

11 September 2020
For consideration by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
Chair of the EU Exit Committee

Lead official:
Miles Gidlow

Domestic Maritime Security Update – Maritime Domain Awareness

ISSUE

1. Following advice on 26 August “Domestic Maritime Security Update”, this is a supplementary paper on the delivery of enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

RECOMMENDATION

2. You are asked to note that:
 - A programme of MDA enhancements is in place ahead of the end of the Transition Period;
 - Against the agreed MDA requirements for the end of the Transition Period, there is only a limited capability gap once planned uplifts are implemented, with the loss of the EU Vessel Monitoring System now assessed as less significant than previously anticipated;
 - Further assessment of SiriusInsight technology demonstrates it would not add decisively to present capability (**ANNEX A**); and Home Office do not require it for their proposals to counter migrants crossing the Channel in small boats (**ANNEX E**).
 - Note the requested information following previous papers (**ANNEX C**) and the table of maritime focussed assets (**ANNEX D**).

CONSIDERATIONS

3. In July, XO agreed that sufficient systems and intelligence were in place, alongside surface and aerial assets, to support a blended approach to maritime security and provide a reasonable picture of vessel activity in UK waters. DfT highlighted the Joint Maritime Security Centre’s intended SR bid for long-term investment which included future investment in MDA technology. XO also recommended that JMSC, and supporting departments, develop a business case to support £5m pre-SR funding to cover personnel and a technology uplift, including in MDA.

Planned MDA capability uplift

4. The recent £1m XO investment in JMSC has facilitated a wholesale review of the threat, risks and capability gaps across the maritime domain and a closer operational partnership with the Royal Navy MDA Programme.
5. As a result, JMSC is carrying out a comprehensive MDA capability uplift programme, with planned improvements to be implemented ahead of the end of the Transition Period, through to the end of March 2021. See the timeline at **ANNEX B**. The £1m EU Exit transition allocation, in addition to the £5m requested from HMT, is funding the required blended approach of systems and intelligence alongside aerial and surface assets to provide a detailed picture of vessel activity:

£1m EU Exit Contingency Funds:

- Integration of MoD information feeds and systems to central JMSC structure including: the Common Command and Control (C2) System (MTIS UK), which will be deployed to 10 maritime headquarters; Common C2 deployed to up to 50 HMG maritime assets; equipping HMG maritime vessels with sensors enabling them to harvest maritime information to be fed into the UK MDA dataset; deploying MoD AI analysis tools to help stakeholders to fully exploit the additional information sets.

£5m pre-SR HMT bid:

- Completion of a whole UK surveillance review to provide a comprehensive understanding of gaps as well as established, funded capability elsewhere e.g. coastal radar feeds from a range of sources including port authorities.

- Integration of military range radars, UK port radars, and other established UK radar platforms into the existing TELESTO system - the UK maritime information database that holds all UK departmental maritime information.
 - Procurement of additional aerial surveillance, providing JMSC with 80 hours per week flying time for tasking
 - Procurement of Synthetic Aperture Radar (satellite imagery) which will enable JMSC to find dark targets operating without VMS in the UK Marine Area.
6. A successful SR bid would allow JMSC to continue to provide these services after March 2021 and acquire the additional technology required to further address the gap in maritime surveillance assets and sensors, including: increased radar; electro-optics (cameras); electronic intelligence (radar, mobile devices, etc); Automatic Identification System (AIS) data.

EU Vessel Monitoring System

7. The ability to effectively mitigate and respond to events in the maritime domain, including the deployment of assets, can be improved by having a more complete and detailed picture of vessel activity in UK waters. The existing picture is limited, and from 1 January 2021 will potentially be degraded by the potential loss of the EU Vessel Monitoring System (EU VMS), which provides information on vessels that are fishing within the UK Marine Area.
8. However, recent analysis carried out as part of transition preparedness work suggests the loss of EU VMS is less critical than previously considered. The Royal Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Programme (MDAP) and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory evaluated information within the UK MDA dataset against the EU VMS feed to understand the impact of its loss. They found 87.5% vessels transmitting on EU VMS are identifiable through other sources. This is the best and most detailed understanding we have of EU VMS access, and a loss of 12.5% of VMS transmitting vessels from our maritime picture is significantly less than had been expected by experts in the field.

SiriusInsight MDA proposal

9. Previous advice committed to further scoping of the SiriusInsight solution and possible deployment timelines. Further assessment of the risks associated with MDA procurement has been conducted (LPP) and supplier discussions have been held. Following further engagement and scrutiny of the practical implementation, JMSC established:
- the SiriusInsight capability is at a low level of development and only likely to provide useful information within very specific environments and conditions. As a result, SiriusInsight technology does not match the requirements nor does it offer a complete solution for short-term delivery. JMSC's assessment of the technology is at **ANNEX A**
 - SiriusInsight is confident it can deploy ten land-based systems and four buoys within 3 months. However, there are concerns about the ability to integrate SiriusInsight data into existing HMG systems, which is unproven.
10. Additionally, the Home Office does not support rapid deployment of the SiriusInsight proposal for small boat detection, on the basis that the detection capability for small boats is unproven, and therefore not deemed necessary or value for money. The Home Office Small Boats joint action plan is summarised at **ANNEX C**.
11. As a result of the concerns about the scope of the SiriusInsight solution, it is recommended that JMSC carry out market engagement with a spectrum of suppliers to communicate the more clearly defined capability requirements ahead of any further procurement of additional MDA solutions.

10 September 2020

Private Office Cover Sheet

Domestic Maritime Security Update – Maritime Domain Awareness

To: **1. Secretary of State**

Lead official: Miles Gidlow
Maritime Security

Lead SCS
(if different): James Driver
DD, Maritime Security Division

Clearances obtained: ("X" to confirm)

Lead official telephone: PD 725

	SCS: Name:
	Finance
	Analytical Assurance
X	Commerical lawyers
	Press

Copies: *Should include:*
Rachel Maclean MP
Robert Courts MP
PS/Bernadette Kelly
Legal, Procurement, Gareth
Davies, Roger Hargreaves,

Others as per list at end

HANDLING INSTRUCTION

Official Sensitive - this submission remains sensitive and should only be shared on a need to know basis with others within Government

Printing advice- Annex A to be printed in colour.

Summary note to Private Secretary

1. This submission follows recent maritime security papers to CDL as part of the security UK waters XO discussions. The paper outlines outstanding questions on how 'Maritime Domain Awareness' can be enhanced for UK waters as we head toward the end of the Transition Period. The Secretary of State is requested to approve this paper for the attention of CDL in his capacity as chair of the EU Exit Committee.

Timing

2. Urgent (response required by 0900 on 10 September).

Clearances

3. This submission has been cleared by [Maritime Director Roger Hargreaves].

Omitted considerations

- Value for Money – NA
- Analytical Assurance - NA
- Public sector equality duty - NA
- State aid - NA

List of Annexes

Annex A	JMSC assessment of SiriusInsight MDA proposal
Annex B	JMSC MDA Capability Timeline
Annex C	Response to CDL questions
Annex D	Maritime focussed assets
Annex E	HMG plans regarding small boats

Copy List: Maritime Submissions, Maritime DDs,

Name

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, Julie-Anne Wood,

Name

JMSC assessment of SiriusInsight MDA proposal


1. The SiriusInsight offer is a modular system using a variety of sensors mounted on buoys or on land to detect and, potentially, identify or classify vessels. The system is built using relatively low-grade commercial off the shelf sensors which increases the affordability of large scale deployments; but results in some operational disadvantages of using lower capability technologies, such as reduced range and fidelity. Data collected by the various sensors is fused and algorithms applied to generate alerts.
2. The system provides a relatively short-range detection capability and performance against smaller targets is much more limited than against large commercial vessels. This short range and lower fidelity against smaller craft may erode any benefits gained from the system as the identification of potentially suspect craft would likely be too close to the UK for an effective interdiction response (detection of small targets from equipment mounted on buoys is only assessed by SiriusInsight as viable at 2-3nm).
3. The buoy mounted elements of the system do not seem to be viable as currently proposed, given the lack of stabilisation which will severely denigrate camera and radar data collected in anything other than relatively calm seas. Additionally, the radar as proposed does not have sufficient range for the requirement, and the cameras do not currently have a viable night capability. These components would need to be upgraded to a higher specification to meet our requirements.
4. Whilst these elements of the system seem to be less effective at meeting the requirement, or meet a requirement that is already being met by existing assets, other elements of the system, such as Wifl and radio frequency detection, could provide some desirable additional capabilities. However, these will need to be robustly tested before they can be relied upon and the legality of using these systems will need to be confirmed.
5. As such, there is merit in conducting a limited procurement and deployment of this technology on a trial basis for a limited period of time in a smaller area of operations, to assess performance and utility in a live operational environment in a range of sea states and meteorological conditions. This should be done in conjunction with trials of similar capabilities from other suppliers to achieve the broadest understanding of these systems before commissioning a wider procurement.

JMSC MDA Capability Timeline 2020-2022

Annex B- JMSC Capability Plan

Key:

- In Service
- Assessment



Additional information following previous advice

Lead	Excerpt & CDL Question	Response
MMO	<p>In previous advice CDL has seen that according to MMO modelling the procurement of the OPV will take us to 3 which is the minimum viable to protect our waters</p> <p>Could we have more information on the assessment/modelling done? For example, who did the assessment and what are the underlying assumptions?</p>	<p>MMO undertook a risk-based assessment looking at fishing activity throughout its area of responsibility. The MMO assumed that fishing activity at the time of exit would (or could) remain broadly similar and that vessels would wish to continue to fish as they had in previous years. The assessment looked at nationalities, numbers and levels of activity as well as the stocks fished. Modelling indicated a number of 'hotspots' within English waters and whilst illegal fishing activity could occur anywhere the assumption is that fishers would fish in the hotspot areas. Such modelling indicated highest levels of activity in the Southern North Sea, English Channel and Celtic Sea. Placement of ships in these three key areas led to the conclusion of a minimum of three ships.</p> <p>The MMO has also assumed further assets may be required and have arrangements in place with IFCAS for extra support activity within inshore waters and arrangements with devolved administrations in areas where mutual boundary fishery risks may exist.</p>
DfT/ JMSC	<p><u>"Explore £5m interim funding for JMSC – DfT has worked with HMT and other government departments to establish the case for allocating interim funding to JMSC ahead of the SR process, providing the certainty required to deliver transition readiness plans. JMSC is finalising a business case to be submitted to HMT in early September. If the early award is successful, it will be considered against the wider SR JMSC funding bid."</u></p> <p>Please could we see the business case?</p>	<p>JMSC are developing a business plan. The primary focus is to continue the initial work underway with the £1m transition funding to enhance the MDA picture. The planned spend would enable the collection of radar information from UK Land radars (Port and range radars) to create the enhanced MDA picture. All the information collected will be available to all Government departments as a cohesive product.</p> <p>An initial draft Business Case will be available in w/c 21st Sept with the finalised plan completed by end of Sept.</p>
Defra MMO	<p>"Procure additional OPV to support fisheries protection - Defra currently has a framework contract in place with commercial suppliers. The</p>	<p>A number of bids were received by the closure date / time. The provision of the second commercial vessel is still in process and the decision is to be made on 11th September. A</p>

	<p>framework for provision of fisheries patrol vessels will expire 28 March 2023, though a call-off made before that date could expire later. To date, Defra has exercised three call-off contracts using this framework and is in the process of forming a fourth to commence 27 October 2020 leading to a second commercial patrol vessel being deployed and manned with a trained MMO inspection team. Tenders for the additional OPV have gone out and bids are expected back by 28 August. This contract will provide the second commercial OPV for Defra for a maximum of six (4+2) months to ensure cover over the transition period. The second OPV is expected to be in the water at or before the start of November. The current contracts, together with support from the Royal Navy, will be deployed to mitigate perceived fisheries risks approaching and at the end of the transition period and until end March/April 2021. Following SR funding clarity, the intention is to continue to utilise the framework to continue to provide OPV capability.</p> <p>Who provided the second commercial patrol vessel? And, wrt the tenders for the additional OPV for which bids were expected back 28 August, what is the outcome? What is the timeline for getting this info?</p> <p>With respect to (wrt) the procurement of an additional OPV, 'will we have three available 24/7 from 1/1/2021 and which 3?'</p> <p>CDL needs either a) certainty that the 3 OPVs are enough and that they will be ready from 1/1/21; and, failing that, b) to consider how to generate more capability</p>	<p>suitable operator / vessel has been found and should be secured through a contract by the end of the month and come into service on (or before) 27th October.</p> <p>Ocean Osprey and Ocean Dee are the two vessels. The supplier is Atlantic Offshore.</p> <p>With respect to 1 Jan 21, MMO will have three ships on the water of which two will be the contracted commercially operated vessels with one being provided by the Royal Navy. RN have indicated that a further vessel may be available (subject to National Tasking) and MMO is waiting for RN availability deployment plans so these details can be finalised. MMO has planned deployment of three vessels and has some 'contingency days' for when RN are able to provide a further vessel.</p> <p>MMO considers that the three vessels will provide sufficient presence and deterrence along with its planned aerial surveillance activity. All ships and aircraft will be ready and operational on 1/1/21 as will operational staff ashore.</p> <p>If levels of activity exceed that expected then MMO will call upon RN and others as noted above, including JMSC(O) to see if additional support can be provided.</p> <p>RN will have two additional OPVs (Offshore Patrol vessels) on standby should they be required.</p>
JMSC	<p>"Given the likelihood it would take at least 4 months from procurement launch for any additional technology solution to be procured</p>	<p>JMSC have written a plan / proposal that currently sits with DfT and HO. This includes an assessment of the actual data / capability gaps post transition and the solutions /</p>

	<p>and implemented, we are also rapidly assessing whether there are alternative options that could boost MDA to a shorter delivery timeframe. JMSC is scoping a range of possible options and further advice will be provided for your consideration. When securing any enhancements to existing capability in this area, we would be seeking a whole UK solution and would therefore sight DAs on our plans.”</p> <p>Please can we, as mentioned, provide further advice on how to boost MDA to a shorter delivery time frame?</p>	<p>mitigations that will be provided by JMSC and its delivery arm – MDA Programme.</p> <p>Work is already underway using the £1m transition funding to enable UK Government vessels as collectors (MDUSA2) with a view to further enhance capability by collecting radar information from UK Land radars (Port and range radars) - enhanced MDA picture. All the information gathered will be available to all Government departments and DAs as a cohesive product via JMSC.</p>
<p>MoD</p>	<p>“Multi-agency media/interoperability live exercise – A live exercise will be carried out in mid-November to demonstrate partner agency capabilities and joint working. This will be a bespoke operation and subject to its own national exercise schedule, where teams from across the country will come together to exercise and train. All relevant agencies and organisations with assets that support maritime security have been invited, however, the exercise will not include CT response, which is beyond JMSC’s remit, and discussions about the level of MoD participation to test their capabilities are ongoing.”</p> <p>When will we know the level of MOD participation and, more broadly, their capabilities?</p>	<p>The plan is for an exercise that will demonstrate the interoperability of maritime agencies.</p> <p>The exercise details have yet to be determined, but we expect them to involve an OPV, probably an RN ‘P2000’ and possibly a RN helicopter.</p> <p>Additional assets are likely to an MCA aerial asset, Police / Border Force LEDETs, Border Force cutter and/or CPV (coastal patrol vessel)</p>
<p>MMO</p>	<p>“Fisheries table-top exercises – These exercises are running internally to check the capabilities and responses of JMSC, partner organisations and the DAs, including media and political responses to fisheries issues.</p>	<p>The MMO held an internal capability table-top exercise on 3rd Sept. The exercise raised a number of questions and actions and MMO is working through these.</p> <p>The exercise however was a success and much of the preparatory work proved on benefit.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - An exercise to test fisheries capability is being held internally on 03 September. This is an internal MMO exercise and will contain a number of table-top exercises to check Standard Operating Procedures. It will encompass both simple and complex scenarios. - A dedicated DA table-top exercise will be held on 10 September. This will also check Standard Operating Procedures and how communication, escalation and handovers around fisheries issues will occur between JMSC, MMO and the DAs." <p>What was the result of the 3 September test? Did this go ahead and could we work this into the paper?</p>	<p>It is too early to say much more than this at this time as a further exercise with a wider fisheries audience is planned for the 10th Sept. and the MMO intends to continue with further scenario planning and of course will be liaising with JMSC(O) on wider maritime scenarios.</p>
JMSC	<p>Wrt table of assets (see table below this table) please can we find out whether all these vessels will be available at the same time, how they will be deployed and how long they take to mobilise?</p>	<p>It is likely, baring defects, that all assets will be available, but some/all will be committed to owner agencies priorities. Due to the number and variety of assets involved deploying all simultaneously is unlikely to be a realistic option. Deployment is likely to be mixed with some assets committed, others at readiness and some on standby. Deployment times will be influenced by these factors. JMSC will be providing coordination of available assets in order to achieve the most efficient deployment/response times possible for partner agencies.</p>
JMSC	<p>"JMSC has access to the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) radar picture in the Dover Strait via the MCA, however this technology is limited to less than 5% of the UK EEZ area and does not meet all requirements. For example, while the Dover VTS system tracks large vessels effectively, small boats of the type used by migrants in the Channel are often undetected by radar owing to their negligible radar signature. Other VTS radars exist</p>	<p>The radars referred to work in silos and are owned by a range of bodies. Work is required to gather this information and fuse it to enable a coherent picture (see earlier comments).</p>

at locations around the UK, such as Sunk VTS for the approaches to the Thames, but these are limited in coverage and not currently available to JMSC.”

Why are other VTS radars not currently available to JMSC?

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<p>MoD</p>	<p>“The SiriusInsight Chief Operating Officer, Nick Cooke-Priest, was forced to resign from the Royal Navy in May 2019 after his unapproved use of an official vehicle.”</p> <p>Please could we have more info on [Name] resignation?</p>	<p>[Name] was not forced to resign. He was removed from his Command for an alleged offence but no investigation into that offence has known to have concluded. More will be provided when available and MoD will provide an official line.</p>
<p>JMSC</p>	<p>CDL wants him and other Ministers to be involved in the JMSC coordinated tabletop exercises this autumn.</p> <p>Please can we reach out to find out?</p>	<p>The table top exercise is not aimed at a ministerial level and little benefit is likely to be derived from attending. Dstl are designing the exercise to test JMSC process and procedures against multiple scenarios including concurrent events. There is a technical demonstration and operations function for VIP's being arranged to follow the table top exercise that would be a more suitable alternative.</p>

Table of Maritime Assets – Surface and Air

Asset Type (Surface / Air)	Lead Organisation	Assets	Comments	LEDET compatible Y/N
Aerial Assets	HM Coastguard	x2 King Air Fixed wing aircraft plus x2 Panther Fixed wing aircraft	Utilised for SAR, counter pollution, MMO and by Police	NA
	Marine Scotland	x2 Fixed wing aircraft	800 hrs flight time. Capacity for +400 hrs (unfunded)	NA
	JMSC	x1 UAV	Dedicated to South East of English Channel	NA
Surface Assets	Northern Ireland	x2 patrol vessels	Limited to 20 nautical miles from land	
	UK Border Force	x4 cutters x6 Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPVs) x6/7 RHIBs	Max of x3 cutters and x4 CPVs deployed at any one time	Y
	Marine Management Organisation	x1 commercially chartered vessel x9 IFCA vessels accessible	Potential to acquire 2 nd chartered vessel ahead of 31 Dec.	N
	Marine Scotland	x3 patrol vessels	Dedicated to waters controlled by Scotland	NA
	Wales	X3 Cat. B vessels	Operating up to 60 nautical miles from shore	Limited
	Police	England x31 (x11 on Thames) Scotland x4 Wales x5 N.I. x6	Generally limited to near-shore activity	Y
	HM Coastguard	x1 Emergency Towing Vessel + 2 x1 small launches (used as tender for MCA survey duties)	Essential for HMCG business delivery	N
	Royal Navy	x2 Batch 1 OPVs x2 Batch 2 OPVs on call x1 'Multifunctional vessel' Multiple launches and RHIBS (dedicated to naval base protection duties only)	Other vessels held at high readiness could be made available depending on priorities	Y

To: Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

From: Illegal Migration
Strategy Team, Home Office

Date: 8th September 2020

Information Note: HMG Plans Regarding Small Boats

Background:

1. Recent months have seen a significant rise in the number of successful small boat crossings, with approximately 1,500 migrants arriving in August and approximately 1,100 in July this year. Many of these crossings are facilitated by organised criminal networks who are making money from facilitating dangerous migrant crossings.
2. In order to address this issue, the Home Secretary has appointed Dan O'Mahoney (formerly the Director of the Joint Maritime Security Centre) to act as Clandestine Channel Threat Commander, to oversee the UK's response. To make the Channel route unviable for small boat crossings, he is working closely with French colleagues to identify what further action can be taken, including using stronger law enforcement measures against facilitators and the potential for adopting interceptions at sea and the direct return of boats. His work will build on existing cooperation between the two countries under the Sandhurst Treaty (2018) and the Small Boats Joint Action Plan (2019), including the UK funding patrols by gendarme reservists and further strengthening preventive security measures, along the French coast.

HMG long term delivery plans on small boats:

3. In order to reduce the number of small boat crossings the Home Office is seeking to deliver the following four objectives.

Impede and reduce the flow of new migrants into N France and remove those already in the region.

4. Both the UK and France are committed to a whole of route approach to tackling illegal migration. The UK is providing long-term support to origin countries and those along common migration routes, increasing their capacity to manage migration and their ability to tackle organisation immigration crime. Addressing border insecurities increases the overall stability of these countries and reduces the risk of irregular and unsafe forms of migration. The UK is funding resettlement and reintegration programmes to support migrants returning to their countries of origin.
5. With France we are jointly approaching source countries of key migrant nationalities found in Northern France in order to organise returns. Returning the large number Iraqi nationals there is a priority and we await further details from the French regarding the support they require and how to approach diplomatic action. We are also working with France to transfer migrants living in makeshift camps and those caught trying to cross the Channel to reception and processing facilities, away from the Calais region. This is designed to prevent repeated dangerous attempts to cross the Channel and encourage migrants to claim asylum in France instead.

6. Our priority going forward is to agree procedures to facilitate readmission of those who arrive in the by small boats to France. However, the French would prefer that an agreement is reached with the European Union to prevent France becoming the recipient for all UK removals. Under the Dublin regulations a migrant recorded in another European country would be eligible for return there.

Deter and prevent migrants from attempting small boat crossings

7. We intend to agree an enhanced Operational Plan with France, to address vulnerabilities along our shared border. France provided a draft plan in July; however, this lacked ambition in terms of the scope of joint operational activity and the type of equipment they are seeking to purchase. We are now working with France to expand the plan, to include improvements to infrastructure and increased patrols by Gendarme reservists, ensuring critical beaches are covered at key times. France has recently agreed to share operational plans and that joint teams including UK intelligence officers will operate on the ground in order to engage with local communities and enhance our understanding of the criminal networks.
8. The UK/France Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) established in July will continue to collate and analyse intelligence to target operations against those involved in OIC and to intercept migrants planning to cross the Channel. UK investigators will also undertake mirror investigations with French law enforcement to target financial networks being used to fund small boats crossings.

Routinely intercept migrants at sea and return immediately to France

9. Border Force sea trials have identified potentially safe tactics to halt a small boat carrying migrants. Further trials and evaluation work are now ongoing to identify means of safely taking control of the disabled boat and managing non-compliant migrants.

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10. The next stage will be to demonstrate the interception technique to the French and allay their concerns regarding its safety and legality. We hope this will enable us to start intercepting migrants and returning them to Dunkirk using UK enforcement powers. However, this will be subject to French agreement. Their current position is that returns are not possible due to the public sensitivities of returning migrants to a region affected disproportionately by migrant pressures.
11. The UK has also offered to deploy surveillance capabilities to support French ground-based patrols. We are continuing to explore with the French whether there are circumstances in which they would allow UK aircraft in their airspace where surveillance capability would be most effective. We have already deployed UK MCA aircraft to provide surveillance capability over the Channel on 'green days' when significant numbers of migrant launches were expected.

Reduce UK pull factors and increase deterrents

12. Between now and 31 December 2020 we are seeking to maximise returns under the Dublin agreement, including working to return 1,000 migrants who had previously

claimed asylum in other European countries. Longer-term we intend to agree a returns agreement with the EU or bilaterally with key states to facilitate returns of migrants who have travelled through a safe country. We also intend to create a new offense of entering or seeking to enter the UK without leave. This could result in a custodial sentence of up to two years taking account of aggregate factors such as repeat offenders and reckless endangerment of others.

Development of the Operational Plan

13. The Clandestine Channel Threats Commander is currently reviewing the Operational Plan and will develop it into a new campaign plan including arrangements to progress both sea and land-based returns to France; and to develop and deliver new maritime tactics in the Channel. The new plan will be linked to a financial package aimed at specific, high-impact investments that can quickly deliver results in preventing crossings.

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE