

THE CRANSTON INQUIRY

OPERATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. This document sets out the operational roles and responsibilities of those involved with the events of 23-24 November 2021. It should be read in conjunction with the Inquiry's 'Organisations Overview' and 'Operational Arrangements' documents, as well as its organograms and charts. It is not intended to be an exhaustive, comprehensive, or final statement of the matters it addresses, but is provided in order to assist full participants in their participation in the Inquiry's forthcoming hearings.

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His Majesty's Coastguard

Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Maritime Tactical Commander: David Jones/George Close/Matthew West

2. David Jones, George Close and Matthew West were 'Maritime Tactical Commanders'¹, within the JRCC (see para 10 of 'Operational Arrangements') [INQ010138 at para 3; INQ010212 at para 2; INQ010097 at para 8].
3. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre ('JRCC') Maritime Tactical Commanders had a unique role within His Majesty's Coastguard's ('HMCG') infrastructure; they were required to work in shifts to ensure that there was a tactical-level officer overseeing the Coastguard network 24/7² [INQ010098 at para 1.43; INQ003766; INQ000390; INQ010212 at paras 13-14; INQ009634 at paras 14 and 18; INQ000410, 'C&C' tab; INQ000404 at page 5; INQ004764 at para 4.3.3].
4. The JRCC Maritime Tactical Commander's role was to ensure the efficient running of the Coastguard network [INQ010138 at para 7, 9]. This necessarily involved maintaining oversight of ongoing search and rescue ('SAR') missions to ensure that there was a proper plan in place, and sufficient resources were available, for those missions [INQ010138 at para 10; INQ003775]. In practical terms, this was achieved through the 'RAGS' procedure, which stands for 'Review, Assess, Guidance, SMC' (see para 23 below) [INQ010138 at para 10; INQ003775; INQ010098]. This process required JRCC Maritime Tactical Commanders to periodically review ongoing SAR incidents and record their assessments briefly in the ViSION system (see para 19 of 'Operational Arrangements') [INQ003775].

¹ This role was formerly known as 'Maritime Operations Controller' [INQ010094 at para 8; INQ010138 at para 3; INQ000403; INQ002650] and is also referred to in the disclosure as 'TACOM' [INQ000411], 'Tactical Commander (Maritime)' [INQ004764 at page 38] or 'MRCC Controller' [INQ000409, 'Controllers' tab].

² When acting in this capacity, they are referred to in the disclosure as 'Network Commander' [INQ000390; INQ010212 at paras 13-14], 'JRCC Commander (Maritime)' [INQ000404], 'JRCC Commander' [INQ003705], 'NETCOM' [INQ009634 at paras 14 and 18], 'DUTY MAR TACTICAL COMMANDER' [INQ000233 at page 2], 'NMOC Controller' [INQ000410, 'C&C' tab], 'Duty Network Commander (TACOM)' [INQ003731], 'Duty Tactical Commander' [INQ003766 at pages 2 and 4].

5. JRCC Maritime Tactical Commanders were line-managed by the 'JRCC Manager', Duncan Ley (see **Inquiry Graphic 'MCA/HMCG Line Management'**) [**INQ000403**; **INQ002650**; **INQ010204**; **INQ010094** at paras 10-11; **INQ010098** at para 1.40; **INQ010094** at paras 8, 10 and 12; **INQ003470**].

6. Outside of the JRCC, each Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre ('MRCC') (see para 7 onwards of 'Operational Arrangements') had an officer at 'Maritime Tactical Commander' level³ [**INQ003766** at page 1; **INQ004550**]. However, this was generally a non-operational role with responsibility for managing an MRCC station as part of the national network [**INQ010212** at para 23; **INQ000402** at page 1], although they could assume Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator ('SMC') duties if needed [**INQ000446** at page 2] and were required to work a rota as 'Duty On-Call Tactical Commanders' to provide out-of-hours network support in addition to, or in the absence of, the JRCC Maritime Tactical Commander who was on duty [**INQ003766** at page 2; **INQ010212** at para 23; **INQ000402** at page 1].

7. On the night shift of 23 November 2021, the JRCC Maritime Tactical Commander was David Jones [**INQ010138** at para 3]. Also on shift was a Maritime Tactical Commander at MRCC Falmouth, who was the 'Duty On-Call Tactical Commander' on 23 November 2021 (see **Inquiry Graphic 'HMCG Command Structure on 23/24 November 2021'**) [**INQ000231** at page 1; **INQ007230** at page 2; **INQ000409**, 'Controllers' tab; **INQ003766** at page 4]

8. On the morning shift of 24 November 2021, the responsibilities of the JRCC Maritime Tactical Commander were shared between George Close and Matt West [**INQ010212** at para 35; **INQ009849**; **INQ008386**; **INQ009632** at para 40; **INQ000233** at page 7]. Matt West took the lead on managing the network, while George Close focussed on small boat activity [**INQ010212** at para 36].

³ As noted above, these are also referred to as 'MRCC Controllers' [**INQ000409**, 'Controllers' tab] or 'Maritime Operations Controllers' [**INQ006746**].

Duty Strategic Maritime Commander

9. Operationally, the JRCC Maritime Tactical Commanders were overseen and supported by the 'Duty Strategic Maritime Commander'⁴ (see **Inquiry Graphic** 'HMCG Command Structure on 23/24 November 2021') [INQ003766 at page 4]. This was a role shared between five 'Grade 7' Coastguard staff, each of whom would be on-call for a week at a time [INQ010094 at para 23; INQ010098 at para 1.42; INQ007230]. The Duty Strategic Maritime Commander would provide advice, re-assurance, assistance with decision making, and support to routine and major Coastguard operations, to those beneath them in the command structure, if required (see **Inquiry Graphic** 'HMCG Command Structure on 23/24 November 2021') [INQ003766 at page 4-6; INQ010094 at paras 26, 28, 29; INQ010098 at para 1.42].
10. On 23/24 November 2021, the 'Duty Strategic Maritime Commander' was Duncan Ley (see also paragraph 5 above) [INQ010094 at paras 14, 21 and 23; INQ010138 at paragraph 15; INQ010212 at para 32; INQ006739; INQ000231 at page 26; INQ000233]. However, he was not contacted during the events concerning Incident 'Charlie' and remained asleep throughout [INQ010094 at paras 37, 40-41]. He was contacted on 24 November 2021 in relation to incident 'XRAY 2' [INQ008386; INQ008388; INQ010094 at para 49].

Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre Aviation Tactical Commander: Dominic Golden

11. Dominic Golden was the 'Aviation Tactical Commander'⁵ on 23 November 2021 [INQ009628 at para 62]. He, like David Jones, was line-managed by the JRCC Manager, Duncan Ley [INQ010201; INQ009628 at para 2].

⁴ The 'Duty Strategic Maritime Commander' is also referred to in the disclosure the Inquiry has received as the 'Duty Commander' [INQ003766 at page 4], 'Duty Strategic Commander – Maritime' [INQ000203 at page 5], 'STRATCOM' [INQ004746 at page 8], 'National Strategic Commander' [INQ009682 at page 2], 'Maritime Strategic Commander' [INQ000446 at page 2], 'Duty Strategic Commander' [INQ010098 at para 1.41], 'Strategic Commander' [INQ009628 at para 22].

⁵ This role is also referred to in the disclosure received by the Inquiry as 'JRCC Commander (Air)' [INQ010201] and 'Aeronautical Operations Controller' ('AOC') [INQ000223 at page 4; INQ008377 at page 2; INQ008373 at page 11], 'JRCC Tactical Commander (Aviation)' [INQ003766 at page 2].

12. The Aviation Tactical Commander role was a distinct role from the Maritime Tactical Commander [INQ009628 at paras 5, 7 and 20]. The Aviation Tactical Commander was responsible for the coordination of the aviation response to SAR incidents and for ensuring that sufficient air assets were available to respond to SAR incidents across the network [INQ009628 at paras 11, 18 and 19].
13. The Aviation Tactical Commander line-managed Team Leaders⁶ within the ARCC [INQ010201]. On a given night, the Aviation Tactical Commander and Team Leader managed a team of and Senior Aviation Operations Officers ('SAOOs')⁷ (see **Inquiry Graphic** 'MCA/HMCG Line Management') [INQ009628 at paras 12c and 13]. SAOOs dealt with the vast majority of SAR taskings, which were usually routine requests for SAR helicopters ('SAR-H'), without input from the Aviation Tactical Commander or Team Leader [INQ009628 at para 16].
14. The Aviation Tactical Commander was supported operationally by the 'Duty Strategic Maritime Commander' (see para 9 above and **Inquiry Graphic** 'HMCG Command Structure on 23/24 November 2021') [INQ009628 at para 22; INQ003766 at page 4].
15. On 23/24 November 2024, the ARCC ViSION Log shows that Dominic Golden's team comprised 4 SAOOs, one of which was a trainee [INQ000223 at page 4; INQ009628 para 62].

Small Boats Tactical Commander: George Papadopoulos

⁶ This role is also referred to in the disclosure the Inquiry has received as 'Aeronautical Operations Specialists' ('AOS') [INQ010201; INQ008590].

⁷ This role is also referred to as 'Aviation Operators' in the disclosure the Inquiry has received [cf INQ009628 paras 13, 62 and INQ000223 at page 1].

16. George Papadopoulos was the ‘Small Boat Tactical Commander’⁸ (‘SBTC’) [INQ009632 at para 13]. He had held this position since its inception on 16 August 2021 [INQ009632 at para 13].

17. The SBTC role was of an equivalent level to MRCC Dover’s Maritime Tactical Commander (see paragraph 6 above) and reported directly to the Division 2 Commander, Mike Bill [INQ009632 at para 31; INQ010097]. The Division 2 Commander usually oversaw SAR zones 6 to 11, 13 and 14 [INQ010204; INQ010202; INQ010097 at para 8; INQ000411; INQ009682], which covered an area on the East Coast of the UK from the Scottish border down to Camber Sands [INQ001459]. However, as noted at para 15 of ‘Operational Arrangements’, the JRCC had assumed control of zone 13 on the date of the incident [INQ000411]. As Division 2 Commander, Mike Bill was the strategic lead for Division 2 and oversaw the work of MRCC Humber and MRCC Dover, as well as the Vessel Traffic Service (‘VTS’) (see para 16 of ‘Operational Arrangements’) [INQ010097 at para 8; INQ010204; INQ009682].

18. The original purpose of the SBTC role was to provide a designated lead in relation to small boat SAR, due to the volume and concentration of crossings around Dover [INQ009632 at para 14]. However, by 23 September 2021, Mike Bill stated that:

‘George’s main function is to act as tactical commander in the Dover ops room on Red days when he will release the network commanders from the requirement to oversee the migrant incidents and take over the RAG function for those incidents...if he considers it necessary, he may play a more hands on role as the SMC handing back the tactical command to the network commander’ [INQ009632 at para 16-17; INQ008621].

⁸ The role was initially known as the ‘Channel Operations Tactical Commander’ [INQ009632 at para 13]. The title and ambit of this role has changed over time and it is variously referred to as ‘Maritime Operations Commander’, ‘Migrant SAR Lead’, ‘Staff Officer Small Boat Crossings (‘SCB’) SAR’, and ‘Small Boat Tactical Commander’ (‘SBTC’ or ‘SBC TACOM’ or TACOM (MIGRANT)) [INQ009632 at paras 13-14, 30-31, 37].

19. In periods with fewer small boat crossings, the SBTC also had a role in supporting the general management of MRCC Dover [INQ009632 at para 16].
20. By virtue of being SBTC, George Papadopoulos also had a training role in relation to small boats matters [INQ009632 at paras 25-26; INQ008621; INQ000449; INQ000428; INQ000434].
21. George Papadopoulos was not on station for the night shift on 23 November 2021; the Watchbill is endorsed 'TOIL' (which the Inquiry infers means 'Time Off In Lieu') [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab]. He was on station at MRCC Dover on 24 November 2021 although only briefly occupied the role of SBTC (see paragraph 34 below).

Search and Rescue Mission Coordinators: Neal Gibson/Christopher 'Tom' Barnett'/James Crane

22. Neal Gibson, Christopher 'Tom' Barnett', and James Crane all held SMC qualifications which entitled them to undertake the role of SMC [INQ010098 at para 1.54; INQ010392 at para 13]. This was a distinct operational function to their line-management, pastoral, and leadership responsibilities as 'Team Leaders' [INQ010204; INQ010140 at paras 4, 19; INQ010098 at para 1.46; INQ010212 at paras 20-21; INQ009632 at para 12; INQ009634 at para 14; INQ002709]. At the time of the incident, SMC qualification was a prerequisite to becoming both a Team Leader [INQ002709 at page 4; INQ010098 at para 1.46; INQ010392 at para 12; INQ010140 at para 4; INQ000366; INQ000359] and a Senior Maritime Operations Officer ('SMOO') (see paragraph 29 below) [INQ002346 at page 4; INQ002763 at page 4; INQ004045 at page 4 cf. INQ000377].
23. The concept of an SMC derives from the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue ('IAMSAR') manual which requires an SMC to be in place in respect of each SAR mission [INQ010445 at para 1.11.2]. Where there are multiple incidents taking place at once, the SMC role may also be delegated to a suitably qualified person [INQ010445 at para 1.11.2].

24. As an operational role, an SMC is '*effectively the on the ground decision maker*' for an individual SAR mission [INQ010140 at para 8; INQ010138 at para 5]. SMCs provide oversight to officers beneath them in the command structure and are responsible for providing effective leadership to the operational team [INQ010140 at para 8].
25. An SMC is in charge of a SAR operation until either: (i) a rescue is effected, (ii) it has become apparent that further efforts will be to no avail, (iii) they are relieved by another SMC, or (iv) responsibility for coordinating the rescue has been accepted by another MRCC [INQ010098 at para 1.54; INQ000401].
26. The person undertaking the function of SMC for a particular SAR incident could be remote from the MRCC within whose area of responsibility the incident was taking place (see also para 6 of 'Operational Arrangements') [INQ000446; INQ000445].
27. The SMC at MRCC Dover for the night watch on 23 November 2021 was Neal Gibson [INQ010392 at para 13]. He was supported remotely by Christopher 'Tom' Barnett who was on station at the JRCC [INQ010140 at paras 13 and 14; INQ000231 at page 18]. There was also a Senior Maritime Operations Officer or 'SMOO' (see paragraph 29 below) at the JRCC available as a remote SMC to MRCC Dover [INQ010140 at para 16; INQ006763; INQ000231 at page 18].
28. The SMC at MRCC Dover on the day watch of 24 November 2021 was James Crane [INQ010142; INQ009634 at para 36; INQ000233 at page 10].

Senior Maritime Operations Officers, Maritime Operations Officers and trainees: Stuart Downs

29. A SMOO is a member of the watch keeping team who exercises delegated leadership and supervision functions in respect of the operations team at a JRCC or MRCC but who does not have line-management duties [INQ010098 at para 1.47]. SMOOs could be delegated to act as SMCs [INQ004045].

30. A MOO is a member of the watch keeping team in the JRCC or MRCC who is responsible for operating HMCG control room systems and communications [INQ010098 at para 1.51; INQ003256]. MOOs must complete modules in 'Mission Conduct' and 'Maritime Search', and a module on 'Mission Coordination' [INQ010040 at page 3; INQ006710; INQ006711; INQ006717; INQ006713] and are sometimes referred to as 'Maritime'/'Mission Coordinators' [INQ009634 at para 28; INQ009632 at paras 35, 40, 41, 42; INQ006713; INQ006717]. Stuart Downs acted as a MOO on the night of the incident.

31. On the night of 23 November 2021, Neal Gibson's team, 'Watch 3', was supposed to comprise a team of 4 MOOs, and 4 Trainee MOOs ('MOO-T') [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab]. However, two MOOs had been allocated to VTS, one was on annual leave, and the other was on sick leave [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, rows 53 and 55 respectively]. Two MOO-Ts were not allocated to be on shift as they were due to start on 1 December 2021 [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, rows 57-58], leaving Stuart Downs as the only MOO allocated to SAR [INQ010208 at para 8; INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, row 54; INQ000231 at page 22]. There was another MOO-T on duty, but they were 'non-operational' [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, row 56], which essentially meant they were only able to observe the operations room [INQ010140 at para 14].

32. On the day watch of 24 November 2021, James Crane's team, 'Watch 4', comprised 3 MOOs, 4 MOO-Ts and 1 SMOO [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab]. The SMOO and 2 MOOs were allocated to VTS [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, rows 64-66]. One MOO-T was not due to start until 1 December 2021 [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, row 71]. Two MOO-Ts were marked as 'Trg.' which, the Inquiry infers from other entries, is an abbreviation of 'Training' [e.g. INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, rows 68-69, column ZJ or row 70, column ZX]. This left only one MOO-T who was 'non-operational' [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, rows 70].

33. Although he was a qualified SMC and Team Leader who was ordinarily based at the JRCC, Richard Cockerill worked on station at MRCC Dover, as 'Op DEVERAN support' (see generally para 30 of 'Operational Arrangements') [INQ000233 at page 10], in the

role of 'Maritime Coordinator'⁹ or 'MC', which was equivalent to a 'MOO' [INQ009634 at paras 28, 35, 36, 38]. He began his shift at 0500 on 24 November 2021 and therefore worked both the night and day shifts of 23 and 24 November 2021 respectively [INQ000409, 'DOVR' tab, row 85; INQ010138 at para 36; INQ009634 at para 31].

34. As noted at paragraph 21 above, George Papadopoulos only briefly acted as SBTC on 24 November 2021 [INQ009632 at paras 32, 37, 40; INQ000409; INQ010130]. Initially, David Jones gave a verbal handover on small boats matters to George Papadopoulos who assumed the SBTC role [INQ009632 at para 37]. However, due to an increase in the volume of small boat incidents it was later agreed between Matt West and James Crane, the day watch SMC at MRCC Dover, that George Papadopoulos would become an 'MC' for the day watch and would hand back his tactical level responsibilities to the JRCC Maritime Tactical Commanders (West and Close) [INQ009632 at para 40; INQ010130].

The Joint Control Room and Clandestine Operations Liaison Officer

35. The JCR (see paragraphs 17-18 of 'Operational Arrangements') was staffed by both HMCG and Border Force Maritime Command Centre ('BFMCC') staff but was led by a Tactical, or 'Silver', Commander from the Clandestine Channel Threat Command ('CCTC') [INQ002761; INQ002764 at page 4; INQ010134 at paras 38 and 51; INQ010445 at para 1.10.4].
36. A key HMCG role within the JCR was the 'Clandestine Operations Liaison Officer'¹⁰ [INQ010134 at para 38; INQ0007168]. The COLO was based within the JCR to facilitate communication between HMCG and the CCTC [INQ010134 at para 38] and was directly accountable to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency ('MCA') Head of Maritime Security [INQ002768; INQ010098 at para 2.15; INQ010203; INQ008173 at page 96].

⁹ This role is also described as 'Mission Coordinator' by George Papadopoulos [INQ009632 at paras 35, 40, 41, 42]

¹⁰ This role is also referred to in the disclosure received by the Inquiry as which was sometimes referred to as the 'Joint Control Room (Dover) Liaison Officer' [INQ009632 at para 69], or the 'MCA LO' or 'CG LO' [INQ002761].

37. The COLO would generally be on task during daytime hours from 0500 onwards, but in the event of a critical incident, could be called in earlier [**INQ010134** at para 38].

38. Also within the JCR was a Border Force Maritime Command ('BFMC') Liaison Officer¹¹ [**INQ010098** at para 2.15; **INQ002266** at page 3; **INQ010098** at para 2.11]. At the time of the incident, the BFMC Liaison Officer's role was to support the BFMCC (see para 28 of 'Operational Arrangements'), who retained overall command and control, in tasking and coordinating BFMC assets [**INQ010137** at para 41; **INQ00619** at page 23; **INQ000619** at page 23].

Border Force

Strategic command of BFMC

39. BFMC was led by the Deputy Director of Border Force Maritime Command, Stephen Whitton OBE [**INQ010207**]. He (or a member of BFMC's senior leadership team acting as his deputy) was responsible for BFMC's strategic operational command [**INQ000619** at page 24; **INQ010137** at para 42], but he also line-managed the 'Head of Operations & Planning' and the 'Head of Operational Support' (see **Inquiry Graphic** 'HO/BF Line Management') [**INQ010207**].

40. The 'Head of Operational Support' line-managed 4 Senior Executive Officers: two had responsibility for technical and logistical support, one had responsibility for training, and one had responsibility for the BFMCC (see para 28 of 'Operational Arrangements') [**INQ010207**; **INQ010137** at para 4].

¹¹ This role is also referred to in the disclosure received by the Inquiry as 'Maritime Command Liaison Officer' [**INQ00619** at page 23; **INQ010137** at para 54].

41. Reporting to the Senior Executive Officer in BFMCC were 5 'HO's ('Higher Officers' or 'BFHOs') [INQ010207]. It was the role of BFHOs to manage requests for BF maritime assets from HMCG and deploy them across the UK [INQ010135 at paras 4, 7, 12, 13, 37, 38, 43; INQ010136 at para 25]. The BFHOs worked shifts to provide 24-hour coverage [INQ010135 at para 26, 31].
42. On 23 November 2021, Karen Whitehouse was on shift working as a BFHO [INQ010135 at para 30]. Also on shift was Tom Willows [INQ010214], a Border Force Officer [INQ000534], who was available remotely to assist her by mobile phone (see **Inquiry Graphic** 'HO/BF Line Management') [INQ010214 at para 3; INQ010135 at para 26, 43]. Karen Whitehouse received an asset availability report from another BFHO who gave her a handover briefing at the change of their shifts [INQ010135 at paras 43 and 46; INQ000566].
43. There was no contact between Karen Whitehouse and Tom Willows on the night of 23/24 November 2021, but Tom Willows did speak with HMCG independently [INQ010135 at para 43; INQ010214 at para 5, INQ007602].

Tactical Command within Border Force: the Commander of the Valiant

44. The 'Head of Operations & Planning' oversaw 3 Senior Executive Officers and the crew of BF's vessels [INQ010207]. This included Commander Kevin Toy, the Commander of HMC Valiant on the night of the incident (see **Inquiry Graphic** 'HO/BF Line Management') [INQ010136; INQ000477; INQ010136 at para 15].
45. The tactical level command for an Operation DEVERAN deployment was the Cutter Commander (Kevin Toy), or the Coastal Patrol Vessel ('CPV') 'Officer in Charge' [INQ000619 at page 24; INQ010137 at para 54], depending on which vessel was deployed (see para 39 of 'Operational Arrangements'). There was also a Duty Senior Executive Officer on call to provide tactical command for an incident or operation [INQ010137 at para 42; INQ000619 at page 24].

46. Commander Kevin Toy was responsible for the overall command of the Valiant, as well as her crew [INQ010136 at para 7]. The Valiant's activities and key information would be recorded in her logbook and Commander Toy's daybook [INQ010135 at para 9; INQ002054], and Commander Toy was required to provide a Situation Report, or 'Sit Rep', to BFMCC every 24 hours on the vessel's activity [INQ010136 at para 10]. At the end of a patrol, Commander Toy would also produce a report of the entire 15-day period for his superior to review [INQ010136 at paras 8, 12]. After small boats incidents, he would also conduct an 'informal' crew debrief if he considered it 'worthwhile', which would involve an evaluation of what had happened and how her crew 'could develop as a team' [INQ010136 at para 12].

47. From April 2021, as part of Operation DEVERAN (see para 30 of 'Operational Arrangements'), Crime and Financial Investigations ('CFI') Officers were deployed on vessels on a 'regular basis' to enhance law enforcement capabilities [INQ000619 at page 6; INQ005236 at page 52]. A CFI officer was aboard the Valiant on the night of the incident [INQ010136 at para 59; INQ010137 at para 114; INQ002051 at page 3].

2Excel

48. At an operational level, the pilots of 2Excel's aircraft reported to a head of division according to the type of aircraft which they flew. The heads of division each then reported to the Head of Surveillance. The Head of Surveillance was overseen in turn by the Director of Special Missions (see **Inquiry Graphic** '2Excel Line Management') [INQ009731].

Bristow

49. R163 ordinarily requires 4 crew: two pilots, a winch operator, and a paramedic [INQ009651 at para 3.2]. Christopher Trubshaw was the Captain of R163 and was responsible, as Air Commander, for the safe operation of the shift, correct operation of the aircraft and overall management of the crew [INQ009651 at para 4.1.3]. He reported to the Bristow 'UKSAR Chief Pilots' (see **Inquiry Graphic** 'Bristow Line Management') [INQ008981]. The R163 had a full complement of qualified crew on the night of the incident [INQ010336 at para 7.1; INQ009651 at para 3.2].

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