandettie Light Vessel. To be aware as Valiant approach the position for CHARLIE incident. They confirm that they are in the vicinity and were approaching the area slowly so that they do not run any vessels over.
- 3.2.37 At 0319UTC Incident MIKE is created in position 51° 09N 001° 46E course 330° Speed 5 knots. This was a sighting by Flammant and was French migrant 11.
- 3.2.38 At 0320UTC A further Mayday relay and Distress DSC broadcast.
- 3.2.39 At 0322UTC an update to the French Tracker was received.





C-scope track of HMC Valiant 24 November

At 0324UTC Valiant inform MRCC Dover that they are onscene at the last known position for CHARLIE. Intention was to proceed to Sandettie as if the small boat had stopped it would drift north.

3.2.41

At 0323UTC LIMA incident was upgraded to a distress incident.

3.2.40


18					03 00	51 10 N	001 10 E	SRM UK	
19					03 00	51 06 E	001 10 E	SRM UK	

Raf UK	Raf UK	Raf UK	Heure de l'aire à l'origine de l'incident (UTC)	Origine de l'aire à l'origine de l'incident (UTC)	Moyen de détection	Support renseignant les renseignements (type, couleur, L, brevités)	POB (brevités)	SFU en recherche ou en surveillance	SFU au contact	Courtoisie	Heure dernière position (UTC)	Dernière position connue	SFU (CB pour relatif à l'heure ou RPA relatif au débarquement (UTC))
			2102	CANAL DES DUNES	VOIE DK	SEMI ROUGE	40	FLAMANT			294 / 6 NDS	51 07 40N / 001 42 57E	possible MLC 2 et 9
			2224	LEFFRINKOUKE	POLICE DK	SEMI ROUGE	30	FLAMANT			268 / 6 NDS	51 07 10N / 001 55 54E	
			2224	LEFFRINKOUKE	POLICE DK	SEMI ROUGE	30	FLAMANT			272 / 6 NDS	51 07 10N / 001 55 54E	SRM UK
			2220	CANAL DES DUNES	VOIE DK	SEMI ROUGE	30				AT EARTH - NO CROSSING		
			2216	VISSANT	POLICE	SEMI ROUGE	15				AT EARTH - NO CROSSING		
			0013	LEFFRINKOUKE	POLICE	SEMI ROUGE	30				ZWANDS	51 04 50N / 002 25 08E	
		7 A	0048	Bouée MRC	SAUVE	SEMI ROUGE	13				305 / 4	51 07 40N	possible MLC 1 et 9
			0107	Berck	Police	SEMI ROUGE GRIS	30						possible MLC 1 et 1
			0111	Dunquerque 7	Mé nigrant		33						possible MLC 2 et 1

- 3.2.42 At 0326UTC ARCC noted that R163 was preparing to take off. At 0327UTC R163 report they have a technical issue which will require engineers to check the aircraft. At 0329 ARCC record in the narrative that the aircraft has shut down and they may need to use the spare aircraft.
- 3.2.43 At 0328UTC the SMC at Dover recorded an updated position on WhatsApp from +447859 279057. The position was 51° 09.027N 001° 45.341E. This message was timed at 0221UTC but was only seen at 0328UTC due to the volume of work and calls.
- 3.2.44 At 0333UTC there is a message to PD 057 from the Dover MRCC mobile phone stating “re send your position please”. This message is indicating that the message was not read as there is only one grey tick in the bottom of the right-hand side of the message. The other messages have two blue ticks in the bottom right side.
- 3.2.45 At 0334UTC Valiant report two potential targets on the night vision goggles. Range 7 cables from Valiant’s position 51° 09.6N 001° 47.5E. One vessel appeared to be stopped and the other was still moving.
- 3.2.46 At 0343UTC ARCC reported R163 serviceable and was preparing for taxiing.
- 3.2.47 At 0348UTC Gris-Nez MRCC inform MRCC Dover that the small boat assigned to incident LIMA, are now in the UK search and rescue region. Dover confirm that the asset in the vicinity is Valiant who are searching for CHARLIE and that multiple targets have been spotted and they are investigating.
- 3.2.48 At 0350UTC ARCC report that R163 are airborne and proceeding.
- 3.2.49 At 0350UTC Valiant report they are onscene with the vessel which had stopped – unlit migrant boat with 40 persons onboard. MRCC Dover respond saying they believed this small boat to be incident Charlie, name of person onboard (Mubin) and telephone number ending 057 passed to Valiant.
- 3.2.50 At 0354UTC R163 informed MRCC Dover they were proceeding to the scene. MRCC Dover passed updated information that Valiant were onscene and had seen one other craft in the area, so a search around Sandettie Light vessel with either an expanding square or parallel track search – whichever R163 thought was appropriate to search for other vessels in the area.
- 3.2.51 At 0403UTC R163 was reported as being onscene and commencing search.



C-scope track for R163 for the search at 0404UTC



- 3.2.52 A 0404UTC The Tactical Commander goes on his break.
- 3.2.53 At 0416UTC persons that were recovered to Valiant claim they had not called the UK authorities. No further questions are asked by MRCC Dover.
- 3.2.54 At 0418UTC R163 advised MRCC Dover that they had a target in position 51° 09.06N 001° 43.9E. the vessel was light grey and had 30 persons onboard and was under power and heading westerly, with no imminent threat to persons onboard and no danger to life. R163 continued to search.
- 3.2.55 At 0436UTC Valiant report all persons recovered from the small boat and the vessel has been marked and has a strobe. Valiant report 35 persons recovered, 20 males, 2 females and 13 minors. Valiant then proceeded to a new position (identified earlier by R163). At 0451UTC Valiant receive an



updated position of the second target from R163. This position is timed at 0432UTC 51° 08.0N 001° 41.8E.

3.2.56 At 0453UTC an updated tracker was received from Gris-Nez MRCC.

12		0343	Berck	Telmigrant		50	SNS Berck	SNS Berck	Stop		50°27'N 001°32'E		
13		0349	Chenal Dunkerque	CMA CGM Marnoz	GRIS	30	Escout		310 / 4.5	04:40	51°05' 00"00"		

3.3 Timeline 0500 -0700

- 3.3.1 At 0505UTC MRCC Dover receive a call from Kent Police who have received an emergency call from a small boat at sea. An incident is created in ViSION and reference OSCAR is allocated. Information passed is that it is from an English Mobile number [PD] 012, Eastings and Northings, small black boat engine working, taking water, 32 persons on board, position 510846.75N 001 3903.24E semi major and minor Of 8M, name given [Name]
- 3.3.2 At 0505UTC MRCC Dover created incident OSCAR. The caller stated they were on a boat and it was sinking, they could not see the land. There were 32 persons onboard, including families. The engine was running but they did not have much fuel. They had red lifejackets and there were a lot of waves. Their telephone number was [PD] 012 and it was a black boat
- 3.3.3 At 0508UTC MRSC London receive another call via DEIT from the Metropolitan Police. The caller was advising that his friend was in a boat crossing the Channel, no other details or information was available.
- 3.3.4 At 0511UTC MRCC Dover inform R163 that at the end of their endurance was the intention for them to return to base and not return. R163 provided a report of their second target at 0509UTC in position 51° 08.0N 001° 41.8E. They were using the IR camera, so no description or colour.
- 3.3.5 At 0511UTC a position is entered into the ViSION narrative for OSCAR incident. The position is 51° 8.46N 001° 39.03E
- 3.3.6 At 0514UTC a new incident was created in ViSION and given the reference NOVEMBER.
- 3.3.7 At 0518UTC a call was received from Gris-Nez MRCC to MRCC Dover. They had taken a call from a small boat who was thought to be in the vicinity of HMC Valiant. They reported that they could see a helicopter, there were 40 persons on board, including one child, wearing lifejackets and the vessel was



green. They had two telephone numbers for the small boat [PD] 263 and [PD] 290

- 3.3.8 At 0519UTC R163 called MRCC Dover to report a third target in position 51° 08.8N 001° 37.7E. They report that they had lost the target due to a fault on the camera, but the vessel was underway and there was no imminent risk to life.
- 3.3.9 At 0521UTC HMC Valiant report to MRCC Dover that they were in position 51° 08.1N 001° 41.2E and were engaging with a migrant vessel.
- 3.3.10 At 0527UTC the SMC makes a comment in LIMA incident that he believes this small boat had been picked up by HMC Valiant at 0423UTC and all migrants rescued at 0436UTC.
- 3.3.11 AT 0528UTC R163 provide an update to MRCC Dover with a further position 51° 08.8N 001° 36.4E heading westerly, vessel is 8 metres in length, with approximately 30 persons onboard, all in order no sign of distress. They had also advised the Motor Tanker ELISABETH that their heading would intercept the track of the small boat. This message meant that the motor tanker was on a collision course with the small boat carrying migrants. At 0537UTC RI63 advise the MT ELISABETH that they have safely passed the small boat and can continue on their passage.
- 3.3.12 At 0529UTC MRSC London receive a call from the Metropolitan Police who had received a call reporting a vessel possibly near Le Manche. The information was very confused and unclear the first informant was relaying information. The first informants name was [Name] and he was calling for his friend Ahmed. They provided two telephone numbers [PD] 194 and [PD] 444. It is recorded that the person was possibly in the water and the first informant was not sure if he was in the water or on a boat.
- 3.3.13 At 0531UTC MRCC Dover were informed that the Tekever Drone was planning on getting airborne from 0600UTC.
- 3.3.14 At 0531UTC MRSC London receive a further update from the Metropolitan Police via DEIT. The original caller's number was [PD] 444. The type of boat was unknown and the amount of people was unknown. The informant was passing information on from social media.



- 3.3.15 At 0532UTC MRSC London receive a further update via DEIT that the informant that has called the Metropolitan Police was Ahmed and his number [PD] 194.
- 3.3.16 At 0532UTC MRCC Dover start incident call collection for incident PAPA. They stated that there was a helicopter ahead of them and their mobile number was [PD] 012. A position N510856.65 Y E013535.74. the caller was [Name] and then the call dropped out.
- This was the same number as that recorded in incident OSCAR and NOVEMBER
- 3.3.17 At 0532UTC the Air Commander at the JRCC records in their ViSION narrative that there had been a briefing with the UAV Operator and the intention was to get the drone airborne. Deconfliction issues with R163 are identified.
- 3.3.18 At 0532UTC R163 call the MT Elisabeth on VHF Radio and inform them that there is a small boat with multiple persons onboard half a nautical mile in front of them heading west. At 0537UTC R163 confirm that the small boat has passed safely.
- 3.3.19 At 0536UTC call collection for Incident PAPA commenced in ViSION.
- 3.3.20 At 0541UTC Incident PAPA is identified as a repeat of November, as the telephone numbers are the same. OSCAR is also linked to these incidents.
- 3.3.21 At 0542UTC the Dover SMC comments in the NOVEMBER incident that the small had been observed by R163 and it was possible it was a repeat of DELTA incident.
- 3.3.22 At 0543UTC the Dover SMC comments that R163 has informed them that there are no visible signs of danger with NOVEMBER small boat and the small boat was underway at a speed of 4 knots on a westerly course. The SMC then downgraded the incident to the Alert phase based on this information.
- 3.3.23 At 0543UTC an entry is made in the migrant administration incident that PAPA at 51° 08.933N 001° 35.498E has R163 overhead.
- 3.3.24 At 0555UTC HMC Valiant inform MRCC Dover that all persons had been rescued from vessel. The dinghy was light grey in colour and has been abandoned in position 51 08.06N 001 41.13E. MRCC Dover asked if anyone



- from the small boat had called the emergency services. Valiant confirmed they would get back to MRCC Dover with information.
- 3.3.25 At 0557UTC the Tactical Commander has returned from their break.
- 3.3.26 At 0558UTC HMC Valiant reported to MRCC Dover that the deck team have confirmed that two rescued persons speak English and they claim that they had not called UK authorities. MRCC Dover asked if they had any names.
- 3.3.27 At 0605UTC HMC Valiant report to MRCC Dover that the second small boat rescued had 31 males, and one person now has confirmed they saw someone make a call.
- 3.3.28 At 0607UTC MRCC Dover tasked HMC Valiant to a third small boat in the vicinity of the South West Goodwin Buoy. This was the target sighted by R163.
- 3.3.29 At 0609UTC R163 confirmed they were returning to base
- 3.3.30 At 0609UTC NOVEMBER incident was upgraded to the alert phase, and SMC records this rationale as the small boat was believed to be in UK waters and that it was possible that it was a repeat of DELTA incident.
- 3.3.31 At 0616UTC ARCC record in their ViSION narrative that R163 spotted the last small boat in position 51° 09.3N 001° 31.0E.
- 3.3.32 At 0616UTC ARCC inform R163 that the Tekever drone was still on the ground and would not lift until 0630UTC.
- 3.3.33 At 0617UTC the call collection information was recorded in ViSION for incident Quebec, with 40 persons onboard, French migrant 17 and the Flammant was with the small boat in position 51° 06.4N 001° 45.9E. The small boat was dark grey in colour and the estimated time of arrival to UK Waters at approximately 0637UTC.
- 3.3.34 At 0620UTC Gris-Nez MRCC call Dover at inform them they have received a call from a small boat in need of assistance, the position was 51° 09.3N 001° 32.18E persons onboard unknown but there was one pregnant woman. No names or telephone numbers were available. The small boat still had the engine, in addition they reported that the Flammant was escorting Migrant 17 with 40 persons on board, dark grey small boat in position 51° 006.4N 001°45.9E. This was approximately 20 minutes away from UK waters.



- 3.3.35 At 0627UTC ARCC record R163 as being back at their base.
- 3.3.36 At 0629UTC HMC Valiant report they have made contact with the third target in position 51° 08.9N 001° 31.5E, and they were launching their Rigid Hull Inflatable boat to investigate.
- 3.3.37 At 0631UTC HMC Valiant report that the third target (small boat) was stopped in the water, and multiple casualties were waving.
- 3.3.38 At 0636UTC MRCC Dover informed Kent Police via Airwave radio that there had been many migrant incidents, but none had made UK shores as far as HM Coastguard knew.
- 3.3.39 At 0636UTC HMC Hunter were informed of incident QUEBEC.
- 3.3.40 At 0641UTC HMC Hunter were proceeding to incident QUEBEC.
- 3.3.41 At 0644UTC ARCC confirm to R163 that the drone AR3 would be supporting the incident. (need to replay this call)
- 3.3.42 At 0643UTC the SMC records in incident QUEBEC that small boat is being escorted by Flammant and that HMC Hunter was tasked to meet the vessel as it approached UK waters.
- 3.3.43 At 0646UTC HMC Valiant are recorded as being onscene. CHARLIE / NOVEMBER
- 3.3.44 At 0646UTC HMC Safeguard is tasked to incident NOVEMBER.
- 3.3.45 At 0651UTC an update to the French tracker is received from Gris-Nez MRCC.



Ref FR	Ref UK	n° SITREP	Heure détection (UTC)	Secteur	Origine de l'alerte & Moyen de détection	Support embarquant les migrants (type, couleur, L, propulsion)	POB (H/F/enfant, avec/ sans brésiliers)	SRU en ralliement ou en recherche	SRU au contact ou en sauvetage	Route/vitesse estimée	Heure dernière position (UTC)	Dernière position connue	SRU GB pour relai ou Port FR de destination	Heure ou HPA du relai ou du débarquement (UTC)
1		3501	2102	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	40	FLAMANT		284 / 6 NDS		51°07.40N / 001°42.67E	possible MIG 7 et 9	
2		3502	2224	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		253 / 5 NDS	03:19	51°07.16N / 001°55.54E		
3		3503	2224	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		272 / 6 NDS	03:10	51°07.08N / 001°43.58	SRR UK	
4		3504	2230	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
6		3505	2316	WISSANT	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	15			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
6			0013	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	30			276/4NDS	00:00	51°04.58N / 002°25.08E		
7	A	3507	0048	Bouée MPC	SAMU 62	SEMI RIGIDE	33 13 femmes 8 enfants			305 / 4	01:30	51°07.4N / 001°46.4E	SRR UK Possible MIG 1 et 9	
8		3508	0107	Berck	Police	SEMI RIGIDE GRIS	30 à 40							
9		3509	0111	Dunkarque ?	Ml migrant		33 3 enfants 6 femmes						possible MIG 7 et 1	

10		3510	0230	Bouée Sandifé	Flamant	NOIR	40	FLAMANT		300 / 6	03:00	51°10 N / 001°47 E	SRR UK	
11		3511	0256	Bouée Sandifé	Flamant			FLAMANT		330 / 6	03:00	51°09 N / 001°46 E	SRR UK	
12			0343	Berck	Tel migrant		50	SNS Berck	Abelle	340 / 4	04:40	50°30 N / 001°29 E		
13			0349	Chenal Dunkerque	CMA CGM Memoz			Escout	Escout	315 / 5,5	06:00	51°05N / 001°59E		
14			0446	Berck	SNS Fournier	NOIRE	40 1 femme	SNS Berck	Abelle			50°27.8N / 001°31.9E		
15			0453	Malo	Sémaphore DK			Escout		stop	05:00	51°03.8 / 002°23.8		Demande assistance - ETA Escout 0700 UTC
16			0453	Malo	Sémaphore DK					300 / 4	05:00	51°03.8 / 002°23.8		
17			0516	Dyck	Flamant	foncé	40	Flamant	Flamant	200 / 6,5	05:50	51°06 / 001°49		
18			0526	La Portal	Tel migrant					260 / 4,5	05:20	50°42N / 001°32E		
19			0530	Slack	Tel migrant					270 / 4	05:40	50°48 / 001°33		
20			0547	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	Sémaphore DK					287 / 5,6	05:50	51°03 / 002°24		

3.3.46 At 0651UTC MRCC Dover receive a call from Sussex Police who had received a 999 call from a boat out to sea, there were 35 persons onboard including women and children. The small boat was black in colour. They had a telephone number [redacted] PD 946. The first informant gave the name [redacted] Name and had no idea where he was or where he had departed from.

This information was logged in the admin incident and an incident was not created with this information.

3.3.47 At 0655UTC an incident was created.

3.3.48 At 0657UTC the SMC comments that the incident was positioned based on the information from Sussex Police.





3.4 Timeline 0700 to 0900

- 3.4.1 At 0703UTC HMC Valiant reports they are returning to Dover Port.
- 3.4.2 At 0716UTC ARCC assign CG26 (fixed wing aircraft) to the incident ARCC created at 0713UTC.
- 3.4.3 At 0716UTC HMC Hunter proceeded to MPC Buoy to await the French Warship Flammant with the small boat it was escorting for incident QUEBEC
- 3.4.4 At 0717UTC Hunter was released from incident DELTA as they were assigned to incident QUEBEC
- 3.4.5 At 0720UTC MRCC Dover are informed that the Flammant has reported that the small boat for Incident QUEBEC has broken down, but do not want to be rescued by the Flammant.
- 3.4.6 At 0722UTC HMC Valiant inform MRCC Dover that they have rescued all persons from the third small boat, they were waiting for the deck crew to confirm the headcount. They were now at capacity with persons rescued so would head back to Dover port. Their position was 51° 08.5N 001° 31.2E.
- 3.4.7 At 0724UTC HMC Safeguard informed MRCC Dover that they were responding to retrieve abandoned small boats
- 3.4.8 At 0726UTC call collection for incident ROMEO was created. The call dropped before the BT operator was able to connect the caller to the Coastguard. The mobile telephone PD 697 was recorded, but the signal was very poor. The BT operator thought the person said, "in the water" and something about Dover and they also asked if they were speaking to the Police.
- 3.4.9 At 0726UTC HMC Safeguard report to MRCC Dover they have located two other vessels abandoned. There are no positions recorded for the small boats.
- 3.4.10 At 0727UTC HMC Valiant report that for their third small boat rescue the headcount was 32 persons rescued with 21 males, 4 females and 7 minors.
- 3.4.11 At 0728UTC AR3 (drone) activity message was received into VISION.



- 3.4.12 At 0729UTC CG26 (fixed wing aircraft) inform MRCC Dover that they were due to depart Doncaster bound Southend. They were advised that the TEKEVER drone was airborne and there were a few incidents. They requested CG26 proceed to Southend and await tasking. This information is recorded in the migrant admin incident.
- 3.4.13 At 0732UTC incident ROMEO is created
- 3.4.14 At 0738UTC call collection for incident TANGO is recorded. This is French migrant incident 13. The last position was reported in the UK search and rescue region – 51° 08.65N 001° 45.86E, this was an estimated position as contact with the asset who then departed the scene. Course for the small boat was 295° and a speed of 3 knots. It was a black boat with approximately 30 persons on board. TANGO incident was created at 0740UTC. The incident does not state what or who the asset was who made the report and the question was not asked on the call
- 3.4.15 At 0745UTC the SMC at MRCC Dover made an entry into the ROMEO incident that the Advanced Mobile Location (AML) details for the mobile phone was around the location of CHARLIE, MIKE and TANGO. The SMC stated that he believed it to be the same incident. I spoke with the SMC and he was referring to the incident MIKE, ROMEO and TANGO being linked but they were in the location of the previous CHARLIE incident.
- 3.4.16 At 0747UTC call collection for incident UNIFORM. The mobile number was PD 160. The first informant (Sophie Rainbow) stated that they had been in contact with people on the boat, who were family friends. The caller stated that their boat was stranded between Dover and Dunkirk, people on the boat have called previously and said there is an emergency. There were 20 persons on board and it was a black and yellow boat. The caller then relayed information from someone with them that there was someone onboard who had died but they didn't know how.
- 3.4.17 At 0750UTC HMC Hunter was tasked to incident TANGO, and was released from incident DELTA. At 1600UTC the SMC made an entry into incident DELTA stating it was a repeat of incident NOVEMBER. There was no rationale recorded for this however in incident DELTA. In incident NOVEMBER the SMC on watch overnight recorded that a 999 call had been received and the small boat observed by R163. Based on the last known position of DELTA, NOVEMBER incident could be a repeat.
- 3.4.18 At 0753UTC HMC Hunter was proceeding to incident TANGO.



- 3.4.19 At 0754UTC call collection for incident SIERRA was recorded. This was a relay of information from Gris-Nez MRCC of a report from the Spirit of France. A migrant rib, white in colour in position 50° 58.6N 001° 43.5E on a course of 264° and speed of 5 knots, with 8-10 persons onboard, some people had lifejackets. There were no units in attendance.
- 3.4.20 At 0757UTC ARCC record in their ViSION narrative that they have spoken to 2Excel who confirmed the fixed wing aircraft was unable to support Operation Altair.
- 3.4.21 At 0757UTC the Advanced Mobile Location (AML) for the first informant for incident UNIFORM placed them on Military Road. The caller was a British female, with a foreign sounding person in the background passing information. The Senior Coastal Operations Officer stated they would send some of the Folkstone Team.
- 3.4.22 At 0758UTC incident VICTOR was created. This is a report from a passing vessel Silver Bowers to MRCC Dover. The small boat had 30 persons onboard in position 50° 45N 001° 13E, some persons had lifejackets. The small boat was currently in the French search and rescue region.
- 3.4.23 At 0800UTC call collection for Incident WHISKEY commenced. It was from mobile PD 697. They stated that there were women and babies in the UK water, they were near a red ship and about to drown. There were 35 persons on board.
- 3.4.24 At 0800UTC information from Gris-Nez MRCC that French migrant 13, the last known position was in the UK search and rescue region 51° 08.65N 001° 45.86E (this was an estimated position as French asset went to another incident). Small boat course 295° and a speed of 3 knots. It was a black small boat with 30 persons onboard. This information was relating to incident TANGO.
- 3.4.25 At 0801UTC information from Gris-Nez MRCC that French Warship Flammant is escorting French migrant 17 with 40 persons onboard in position 51° 06.4N 001° 45.9E. The small boat was light grey in colour. The estimated time of arrival to UK waters was 20 minutes. This information is referring to incident QUEBEC. There is no further information recorded in this ViSION log for this incident and the incident is closed at 1803UTC with a generic statement from the tactical commander and SMC used to close open incidents around this time.



- 3.4.26 At 0803UTC a call from Kent Police reporting they had received a call from PD 697, the coordinates they had recorded on their system were N510846.18 E013947.34. The call dropped so there was no other information. This telephone number is recorded at 0806UTC in the ViSION log as being the same as the number recorded in incident ROMEO. It is also the same number for incident WHISKEY.
- 3.4.27 At 0807UTC there is a ViSION entry from the JRCC that the Cargo Vessel Saga Freya is in the same position as incident WHISKEY and the cargo vessel has a red hull.
- 3.4.28 At 0808UTC incident WHISKEY is closed as a repeat of incident ROMEO, the rationale had been recorded previously in the incident.
- 3.4.29 At 0808UTC HMC Hunter inform MRCC Dover they have visual of two small boats visual and they will assess the sea worthiness of both and inform Dover which had priority for rescue. This is relating to incident TANGO.
- 3.4.30 At 0816UTC call collection for incident XRAY commences with a report from Gris-Nez MRCC that the vessel Abvielle Langudoc is near French migrant 12 in position 50o 37.13N 001o 05.45E. The black small boat is in the UK search and rescue region, with approximately 50 persons on board, some with lifejackets. The incident for XRAY was created at 0818UTC.
- 3.4.31 At 0818UTC ARCC record in their ViSION narrative that in discussion with 2Excel, CG25B (fixed wing) had disappeared from the tracker. It reported CG25 had a technical issue and engineers were about to sign paperwork with the problem rectified and MRCC Dover were aware. They expected the issue to be resolved by 0900UTC.
- 3.4.32 At 0819UTC Kent Police inform MRCC Dover of another call from incident NOVEMBER. The call dropped again. The position recorded was E13947.34 N510846.18.
- 3.4.33 At 0820UTC the Tekever Drone was relocated overhead the small boat for incident VICTOR.
- 3.4.34 At 0822UTC HMC Hunter is recorded as being called and proceeding to incident XRAY
- 3.4.35 At 0823UTC HMC Hunter inform MRCC Dover that they are onscene with the second vessel they had visual at 0808UTC. It is a black 10 metre small boat with approximately 30 persons onboard. Their intention was to rescue those



onboard and then that would be the two boats in the vicinity one with 30 persons onboard and the other with 28 persons onboard, so they would then proceed to Dover Port to offload.

- 3.4.36 At 0824UTC the JRCC task BF Hurricane to incident XRAY to position 50° 37.13N 001° 05.45E to a black small boat with approximately 50 persons onboard. BF Hurricane confirm they will make best speed and have 38 nautical miles to run. They are informed of two vessels in the vicinity, but no other information on the other small boat.
- 3.4.37 At 0827UTC BF Hurricane was re-tasked so Dungeness RNLI Lifeboat was being called and tasked to incident XRAY.
- 3.4.38 At 0827UTC the vessel Edzard Cirksena reported they had sighted a small boat at 0822UTC. The small boat was abeam of port side in position 51° 11.3N 001° 43.3E with lots of people onboard. The incident was created with reference YANKEE.
- 3.4.39 At 0829UTC Dungeness RNLI Lifeboat were tasked to incident XRAY.
- 3.4.40 At 0829UTC BF Hurricane was tasked and proceeding to incident YANKEE
- 3.4.41 At 0829UTC call collection for incident ZULU commenced. Telephone number 491784816380. The first information stated they were in the sea in a boat with 45 persons onboard, which included 3 children and only half of the people have lifejackets. They believed they were near New Romney, then the call dropped.
- 3.4.42 At 0830UTC the Launch Authority approved the launch request for Dungeness Lifeboat. The Lifeboat capacity for those rescued would be 50 persons and if the second small makes it to the UK waters they would not be able to rescue both small boats.
- 3.4.43 At 0830UTC BF Hurricane inform MRCC Dover they will have an estimated time of arrival to incident YANKEE in 30 minutes arriving at 0900UTC.
- 3.4.44 At 0833UTC AR3 (drone) was called and proceeding to incident VICTOR, estimated time of arrival was 0903UTC
- 3.4.45 At 0840UTC a MC comment was made in ZULU incident that the position for the small boat has been repositioned in the UK search and rescue region in the vicinity of Dungeness near to the separation zones. The operator stated



that based on the number of persons on board and position it could be a repeat of incident XRAY.

- 3.4.46 At 0841UTC an entry is also made in the ZULU incident that AR3 (drone) is also in the area looking for incident VICTOR small boat.
- 3.4.47 At 0847UTC Incident ALPHA1 call collection is commenced. The first information stated that they were in the UK sea from last night, he said his name was ACHMED. There were 40-45 persons onboard with 5-7 children and 10 women, some people had lifejackets. All were very cold. He could not see land but thought he was near to Hastings. A position was recorded in the call collection 50 45 5408 1023903. Telephone number was **PD** **PD** 119. The line was weak throughout the call. The caller stated no one else had called emergency services from the boat, he could see a ship in the distance and the engine for the small boat was working. The incident is created at 0905UTC
- 3.4.48 At 0848UTC AR3 (drone) inform MRCC Dover that they had eyes on a black small boat in position 50° 50.91N 001° 12.9E course 280° speed 6 knots, some persons were wearing lifejackets and there were 40+ persons onboard. This information was linked to incident ZULU
- 3.4.49 At 0848UTC an updated position was provided for incident VICTOR from Dover CNIS 50° 39.1N 001° 09.55E.
- 3.4.50 At 0850UTC an updated position for incident XRAY /YANKEE was received from Dover CNIS at 0845UTC 50° 39.1N 001° 02.9E, course 310° speed 3.6 knots.
- 3.4.51 At 0850UTC a WhatsApp attempted on the telephone number for incident ZULU was not successful.
- 3.4.52 At 0851UTC HMC Hunter inform MRCC they have rescue 28 migrants from UKBF reference M961, and they now have approximately 60 persons onboard. UKBF Reference M960 was black small boat, approx. 34 persons onboard. Second small boat M961, grey in colour, 10 metres in length with 28 persons onboard. MRCC Dover asked if anyone had made 999 calls and HMC Hunter stated they would find out. This information was linked to incident TANGO.



- 3.4.53 At 0851UTC a simulated target is assigned to incident ZULU on C-SCOPE. The officer stated they would consider using Dungeness RNLI Lifeboat to intercept (head to the vessel) the vessel and assess their priority for rescue.
- 3.4.54 At 0853UTC HMC Valiant is released from incident NOVEMBER.
- 3.4.55 At 0855UTC BF Hurricane reports they are onscene with small boat for incident YANKEE.
- 3.4.56 At 0855UTC AR3 (drone) are informed of incident ZULU.
- 3.4.57 At 0856UTC MRCC Dover overhear on Airwave Radio that BF Hurricane is onscene with Coastguard incident YANKEE which is then given UKBF reference M962.
- 3.4.58 At 0857UTC Dungeness RNLI Lifeboat inform MRCC Dover they are launched on service and the tasking is passed by the Dover operator for incident XRAY.
- 3.4.59 At 0859UTC call collection for incident BRAVO1 commenced. No telephone number was available, the caller stated that they needed help, they were in a boat with lots of people. There were lots of voices in the background and then the call dropped out.



3.5 Timeline 0900 to 1100 UTC

- 3.5.1 At 0901UTC an update to the position for the small boat for incident VICTOR based on a radar target, places the small boat in UK waters and the incident is moved to the distress phase. It is also notes that AR3 (drone) is in the area.
- 3.5.2 At 0902UTC the vessel YM Enlightenment in position 50° 51.3N 001° 11.7E reported to Dover CNIS that they had sighted a migrant small boat with multiple occupants. The small boat was on a course of 295° at a speed of 5.7 knots. It was a black small boat, 30 foot in length and with over 30 persons onboard. This information was linked to incident ZULU.
- 3.5.3 At 0903UTC incident creation for CHARLIE 1 begins.
- 3.5.4 At 0904UTC Dungeness RNLI Lifeboat have a launch request to respond to incident ZULU. They had ordinally been tasked to incident XRAY.
- 3.5.5 At 0905UTC MRCC Dover call Gris-Nez MRCC to confirm the position of the small boat for incident XRAY which is in the UK search and rescue region and is near the French vessel Languedoc. The position passed is 50° 39.12N 001° 07.4E timed at 0846UTC.
- 3.5.6 At 0905UTC the HMC Safeguard is released from incident NOVEMBER.
- 3.5.7 At 0905UTC incident BRAVO1 is upgraded to distress as believed to be a small boat incident.
- 3.5.8 At 0906UTC the ALPHA1 incident narrative stated that the caller tried to give their position but the signal was weak.
- 3.5.9 At 0906UTC call collection for incident FOXTROT 1 commenced. The caller stated that they were in the sea in a boat, 50 persons onboard with 5 children and only 6 lifejackets. They left France 8 hours ago. The black small boat was still moving, their name was and telephone number 791. They thought they were about 27 kilometers from Hastings, they had no internet and no other boats were nearby
- 3.5.10 At 0906UTC BF Hurricane informed MRCC Dover they had rescued 35 persons and were securing the tow for the black small boat. MRCC Dover requested BF Hurricane to complete a sweep of the area before returning to Dover Port. This information is linked to incident YANKEE.
- 3.5.11 At 0907UTC incident BRAVO1 was moved to the distress phase.



- 3.5.12 At 0908UTC the SMC comments that the telephone numbers for incidents ALPHA1 and BRAVO1 are the same and will be made a repeat incident. At 0909UTC BRAVO1 incident is closed as a repeat of ALPHA1 incident.
- 3.5.13 At 0911UTC call collection for incident ECHO1 commenced. The caller reported 50-60 persons onboard, including 5 women and 5 children, with only 5 or 6 lifejackets. The caller thought they were in UK waters and the small boat was in a bad condition, then the call dropped.
- 3.5.14 At 0913UTC AR3 (drone) informs MRCC Dover they have eyes on a dark blue small boat for incident VICTOR 50° 45.17N 001° 14.65E. There were approximately 25 persons onboard and they were doing an erratic course with water over the bow.
- 3.5.15 At 0913UTC call collection for incident CHARLIE1 is commenced. They state that they are in the sea and need help. They have 44 persons onboard, 3 children and 4 women. Small boat is white. Caller's name was Achmed and had been at sea for 11 hours and he stated that they were dying. The call was difficult for the operator as there was a lot of background noise. He was asked if it was possible to get a position on his phone if he had internet.
- 3.5.16 At 0913UTC the SMC makes a comment in ALPHA1 incident. There were no exact positions as the calls were dropped and not able to reconnect. He believed ALPHA1, BRAVO1 and ZULU were the same incident. Dungeness Lifeboat was proceeding to incident ZULU. The telephone numbers for the incidents were linked.
- 3.5.17 At 0914UTC MRCC Dover receive a confirmed sighting incident VICTOR in French waters and the incident was moved to the monitoring phase. MRCC Dover state that they will inform Gris-Nez MRCC and handover coordination.
- 3.5.18 At 0914UTC call collection for incident 041433-24112021 was commenced. The caller stated that he didn't know where he was, on a boat with women and children, 44 persons onboard – 4 women and 3 children. They departed Calais and had been on the boat for more than 10 hours. Could see boats but far away and could not see land. The small boat was white in colour. His name was Ahmed in position 50.4618N 1.01418E. His telephone number was PD 119. This was the first time he had called 999. This telephone number is a repeat of the numbers in ALPHA1 and BRAVO1 incidents.
- 3.5.19 At 0915UTC the JRCC record in the incident narrative for CHARLIE1 that coordination has been passed to MRCC Dover. The SMC at Dover records in



- the CHARLIE1 incident narrative that it was the same telephone number for ALPHA1 incident and was closed as a repeat at 0917UTC.
- 3.5.20 At 0917UTC incident FOXTROT1 is created
- 3.5.21 At 0917UTC call collection for incident DELTA1 is commenced. A report from the vessel Vana Maerland of a small boat in position 51o 47N 001o 03E on a westerly course, with lots of persons onboard. The vessel states he has seen a lifeboat but the lifeboat was heading east and the small boat was more to the west. During the call he then spots a second small boat. The two small boats were south of the vessel on a north-west course, one small boat was black and the other small boat was white.
- 3.5.22 At 0921UTC Gris-Nez MRCC contact MRCC Dover to ask if they have any assets in the vicinity of incident VICTOR. MRCC Dover response is that all resources are committed within the UK search and rescue region. Gris-Nez MRCC confirm they have coordination for incident VICTOR.
- 3.5.23 At 0924UTC incident 041433-24112021 is handed from the JRCC to MRCC Dover for coordination. At 0928UTC this is identified as being a repeat of ALPHA1, the rationale recorded in the incident is that it is the same telephone number, and the incident is closed.
- 3.5.24 At 0927UTC there is a ViSION narrative entry recording a request for rotary support for patrol area CHARLIE. The entry identified that the request will be passed to R163 and that the Controller will identify another asset if R163 are not available.
- 3.5.25 At 0927UTC Dungeness Lifeboat are reported as being onscene with incident ZULU.
- 3.5.26 At 0929UTC an SMC comment in incident ECHO1 narrative in discussion with the Tactical Commander George P. The incident has no telephone number or position, the SMC suspects it to be in the vicinity of ALPHA1, BRAVO1, DELTA1 and has repositioned it as such and has downgraded it to monitoring.
- 3.5.27 At 0929UTC ARCC record in their ViSION narrative that CG25 are requested to proceed to patrol area Charlie.
- 3.5.28 At 0931UTC Hastings RNLI Lifeboat is requested to respond to incident XRAY.



- 3.5.29 At 0931UTC the SMC enters a comment into ViSION that due to the number of vessels south of the area they are going to ask Hastings Lifeboat to proceed to the vicinity, as HMC Valiant has another 35 minutes before they will depart Dover Port so no other SAR units are able to proceed. Also it is recorded that the weather is not favourable with choppy seas.
- 3.5.30 At 0931UTC the ARCC record that a fixed wing is reported to be airbourne in 30 mins and will proceed to patrol area Charlie.
- 3.5.31 At 0931UTC Hastings RNLi Lifeboat is requested as no other units were available to respond to incident XRAY. Communications were on VHF channel 0 and a drone was in the vicinity of the small boat
- 3.5.32 At 0931UTC the SMC made a comment that due to the number of small boats south of the area, Hastings RNLi Lifeboat were tasked to proceed to the vicinity as HMC Valiant had a further 35 minutes before they were able to depart from Dover Port and no other SAR units were able to proceed. He also comments that the weather appeared unfavourable with choppy seas.
- 3.5.33 At 0931UTC the ARCC ViSION narrative states that a fixed wing aircraft was reported to be airbourne in 30 minutes and would proceed to incident CHARLIE. R163 had also been assigned to small boat incidents, and this was supported by the Air Commander due to the fixed wing aircraft not being available at the time.
- 3.5.34 At 0932UTC call collection for GOLF1 was recorded. It was a routine call from Kent Police, reporting a black boat from Calais. They stated that the line kept dropping out and no telephone number was available. They reported there to be 35 persons onboard the small boat, including 5 children. They were wearing lifejackets.
- 3.5.35 At 00932UTC ARCC record in their ViSION narrative the tasking for R163 to search CHARLIE Area. They stated that it was not yet known if the helicopter will be stood down upon arrival of the fixed wing aircraft. There had been four reports of small boats with 30-50 people onboard. UKBF were responding to incidents with no distress or injury reported.
- 3.5.36 At 0933UTC R163 were informed of their tasking.
- 3.5.37 At 0935UTC call collection for 999 call, but the dropped call out prior to full details, being obtained. The only information available was that they were in a



boat, and needed help. The incident was recorded by the Global Incident Number (GIN) only.

- 3.5.38 At 0935UTC call collection for 999 call which was suspected to be small boat, but nothing was heard and no position information was available.
- 3.5.39 At 0938UTC Incident INDIA 1 call collection. A report from the vessel Four Brothers, reporting a beach landing heading towards Dungeness, approximately 2 miles offshore. It was a black rubber small boat with 20-30 persons onboard, at a speed of 2 knots
- 3.5.40 At 0939UTC AR3 (drone) was tasked to investigate incidents ALPHA 1 and DELTA 1.
- 3.5.41 At 0940UTC Call collection for HOTEL1 recorded. The called asked for help and stated they did not know where they were, then the line dropped, with no telephone number or position recorded.
- 3.5.42 At 0940UTC R163 inform ARCC that the crew are fatigued and request R175 (Lee-on-Solent) cover the tasking.
- 3.5.43 At 0941UTC call collection for incident JULIET1. The BT operator stated they transferred the call to the Police, who informed them to pass it to the Coastguard. There was background noise with people with shouting in Arabic and then the call dropped before the BT operator was able to pass the call to the Coastguard.
- 3.5.44 At 0941UTC R163 is put to standby status
- 3.5.45 At 0944UTC AR3 reported an updated position for VICTOR incident as 50° 46.43N 001° 13.45E.
- 3.5.46 At 0945UTC ARCC inform MRCC Dover that R163 have declined the tasking due to fatigue. The fixed wing was due to lift at 1000UTC and then be onscene at 1100UTC. R175 was the next closest rescue helicopter. The officer advised they would speak to the SMC and get back to ARCC.
- 3.5.47 At 0949UTC a ViSION Flash message is recorded for the MRCC Dover SMC to contact TACOM as soon as possible.
- 3.5.48 At 0948UTC Dungeness RNLI lifeboat reported that all persons were rescued from the small boat for incident ZULU and they were returning back to Dungeness.



- 3.5.49 At 0949UTC the French vessel Abeille was assigned to small boat VICTOR and reported as being onscene.
- 3.5.50 At 0949UTC Gris-Nez MRCC inform MRCC Dover that the small boat for incident VICTOR, a black/blue small boat, course was towards the UK at a speed of 3.5 knots. The Abeille was onscene and the persons onboard stated they did not want assistance. All persons onboard were wearing lifejackets, no confirmed persons onboard. They stated that the Abeille had departed the scene.
- 3.5.51 At 0949UTC call collection for GIN 041442, information from the BT operator was that the persons said they were on a boat, just women and children. There was no position information and that they spoke in a foreign language.
- 3.5.52 At 0949UTC ARCC request MRCC Dover confirm which asset was required. R175 was requested due to the number of sightings and limited number of surface vessels available.
- 3.5.53 At 0950UTC call collection for incident KILO1. The caller was at a campsite at Kinsdown and reported two small boats just off the coast near the golf course approximately $\frac{3}{4}$ mile offshore. The small boats were heading to Dover. The first informant was **Name** and telephone number **PD** 713.
- 3.5.54 At 0950UTC R175 is tasked
- 3.5.55 At 0951UTC call collection for LIMA1. Telephone number **PD** 922 is recorded and they reported that they were in a boat near Dungeness, with 60 persons onboard including 5 women and 7 children, no lifejackets. The small boat was black and had departed from Itablez, France. The first informant name was Ali and the small boat engine was working. A position 50° 40.38N 0° 57.47E was also recorded in the incident.
- 3.5.56 At 0952UTC the tactical commander enters a ViSION narrative to reflect the discussion with the SMC at MRCC Dover. Network support will be given by the JRCC with 1x VHF Channel 16 distress, urgency and safety operator and 1x routine operator. The drone is identified as being unable to cover the patrol box DELTA. Request for SAR-H is to cover the gap until the fixed wing aircraft arrives for domain awareness.
- 3.5.57 At 0953UTC call collection for NOVEMBER1. In position 50° 53.48N 005° 21.89 E, with 60 People onboard with 4 Children including a 6 month old child. The black small boat was making way, and they had been at sea for 6



- hours. The first informant's name was **Name**, and his telephone number **PD** 510. He also stated that someone had asthma. He stated he had not rung the Coastguard before when asked.
- 3.5.58 At 0956UTC ARCC inform MRCC Dover that R175 had been tasked and that they would advise when CG25 was airborne.
- 3.5.59 At 0958UTC Deal Coastguard Rescue Team confirm they will investigate incident KILO1.
- 3.5.60 At 0959UTC call collection for incident MIKE1. 999 Call. The caller stated they thought they were near Dungeness and had come from Calais, there were 2 children, 26/27 men 33-35 POB. The first informant's name was Ali and his phone number was unknown. He stated that the green small boat was sinking and the persons onboard were wearing lifejackets. He stated that there was no internet on the phone as no signal and the telephone number **PD** 243 is recorded. He stated that he was 10km away from land. The following position was recorded 50.886954118183866, 1.11284715535092473 in the incident.
- 3.5.61 At 0959UTC CG26 is identified as responding with an ETA onscene of 1110UTC.
- 3.5.62 At 0959UTC TACOM sends a ViSION flash message to MRCC Dover to use Talk Box 5 for Channel 16 due to the volume of communications between the COLO & Dover Ops
- 3.5.63 At 1005UTC call collection for PAPA1 recorded. It was a weak signal and the line dropped The caller said that they were on a boat with a lot of people and they sounded foreign.
- 3.5.64 At 1005UTC Call collection for OSCAR1. No service request and the caller just said hi at times but nothing else. The police informed the BT operator to pass the call to the Coastguard, but it dropped before it was possible to do so. There was a boat engine in the background.
- 3.5.65 At 1007UTC call collection for QUEBEC1. The caller requested the Coastguard and stated that they were in the sea, but did not know their location. He stated he had no internet connection. There were 44 persons onboard, including 4 women and 3 children. The caller stated that he thought someone onboard was having a heart attack and they could not breathe. The



small boat was White, he stated that he had called 4 or 5 times before. He stated that they were freezing and wet. His name was Ahmed.

- 3.5.66 At 1007UTC call collection for ROMEO1. This was call attempt 3 from this number, this information was from BT. The caller stated he needed help and that they were close to the British shore and they had kids and women onboard. The telephone number: [PD] 866 was recorded. The telephone number didn't appear on the tracker and positioned on MRCC Dover as no position data was available.
- 3.5.67 At 1007UTC call collection for TANGO1. There were 35 persons onboard the white small boat, 10 metres in length. They departed Audresselles at 0200. They were in the sea and had called previously. There were 35 persons onboard including 3 children. The telephone number was [PD] 380. And the phone battery was at 30%. The small boat was losing inflation and there were large waves coming over the top of the boat. The outboard was still running but making little progress. Half the persons onboard had lifejackets and they could not see the coast, they could only see 3 x Fishing Vessel and a big cargo ship. They departed at 0200UTC from Audresselles, France.
- 3.5.68 At 1008UTC the tactical commander identified in ViSION that from the tracker incident CHARLIE is confirmed as 41 persons recovered and the small boat abandoned and marked.
- 3.5.69 At 1008UTC ViSION Flash message from MRCC Dover that all Dover IP aerials for Zone 14 are faulted.
- 3.5.70 At 1009UTCv the tactical commander makes an entry in ViSION that Valiant onscene with CHARLIE incident and numerous vessels around, possibly migrant incident MIKE. R175 and CG22 were proceeding for domain awareness patrol box CHARLIE and DELTA.
- 3.5.71 At 1009UTC Coordination of PAPA1 incident was passed to MRCC Dover.
- 3.5.72 At 1010UTC a tactical commander entry is made in ViSION. Note no positional information known and a high number of small boat crossings were being investigated as part of the larger HMCG response.
- 3.5.73 At 1010UTC call collection for incident SIERRA1. The caller stated that they were off Southampton, off the South of England and were 1 or 2 hours off the beach. They stated they were in the boat, but the water is too high and the boat goes left or right. There were 50 persons onboard - 30 men 10 women



10 children. The small boat was black and they had lifejackets for the adults only, not the children. The first informant's name was [Name] and his phone number was not known. The Coastguard was able to record telephone [PD] 866 which was the number auto filled in vision but unconfirmed if correct) The caller stated it was a bad situation and they needed food and there was water inside the boat. They came from France. He stated he could see two ships and nothing else.

3.5.74 At 1011UTC the tactical commander recorded the following RAG statement in ViSION.

R. TANGO - CPV HUNTER on scene & recovered 28 POB

A. Phase and actions appropriate

G. Nil

S. SMC R. Cockerill"

3.5.75 At 1011UTC call collection for UNIFORM1 recorded. No customer number was available. The caller stated that they were in the sea. They had been out at sea for 9 hours. The caller stated they had called 7 times, but no one had come for them. Their position was 50° 41.002N 000° 56.45E, there were 50 persons onboard including 7 children and 7 women. The small boat was black. The caller's name was [Name] and they had no lifejackets.

3.5.76 At 1012UTC NOVEMBER1 incident coordination was handed to MRCC Dover and it was noted that the position was incorrect for migrant small boat incidents.

3.5.77 At 1013UTC HMC Valiant confirm that they had started to off-load persons at Dover Port. Due to them starting at 0100UTC it would be unlikely they will be tasked again and will stand down shortly.

3.5.78 At 1013UTC the SMC identified the phone numbers for QUEBEC1 and ALPHA1 are the same.

3.5.79 At 1015UTC the BT Operator informs MRCC Dover of a dropped 999 call, they had no information to pass.

3.5.80 At 1016UTC QUEBEC1 incident is closed as a repeat of ALPHA1.



- 3.5.81 At 1016UTC ViSION Flash message from JRCC the fault is recorded as a Priority 1 and IT were investigating
- 3.5.82 At 1016UTC ViSION flash message that R175 were airbourne, ETA 1040UTC and 2 hours endurance.
- 3.5.83 At 1017UTC incident UNIFORM1 coordination handed to MRCC Dover.
- 3.5.84 At 1017UTC SMC identified that the phone number for TANGO1 matched ZULU.
- 3.5.85 At 1018UTC ROMEO1 is closed as a repeat of OSCAR1.
- 3.5.86 At 1022UTC SIERRA1 is closed as a repeat of OSCAR1.
- 3.5.87 At 1023UTC AR3 proceeding to relocate VICTOR incident.
- 3.5.88 At 1023UTC call collection for VICTOR1. Telephone number [PD] 119 is recorded and the caller stated they were in the sea and could not see land as too far away. There were 44 persons onboard including 3 children and 4 women. The small boat was white and they departed Calais at 0100UTC. They did not have food or water and only some people had lifejackets. The caller stated they had called the Coastguard 6 times previously.
- 3.5.89 At 1026UTC call collection for ALPHA2. Telephone number [PD] 866 is recorded and the caller stated that they were in the sea with a boat, and needed help. There were 45 to 50 persons onboard, with 20-30 men, 10 children and 10 women. The small boat was black and they had called previously and they were worried that the small boat would sink. The first informant name was [Name] He stated he did not know his position but thought he might be off Hastings. There were two vessels far away and a large ship a little closer, with a white lower hull and blue/red upper hull. Maersk vessel of some type.
- 3.5.90 At 1028UTC call collection for WHISKEY1. This is a report of a green small boat with 25 persons onboard, including 1 child All were wearing lifejackets and the small boat was dead in the water with no power. Position 50° 58.89N 001° 22.88E is recorded in the incident.
- 3.5.91 At 1030UTC ARCC inform MRCC Dover that CG26 is airbourne with an estimated time of arrival of 50 minutes.
- 3.5.92 At 1032UTC VICTOR1 is closed as a repeat of ALPHA1.



- 3.5.93 At 1037UTC MRCC Dover contacted UKBF MCC to ascertain how long it would be until BF vessels would be available to task again. UKBF MCC stated it would be HMC HUNTER but no time of availability at that time.
- 3.5.94 At 1037UTC call collection for Incident ZULU1. Call from Kent police, who received a call from a green boat in the water. There was water in the boat, and they had been in the boat for about 4 hours. There were 40 POB, including 7 children between 2 and 6 years old. The operator recorded that they could hear the children crying quite a bit in the background. There was no telephone number or positions recorded.
- 3.5.95 At 1037UTC call collection for BRAVO 2. No number recorded from BT. The caller stated that they needed help, they were 20km from Brighton, they departed from France to England, and they had given this information before, more than 20 mins ago. They had children onboard, 5 patients, and a pregnant lady, who had maybe lost her baby. They were in an emergency situation. The caller's name was [Name]
- 3.5.96 At 1039UTC Dover RNLi Lifeboat were tasked to WHISKEY1. Request launch of ALB to proceed to migrant vessel that is dead in the water with 25 POB including 1 child. The Vessel Louise Jane was standing by but unable to assist. Position is 50 58.89N 001 22.88E.
- 3.5.97 At 1039 call collection for DELTA2. The caller stated that they were on the sea next to the Dungeness- 27km off. They had 60 persons onboard - 4 children and 4 women. They were next to a boat - Maersk line. They had called before. The caller's name was [Name] - telephone numbers [PD] 922 and [PD] 627. They only had 6 lifejackets and had no oil. The coastguard officer identified 50°41.717'N 000°51.517'E - position on the location of the Maersk SEMBAWANG as no AIS data for the Maersk-line is available.
- 3.5.98 At 1042UTC call collection for ECHO2. Caller stated they were in a boat between France and UK. They left 10 hours ago. There were 50 people onboard including 16- 20 children and they had no lifejackets. They had a problem with their motor and were not moving. Caller's name was [Name] and telephone number [PD] 208. He stated he had rung on another number 30 minutes ago and there was water inside the small boat. The following position was recorded in the incident 50.7521893, 0.9600344.
- 3.5.99 At1044 ALPHA2 is made a repeat of OSCAR1.



- 3.5.100 At 1044UTC call collection for CHARLIE2. The caller stated they need help and came from France. There were 60 persons onboard with women, children, and babies. He had called previously many times. He stated he had no network to send a position, he stated they were heading for Brighton but had no engine now.
- 3.5.101 At 1049UTC Southeast Coast Ambulance call MRCC Dover to say they had received a call from a small boat. The stated the caller said there were 50 people in a small boat. 6 children in the boat between 1-3 years old. They left France 9 hours ago and could see a large container ship. No telephone number was available, and they did not have lifejackets. They thought a boat was going to help them and said RNLI 13-28 was onscene, during the call.
- 3.5.102 At 1051UTC R175 was recorded onscene.
- 3.5.103 At 1051UTC Deal CRT are onscene nothing to report.
- 3.5.104 At 1051UTC AR3 report they have eyes on the vessel Louise Jane, the small boat in position 50°58.4020N 001°22.2655E with 20 to 30 persons onboard and looked fine.
- 3.5.105 At 1052UTC ECHO2 coordination handed to MRCC Dover
- 3.5.106 At 1055UTC R175 reported, 2 Migrant small boats – small boat 1 position at 1048UTC 50° 52.51N 000°56E North at 5 knots, grey inflatable, approximately 20 ft long, 40 persons onboard some with and some without lifejackets, they do not look like in distress
- Small boat position 2: 1052UTC at 50°52.18N 000°57.50E North at 10 knots, green inflatable, approximately 24 ft, 38 persons onboard mixed with and without lifejackets, not in distress.
- 3.5.107 At 1055UTC Hastings RNLI is onscene with incident XRAY.
- 3.5.108 At 1055UTC LIMA1 identified as a repeat of of DELTA 2
- 3.5.109 At 1057UTC Hastings Lifeboat in position 50° 42.15N 000°55.57E. The small boat has 60 Persons onboard, and vessel stopped in the water. Lifeboat advise they cannot tow the vessel to land
- 3.5.110 At 1057UTC MRCC Dover informs the Vessel Louise Jane that Dover RNLI Lifeboat is proceeding. The Louise Jane advise that they are not happy to take anyone onboard.



3.5.111 At 1059UTC ECHO2 is closed as a repeat of DELTA2

3.6 Timeline 1100 to 1257UTC

- 3.6.1 At 1100UTC call collection for FOXTROT2. From R175 another small boat sighting by the power station, with 11 persons onboard, heading East along the beach. The small boat was black, offshore and empty approximately 500 metres from the shore.
- 3.6.2 At 1102UTC an airwave transmission was received reporting four landings at Dungeness so far.
- 3.6.3 At 1106UTC Lima1 is closed as a repeat of DELTA2.
- 3.6.4 At 1109UTC Hastings lifeboat advise that they can possibly take 40 persons on the lifeboat leaving 20 on the casualty small boat which they can then attempt to tow. It is identified that Eastbourne Lifeboat can be onscene in 1 hour.
- 3.6.5 At 1111UTC Hastings Lifeboat are informed that Dungeness Lifeboat will be tasked to assist them.
- 3.6.6 At 1112UTC call collection for GOLF2. There is lots of shouting on board and it is difficult to hear the caller. The telephone number is [REDACTED] PD [REDACTED] 866. He stated that they were in the sea but no exact location. The caller's name was Mohamed. The black small boat had 50 persons onboard with 10 women and 10 children and they did not have lifejackets. There was water in the boat and they were nearly at Hastings.
- 3.6.7 At 1115UTC Dover Lifeboat report an ETA of 30 minutes to incident WHISKEY 1.
- 3.6.8 At 1115UTC call collection for HOTEL2. They are in UKSRR. The small boat was located by WhatsApp, position 51 05.56N 001 40.26E, with 30 POB. Phone number was [REDACTED] PD [REDACTED] 584. No other details available.
- 3.6.9 At 1118UTC Dover lifeboat Coxswain is informed the vessel Portia may have gone to the FV Louise Jane. It was believed a film crew may be onboard.
- 3.6.10 At 1119UTC Dungeness RNLI lifeboat relaunched on service.
- 3.6.11 At 1121UTC Dungeness RNLI lifeboat tasked to proceed to assist Hastings Lifeboat with incident XRAY.



- 3.6.12 At 1121UTC Incident GOLF2 is identified as a repeat of OSCAR1.
- 3.6.13 At 1123UTC Dungeness Lifeboat report an empty small boat in position 50° 53.93N 000° 59.1E.
- 3.6.14 At 1123UTC Call collection for INDIA2. Caller reported that 22 persons had landed ashore and were running towards the power station at Dungeness. The black small boat had been beached. The First information name was Name
- 3.6.15 At 1124UTC Incident GOLF2 coordination handed to MRCC Dover.
- 3.6.16 At 1125UTC Dungeness Lifeboat report a small boat proceeding under their own power, estimated 1 nautical mile from Dungeness Point. The lifeboat is requested to proceed with the original tasking.
- 3.6.17 At 1125UTC call collection for incident JULIET2. Call from Kent Police. Small boat with 44 POB including woman and children. They could see a lighthouse. Telephone number PD 521. It was a very noisy call and no name was given.
- 3.6.18 At 1127UTC Dover Coastguard identify Kent police have been informed of the landing near the power station at Dungeness.
- 3.6.19 At 1128UTC GOLF2 is identified as a repeat of OSCAR1.
- 3.6.20 At 1132UTC call collection for KILO2. Caller stated they were in the middle of the sea with no location. They had called previously. Caller's name was Ahmed and telephone number PD 866. Small boat was black and with 50 people onboard including 10 kids and 7 women. The engine was still working. The position recorded in the incident was 50.898779, 0.946217.
- 3.6.21 At 1133UTC Hastings Lifeboat report they are taking casualties onboard with one pregnant female reporting stomach pain. Lifeboat report they are leaving the vessel to head to Rye due to paramedic guidance that the female needs to be taken off quickly.
- 3.6.22 At 1134UTC RNLi HQ informed of multiple lifeboat taskings.
- 3.6.23 At 1136UTC R175 assigned to incident XRAY.
- 3.6.24 At 1137UTC Hastings Lifeboat requested to remain with the small boat until the arrival of R175.



- 3.6.25 At 1137UTC Dover Lifeboat report onscene with the Fishing Vessel Louise Jane and the small boat.
- 3.6.26 At 1137UTC call collection for LIMA2. Report from the vessel AMANDINE in the north east lane. they will also report the information to Gris-Nez MRCC. Small boat number 1 is 340.2°, distance 0.5nm from the AMANDINE black in colour with approximately 20-30 POB some wearing lifejackets.
- 3.6.27 At 1138UTC JRCC SMC identified OSCAR1 and KILO2 have the same telephone number.
- 3.6.28 At 1140UTC call collection for MIKE2. Report from the vessel AMANDINE in the north east lane. They were also advised to call Gris-Nez MRCC. Small boat number 2 is 051.7° distance 0.5nm from the AMANDINE grey in colour with approx 20-25 POB can't see any lifejackets.
- 3.6.29 At 1141UTC R175 advise MRCC Dover they will recover the pregnant female and proceed to Eastbourne hospital. This is relating to incident XRAY.
- 3.6.30 At 1147UTC French Tracker is received.
- 3.6.31 At 1148UTC call collection for NOVEMBER2. The call dropped prior to handover. BT Operator stated they said they were on a boat.
- 3.6.32 At 1153UTC Dover Lifeboat confirm they have casualties onboard. 22 POB, 4 females and one child with no sickness or injuries.
- 3.6.33 At 1153UTC call collection for OSCAR2. Migrants in UK search and rescue region. Position 51° 04.55N 001° 38.0E from WhatsApp. No persons recorded, telephone number PD 919.
- 3.6.34 At 1153UTC call collection for PAPA2. Caller stated they needed help and that they haven't seen a helicopter. Caller's name was Name and he had called 20 minutes ago. The small boat was black with 50 people on the boat. He said he couldn't drive the boat and the boat was full of water and they were freezing.
- 3.6.35 At 1154UTC Gris-Nez MRCC reported to MRCC Dover, migrants in UK area in position 51° 04.55N 001° 38.05E from WhatsApp. No persons.
PD 919
- 3.6.36 At 1158UTC PAPA2 incident is closed as a repeat of DELTA2



- 3.6.37 At 1202UTC a further update on OSCAR2 incident from Gris-Nez MRCC who transferred the call. The caller said they were on a green small boat with 25 people. The small boat had a problem, and they wanted to the UK. The caller's name was Kazan, there were no children onboard and all had orange lifejackets.
- 3.6.38 1203UTC The COLO informed MRCC Dover that UKBF required assistance at the Tug Haven.
- 3.6.39 1203UTC call collection for incident QUEBEC2. From Gris-Nez MRCC, the small boat telephone number [PD]717, with 41 persons onboard, and then the call was transferred. The caller stated they had 1 child onboard and were wearing red lifejackets. They thought they were around Dover. They stated they would send their location then the call disconnected.
- 3.6.40 At 1205UTC R175 report the winchman is onboard small boat XRAY. R175 request confirmation of the nearest maternity unit due to working out of their normal operational area. Hastings is identified as the nearest maternity unit
- 3.6.41 At 1207UTC call collection for TANGO2. The caller stated they were in a white boat, with 50 POB – including 7 children and 5 women. The small boat engine was not working. The caller stated he could see a ship and they did not have any lifejackets.
- 3.6.42 At 1208UTC call collection for incident ROMEO2. The caller stated there were a lot of people, 30 people. No Lifejackets and they were in position 50° 51.99N 001° 02.04E.
- 3.6.43 At 1208UTC ARCC inform Dover Coastguard that R175 will be returning to base for a crew change once the casualty has arrived at Ashford hospital. Dover confirm they are happy to keep the fixed wing on-scene.
- 3.6.44 At 1211UTC call collection for SIERRA2. Kent Police reported a Migrant small boat coming from Paris with 10 persons onboard, they could see 2 blue ships and 1 white one. No names were provided. The migrants were in a white boat near 2 blue ships.
- 3.6.45 At 1212UTC ARCC contact Ashford hospital to report R175 is bringing in a pregnant female from a migrant vessel who is suffering stomach pains.
- 3.6.46 At 1215UTC a further call from small boat OSCAR2. It was a call back from Kazan, He stated that he needed help, and there was water in the boat. The coastguard operator stated that assistance was on the way.



- 3.6.47 Call collection for UNIFORM2. The caller stated that he had called many times and was near Hastings. The caller stated that someone else on the boat had called and their name was [Name]. There were 50 people onboard. The telephone number for [Name] was [PD] 866. A position is recorded in VISION 50.821836 0.917742.
- 3.6.48 At 1216UTC BFMCC informed of small boat ROMEO 2. HMC ARTEMIS to be tasked to locate and assess.
- 3.6.49 At 1218UTC CG26 confirm they have completed the search of Box CHARLIE and nothing was seen.
- 3.6.50 At 1220UTC Hastings lifeboat report that R175 has a second casualty onboard. A second boat is identified as being in position 50° 48.70N 000° 55.2E. Hastings lifeboat were proceeding to Rye and a land team is requested to meet them. Multiple landings have been reported at Dungeness. The lifeboat advise they can proceed to Hastings but CRT and police would be required to meet them.
- 3.6.51 At 1221UTC Dungeness Lifeboat report they have 25 male casualties onboard. The casualty small boat has been left in situ marked with red and white tape and pink paint. They state they will be 20 minutes ETA to station.
- 3.6.52 At 1224UTC MRCC Dover request CG26 to MPC buoy to identify vessels then proceed to Sandettie Light Vessel.
- 3.6.53 At 1224UTC MRCC identify that OSCAR1 is a repeat of UNIFORM2.
- 3.6.54 At 1226UTC MRCC Dover request Hastings Lifeboat proceed to Dungeness Lifeboat Station as all officers and transport will be present. Hastings advise they will identify landing conditions with Dungeness Lifeboat.
- 3.6.55 At 1226UTC Dover Lifeboat report they are with the target in position 51° 01.24N 001°24.24E.
- 3.6.56 At 1226UTC call collection for WHISKEY2. The caller stated their telephone number is [PD] 011 and their name was [Name]. He did not know where he was and could see a ship – with LNG on it. There were 50 people onboard, including 7 children and 5 women. The small boat was white and the engine was broken, and they had been in the water for 8 hours. They stated that he had called before, and he thought he was 6km away from Romney.



- 3.6.57 At 1227UTC call collection for VICTOR2. A call from FV Elizabeth Jane reported a small boat heading towards Dungeness, most of the persons had lifejackets, and there were approximately 30 persons onboard. The small boat was a black inflatable, in position 50-52.607N 001-01.737E.
- 3.6.58 At 1228UTC Dover RNLI ALB is assigned to the incident and identified as being on-scene.
- 3.6.59 At 1230UTC Hastings Lifeboat confirm to Dover that they are proceeding to Dungeness.
- 3.6.60 At 1232UTC HMC Hunter are onscene with small boat HOTEL2.
- 3.6.61 At 1234UTC Dover Lifeboat report they have taken onboard casualty vessels from SIERRA2, all males, only 2 wearing lifejackets, and the intention is to return to Dover. The first tasking was 8-9m dark green inflatable with Suzuki 9.9 outboard.
- 3.6.62 At 1240UTC 2Excel inform ARCC that 26A is in the Dover Straits, but has had a technical issue. The aircraft will keep going and land at Southend for refuel with 1 hour endurance remaining. 2Excel advise they can get them ack to Doncaster after refuel and transfer them to CG25 so they can fix CG26. There will be a 2 hour delay to depart from Southend and back to scene.
- 3.6.63 At 1249UTC The vessel identified in small boat WHISKEY2, is the LNG CLEAN HORIZON, have asked CNIS to ask vessel if they have visual.
- 3.6.64 At 1250UTC Dungeness Lifeboat 's boathouse are informed by Dover Coastguard that a second tasking is highly likely and they are requested to turn the boat around quickly.
- 3.6.65 At 1252UTC ARCC inform MRCC Dover that CG26A were able to fly out again for approximately 3 hours as the technical issue was not affecting SAR capabilities.
- 3.6.66 At 1256UTC Kent Police informed MRCC Dover of a small boat about 4 kilometres from land. The caller stated they could see Romney Power Station. Kent Police stated they had the call 1 minute previously. There was no telephone Number recorded and there were 14 persons onboard, including 7 children.



- 3.6.67 At 1256UTC Hastings lifeboat reported they could see another vessel 1 mile off their starboard beam. In position 50° 53.55N 001° 00.27E but it looked empty.
- 3.6.68 At 1257UTC MRCC Dover recorded they sent a WhatsApp message to small boat WHISKEY2 in an attempt to locate the casualty small boat. The LNG Clean Horizon had been contacted by CNIS and report they had nothing visual.
- 3.6.69 At 1257UTC MRCC Dover receive a call from Gris-Nez MRCC Gris Nez stating they had a current rescue operation with 10-15 people in the water, and they were Gris-Nez ask if it was possible to send some drone or aircraft, to position 51 05.58N, 001 43.41E. The first informant was a report from fishing vessel. Gris-Nez informed MRCC Dover that the Flammant was tasked as well as a SAR helicopter.
- 3.6.70 At 1300UTC MRCC Dover recorded an attempt to contact the casualty for WHISKEY2 by telephone has been made and a voice message has been left.



3.7 Charlie Incident

3.7.1 On 22 March 2022 HM Coastguard received information confirming some of the telephone numbers belonging to persons who were aboard the small boat which subsequently sank on 24 November 2021. From this we have been able to confirm that HM Coastguard received calls from people from the small boat on the morning of 24 November. Below is the incident narrative for CHARLIE incident which is the incident associated to these telephone numbers. This has been separated out from the timeline above to provide a clearer understanding of the activity and messages associated with the incident. It is however important to remember the incident was not prosecuted in isolation and the timeline above provides a true overview of the activity that morning.

3.7.2 At 0115UTC CHARLIE incident was created by MRCC Dover based on the information received from Gris-Nez MRCC for Migrant 7. The information recorded is as follows:

French Migrant 7 is UK Migrant CHARLIE

30 persons onboard – 13 women and 8 children, 14 of the people have lifejackets.

Dinghy appears in good condition

Tel numbers: 095 and 166

3.7.3 At 0122UTC the position 51° 06.51N 001° 46.21E is entered into ViSION. This was passed from Gris-Nez MRCC during the call at 0106UTC and was received from the small boat via WhatsApp.

3.7.4 At 0124UTC UKBF MCC are logged in the ViSION narrative as being informed of incident CHARLIE. A brief description of the call to UKBF MCC at 0120UTC is logged in the ViSION narrative at 0124UTC.

3.7.5 At 0125UTC Dover Coastguard made an announcement on VHF Radio Channel 16 to all vessels in the Dover Strait. This is an alert to a supplementary information service broadcast concerning search and rescue operations in the Dover Strait to listen to Channel 11.

3.7.6 At 0126UTC Dover Coastguard made the following broadcast on VHF Channel 11:



“All Ships this is Dover Coastguard. SAR Operations. Following confirmed reports of small boat crossings this evening, vessels are requested to post extra lookouts whilst transiting the south-west lane between the Interbank Buoy and the South Varne Buoy and report any sightings of small craft to Dover Coastguard on CHF Channel 16. The next routine broadcast by Dover Coastguard on Channel 11 is as 0147UTC. Ends. This is Dover Coastguard.”

- 3.7.7 At 0130UTC there is a ViSION entry that UKBF MCC confirm that HMC Valiant has been tasked to CHARLIE incident and will be departing from Dover.
- 3.7.8 At 0133UTC 2Excel report that they are planning a flight but that there are likely to be delays due to the weather.
- 3.7.9 At 0143UTC the SMC at MRCC Dover has returned to SAR duty and makes an entry in the ViSION narrative that CHARLIE incident is upgraded to a distress incident as it is in the UK Search and Rescue Region, the condition of the craft is unknown nor the persons onboard as there is no French asset with the vessel.
- 3.7.10 At 0148UTC Gris-Nez MRCC transfers a call to MRCC Dover from French Migrant 7 / UK CHARLIE. It is unknown how long Gris-Nez MRCC were on a call with Migrant 7/UK CHARLIE, prior to this call being transferred to MRCC Dover. The call is taken by the SMC at MRCC Dover and lasts for 21 minutes and 14 seconds. The name of the caller is Mubin. It is very difficult to understand what Mubin is saying due to lots of shouting in the background. A WhatsApp number is requested by Mubin and the MRCC Dover mobile phone number is passed – again there is a lot of confusion and shouting making it very difficult, almost impossible to hear what Mubin is saying. The Coastguard operator asks for others to be quiet throughout the call and for only one person to speak. He confirms he is the UK Coastguard.

The following number is passed by Mubin [PD] 879 – the operator tries to read it back but there is too much background noise and shouting. Mubin states that there are 40 persons on board and that they have no internet. The signal/connection is weak at times throughout the call. The Coastguard officer states that a WhatsApp message is sent to the phone number, then Mubin provides another telephone number for WhatsApp – [PD] 057. The Coastguard Officer confirms that he is sending a WhatsApp message to the number and a normal message also.



Mubin asks if a boat will be sent to them, which is confirmed by the Coastguard Officer, but he explains that it will take time for it to arrive.

Mubin confirmed he received a message from MRCC Dover, and he was then sending a live location on WhatsApp. Mubin asks if they are in UK waters and the Coastguard officer stated that he was just checking, and a boat was on its way to them. Mubin then stated that he could see a light and there was an increase in shouting and screaming for the next few minutes with people on the boat shouting “look left”, and “can see the light”. The coastguard officer tried to explain that he was not on the boat and that he was trying to contact that vessel to request they keep a sharp lookout, and that the Coastguard were sending a boat to help. (Contact was made see further down the timeline). This continues for a few minutes and then the call drops out.

An entry is made into the ViSION incident narrative for incident CHARLIE at 0211UTC with a brief description that the call was unreadable with shouting, WhatsApp messages sent and there were 40 POB and a telephone number [PD] 057.

- 3.7.11 At 0149UTC a message was sent via WhatsApp from the MRCC Dover mobile phone to [PD] 879 saying “This is the UK Coastguard” and “Please send us your position”.

A response to those messages with a position was received by the mobile phone at 0220UTC. The position received was 51.149422,1.754940 which converted to latitude and longitude is 51° 008.96N 001° 45.296E

At 0152UTC an updated French Tracker was logged in the Migrant Admin incident. No telephone numbers are recorded on the sheet from the French Coastguard.



Ref FR	Ref UK	n° SITREP	Heure détection (UTC)	Secteur	Origine de l'alerte & Moyen de détection	Support embarquant les migrants (type, couleur, L, propulsion)	POB (MF=enfant, autres=beaux-pères)	SRU en ralliement ou en recherche	SRU au contact ou en sauvetage	Route/vitesse estimée	Heure dernière position (UTC)	Dernière position connue	SRU GI pour relai OÙ Port FR de destination	Heure ou HPA du relai ou de débarquement (UTC)
1			2102	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	40	FLAMANT		284° / 6 NDS		51°07.40N / 001°42.67E	possible MIG 7 et 9	
2			2224	LEFFRINKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		266° / 6 NDS	0023	51°05.18N / 002°12.54E		
3			2224	LEFFRINKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		272° / 6 NDS	0000	51°05.09N 002°02.60		
4			2228	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
5			2316	WISSANT	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	15			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
6			0013	LEFFRINKOUCKE	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	30			276ANDS	0000	51°04.58N / 002°25.96E		
7			0048	Bouée MPC	SAMU G2	SEMI RIGIDE	33 13 enfants 6 enfants			305 / 4	0130	51°07.4N 001°45.4E	SRR UK à 0130 UTC Possible MIG 1 et 9	
8			0107	Berck	Police	SEMI RIGIDE GRIS	30 à 40							
9			0111	Dunkerque ?	Mi migrant		33 3 enfants 6 femmes						possible MIG 7 et 1	
10			0136				40							

3.7.12 At 0154UTC incident INDIA was created from the French tracker in ViSION, which was linked to French migrant 9. It was reported to have 33 persons onboard, 3 infants and 6 females. This is linked to incident CHARLIE as stated on the French tracker.

3.7.13 At 0200UTC a WhatsApp message was sent to PD 057 which is linked to incident CHARLIE stating “please send us your position”.

A response was received at 0201UTC with a WhatsApp position.


The position is 51.146557, 1.748657 which converted to latitude and longitude is 51° 08.476N 001° 44.52E. This is the position used in the mayday relay and passed to search and rescue units.

A further message was sent from MRCC Dover at 0207UTC asking “can you re send your location”. At this time Mubin was still on a call with MRCC Dover which did not finish until 0211UTC

A second position was received at 0221UTC. The position is 51° 09.045N 001° 45.568E.

3.7.14 At 0206UTC Dover CNIS contact the LPG Vessel Gaschem Schinano. This is a result of the people on the 999 call that is still ongoing with Mubin, shouting that they can see a vessel. The vessel Gaschem Schinano state they have no targets or lights in sight, when asked by the Coastguard Officer. The image below is the AIS screenshot of the location of Gaschem Schinano when they were contacted by HM Coastguard. Their position is 0.9 nm away from the WhatsApp position, and is inside the UK search and rescue region.





3.7.15 At 0207UTC a further WhatsApp message was sent to PD 057 asking “can you re send your location”.

3.7.16 At 0209UTC a text (normal) message was sent from the MRCC Dover mobile phone to PD 057.

The message stated “Can you share your google maps location. No response was received on normal text messages. This number did respond to WhatsApp messages previously, however.

3.7.17 At 0213UTC a ViSION narrative entry is made that a position was received from WhatsApp – PD 057 – the position in the ViSION narrative is 51° 08.476N 001° 44.552E. This was received on the phone at 0201UTC. (Incident CHARLIE)

3.7.18 At 0220UTC a position was received from WhatsApp from PD 879 to MRCC Dover mobile telephone.

3.7.19 At 0221UTC a WhatsApp position is received from PD 057 to Dover MRCC mobile telephone.



- 3.7.20 At 0224 the SMC at Dover creates the Mayday Relay broadcast; Small Craft with 40 persons on board in position 51° 08.5N 001° 44.5E this bears 244° 1.8nm from Sandettie Light Vessel, taking water and requiring immediate assistance any vessel that can assist to contact Dover Coastguard
- 3.7.21 At 0225UTC a 999 call is received from a small boat. The person said his name was Jonas and he was in the middle of the sea and they were sinking. They had lost their engine and the engine had stopped. They were halfway between France and England. They departed Dunkirk at 2100hrs on 23 November. He could see a vessel approximately 3km away, then the call dropped. No telephone number was available through the BT operator. This call was not recorded in CHARLIE incident. The information being reported is almost identical to that from the call with Mubin.
- 3.7.22 At 0225UTC the SMC at Dover sent an instant message to the JRCC that the Mayday Relay was ready for them to broadcast on behalf of MRCC Dover.
- 3.7.23 At 0227UTC the Mayday relay was broadcast. It was preceded by a Digital Selective Call but was only an urgency alert and should have been a distress alert, it did however still go to all vessels.

The broadcast was:

Mayday Relay x 3

All Stations x 3

This is Dover Coastguard x 3

Mayday information number 1

Small craft with 40 persons on board In position

51° 08.5N 001° 44.5E, this position bears 244° distance 1.8 nautical miles from Sandettie Light Vessel

Taking water and requires immediate assistance

Any vessel that can assist call Dover Coastguard

Date Time Group 240224UTC. This is Dover Coastguard.

- 3.7.24 At 0228UTC the SMC at Dover notes in the ViSION narrative that according to C-Scope the Flammant is the closest vessel. According to my plot the



Flammant is 4.3 nautical miles away from the Mayday relay position at 0230UTC. This is using data from AIS/C-scope in position 51° 07.768N 001° 52.345E.

3.7.25 At 0232UTC another 999 call was received at MRCC Dover. The number provided PD 187, 40 POB, departed from Calais, when asked what colour the boat was, to which there was no response. (I have listened to this call multiple times and I can confirm the person said his phone was close to the water.)

They then shouted for WhatsApp and confirmed sent to the UK – the telephone number was PD 394 then unreadable. The Coastguard operator recognised the telephone number and then asked how many times they had called the Coastguard and Police. He stated that he had spoken to Mubin and told Mubin that a boat was on the way, at that point Mubin confirmed he was there also on the phone.

3.7.26 They asked where the boat was and stated that they were dying. The Coastguard stated that they would have to wait for the boat it was on its way. They stated that the phone was close to the water. The coastguard officer explained it would take about 30 minutes and appreciated everyone was scared. They responded saying that it was too cold. They were told to stop calling as each time we get a call we may mistake them for another boat and it could prevent their rescue. The call then dropped.

3.7.27 At 0237UTC an update to the French Migrant Tracker was received. This had telephone numbers which had been received calls by the French Coastguard.

Ref FR	Ref UK	n° SITREP	Heure detection (UTC)	Secteur	Origine de l'alerte & Moyen de détection	Support embarquant les migrants (type, couleur, L. propulsion)	POB (H/F/enfant, avec/sans brevets)	SRU en ralliement ou en recherche	SRU au contact ou en sauvetage	Route/vitesse estimée	Heure dernière position (UTC)	Dernière position connue	SRU GB pour relai ou Port FR de destination	Heure ou HPA de relai ou de débarquement (UTC)
1			2102	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	40	FLAMANT		284° / 6 NDS		51°07.40N / 001°42.67E	possible MIG 7 et 9	
2			2224	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		266° / 6 NDS	0230	51°07.18N / 001°56.54E		
3			2224	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30	FLAMANT		272° / 6 NDS	0230	51°07.09N / 001°50.60	ETA SRR UK 03:30	
4			2230	CANAL DES DUNES	VIGIE DK	SEMI RIGIDE	30			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
5			2315	WISSANT	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	15			AT EARTH		AT EARTH – NO CROSSING		
6			0013	LEFFRINCKOUCKE	POLICE	SEMI RIGIDE	30			276°/NDS	00:00	51°04.58N / 002°25.08E		
7	A		0048	Bouée MPC	SAMU 62	SEMI RIGIDE	33 13 femmes 8 enfants			305 / 4	0130	51°07.40N / 001°45.4E	SRR UK à 0130 UTC Possible MIG 1 et 9	PD 23 12 96
8			0107	Berck	Police	SEMI RIGIDE GRIS	30 à 40							PD 87
9			0111	Dunkerque ?	tel migrant		33 3 enfants 6 femmes						possible MIG 7 et 1	PD 388 PD 05
10			0230	Bouée Sanddél	Flamant	NOIR	40	FLAMANT		300 / 6	0230	51°05 N / 001°51 E	ETA SRR UK 03:30	



3.7.28 The telephone numbers that the French have recorded are:

3.7.29 • French Migrant 7 - [PD] 523

3.7.30 • French Migrant 7 - [PD] 296

3.7.31 • French Migrant 8 - [PD] 187


3.7.32 • French Migrant 9 - [PD] 388

• French Migrant 9 - [PD] 605

3.7.33 At 0239UTC HMC Valiant request permission to proceed contrary to Rule 10 of the Collision Regulations (ColRegs) as responding to a SAR incident. This was confirmed by the SMC. Rule 10 states that ships crossing traffic lanes are required to do so "as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic flow." This reduces confusion to other ships as to the crossing vessel's intentions and course and at the same time enables that vessel to cross the lane as quickly as possible. By not following Rule 10 requirements Valiant was able to proceed to the last known position more quickly.

3.7.34 At 0242UTC Gris-Nez MRCC call MRCC Dover to ask about incident ALPHA response which is French Migrant 7. MRCC Dover inform Gris-Nez that the French Warship Flammant is closest vessel and the SMC states it is 3 nautical miles to the small boat who has stated it was sinking. Dover also state they have put out mayday relay and reinforce that Flammant is closest vessel. Gris Nez ask about Valiant and they are informed that Valiant is responding at best speed and has 9.5nm to run so will be onscene in 35-40 mins again the Dover operator states that Flammant is closest. French CG respond that Flammant is with French Migrant 10 incident, Dover reply asking what the status of the small boat is, especially as the other small boat was reported to be sinking. Gris Nez respond that Flammant is with Migrant 10. C-Scope track of the French Warship Flammant 24 November





- 3.7.35 At 0247UTC the JRCC make an entry in the incident narrative that the Search and Rescue Helicopter R163 will be airborne at 0330UTC for a 90 minute sortie.
- 3.7.36 At 0247UTC a further Mayday relay and DSC alert (Urgency again) was broadcast
- 3.7.37 At 0249UTC R163 call MRCC Dover to inform them that they should be airborne at 0330UTC patrolling for small boats and asked if any distress calls were being received at Dover. MRCC Dover confirmed they were receiving distress calls and R163 requested coordination from MRCC Dover from the start, as they may struggle with the weather. R163 Captain stated they required MRCC Dover to tell them exactly what they were required to do, unless the search instructions were ready to be passed. The Operator then transferred the call to the SMC. The Captain then informed the SMC that he requested clear instructions and asked if it was possible to provide something over the phone which they could start with and amend once they were proceeding



The SMC stated that there were numerous boats being reported, however he thought some were repeat calls. He requested R163 search from Mike Papa Charlie Buoy up to Sandettie Light Vessel and provided the latitude and longitude for Sandettie and a course and distance from Lydd. The SMC continued that the tide would be in a north east direction so the rectangle would be to the north-east to East Goodwin Light Vessel and for R163 to concentrate in that area. The SMC continued that HMC Valiant were proceeding to one vessel and another two small boats were reported to be heading to that area also.

R163 stated that the weather at Lydd was not too bad, but a risk at 0500UTC of shallow fog, and they would monitor conditions.

The SMC confirmed the mission was to search, no rescue as it would not be safe to winch from a small boat. The Captain confirmed they would take the life raft onboard. The SMC confirmed that visibility was good at Dover with a cloud height of around 750 feet approximately.

3.7.38 At 0257UTC there is a missed WhatsApp call from PD 057 on the Dover MRCC mobile phone

Screen shot of message

3.7.39 At 0301UTC A further Mayday relay is broadcast, with a DSC urgency alert.

3.7.40 At 0306UTC in CHARLIE incident the SMC states that ALPHA may be linked to CHARLIE as similar story and background noise, nothing further is recorded regarding this comment. There are no messages on the MRCC Dover mobile phone from or to the number for ALPHA incident.

3.7.41 At 0312UTC there was a missed WhatsApp call from PD 057 to MRCC Dover mobile phone.

3.7.42 At 0312UTC a 999 call was received at MRCC Dover. They stated they were in the water, finished and dying and requested help. There was shouting on the call and stated there were 40 persons onboard. The Coastguard Operator asked where they were – they stated in the water in English waters and continued their request for help. The operator did not get any other information and advised the caller to dial 999 which he stated he had done already. The operator stated that if that had not worked, then it was possible they were still in French waters and advised to dial 999 to see if position information could be made available.




message was timed at 0221UTC but was only seen at 0328UTC due to the volume of work and calls.

- 3.7.48 At 0333UTC there is a message to PD 057 from the Dover MRCC mobile phone stating “re send your position please”. This message is indicating that the message was not read as there is only one grey tick in the bottom of the right-hand side of the message. The other messages have two blue ticks in the bottom right side.
- 3.7.49 At 0334UTC Valiant report two potential targets on the night vision goggles. Range 7 cables from Valiant’s position 51° 09.6N 001° 47.5E. One vessel appeared to be stopped and the other was still moving.
- 3.7.50 At 0343UTC ARCC reported R163 serviceable and was preparing for taxiing.
- 3.7.51 At 0350UTC ARCC report that R163 are airborne and proceeding.
- 3.7.52 At 0350UTC Valiant report they are onscene with the vessel which had stopped – unlit migrant boat with 40 persons onboard. MRCC Dover respond saying they believed this small boat to be incident Charlie, name of person onboard (Mubin) and telephone number ending 057 passed to Valiant.
- 3.7.53 At 0354UTC R163 informed MRCC Dover they were proceeding to the scene. MRCC Dover passed updated information that Valiant were onscene and had seen one other craft in the area, so a search around Sandettie Light vessel with either an expanding square or parallel track search – whichever R163 thought was appropriate to search for other vessels in the area.
- 3.7.54 At 0403UTC R163 was reported as being onscene and commencing search.

C-scope track for R163 for the search at 0404UTC





- 3.7.55 At 0416UTC persons that were recovered to Valiant claim they had not called the UK authorities. No further questions are asked by MRCC Dover.
- 3.7.56 At 0436UTC Valiant report all persons recovered from the small boat and the vessel has been marked and has a strobe. Valiant report 35 persons recovered, 20 males, 2 females and 13 minors. Valiant then proceeded to a new position (identified earlier by R163). At 0451UTC Valiant receive an updated position of the second target from R163. This position is timed at 0432UTC 51° 08.0N 001° 41.8E.



Search Planning

4



4 SAR Plans

4.1 Actions on the 24 November

4.1.1 The Captain of R163 spoke to MRCC Dover at 0249UTC to confirm that they will be undertaking a patrol for small boats and should be airborne at 0330UTC. The SMC changed this to a search area based on the reported activity from telephone calls received and also the information from Gris-Nez MRCC.

The search area provided to the Captain at 0249UTC was:

From Mike Papa Charlie Buoy up to Sandettie Light Vessel and then to the East Goodwin Light Vessel as a rectangle. This area would cover the passage small boats would take when making way to the UK.

4.1.2 Then at 0354UTC R163 report to MRCC Dover that they are proceeding. MRCC Dover advised R163 that HMC Valiant were on scene in position 51° 10.5N 001° 47.5E, they were with one small boat and reported a second small boat in the vicinity. MRCC Dover then requested R163 search around the Sandettie Light Vessel with either an expanding square search or parallel track to search for other small boats in the area. This was a change to the original instruction simply because the situation had evolved.

4.1.3 The use of an expanding square search was valid for the report of the second vessel which is what the SMC requested R163 to search for as well as other vessels in the area. There is an assumption made that the sightings are connected to incident CHARLIE and therefore no application of drift from the last known position from the WhatsApp position was calculated, by the SMC.

4.1.4 At no time did the SMC request search plans to be calculated using the SARIS, this is the search planning modelling system used by HM Coastguard, which will calculate the drift of a target using wind and tidal information. Instead, he used his experience of small boat operations, knowledge and actual direction of drift from systems available to him to provide a search from the areas which had been identified during emergency calls and the information from the French tracker.

4.1.5 During the review I have calculated search plans using SARIS and the search area produced for the target type of a a a person in the water unknown state, as we know there was not enough lifejackets and some ofthe lifejackets were



in fact buoyancy aids. The formula for this used was $0.011xU+0.070$ divergence 40° . (U is the wind speed).

4.1.6 The Datum Time determines the size, shape and position of the search area. Current Search Planning software does not allow for dynamic target drift during a search. Therefore, the decision on what Datum Time to use and what area to search is critical. Once the Datum Time is decided, the Drift Elapse Time can be calculated. The SMC in creating the search applied this methodology.

4.1.7 For the model calculations in the review I have used the

AWAITING VISUAL SEARCH PLANS TO COMPLETE THIS SECTION



5 Findings on the Small Boat relating to Incident CHARLIE.

5.1 FINDINGS

- 5.1.1 Based on the telephone numbers provided by Duncan Lewis solicitors on the 22nd March 2022 I can confirm that HM Coastguard did receive calls from the small boat that later sank with the loss of 27 lives that were found in the French Search and Rescue Region. This incident is identified in our ViSION log as incident CHARLIE. HM Coastguard took coordination but had already instigated a SAR response for incident CHARLIE whilst the small boat was in the French Search and Rescue Region following information provided by the French Coastguard.
- 5.1.2 Given the variable estimated drift calculations from the Search Planning methodologies, regardless of whichever Search and Rescue Region the targets linked to Incident CHARLIE actually were in, the SMCs established search area adequately covered the estimated downwind drift search models.
- 5.1.3 During the incident, the SMC using the only positional data available to him (WhatsApp), placed the small boat relating to incident CHARLIE in the UK Search and Rescue Region.
- 5.1.4 Numerous calls were received suggesting there were a number of small boats in distress in the vicinity of the Sandettie Light Vessel. Small Boat Information was also provided by the French Coastguard via their migrant tracker. It is difficult to establish the number of small boats in difficulty because the operating model of the OCG is to encourage migrants to make multiple, exaggerated, distress calls from each small boat. This makes it virtually impossible for the SMC to have a clear understanding of the number of small boats and persons in distress, requiring immediate assistance. On days with favourable weather, the HM Coastguard Fixed Wing Aircraft is used to provide an improved surface picture. On the 24th November this asset was not available due to weather restrictions.
- 5.1.5 Due to the urgency of the situation as assessed by the SMC and using his local knowledge and experience of small boats operations, he established a search area and instigated a layered response utilising a HM Coastguard SAR helicopter and HMC Valiant. I have since validated the credibility of this search area using conventional datum point search planning methodology.



- 5.1.6 The SMC took mayday relay broadcast action and using AIS, identified the French War Ship Flammant as being the nearest asset to the WhatsApp position. During conversations with the French Coastguard, he requested the assistance of the Flammant. This request was refused by the French Coastguard, because they stated that it was escorting another small boat that was making way to the UK.
- 5.1.7 According to AIS at 0242 UTC, the Flammant was 3.2 nautical miles from the WhatsApp position. Based on a speed of 15 knots it would have taken approximately 13 minutes to arrive on scene and would have arrived approximately 30 minutes before the first UK rescue asset to arrive on scene, which was HMC Valiant.
- 5.1.8 Following information received from a caller that I now believe is linked to the small boat related to Incident CHARLIE, the caller said they could see a vessel nearby. HM Coastguard used CNIS in order to identify vessels in the vicinity of the WhatsApp position. The vessel Gaschem Schinano was contacted and informed that there was a small boat in the area and asked if they could see anything. The vessel reported that they could see no targets and no lights.
- 5.1.9 Despite broadcasting four mayday relays stipulating that a small boat was taking water and required immediate assistance, there was no response from commercial vessels in the area.
- 5.1.10 However following information received from a caller saying they could see a vessel nearby HM Coastguard used CNIS to identify the nearest vessel and contacted that vessel to ask them to see if they could see any targets and/or lights to which they said no.
- 5.1.11 HM Coastguard Rescue Helicopters have a contractual readiness time of 15 minutes during the day and 45 minutes readiness time at night. Having reviewed the incident on the 24th November, I have established that the readiness time of R163 was delayed by 16 minutes. This was due to a technical error whilst taxiing which for safety reasons had to be investigated.
- 5.1.12 The search of the area by R163 took 2 hours 37 minutes, during which time 3 targets (small boats) were found and rescued within the search area. All of these targets had similar characteristics to the numerous reports received relating to small boat incidents that morning, including those relating to incident CHARLIE.



5.1.13 Based on the fact that no other targets were identified in that search area and the SMC believing that the small boat relating to Incident CHARLIE was one of the small boats rescued, the search for the incident relating to CHARLIE was terminated.



6 Conclusions on the Small Boat relating to Incident CHARLIE

- 6.1.1 Having listened to 75,000 calls, reviewed 99 ViSION logs, interviewed 17 staff and responders, in my opinion it was apparent that the developing operational picture on the 24th November was unclear because of the high number of exaggerated distress calls being received, the inability of callers to provide their positions further exacerbated by most callers only speaking broken English and significant background noise such as shouting and screaming, with calls often being disconnected due to weak mobile phone signals. Calls were also being received and relayed to Dover MRCC, JRCC and London MRSC by other emergency services who equally had difficulty obtaining information from the callers for the same reasons. In my opinion this presented significant challenges to HM Coastguard operators being able to obtain credible positional and incident information.
- 6.1.2 I have found no evidence in the information that I have reviewed that HM Coastguard declined any requests to accept coordination from the French Coastguard or any other UK emergency service for any small boat incident on the 24th November.
- 6.1.3 The key to any SAR incident is the identification of a credible initial position. I have spent considerable time reviewing positional information relating to the SAR response on the 24th November and established the following.
- 6.1.4 The SAR response was based on an initial position obtained via WhatsApp from the small boat associated with incident CHARLIE. Whilst this was the only positional information available to the SMC and I support the subsequent SAR action taken based upon it, I do however have concerns relating to WhatsApp's positional accuracy. This is because WhatsApp is an unverified system not designed for use at sea and is not recognised in international Search Planning methodology as an effective method of obtaining accurate positions. I also have concerns that the phone was operating at the edge of its signal availability and consequently the call kept dropping out when connected to HM Coastguard and other Emergency responders. In relation to the small boat related to Incident CHARLIE, I have established based on the limited positional data that we had, despite being in the UK Search and Rescue Region the small boat was closer to the French Coastline than the UK Coastline. Based on line of sight principles, I would suggest that the



mobile phone signal would be more likely to connect to the French mobile phone network than the UK's network. I have also made several attempts to contact WhatsApp who were unable to provide any information to clarify the accuracy using WhatsApp application for positional information at sea.

- 6.1.5 It is also fair to conclude given the challenges of positions of mobile phone masts both within the UK and France that WhatsApp and/or text messages may have a delay associated with the time of receipt and then transmission of messages.
- 6.1.6 I have concluded that it was impossible to keep persons on the phone for the duration of the incident. Calls often had a weak signal or dropped out completely, when we attempted some call backs there was no response or it was a foreign ring tone and information was then relayed to France. The volume of calls that night also meant it was impossible for operators to remain on the phone. It is not a requirement to do so. Whilst it is considered best practice in some incidents it should never be to the detriment of the response.
- 6.1.7 The confirmed position of where the casualties were found in the French Search and Rescue Region has allowed me to identify a number of estimated positions using conventional backtrack search planning methodologies. This includes the use of hindcast environmental factors and a drift elapsed time period. These methodologies are internationally recognised. My calculations also show that the downwind drift was within the Search Area created by the SMC for the duration of the search period.
- 6.1.8 My assessment of the SAR response on the morning of the 24th November was that it was appropriate based on the information available to the SMC. I have seen evidence that as soon as information was received from the French Coastguard that small boats were making their way to the UK, HM Coastguard informed UK Border Force MCC who then mobilised a rescue asset to respond, HMC Valiant. At the time of mobilising HMC Valiant the small boat associated with incident CHARLIE was in the French Search and Rescue Region and in contact with the French Coastguard.
- 6.1.9 The French Coastguard provided HM Coastguard with an updated WhatsApp position for Incident CHARLIE which indicated that the small boat was in the UK Search and Rescue Region. Based on this updated position, HM Coastguard assumed coordination of the incident but despite attempts to contact the small boat via WhatsApp and Text, communication was only possible between the French Coastguard and the small boat. The French Coastguard later transferred a distress call they had received from the small



boat relating to incident CHARLIE to MRCC Dover. The fact that communication could only be achieved between the small boat and the French Coastguard may provide further uncertainty as to whether the small boat related to incident CHARLIE could have been in either Search and Rescue Region.

- 6.1.10 Following receipt of the transferred call, HM Coastguard transmitted 4 mayday relay broadcasts over a period of approximately 45 minutes. The SMC determined based on the lack of information received from the small boat associated to incident CHARLIE that this was appropriate in order to receive further information and/or response from vessels in the area. Despite there being a number of vessels in the area, no vessel responded. In my opinion the action taken by the SMC was appropriate and had vessels responded as they should have done under SOLAS, additional information and/or resource may have been able to support the immediate response.
- 6.1.11 It is important to state that during my review I questioned the use of an URGENCY alert rather a DISTRESS alert preceding a mayday relay broadcast. Whilst this is unconventional, it achieves the same result – an audible alarm being received on the bridge of a ship; and the VHF transmitter being tuned automatically to Channel 16 in readiness to receive the mayday relay distress broadcast. I am satisfied this had no adverse impact on vessels in the area receiving these alerts.
- 6.1.12 Shortly after the first mayday relay broadcast, the French Coastguard contacted MRCC Dover to inform them that the small boat relating to incident CHARLIE, had contacted them (the French) to say that the small boat was sinking. At this stage the SMC states that HMC Valiant is 9 nautical miles away from the estimated position and requests that the French Warship Flammant which is only 3 nautical miles away responds. Despite the fact that the French confirmed that they knew that people from incident CHARLIE were reporting to them that they were in the water, they declined the request for Flammant because it was escorting French Migrant Incident 10 which was a small boat making way to the UK. The French Coastguard operator also said that her colleague was currently on the phone to the small boat linked to incident CHARLIE and I when listening to the audio can hear a French Coastguard operator telling the small boat to dial 999. It is my opinion that the refusal of the French Coastguard to accept the request to send Flammant to this incident delayed the arrival of the first SAR unit on scene. I would not expect the French Coastguard to tell a small boat in distress to call the UK authorities by dialling 999. Rather, I would have expected the French



Coastguard to obtain all relevant information and pass that to Dover MRCC. This would explain media reports suggesting that migrants on the small boat related to Incident CHARLIE were told to hang up and call UK authorities. I have found no evidence during my review that HM Coastguard told any small boat to hang up and contact the French Authorities.

- 6.1.13 Throughout this incident, the SMC utilised two response assets. The UK Border Force maritime assets are the most experienced and capable surface assets for use for small boat migrant operations and as such the SMC tasked HMC Valiant as the surface asset on this occasion. In addition to this surface asset the SMC also utilised Rescue Helicopter 163 as the aerial search asset, therefore achieving a layered response for the small boat incident related to CHARLIE. The layered search consisted of R163 conducting an expanded square search to identify and track targets with HMC Valiant effecting the rescues. Having assessed the response plan, I consider that the SMCs decision to utilise these assets was correct given the information available to him at the time, his local knowledge and experience of small boat operations. Shortly after HMC Valiant arrived on scene they identified a small boat that had similar characteristics to the small boat associated with Incident CHARLIE. It is common practice with small boat operations for surface assets to arrive on scene and find that small boats are not in the same grave situation as described in the distress calls to HM Coastguard. The SMC now believing that the small boat related to Incident CHARLIE was resolved, decided that no further surface response assets were required. Whilst HMC Valiant was rescuing this small boat, R163 identified two further targets within the search area both of which were also rescued by HMC Valiant. I understand why the SMC made the decision that HMC Valiant provided sufficient rescue response because the vessel has a greater survivor capacity than a RNLI all weather lifeboat and therefore would have been capable of being able to rescue more than one small boat during the search period. I also understand why he did not task additional rescue assets because he believed that all targets had in the search area been rescued (1 original target plus 2 others). Whilst I acknowledge that additional rescue assets could have increased the possibility of detection, I cannot say with any degree of certainty that additional rescue assets would have changed the outcome of this incident.
- 6.1.14 The SMC made attempts to validate, post rescue, the identity of the small boat related to Incident CHARLIE with HMC Valiant crew. HMC Valiant were unable to confirm the name MUBIN or the telephone numbers however this is not unusual because migrants are told by Organised Criminal Gangs to give



false names and to throw their mobile phones overboard when SAR units approach. However, other factors in the SMCs decision making process led him to believe that this was the small boat linked to Incident CHARLIE i.e the small boat was in the search area, it matched the description given and had similar numbers of migrants onboard. Often this is the only information available to correlate calls to small boats rescued. Therefore, based on this information the SMC believed all rescue operations related to the small boat linked to Incident CHARLIE had concluded and terminated the operation. Based on the information that the SMC had at that time, including no further calls post the rescue of what was believed to be small boat CHARLIE, in my opinion the termination was reasonable.



7 Recommendations to Strengthen Migrant Small Boat Operations.

NEED TO BE INSERTED





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