

To:

Home Secretary
Minister for Immigration Compliance
(simultaneous)

From: Dan O'Mahoney

Date: 3 December 2020

Clandestine Channel Threat: Winter Preparedness

Issue:

The CCTC will stand up Operation Altair before Christmas. This operation is central to the delivery of the CCTC Campaign Plan and will shift the small boats response into a whole of Government operation with a law enforcement focus, coordinating operations on both sides of the Channel. The response will balance our priorities to preserve life, securing the border and increase public confidence in our response, whilst dynamically responding to any additional pressures and risks that arise over the winter period. It will also put in place the required capability necessary for new maritime tactics, subject to pending policy and legal requirements being satisfied.

Timing: Urgent

Recommendation

That you Home Secretary and Minister for Immigration Compliance:

- i. **Note** the assessment of likely clandestine activity over winter and the operational preparations in place to deal with this. This document will inform the scenario planning session on 4 December.
- ii. **Approve** the procurement of an emergency response vessel as outlined in submission "**Approval for the procurement of an Emergency Response Vessel, by Single Tender Award, to support Clandestine Channel Threat Command activity at a cost of £1.8m for six months**"
- iii. **Approve** the delivery of the Strategic Communication plan outlined in the submission **Organised Immigration Crime (OIC) Communications Strategy: Deterring irregular migrants from making the journey to the UK**
- iv. **Approve** to the publication of small boats data as outlined in the submission **Publication of Small Boats Data.**
- v. **Note** the detailed resourcing and operational posture in Annexes A and B
- vi. **Note** the related accommodation challenges over this period and list of options available to meet the demand
- vii. **Note** that we will revert on 7th December with more detailed costs and impacts based on your steer as to which accommodation options to pursue.

Summary

1. We have assessed that there will be an increased volume of clandestine activity during the next two months. This is likely to consist of focused increases in small boats activity over the festive period, and a displacement into vehicles and unaccompanied freight post-Transition. Our system-wide response will encompass;
 - Op Altair, bringing together land, sea and air assets, as well as improved operational coordination with the French;
 - the publication of statistics to avoid daily drum beat of media focus and stop the use of successful arrival stats by OCGs as a marketing tool; and
 - Comprehensive Communications Plan including RICU-targeted identification of migrants and OCGs.
2. Any increased clandestine activity will directly impact on our need for accommodation at a time when we are already facing a challenge on available bed space based on current intake and cessation forecasts.

Assessment of Impact

3. **Our professional assessment of clandestine activity over the winter period is that we will see an increase of small boats arrivals, likely concentrated on a single day with favourable conditions.** Patterns for previous years show an overall drop in Juxtaposed detections as traffic drops over the festive period and this is expected to be the case this year. As we move into the first days of January, we expect to see a shift away from small boats and into lorries, as traffic through Juxtaposed ports resume, with the possibility of long queues occurring outside of the secure areas of the ports.
4. Although small boats arrivals have declined significantly since September (down to an average of 55 per red day in November) we are planning for a potential worst case scenario over Christmas of up to 200 arrivals on a single day by small boats. In addition, we are planning for the potential for a simultaneous large arrival on another route, such as the fishing vessel on 17 November with 69 Albanian migrants, or a large in-country event in lorries or unaccompanied freight (although we assess this scenario to be unlikely). Further details of the plans within key functions are provided in Annex A. Detailed resourcing numbers for key functions can be found in Annex B.
5. **Intelligence from debriefs has indicated there are perceptions in migrant communities of a reduced law enforcement effort during public holidays** and communications plans are in place to mitigate this. December has traditionally seen increases in total numbers and average numbers during favourable conditions. This is evidenced in the numbers arriving by small boats in previous years (Fig 1) and the average numbers per “red day” (Fig 2).




Fig 1




Fig 2

6. **Intelligence assessments (NAC(20)303 - EU Exit Threat Update, Small Boats CRIP) have identified the potential for surge in OCG and self-facilitated activity, driven by a perception in migrant communities that attempts must be made prior to the expiry of the transition period to be successful.** It is our understanding that OCGs are spreading this information in an attempt to increase business, similar to the attempts seen prior to other significant events such as key dates in the Brexit timeline.
7. **Recent intelligence suggests displacement, in particular likely increases by OCGs in the use of lorries instead of small boats for the facilitation of clandestine entry to the UK.** This is partly driven by the increase in the effectiveness by French authorities. We believe there is the potential for considerably higher volumes of attempts over this winter than in previous years. Freight traffic is currently around 20% up on last year

with delays at peak periods that can amount to several hours. There is a high probability of periods of standing traffic that will provide opportunities to migrants to try to gain access to UK bound vehicles on the approach roads to ports which may grow as we move into the new year with the end of transition and introduction of additional checks. It is particularly likely that this method will be utilised by those looking to make self-facilitated attempts to reach the UK.

8. **We expect to see increased displacement from small boats into previously successful methods of clandestine entry to the UK as a result of the implementation of our Operational Campaign Plan.** The NAC assessment on the impact of the Operational Campaign Plan (NAC (20) Displacement of Migrants from Small Boats, Annex D) identified a high confidence of displacement to previously used routes and modes, with the most significant displacement of OCG facilitated Organised Immigration Crime to juxtaposed controls. This analysis also identifies the possibilities of shift to wider geographies and the use of different vessel types. Of note, is the acknowledgement of the adaptability of OCGs which will requires us to be alert to emergent changes and flexible in our resourcing and tactics to disrupt and prevent clandestine activity.
9. Our dynamic operational response has been informed by intelligence, proactive tracking of activity levels and Home Office Analysis and Insight analysis of historic trends (Annex C).
10. Our operational planning will be enhanced by the new Met Office product signed off this week, which will give us a more detailed and accurate weather forecasts.

Strategic posture

11. **Our operational response will see a step-change from mid-December when we commence Op Altair.** This will provide;
 - A cross government control room for the co-ordination of the operational response
 - A clear Gold, Silver, Bronze structure enhanced by on call arrangements;
 - A move to land based operations at the more discrete location of Ramsgate, enabled by the use of an Emergency Response Vessel (subject to your agreement) to mitigate risks surrounding emergent trends for departures from Belgium causing longer crossings and increased threat to life; and
 - Joint UK and French Red Weather Strategic Oversight preparedness meeting in advance of and following “red days”.
12. **Op Altair will continue to be refined and further capabilities added in a phased approach** over the winter period through further co-operation with the French and additional Intelligence products being fed in to the

Operations room, providing further enhancements to our intelligence led Operational capability.

13. **At the near border, a key consideration is maintaining the fast time actionable intelligence to prevent clandestine entry attempts by all methods.** We will continue to engage with our French and Belgian partners 24/7 at an operational level through the CCIC, Joint Intelligence Cell, Paris Invigor and our international liaison officers from the Home Office and NCA. All of these functions will be operating during winter with full capabilities, and on call arrangements where appropriate.
14. **The NCA will be resourced across all of its functions to respond to small boats and other Organised Immigration Crime events during the winter period.** This will include intelligence sharing, investigation and critical incident management.
15. **One of our most significant risks is the availability of staff with PST 3 (Personal Safety Training to Level 3) capability.** This impacts on our ability to effectively respond to high volume small boats arrivals in Dover and events such as the recent fishing vessel incident in Harwich. Tug Haven reception arrangements in Dover are delivered predominantly by PST3 trained officers from Clandestine Operational Response Team (CORT) with surge capability from Border Force and Immigration Enforcement. Due to competing demands across the department we have taken a flexible approach to resourcing, with a greater emphasis on surge responses that can deploy nationally as required. We continue to work closely with Immigration Enforcement and Border Force around resources to address the current staffing shortfall for high volume arrivals. The Emergency Response Vessel, if approved, would significantly mitigate this risk, reducing the requirement for land-based uniformed officers significantly, being partially replaced by a smaller cohort of civilian contractors on board.
16. **Border Force recently provided a submission on Border Force Winter Directive guidance** which identifies searching for clandestines at high risk ports to be in their highest priority of activity. The response, delivered under Op Argonite, will ensure a continued focus on maritime freight and will be informed by a dynamic assessment of the threats as they emerge. We anticipate the continued checks at these ports will provide a significant level of preventative action in France and Belgium, as well as early detection at high risk UK ports. The appropriate resourcing of Juxtaposed ports is essential for the Home Office and across Whitehall, the resourcing of the clandestine response in Tug Haven will by necessity be a much lower priority and on a typical day Border Force do not anticipate having staff available to divert.
17. **The searching for clandestines at low risk ports is in the lowest level of priority for the Border Force Winter Directive.** However, searching will be intelligence led and we will continue to target specific vehicles on

this basis as well as monitor for emerging trends and potential displacement across routes.

18. The Home Office Winter Co-ordination Cell (WCC) has been established to provide a command control and co-ordination function for winter pressures. We will dock into the structures of the WCC, and we will benefit from the situational awareness and dashboard that they will be providing, allowing us to respond quickly to any changes in activity or emergent risks.

19. There are wider considerations on the Maritime position that we need to be cognoscente of. HO maritime assets may be required to divert to other activity under the Tier system agreed on a cross-departmental basis for transition response. This increases the potential for non-BF assets to be required for Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) events in the channel in relation to small boats, specifically the RNLi or commercial operators. Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) is the main coordinator of maritime events in relation to transition, and many events will be able to be managed using the Tier system for prioritisation. However, in the case of higher criticality Tier events which have a multi-agency angle, or concurrent events at lower Tiers which become critical taken together, due to the demands they place on the system, the Strategic Commander, Name Name will sit as overlay and direct across HMG.

Additional Mitigations

20. A playbook for our response to general maritime events, similar to the fishing vessel on 17 November, is in development and we are getting legal advice on the scenarios and potential responses to strengthen our law enforcement response.

21. You, (Home Secretary) have received a separate revised submission on the option of a vessel to be used in the Channel for the reception arrangements for arriving migrants. This proposal outlines a phased approach to the vessel's use which begins with a safe and secure environment to manage high volumes of arrivals with reduced staffing numbers, therefore mitigating the risk of IE and Border Force surge resources not being available. Furthermore, the use of the vessel would address some of the challenges around Maritime assets being required to divert to other activity.

Asylum Accommodation

22. Intake numbers continue to exceed the rate at which we see people leaving our accommodation. Our medium-term plans to bring on additional MOD sites and vessel accommodation are in progress and will deliver Q1/2 2021. We do however face a short-term challenge with insufficient numbers of beds available to meet latest forecast intake figures, compounded by any of the 'surge' scenarios over the Christmas

period. Assuming we see an increase in current forecasted intake of up to 1000 over this period we have considered a range of options. The full list of options considered is included in Annex E. We have prioritised these and are presenting four preferred options below for your consideration. **We intend to revert on Monday 7th December with finalised advice, seeking your permission to proceed with our recommended options.**

Summary of preferred options

Doubling up in hotel rooms (2m apart)	Across hotel estate (no. pending response from our providers)	PHE will not support.
New Hostel style accommodation	Stoke Mandeville (70) Abbey Lodge (360)	Will require approval to inform LAs of decision to proceed.
MOD Site @Manston	c.230 beds plus hard sided tents (c200)	Would increase burden on Kent. Part of police contingency planning for end Transition. Will require approval to inform LA.
Temporary accommodation @Yarlswood / Campsfield / Barton Stacey / Napier	Hard sided tents inside grounds (c200 at each site)	Will require approval to inform LA of decision to do this without consultation.

23. We have requested that all of our accommodation providers revert with proposals for where we could safely double up in hotel rooms across the country. We would only do this with people who had already completed their quarantine period or who had arrived together into the country. This goes against our PHE 'gold' standard which is to use single rooms to minimise covid19 risks. It is however in line with our use of dormitories in MOD sites. This would only be where beds are 2m apart and we will need to supply hand sanitiser etc to allow sharing of bathroom facilities. We expect to recommend implementing this in a small number of hotels where we would be able to monitor the situation closely. Next step would be to engage with PHE and with relevant Local Authorities to inform them of our plan.

24. We have identified 2 properties that could provide hostel style accommodation, and which could be ready for service within 2-4 weeks. Our providers have been liaising with relevant LA. *Property 1* is Stoke Mandeville Stadium in Aylesbury (Rob Butler MP) where the Local Authority is relatively supportive. *Property 2* is Abbey Lodge in Derby (Amanda Solloway MP) where the Local Authority has not said no but is rightly raising concern that they already have 480 initial accommodation beds. Next step would be to inform the Local Authorities that we will be proceeding without further consultation owing to urgency of the situation

but agree to vacate as soon as alternative accommodation has come online in first half 2021.

25. We have previously provided advice to you on the possible use of the MOD site at Manston, Kent, for asylum accommodation purposes.

You agreed previously to revisit this option at a later date. The site presents a good option for our accommodation purposes, with over 230 beds able to be used in the same way as at Napier, and hard standing on which we could put temporary structures to house 200-300 people. We do however recognise that this would be placing a further burden on Kent at a time when we are already asking a lot of them (Napier, UASC, Tug Haven, KIU) and at the same time as we all prepare for the end of Transition. We are also aware of plans for Kent Police to use this site as part of contingency arrangements and we have reached out to Police colleagues to discuss options for possibly sharing the use of the site. As with other MOD sites that we are using, we are likely to see significant local resistance and need to be prepared for disruptive activity including by the Far Right. We would need to work closely with local partners and national policing leaders to address these risks. We expect to recommend urgent discussions with Kent police before informing the Local Authority (North Thanet) and local MP (Roger Gale) of our intention to use the site temporarily.

26. We can rapidly procure hard sided tents and / or container accommodation to situate within the grounds of existing HO or MOD sites. We would be able to use container style accommodation for up to 300 people (preferably at one site but possibly spread over more than one) and we could procure large numbers of tents for use at multiple locations. We have done site visits at both Yarlswood (site adjacent to existing IRC) and Campsfield (MOJ owned, was IRC) and each has sufficient land on which to construct accommodation for c.200 people. We also have the option of putting this type of temporary accommodation in Barton Stacey (where we are also looking to put in place longer term modular accommodation by February 21) and our existing site at Napier.

27. Accommodation would be basic by necessity of time and supply available however it would be fit for purpose assuming a short-term requirement of up to 3 months. We are in the process of confirming the planning situation at Yarlswood and Campsfield but do not believe this is an issue. We have not engaged with Local Authorities or local MPs and we anticipate this will not be well received (and may be complicated for Barton Stacey in light on ongoing engagement on the modular build plans). Next step would be to inform local MPs and Local Authorities of our intention to use these sites on a temporary basis until other accommodation is available.

Scenario Planning

28. We have been working with the Winter Co-ordination Cell to test our response plans across various scenarios involving clandestine

activity. This has helped to inform our decision making around the flexibility of resources as well as to identify potential impacts of various cross-cutting scenarios.

29. **We have commissioned a National Assessment Centre intelligence product on the clandestine threat with a particular focus on the impact of COVID-19 and the potential impact of the Operational Campaign Plan.** This product is due to be received next week and will be discussed at the Campaign Delivery Board on 11 December. This product will support our continued risk mitigation and tactical planning across small boats and other clandestine activity.
30. **One element of our scenario planning is to ensure plans are in place to manage a significant incident at any of our larger accommodation sites.** We have existing protocols at each site, owned by our accommodation providers, to handle incidents ranging from individual injury, damage to property through to large scale disturbance or fire. As part of our readiness activity we are reviewing these protocols with each of our providers over the course of the next week. All incidents that cannot be managed by the on-site teams are escalated to emergency services as required. All sites have details of local police, fire and health care services in the event of such an incident. We have had cause to test out a number of calls to emergency services in recent months, these have been successful. Providers will be operating their out of hours service over the Christmas period as will UKVI and we will respond to events in the usual way. Should there be an incident that makes significant amounts of a site unusable we will decant service users to other accommodation across the estate, utilising the capacity discussed above.

Strategic Communications

31. **To support our work, a Cross Government Organised Immigration Crime deterring and influencing Communications Strategy has been developed and is awaiting your approval.** The strategy, which targets migrants, organised criminal gangs and hauliers drivers, which see sequenced and aligned communications activity being delivered by Home Office, National Crime Agency (NCA) and RICU (Research, Information and Communications Unit), and will be supported by British Embassies over 2020/21 and 2021/22.
32. The communications strategy sets out how partners will work together to invest, align and deliver whole journey audience focused communications activity to deter migrants from making the journey to the UK illegally, by tackling disinformation from criminal gangs and providing a counter-narrative on alternative options, existing support and potential safe and legal routes. Subject to approval, initial activity is intended to start from December 2020.

33. Key projects in our Cross Government Organised Immigration Crime Strategy Communications Strategy, which is subject to final approvals, include:
- Proactive media and social media led by HO but amplified by strategy partners including NCA, RICU and FCDO;
 - UK and EU haulier communications – vehicle security (Dec 2020-July 2021) and signs to spot (January-July 2021) and the consequences (January-July 2021); and
 - Near Borders and upstream migrant communications; social media, online and non-digital activity (subject to Cabinet Office PASS approval, early 2021)

Media Handling

34. **There continues to be high levels of media interest on the Channel crossings, including interest in daily arrivals and total figures. Most recently there has been widespread coverage in the joint agreement between yourself (Home Secretary) and the French Interior Minister,** this package ran on Saturday evening bulletins and the Sunday papers outlining the boost in resource and equipment to tackle the issue. Most media were welcoming of the package, and the total numbers of interceptions and statistics around arrests and prosecutions ran highly. There was some minor criticism that the UK government had been putting more money behind this and that the French weren't doing enough.
35. Each time there is a Channel crossing there is routine interest from BBC South East, Ferrari Press, and often PA, the Telegraph and the Mail. Where numbers of crossings are higher and on red days there is routinely much wider interest in the numbers crossing with interest from the above mentioned as well as broadcasters. Ahead of red days press office provide full media handling that includes a regular drum beat of communications ahead of anticipated red days, including social media and briefings on the work to date as well as the joint work with the French authorities and the number of boats intercepted.
36. **Press Office are preparing a strategic plan for Winter and the next few weeks that builds of the joint agreement with the French and moves into the Sovereign Borders activity.** We continue to promote and brief on the refreshed narrative on French interceptions and successes and continue to seek opportunities to publicise these joint efforts. Into the Winter we are preparing media handling to promote the laying of the Immigration SI's including sourcing media opportunities for trials at sea and the launch of the new command Centre. This work will sit alongside the continuous daily drum beat of activity to promote action at every level, from stopping the crossings, to pursuing the criminals and returning those with no right to remain in the UK. This includes promoting returns flights by briefing journalists on the numbers returned and the number of late claims frustrating the process and towards the end of the year we will look to brief out on both these figures. We also continue to prepare proactive handling on arrests or prosecutions to continue the

narrative that we are pursuing the criminals, including work by the JIC, Operation Wattamola and Operation Invigor. In addition, we continue to work on content across all media to promote the joint work with UK and French law enforcement as well as the number of interceptions.

37. **In preparation of winter crossings and where intelligence suggests large numbers of arrivals, we are prepared to amplify the above content and put into place specific intensive media plans.** This would include considering accepting bids that come forward if the story is high on the agenda, exploring filming opportunities, issuing press statements and briefings on key interceptions or surge activity, rebut inaccurate material and push social media content on work underway using both Home Office account and the Clandestine Channel Threat Commander account. Handling will be sent in the usual way.

Copy list

Home Secretary, Immigration Minister, PUS, Special Advisers, Home Secretary's Immigration Private Secretary, Immigration Minister's Private Secretary, Permanent Secretary's Private Secretary, Directors General, Press Office, Intelligence Directors, HOAI, Parliamentary Team, Clandestine Threat Command, NCA, British Embassy Paris.

Annex A

Prevention and Upstream Intelligence

Border Force CCIC has planned for a 24/7 attendance for the rest of 2020, providing continuous duty desk cover as per our normal operational model throughout the year. Planning for January to end of March 2021 is being finalized and staffing will remain consistent with the first half of the winter period and that of the rest of year.

Over the festive period the Joint Intelligence Cell (JIC) will have on call arrangements, jointly managed by Home Office and NCA

Our red day planning calls with Home office, NCA, Policing, Coastguard and French partners will continue throughout the winter period. Additionally, we will be scheduling frequent calls over the festive period regardless of the weather forecast to co-ordinate our response to all methods.

UK Intelligence Functions

Due to the nature of Gateway's work our resources to the Organised Immigration Crime (Small Boats) Threat Desk remain constant throughout the year, however we are able to draw on additional resources from within Gateway at times of peak demand. Coverage is reduced on Public Holidays and Weekends however we have minimal duty officer coverage and on-call across all agencies.

The Joint Debriefing Team (JDT) will has flexible deployment of officers to locations where debriefs are required. This covers additional staff to the numbers aside from other parts of Immigration Intelligence and have received debrief training, this is aligned with Red days wherever possible and where JDT resources may be tight providing resilience if required. On call covers all days of the year. It is important to note that whilst we have staff available, accommodation may be limited in terms of appropriate rooms available to conduct debriefs.

Criminal Financial Investigations teams will continue to operate throughout the winter period. They will respond flexibly over the period to meet the needs for surge response at Tug Haven, seizure of evidence, progressing investigations and financial investigations.

The NCA response to small boats involves a wide range of functions including: Intelligence Collection, International Liaison Officers, Investigations, National Targeting Centre, the Joint Intelligence Cell and Threat Leadership. Across all of these functions around 70 officers currently dedicate a notable proportion of their time to targeting the OIC Small Boats threat, flexing this according to intelligence and events as appropriate.

As a 24/7 law enforcement agency, the NCA flexes its resources to respond to the highest priority SOC threats and is able to task appropriate resources to

dynamically respond to incidents and intelligence. To ensure sufficient resilience and respond to any additional pressures during this period, including around the end of EU exit transition, the NCA has reviewed staffing levels for all of its functions and has additional arrangements (such as enhanced minimum staffing levels) in place for key departments.

The NCA has established a Critical Incidents Cell which will work with and feed into the Home Office Winter Coordination Cell.

At sea

The at sea response provided by Border Force is maintained throughout the whole year and does not change in winter.

Given the increased risk of hypothermia during the crossing attempts in winter it is imperative that events are responded to quickly. The availability of aerial surveillance assets significantly enhances the operational coordination by the Maritime Coastguard Agency facilitating the quick identification of vessels. There are days where poor visibility means that aerial assets cannot be deployed. In these instances, it is more likely that we will see beach landings, arrangements are in place for the clandestine Operations Team (CORT) and Kent Police to attend potential beach landings, with the Medevent team where needed.

We are live to the risk of a further divergence in launch points for small boats crossings and where intelligence indicates this is likely Border Force vessels can be positioned accordingly to provide a swift response.

We have a standard deployment of one Cutter (with 10 crew) and 2 Coastal Patrol vessels (with 5 crew on each) available in the South East everyday throughout the whole year working from both Ramsgate and Dover. This has been the standard deployment since March 2019. In addition, we have a second Cutter (with 10 crew) available to be deployed into the area within 12 hours if operationally necessary. Crew numbers can flex depending on circumstances.

On "red" days, where the risk of crossings is high, we also deploy up to 4 Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) working out of Dover (Total of 12 staff) to support the response to small boats with a focus on preventing beach landings and supporting rescues.

We also maintain a 24/7 command and control facility within our Maritime Command Centre in Portsdown.

We are, however, looking at a possible to change to our deployment profile in the Channel based on a requirement to change our approach to small boats. This is currently being worked through but would result in a significant increase in resources. This is subject to a range of separate advice.

Reception arrangements

The key concerns about the impact of winter on the land side reception arrangements include the increased risk of hypothermia in this period, and the availability of resources to respond to high volume events. The enhanced weather product from the Met Office will assist with the planning for high volume activity.

The recent increase in French interceptions of migrants has decreased the resources requirement for the UK land-based response. The CTC CORT team are a dedicated resource who will continued to respond to small boats incidents 24/7 with the support of Border Force and Immigration Enforcement officers. The competing priorities for both IE and BF pose a risk in providing sufficient surge resources above and beyond the ability to respond to 100 arrivals each day over the coming months. Sufficient volumes of surge resource volunteers have been obtained for the Christmas period from IE with the CTC and BF providing dedicated local on-call resources.

Where there are excessive numbers of clandestine arrivals on any single or multiple routes there are well established protocols in place under Op Cowl for the co-ordinated response to high volume activity on successive days.

The risk of Hypothermia has significantly increased with the colder weather and increases in the length of the journeys where they have displaced to Belgium or more southerly French beaches, despite a decrease in arrivals since the summer/autumn months we continue to see an increase on last years' winter numbers. There have been recent arrivals with mild hypothermia however the improvements made at the Tug Haven and the introduction of the contracted medics has allowed us to respond more effectively. Staff awareness of the symptoms of hypothermia has also been raised with posters and targeted email comms. The addition of shipping container storage at the Tug haven means there is sufficient stock of warm drinks and blankets. Protocols with Kent Police are being progressed should there be deaths at sea or on arrival at the Tug Haven.

The Emergency Response Vessel is integral to our risk mitigation plans for the safety and welfare of migrants and officers. This vessel will enable us to deliver reception arrangements and control of arrivals with a reduced staffing resource, and through the use of contractors for delivery of migrant safety on board, allow us to use the Home Office PST3 resources where they are most needed.

Our staff have a dispensation for the Op Stack arrangements to allow for access into Dover and the port area. This will be particularly helpful for surge responses that may need to attend at short notice.

Intake Response

The response within intake units is not anticipated to be impacted by clandestine arrivals unless they are considerably higher than historic levels

and well above capacity. Resources from across the 3 NAIU sites are flexed to respond to surges in intake and have done so in response to the increase in small boats arrivals; utilising all available processing facilities and workforce. Annualised Working Hours (AWH) in our operational teams enable us to ensure this is maintained through the winter, including the Christmas period. National Asylum Intake Units (NAIU) has seen an uplift in headcount to support the increase in national asylum intake levels we have seen in the last 18 months. Within this headcount, an Intake Response Team has been created which provides a flexible resource to respond to surges in intake as required. This is further supported by additional resources which can be drawn from across Immigration & Protection, when weather forecasting and intelligence anticipates periods of significant arrivals.

The Kent Intake Unit (KIU) operates 24/7, 365 days of the year, and the Midlands Intake Unit (MIU) is available on the same basis, although the asylum intake process operates 8am to 5pm, for 364 days. The Asylum Intake Unit (AIU) operates during business hours but the on-site holding capacity is available outside of this and AHW enables the asylum intake process to be operated as required. Across intake units and surge capacity the asylum intake operation has access to holding capacity for over 400 arriving migrants.

However, there are identified risks regarding the availability of staffing resources for the movement of migrants from the Tug Haven to intake units which relies upon PST 3 (Personal Safety Training to Level 3) capability and transport contracts in Immigration Enforcement and Border Force. Given the competing demands on PST3 trained staff and the limited overall numbers available to the response from IE and Border force this may result in delays in the movement of people.

Asylum Accommodation and UASC


Safeguarding Hub and social worker support available in asylum accommodation will continue to be provided throughout the winter period, making onward referrals as required. Four social workers are currently employed in Kent Intake Unit to undertake short Merton age assessments to relieve some of the pressure on this area of work following the decision by Kent County Council to cease this work. The social workers are employed as agency workers and can be retained or released dependent on the volume of arrivals.

Returns

Small boat returns will officially cease under the Dublin Regulations from 31 December 2020 but will effectively end sooner than this given the closure of Dublin units for Christmas and New Year. Our last charter operation is due to take place on 21 December. Returns after this point are still being worked

through and will be subject to the application of new inadmissibility rules and any returns agreements secured with our near borders partners.

Annex B – Resourcing



Department	Number of Officers allocated on a typical day	Number of officers allocated on a typical day over winter	Any special arrangements/On call arrangements per day	Any other comments.
CTC	16	16	The Silver role during the Xmas period will be covered in person.	Includes Duty Office and Operational CORT Team. Surge capability including Border Force and IE resources up to 100 officers per day.
CFI	6	5	1 x HMI, Duty CIO and 4 IOs on call during the winter	
MAH Gateway	25	25	NCA embeds on call for weekends and public holidays, IE and BF staff cover duty office/ triage 7 days per week, 7am to 7pm other than Christmas day	Figures include Duty Office/ Triage and OIC Threat Desk only however the wider Gateway Team can be allocated additional work at times of peak demand.
CCIC	6	6	24/7 cover & Daily duty office cover.	Over 3 shifts
JDT	10 (across all shifts E, L and red day nights)	10 (across all shifts E, L and red day nights)	On call HMI, CIO and IO 24/7 each day for urgent issues.	Flexible deployment of officers during winter, including surge capacity and On Call Cover.
JIC	2	2	Staffing patterns mirror French staff based in unit. Out of hours Duty Officer on call.	Joint unit with NCA however their staff are not included in these figures. (On call function jointly managed)
NCA			Enhanced minimum staffing levels in place for Winter.	
Paris Invigor	3	3	Duty officer out of hours and at weekends. (On call function also covers IEI air threat).	Joint unit with NCA but their staff not included in figures

Annex C – HOAI Analysis of Clandestine Activity Trends in Winter




Fig 1




Fig 2

1. Whilst comparisons between the festive periods of 2018 and 2019 can be drawn for irregular clandestine migrants (Juxtaposed detections, In country and UK Port arrivals), due to the general similarity of the years leading up to these periods, it is unwise to use these periods to predict the 2020 winter. 2020 has been very different to previous years, in terms of the increased use of small boats by irregular migrants but also the policy and national conditions in the UK and rest of Europe regarding Covid-19. The winters of 2018 and 2019 showed a reduction in the numbers of irregular migrants (Juxtaposed detections, In country and UK Port arrivals) identified in the Christmas (week 52) and New Year weeks (week 1). The numbers of irregular migrants arriving via small boat in 2020 is very different to 2018 and 2019; the average number of irregular migrants arriving via small boat per week between weeks 40 to 48 for 2020 is a 5 times higher than the same period in

2019 and 9 times higher than the same period in 2018. The use of small boats to enter the UK does not rely on ferry or freight movements and in part is driven by the weather and sea conditions of the Channel.