

THE CRANSTON INQUIRY

ORGANISATIONS OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to section III of the Inquiry's List of Issues, this document sets out information about the main organisations and individuals involved in responding to small boats in the UK and France on 23-24 November 2021. It also sets out how these organisations and individuals related to, and worked with, one another at the time of the incident at an 'institutional', 'corporate' or 'policy' level. This document should be read in conjunction with the Inquiry's 'Operational Arrangements' and 'Operational Roles and Responsibilities' documents, as well as its organograms and charts. It is not intended to be an exhaustive, comprehensive, or final statement of the matters it addresses, but is provided in order to assist full participants in their participation in the Inquiry's forthcoming hearings.
2. The following organisations were involved in dealing with small boats in the Dover Strait as at 23/24 November 2021:

Organisation	Paragraph
Department for Transport ('DfT')	3
Maritime and Coastguard Agency ('MCA')	21
His Majesty's Coastguard ('HMCG')	37
Home Office ('HO')	49

Border Force ('BF')	55
Joint Maritime Security Centre ('JMSC')	59
Clandestine Channel Threat Command ('CCTC')	65
National Crime Agency ('NCA')	72
Kent Police	79
Metropolitan Police	84
Private Aerial Search and Rescue ('SAR') providers	87
2Excel Aviation Limited ('2Excel')	88
RVL Limited ('RVL')	92
Bristow Helicopters Limited ('Bristow')	97
Tekever Limited ('Tekever')	102
Royal National Lifeboat Institution ('RNLI')	103
Ministry of Defence ('MoD')	111
French Authorities	122

Department for Transport

3. The Department for Transport ('DfT') is a United Kingdom government department. The Secretary of State for Transport and the Department have an obligation to promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue ('SAR') service regarding safety on and over the sea, pursuant to a number of international treaties and Conventions including: the Convention on the High Seas 1958; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 ('SOLAS'); the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 ('UNCLOS'); the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979; and, the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR') [INQ010337 at para 22; INQ010134 at para 10; INQ010137 at para 12].

4. Additionally, the Secretary of State for Transport is a Category 1 responder pursuant to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which places a statutory duty on him/her to 'assess, plan and advise' in relation to, among other things, *'an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom'*[INQ010337 at para 22h and 23b; Civil Contingencies Act 2004, ss.1, 2 and Schedule 1(12)].

5. The Department is also responsible for coordinating maritime interests across government [INQ010337 at para 9; INQ010134 at para 11; INQ010098 at para 2.4].

Roles and Responsibilities within the Department for Transport

6. At the time of the incident, the Secretary of State for Transport was the Rt Hon Grant Shapps MP [INQ000868]. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary and Minister for Aviation, Maritime & Security was Robert Courts MP [INQ010337 at para 253; INQ002337].
7. An organogram has been provided by the Department for Transport setting out the civil service roles relevant to small boats within the Department [INQ008176].
8. The Permanent Secretary (the most senior civil servant in the Department) was Dame Bernadette Kelly DCB. Reporting to the Permanent Secretary on matters related to small boats was the Director General of the 'Aviation, Maritime, International and Security Group', Gareth Davies. Beneath this Director General sat a number of directorates, two of which were relevant to small boats [INQ008176].
9. The main directorate of relevance was 'Maritime'. At the time of the incident, the Maritime Directorate was led by Petra Wilkinson CBE [INQ007961 at page 2]. She had succeeded Roger Hargreaves [INQ002125 at page 2] in around November 2020 [INQ009175]. At first, she was 'acting director' [INQ009175], but by June 2021 she had taken on the role permanently [INQ008087]. The Maritime Director was responsible for overall policy for shipping, including marine safety, SAR, and counter pollution response [INQ010337 at para 11].
10. Within the Maritime Directorate were 4 'divisions', 2 of which were relevant to small boats. The first of relevance was the 'Maritime Operations Division' which held Maritime and Coastguard Agency Sponsorship (discussed at paragraphs 28-36 below). The second was the 'Maritime Security Division' which was led by James

Driver [INQ010337 at para 5] and comprised 4 teams: (i) the Domestic and Europe Port & Ship Security team; (ii) the International Shipping and Counter Piracy team; (iii) the Strategy team; and (iv) the Coordination team [INQ010337 at para 7].

11. The other directorate of relevance was 'Transport Security, Resilience and Response'. Within this sat the Transport Security Operations Centre ('TSOC'), which had a limited cross-departmental coordination function regarding major civil contingency and security incidents [INQ010337 at para 41].

Decision-making within the Department for Transport

12. The DfT is governed by its Board [INQ010337 at para 14; INQ007960; INQ008125 at page 2; INQ008124 at page 2; INQ008123 at para 10; INQ009118]. A sub-committee of the Board is the Executive Committee ('DfT ExCo') [INQ010337 at para 14].
13. At the time of the incident, the DfT ExCo was attended by the most senior departmental officials including the Permanent Secretary (Bernadette Kelly) and the Director General of the Aviation, Maritime and Security Group (Gareth Davies) [INQ010337 at para 14; INQ007960]. It met weekly '*to steer DfT's strategic vision, maintain strategic oversight, provide scrutiny of DfT policies and delivery commitments, and take significant management decisions across the department*' [INQ010337 at para 14].

The Department for Transport's relationship with other government departments

14. The DfT, together with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office ('FCDO'), liaised with the Home Office ('HO') in relation to its illegal migration policies to ensure that they did not infringe on the UK's international obligations and ability to save lives at sea [INQ010337 at paras 45, 53, 241].
15. The DfT also represented the Maritime and Coastguard Agency ('MCA'), and maritime interests generally, across Whitehall [INQ010337 at para 158b]. For

example: the DfT convened the Maritime Security Ministerial Small Group ('MSMSG') [INQ010337 at paras 219 and 233]; the Maritime Director chaired the National Maritime Security Committee (Officials) ('NMSC(O)') [INQ010337 at para 223]; and the DfT would contribute, where necessary, to National Security Council ('NSC') meetings [INQ010337 at para 229].

16. The Secretary of State for Transport and departmental officials also attended the 'Illegal Migration Taskforce' ('IMTF'), or 'Domestic and Economic (Illegal Migration) Cabinet Committee', as and when requested [INQ010337 at paras 75-76].
17. From 2019, the DfT participated in a 'Small Boats Planning Group' which was convened and chaired through the Joint Maritime Operations Coordination Centre ('JMOCC') [INQ010337 at para 238].
18. The JMOCC was established in October 2017 to coordinate the deployment of seagoing government assets in contexts other than SAR [INQ010137 at para 37; INQ010445 at page 41; INQ009128 at page 3; INQ006156; INQ000003 at para 4; INQ000426]. It was physically located in Portsmouth, together with the National Maritime Information Centre ('NMIC') [INQ001119].
19. The NMIC was established between 2010 and 2012 [INQ009128 at page 4; INQ000441 at page 2]. Whereas the JMOCC had an asset coordination role, the NMIC's role was to gather intelligence [INQ009128 at page 4; INQ000003 at para 3; INQ000441 at page 2].
20. In 2019, the Joint Maritime Security Centre ('JMSC') was created to act as an umbrella organisation for the NMIC and JMOCC (see paragraph 59 below). The JMSC is sponsored by the DfT and the HO, and some non-financial support is provided by the Ministry of Defence ('MoD'), but it sits under Border Force ('BF') for administrative purposes and is therefore set out in greater detail below [INQ010337 at para 60; INQ004290 at page 2].

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency

21. The MCA is an 'Executive Agency' of the Department for Transport. It was formed on 1 April 1998 when the 'Marine Safety Agency' and 'Coastguard Agency' were merged to form the 'Maritime and Coastguard Agency' [INQ010413 at page 8, para 4; INQ000168 at page 53].

22. The MCA's purpose is to discharge the Department for Transport's international obligations and statutory duties in respect of SAR and civil contingency [INQ010337 at para 24]. At an operational level, the MCA does this through His Majesty's Coastguard [INQ010337 at para 24; INQ010098 at para 1.1], with the MCA providing corporate governance.

Roles and Responsibilities within the Maritime and Coastguard Agency

23. At the time of the incident, the MCA was led by the Chief Executive, Brian Johnson [INQ000955 at para 33; INQ003734; INQ000168 at page 50]. The Chief Executive was responsible for the overall '*risk management and maritime governance, improvement and assurance*' of the MCA [INQ000168 at pages 50, 52].

24. At a corporate level, the discharge of HMCG's six functions was the responsibility of the 'Director of HM Coastguard', Claire Hughes [INQ000168 at page 51; INQ010203; INQ002301]. The Director of HM Coastguard was part of the executive directorship of the MCA [INQ000168 at pages 51 and 54].

25. Reporting to the Director of HM Coastguard were: (i) the Assistant Director HMCG Policy & Standards (Julie-Anne Woods [INQ004603]), (ii) the Deputy Director of HMCG; (iii) the SOSREP ('the Secretary of State's Representative for Maritime

Salvage and Intervention’); and (iv) the Chief Coastguard (Peter Mizen – see paragraph 46 below [INQ010203]).

Decision-making within the Maritime and Coastguard Agency

26. At the time of the incident, the ‘MCA Board’ was the highest decision making entity within the MCA [INQ000955 at para 39] and was responsible for (amongst other things):

(i) establishing the strategic objectives of the organisation in line with policy and resources determined by the Secretary of State for Transport; (ii) ensuring that responsible ministers were kept informed of any changes within the MCA; (iii) reviewing financial information about the MCA; and, (iv) ensuring the MCA Board was informed of any concerns about MCA activities [INQ000955 at para 40].

27. These meetings were chaired by a Non-Executive Chair, Christopher Rodrigues [INQ000168 at page 8]. The Non-Executive Chair was appointed by the Secretary of State for Transport and his role was to provide independent advice and inform the decision-making process of the MCA Board [INQ000955 at para 39]. MCA Board meetings were attended by the Chief Executive, Executive and Non-Executive Directorship of the MCA and the Policy Sponsor (see paragraphs 29-33 below) [INQ000955 at paras 39 and 91].

Relationship between the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Department for Transport

28. The detail of the relationship between the DfT and the MCA was set out in the *‘Framework Document for the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), November 2017’* (‘the MCA Framework’) [INQ000955]. In broad terms, this document sets out a number of specific roles/titles unique to the Executive Agency relationship between DfT and MCA. Many of the roles automatically attach to positions of executive leadership in DfT and MCA. For example, the ‘Director General with

responsibility for Maritime' (Gareth Davies) was, by virtue of that position, also the 'Agency Owner' under the terms of the MCA Framework. The document also sets out their responsibilities and working relationships to one another.

Roles and responsibilities under the Maritime and Coastguard Agency Framework

29. Under the MCA Framework, the Secretary of State for Transport was accountable to Parliament for all matters concerning the MCA, for the policy framework in which it operated, and for agreeing the MCA's strategic objectives, but he/she was not expected to become involved in day-to-day operational matters [INQ000955 at para 11].
30. The DfT Permanent Secretary (Bernadette Kelly) was the DfT's 'Principal Accounting Officer' ('PAO'), and was therefore responsible *'for the overall organisation, management and staffing of the Department and for ensuring there is a high standard of financial and other resource management in the Department'* [INQ000955 at para 16]. She was required to satisfy herself of the adequacy of the MCA's financial systems and procedures, and she had responsibility for any grant-in-aid issued to the MCA [INQ000955 at para 16].
31. As noted at paragraph 28 above, the DfT Director General with responsibility for Maritime (Gareth Davies) was also the MCA 'Agency Owner' [INQ000955 at para 19]. He was *'responsible for allocating the [MCA]'s resources as part of the [DfT]'s Business Planning Process and for setting its detailed objectives within the strategic parameters agreed by Ministers'* and for advising the PAO (Bernadette Kelly) and Ministers on MCA matters in the context of wider DfT activity [INQ000955 at para 20].
32. The DfT Director of Maritime (Petra Wilkinson) was also the MCA 'Agency Sponsor' [INQ000955 at para 23]. She was *'responsible on behalf of the Agency Owner [Gareth Davies], the Minister and the Permanent Secretary [Bernadette Kelly] for*

holding the MCA to account and gaining assurance on the body's governance, risk management, and internal control processes'. The Agency Sponsor's focus was 'to support the MCA to be accountable, high performing and deliver value for money [INQ000955 at para 23].

33. The Chief Executive of the MCA (Brian Johnson) was also the MCA's 'Accounting Officer' and had overall responsibility for the MCA's performance and the expenditure of public funds [INQ000955 at para 34]. He reported and was accountable to the Agency Owner (Gareth Davies) [INQ000955 at para 19]. Through this relationship, Johnson was ultimately accountable to Ministers and to the Public Accounts Committee [INQ000955 at paras 35 and 36]. The Chief Executive was responsible for providing the MCA's professional, technical and expert advice to the Secretary of State on all matters within the scope of its remit [INQ000955 at para 35].

Department for Transport's oversight of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency

34. The DfT formally oversaw the MCA through the 'MCA Sponsorship Board' [INQ000955 at paras 46-48; INQ010337 at paras 27-30], although there were also a number of other, more informal, channels of oversight (discussed at paragraph 36 below). The MCA Sponsorship Board met quarterly [INQ010337 at para 29; INQ000955 at para 91] and its purpose was to inform the Agency Owner (Gareth Davies) of MCA performance and to provide the MCA Chief Executive (Brian Johnson) with advice, support and assistance [INQ000955 at para 47-48]. It was chaired by Gareth Davies as the relevant Director General and Agency Owner, and was attended by senior members of the DfT and MCA, including Petra Wilkinson as Agency Sponsor, Brian Johnson as MCA Chief Executive, and Christopher Rodrigues as MCA Non-Executive Chair [INQ000955 at para 46; INQ010337 at para 29].

35. In addition to this, under the terms of the MCA Framework, the MCA was generally required to ‘regularly’ report its financial and non-financial performance to the Agency Sponsor (Petra Wilkinson) and to inform them of any changes which may impact the achievement of the MCA’s objectives [INQ000955 at para 88]. In a similar way, the Agency Owner (Gareth Davies) was required to ensure there were arrangements in place to bring concerns about the MCA’s activities to the MCA and DfT Boards [INQ000955 at para 21].
36. There were also other ‘liaison arrangements’ involving different combinations of key senior individuals which took place at varying intervals [INQ000955 at para 91]. For example, the Agency Owner (Gareth Davies) met monthly with the Chief Executive (Brian Johnson) ‘*to discuss objectives and tactics*’. The Agency Sponsor (Petra Wilkinson) held ‘*regular*’ one-to-one meetings with the Chief Executive (Brian Johnson) ‘*to ensure a steady flow of information between MCA and DfT, and that there is alignment to support and enable a ‘single maritime voice’’*. Also, the Agency Sponsor (Petra Wilkinson) was to ‘*chair regular ‘Contact Group’ meetings (every fortnight where possible) between the MCA Chief Executive, MCA Directors and Deputy Directors within the Maritime Directorate to discuss live, cross-cutting, and time critical issues*’ [INQ000955 at para 91].

His Majesty’s Coastguard

37. His Majesty’s Coastguard (‘HMCG’) has six functions: (i) SAR, (ii) vessel traffic monitoring, (iii) maritime security, (iv) pollution response, (v) maritime safety, and (vi) disaster and emergency response [INQ010098 at para 1.5].
38. In respect of SAR specifically, HMCG provides 24-hour emergency SAR services for incidents at sea and in the coastal, or ‘littoral’, areas of the UK [INQ009632 at para 28; INQ009634 at para 18; INQ010098 at para 1.1; INQ000379 at page 9; INQ000412 at page 8].

39. HMCG became the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Transport in 1983 [INQ010337 at para 24b]. However, it had not always been the DfT's responsibility, nor had it always been recognised as having a search and rescue remit.

40. When HMCG was initially formed in 1822, its role was to prevent smuggling by patrolling the coast of the United Kingdom [INQ010412 at page 5 onwards]. It then spent a brief period under the control of the Admiralty [Coast Guard Service Act 1856, s.3], before being returned to civilian control under the Board of Trade 'as a coast-watching force for the performance of the duties hitherto performed by the coastguard on behalf of the Board, and of such other duties as may be determined by the Board' (emphasis added) [Coastguard Act 1925, s.1; INQ000099].

41. In 1992, following a period of ambiguity around HMCG's role, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (then Patrick McLoughlin MP) announced on behalf of the Secretary of State that:

'Her Majesty's Coastguard is responsible for the initiation and co-ordination of civil maritime search and rescue within the United Kingdom search and rescue region. This includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of adequate resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea, or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the United Kingdom' [INQ010411].

42. This 'determination' by the Secretary of State formally clarified HMCG's SAR role and the duty upon HMCG to provide SAR services pursuant to the Coastguard Act 1925 [INQ010337 at para 24b; INQ010411].

43. HMCG primarily discharges its SAR duty by coordinating assets which are declared or contracted to it; it has not had its own fleet of maritime surface assets (i.e. sea-going vessels) since the 1970s [INQ010098 at para 2.71 onwards; INQ010337 at para 104].

44. The assets HMCG coordinates are either 'Declared SAR Facilities' or 'Additional Facilities' [INQ010098 at para 2.73 onwards; INQ001347]. A 'Declared SAR Facility' is a facility which has been designated as being available for maritime SAR according to a specific standard or set criteria (e.g. the Royal National Lifeboat Institution ('RNLI') and contracted air operators), whereas an 'Additional Facility' is one which may be available from time to time but which is not of a specific standard (e.g. vessels in the vicinity of an incident, Police, or Diving Club) [INQ001347].

Leadership roles and responsibilities in His Majesty's Coastguard

45. HMCG is led by the Chief Coastguard, who is responsible for setting the strategic direction of HMCG operations [INQ010098 at paras 1.33; INQ010205]. The Chief Coastguard is also responsible for ensuring that HMCG is adequately structured and resourced to deliver on the UK's coastal State responsibilities, the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, as well as the MCA and HMCG's business strategy and plans [INQ010098 at paras 1.33 and 1.34].

46. The Chief Coastguard has a role in establishing and representing the interests of HMCG at a national level to other key stakeholders such as the DfT, HO, RNLI, and other international coastguard services [INQ010098 at para 1.35]. The Chief Coastguard can enter the operational chain of command (albeit not in a decision-making capacity) by virtue of the 'Duty Operations Director' ('DOD') function; an on-call role, performed by a roster of senior MCA and HMCG staff, which is responsible for briefing the Director of HMCG and/or the MCA Chief Executive on major incidents [INQ003766 at page 10; INQ000457]. At the time of the incident, Peter Mizen was the Chief Coastguard [INQ003103; INQ009632 at para 30].

47. The Deputy Chief Coastguard is the deputy head of the profession and is responsible to the Chief Coastguard for delivering the strategic operational direction for HMCG, as well as its business objectives [INQ010098 at paras 1.36-1.38]. He/she is also responsible for ensuring that HMCG delivers on the UK's international and domestic responsibilities and obligations [INQ010098 at paras 1.36-1.38]. The Deputy Chief Coastguard is also part of the DOD function [INQ010098 at para 1.39; INQ003766 at page 10; INQ000457 at page 2]. At the time of the incident, the Deputy Chief Coastguard was Helen McCaffery [INQ003470; INQ000411].

48. The Deputy Chief Coastguard reported directly to the Chief Coastguard, along with the (ii) Head of Infrastructure (Matthew Leat [INQ010098]); (iii) Head of Coastguard Operations; and (iv) Head of Technical Training [INQ010203].

The Home Office

49. The Home Office is a United Kingdom government department. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (or 'Home Secretary') and his/her department are responsible for immigration and law enforcement within the UK [INQ010134 at para 17]. The Home Office comprises a wide range of directorates and bodies but the main ones relevant to the Inquiry's work are (i) UK Visas and Immigration ('UKVI'); (ii) Border Force, and (iii) Immigration Enforcement ('IE') [INQ010134 at para 18; INQ010135 at para 5]. Together, these directorates represent the three key stages in the UK's immigration system [INQ009671 at page 16].

50. UKVI was responsible for '*decision making about who has the right to visit or stay within the [UK] (including asylum and the provision of accommodation) with a firm emphasis on national security*' [INQ010134 at para 18]. The UKVI sat within the 'Customer Service Group' within the Home Office [INQ010417 at pages 169-170].

51. BF and IE both sat within the 'Migration and Borders Group' in the Home Office [INQ010417 at page 169-170]. BF was '*responsible for securing the UK border by carrying out immigration and customs controls for people and goods entering the UK*' [INQ010137 at para 7; INQ010134 at para 18]. IE was responsible for enforcing immigration laws and policies, preventing abuse of the immigration system, and '*protecting the vulnerable*' [INQ010417 at page 170; INQ010134 at para 18].
52. The Home Office was not responsible for SAR policy or provision [INQ010134 at para 10; INQ010137 at para 12] which, as noted at paragraphs 3-5 above, sat with the Department for Transport. However, through Border Force (and specifically 'Border Force Maritime Command' ('BFMC')), the Home Office have had an 'enduring' role in search and rescue arrangements in the UK since 2018 [INQ010137 at paras 8, 14].

Roles and Responsibilities within the Home Office

53. At the time of the incident, the Home Secretary was the Rt Hon Priti Patel MP [INQ010417 at page 6]. She was supported by a number of Parliamentary-Under Secretaries and Ministers with relevant responsibilities including the Rt Hon Damian Hinds MP, Tom Pursglove MP and Kevin Foster MP [INQ010417 at page 65-66].
54. There were two Permanent Secretaries within the Home Office [INQ010417 at pages 66-67]. Beneath the two most senior civil servants sat a number of Directors General who reported directly to one or other of the Permanent Secretaries and, beneath them, there was a directorate [INQ010417 at page 67; INQ010414; INQ010415].

Border Force and Border Force Maritime Command

55. Border Force was established in 2012, after the disbanding of the UK Border Agency ('UKBA') [INQ009671 at page 13]. By 2013, the UKBA had been separated into BF, IE and UKVI as individual directorates within the Home Office which were directly

accountable to Home Office Ministers [INQ009671 at page 13]. BF was led by the Director General of Border Force ('DGBF') [INQ009139; INQ010417 at page 67]. The DGBF reported to the Second Permanent Secretary [INQ010414, column K, row 12; INQ010415, column K, row 7].

56. Border Force Maritime Command operates the UK's national maritime law enforcement capability in UK and adjacent territorial waters ('TTW') [INQ010137 at para 8]. It is responsible for preventing and disrupting organised crime from exploiting the UK's territorial waters for illegal purposes including drug trafficking, illegal migration and modern slavery [INQ010137 at para 8]. The Head of BFMC was Stephen Whitton OBE [INQ010137 at para 1; INQ010207].

57. BFMC operated from the Border Force Maritime Command Centre ('BFMCC'), which was located in Portsmouth together with the JMSC, NMIC and JMOCC [INQ010137 at para 37].

58. BFMC's 'top priority' is law enforcement, and it is not responsible for coordinating search and rescue in the UK; that is the duty of HMCG [INQ010137 at paras 9, 12 and 13].

Other organisations associated with the Home Office

Joint Maritime Security Centre

59. The JMSC was established in 2019 as the '*umbrella organisation*' or '*collective title*' [INQ010445 at page 42; INQ000426; INQ007060 at page 12] for the NMIC [INQ000441] and the JMOCC [INQ010337 at para 60; INQ000442; INQ000003 at para 2; INQ005282 at pages 5-6]: see paragraphs 17-20 above. The creation of the JMSC resulted in a single senior civil servant having ownership of both the NIMC and the JMOCC [INQ004290 at page 2] whilst preserving the distinct functions and identities of both the NMIC and JMOCC [INQ000442 at pages 1-2].

60. The Director of the JMSC is employed by BF but is accountable to a 'Joint Governance Board', comprised of around 20 stakeholders, which meets quarterly and is chaired by the DfT [INQ004290 at page 2; INQ000003 at para 5]. The 'JMSC Operations room' was physically located within the JMOCC [INQ002091 at page 2].
61. The JMSC is the UK's cross-government organisation for maritime security [INQ000003 at para 1], and its assets and personnel come from a range of government departments and agencies, including the Royal Navy, BF, and MCA [INQ010134 at paras 19 and 20; INQ007947 at page 13].
62. The JMSC's 'Operational Mandate' states that the JMSC provides '*expert, independent advice and support to government, including the Devolved Administrations and Crown Dependencies on maritime security, including maritime related threat, operational capability and response mechanisms*' [INQ000003 at para 1].
63. The JMSC was not an organisation dedicated only to small boats, nor did it have a command-and-control function in relation to small boat SAR [INQ010337 at paras 60-61; INQ010134 at paras 19, 20].
64. Dan O'Mahoney was the founding director of JMSC until his appointment as Commander/Director of the Clandestine Channel Threat Command in August 2020 [INQ010134 at para 2].

Clandestine Channel Threat Command

65. The 'Clandestine Channel Threat Command' was established in August 2020 [INQ010134 at para 22]. This organisation replaced the 'Clandestine Operations Response Team' ('CORT') which had been formed within the IE directorate of the HO in June 2020. The CCTC was established to lead and unify the government response to small boats, providing a '*whole of route, whole of government*'

approach [INQ010134 at para 21-22; INQ000017 at page 1; INQ008370 at page 2; INQ001108]. The CCTC's purpose was to render the channel crossing migration route to the UK 'unviable' [INQ001960; INQ001108].

66. Dan O'Mahoney led the CCTC from its creation until December 2022 [INQ010134 at para 23; INQ001960]. He reported to the Director General of IE [INQ010134 at paras 23] (Tony Eastaugh CBE [INQ010417 at pages 67 and 118]) who, in turn, reported to the Second Permanent Secretary [INQ010414, column K, row 8; INQ010415, column K, row 5]. Dan O'Mahoney also had a direct reporting line to the Home Secretary [INQ010134 at para 23; INQ001960; INQ000017 at page 1].

67. There were four teams within the CCTC: (i) Future Planning and Capability ('FPC'), led by Emma Porter; (ii) Chief Technology Officer ('CTO') team, led by Dr Neil Honeyman [INQ010409]; (iii) Operational Command; and (iv) Illegal Migration Strategy ('IMS') team [INQ010134 at 24].

68. As well as seeking to control the maritime environment, the CCTC also had a role in establishing and managing migrant reception facilities and disembarkation facilities [INQ010134 at para 36].

69. The CCTC's work was guided by an 'Operational Campaign Plan' [INQ008370; INQ010134 at 25 onwards] and was overarchingly described as 'Operation ALTAIR' [INQ008370 at page 3; INQ010134 at 25 onwards]. The delivery of the 'Operational Campaign Plan' was overseen by the CCTC Delivery Board, which was chaired by Dan O'Mahoney and attended by multiple stakeholders, including the DfT, BF, and MCA [INQ010337 at para 56; INQ001052; INQ001108].

70. Operation ALTAIR had four strategic 'aims': (i) to save lives, (ii) secure the UK border, (iii) improve public confidence, and (iv) to recognise and identify vulnerable people or people who may pose a risk to others [INQ008370 at page 3].

71. The Operational Campaign Plan set out 5 strategic 'objectives' for Operation ALTAIR to: (i) reduce the pool of people at Calais who may seek to cross the channel, (ii) minimise the opportunities and resources available to those seeking clandestine entry to the UK, (iii) stop illegal border crossings by intercepting and returning boats or detecting them at ports, (iv) remove incentives to come to the UK, and (v) control arrivals [INQ008370 at page 2-3].

National Crime Agency

72. The NCA was formed on the 7 October 2013 and replaced the Serious Organised Crime Agency ('SOCA') [Crime and Courts Act 2013].

73. The NCA operates under the direction and control of the Director General of the National Crime Agency ('DGNCA') [Crime and Courts Act 2013, s.1(2)]. The NCA's relationship to the Home Office is set out in a Framework Document [INQ010435].

74. The functions and remit of the NCA are set out in detail in section 1 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, but in broad terms, it leads the UK's operational response to serious organised crime, one example of which is organised immigration crime via small boat crossings [INQ010100 at paras 5 and 9]. It does not monitor routine traffic in the English Channel and has a limited role in relation to SOLAS [INQ010100 at para 7].

75. The NCA have been involved in work relating to illegal migration in Europe and the UK since at least 2015 when, through Project INVIGOR [INQ010100 at paras 11], boats were sent to the Mediterranean to support its European partners. From this work emerged Operation CATLIN in 2018, which was an operation that targeted small boat illegal migration from continental Europe to the UK.

76. Operation CATLIN governed the NCA's small boats response at the time of the incident [INQ010100 at paras 12]. Its *'lead objective'* was *'the safeguarding of migrants and [Organised Crime Group ('OCG')] members'* [INQ010100 at paras 13] and it sought to achieve this by targeting OCGs involved in facilitating small boat crossings [INQ010100 at paras 13].
77. During Operation CATLIN, the NCA's function was to disseminate intelligence packages to other partners involved in small boats [INQ010100 at paras 12, 14 and 20].
78. In a similar way, once the CCTC and Operation ALTAIR had been established, the NCA contributed intelligence to 'Gold' level meetings of the CCTC to inform its approach [INQ010100 at paras 16-19].

Kent Police

79. Kent Police are a police service in England. They are led by a Chief Constable who is supported by a Deputy Chief Constable ('DCC') and a team of Assistant Chief Constables ('ACC') and Directors [INQ010424]. ACC Nigel Brookes had responsibility for the Central Operations portfolio, which included responsibilities relevant to small boat crossings [INQ008998 at para 2].
80. Police forces have two primary relevant responsibilities in the context of small boat crossings: to coordinate land-based SAR operations [INQ000412 at page 7; INQ008911 at paragraph 1.3], and to investigate associated criminality – other than organised immigration crime which is generally a matter for the NCA – on land, or at sea [Police Act 1996, s.30; Territorial Sea (Limits) Order 1989; INQ010098 at para 2.35; INQ008998 at para 4]. They also assist the NCA, in respect of incidents at sea, in cooperating with French authorities in respect of suspected criminal offences in French TTWs [INQ008998 at para 4].

81. Kent Police's investigations in respect of any incidents at sea are independent from those conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch ('MAIB'), but the two organisations will cooperate with one another pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding [INQ001005 at page 42 onwards]. Kent Police also have responsibilities under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which they discharge through their involvement as a partner agency of the Kent and Medway Resilience Forum ('KMRF') [INQ008998 at 13].
82. Kent is the closest county to mainland Europe and therefore a large proportion of policing responsibilities in respect of small boat channel crossings falls to Kent Police; although they are supported by Sussex Police or the (privately funded [INQ010437]) Port of Dover Police, if necessary [INQ008998 at para 4]. Kent Police also receives phone calls from occupants of small boats due to its location [INQ008998 at para 14].
83. In respect of SAR responsibilities, Kent Search and Rescue ('KSAR'), a voluntary organisation, can provide further SAR resources to Kent Police [INQ008998 at para 5].

Metropolitan Police

84. The Metropolitan Police Service ('MPS') are responsible for policing the 32 boroughs of Greater London, excluding the City of London [INQ010426 at page 1]. They are led by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner [INQ010425].
85. With some limited exceptions, the MPS only has responsibility for matters within its geographical boundary; it is not a coastal police force, and its Marine Support Unit polices only the River Thames [INQ009680 at para 9].
86. However, the MPS occasionally (and atypically) receives calls to its control room about small boats incidents. Generally, these are made by persons who are based

within the geographical area of the MPS; any such calls are referred on to the MCA [INQ008995; INQ009680 at paras 11 and 15].

Private Aerial SAR providers

87. As noted above, HMCG does not 'own' any SAR assets. It does, however, have contracts with aerial asset providers to provide aerial search and rescue resources in the form of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters or drones. At the time of the incident, aerial SAR taskings were deployed proactively by the MCA pursuant to 'Operation EOS' [INQ005198; INQ010098 at para 2.29; INQ009632 at para 23c; INQ000459]. Operation EOS had been established in or around May 2020 to keep track of the MCA budget commitment of such taskings and to differentiate them from Op DEVERAN taskings [INQ006155 at page 3].

Fixed-wing aircraft

2Excel Aviation Limited

88. 2Excel Aviation Limited ('2Excel') is a private company based in Northamptonshire [INQ010335 at para 1], founded by Christopher Norton and two co-founders [INQ010335 at para 5].

89. 2Excel is regulated by the UK Civil Aviation Authority [INQ010335 at paras 18, 23]. As well as being a company founder, Christopher Norton was the 'accountable manager' and a director of the company, meaning that he had overall responsibility and accountability for all management systems, compliance, and safety [INQ010335 at para 5; INQ000646 at paras 1.3.1 and 3.3.1]. The management and structure of 2Excel is set out at INQ0009725 (see also Inquiry Graphic '2Excel Line Management').

90. As at the date of the incident, 2Excel held a single contract, known as the 'Aerial Surveillance and Verification' ('ASV') contract, to provide the MCA with two types

of fixed-wing aircraft: the Piper PA31 Panther and the King Air B200 [INQ010098 at paras 2.44 and 2.45; INQ010335 at paras 8 and 79]. 2Excel were awarded the ASV contract on 19 March 2019 [INQ010335 at paras 8; INQ006325]. The contract was subsequently amended a number of times [INQ010335 at para 9-11; INQ006328; INQ006327; INQ006326; INQ006324; INQ006323].

91. A further contract was in the process of being negotiated at the time of the incident pursuant to Operation CAESAR; an MCA project to obtain greater aerial asset capability in response to the projected number of small boat crossings in 2022 [INQ010098 at para 2.20]. However, Operation CAESAR did not go live until the 1 March 2022 [INQ010098 at paras 2.22, 2.44, 5.2, 5.61].

RVL Aviation Limited

92. RVL Aviation Limited ('RVL') is a private company based in Leicestershire [INQ010102 at para 2] which provides a wide range of specialist aviation services to private and public sector clients, including the MCA and HO [INQ010102 at para 2, 4-5]. The 'Head of Specialist Operations' for RVL was Gary Ferguson [INQ010102 at para 2].

93. RVL contracted with the MCA to provide an aircraft (registration 'G-RAFL', serial number BB-1832) for Aerial Dispersant Spray Services on 01 February 2012 [INQ000097 at pages 4, 25]. By November 2021, this agreement had been augmented for RVL to provide airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ('ISR') services to both the MCA, as part of Operation EOS, and to the Home Office [INQ010102 at paras 4, 20; INQ009628 at para 36].

94. RVL's relationship with the HO began in late 2020 [INQ010102 at para 7].

95. On 04 June 2021, the existing contract between MCA and RVL was modified, and a Memorandum of Understanding between the HO and MCA was agreed, which allowed G-RAFL to be made available to the CCTC to test an enhanced surveillance capability [INQ010409 at para 10; INQ010102 at para 14; INQ000097 at page 19, 28]. This became known as 'Project Reveal'. The practical effect of these changes was that G-RAFL was available to the MCA during the day and the CCTC at night [INQ000097 at page 28; INQ010102 at para 20].

96. The first Project Reveal flight took place on the 09 October 2021. The final Project Reveal flight took place on 25 January 2022 [INQ010102 at para 14]. Thereafter, RVL had no further involvement with the CCTC or HO but continued to provide ISR services to the MCA and Operation EOS flights [INQ010102 at para 33].

Helicopters

Bristow Helicopters Limited

97. Bristow Helicopters Limited ('Bristow') is a private limited company based in Surrey [INQ010336]. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bristow Group Inc ('Bristow Group'), a multinational company headquartered in Texas [INQ010336 at paras 2.1 and 2.2].

98. Bristow's UK government contracts were managed by its 'Director of UK SAR', who was also the also the 'accountable manager' for the purpose of Bristow's Air Operator Certificate. This meant that he was accountable to the Civil Aviation Authority for all regulated activities [INQ010336 at paras 1.2 and 1.4]. Beneath this sat Graham Hamilton, who was the Deputy Director of UK SAR at the time of the incident [INQ010336 para 4.4; see also Inquiry Graphic 'Bristow Line Management']. The wider corporate structure of Bristow is set out at INQ008981.

99. In 2013, Bristow contracted with the Department for Transport under the 'SARH contract' to provide and operate all HMCG SAR helicopters [INQ010098 at para

2.41; INQ001157 at page 2]. The contract began in 2015 [INQ010336 at paras 2.2 and 3.1]. As part of this contract, Bristow provided a fleet of Sikorsky S-92A and Leonardo AW189 helicopters which bore the HMCG logo [INQ010098 at paras 2.41 and 2.42].

100. Bristow operated these helicopters in multiple locations across the UK, but small boats taskings were usually deployed from Lee-on-Solent, Lydd, and to a lesser extent Humberside [INQ010336 at para 2.4; INQ000115]. As well as SAR taskings, Bristow helicopters were also deployed to conduct SOLAS surveillance [INQ010336 at para 5.5].

101. As of November 2021, Bristow had no formal working relationship with BF, 2Excel or RVL but did liaise with BF to coordinate their assets within UK airspace [INQ010336 at paras 4.1].

Drones

Tekever Limited

102. Tekever Limited ('Tekever') is a private company based in Lydd [INQ009628 at para 38]. Tekever were contracted by the CCTC/Home Office to provide unmanned aerial vehicles ('UAVs') on 5 out of every 7 days for surveillance over the Dover Strait to locate small boats and produce images of boats, suspected facilitators and boat occupants [INQ010134 at para 70-71; INQ010098 at 2.47]. By November 2021, Tekever drones were available to the MCA and were used as an extra layer of support in the event that fixed-wing aircraft were unable to be tasked [INQ009628 at para 38].

Royal National Lifeboat Institution

103. The RNLI is a charitable organisation headquartered in Poole [INQ010101; INQ010440 at page 2]. It was founded in 1824 with the support of HM King George IV and shortly after received a formal Royal Charter from HM Queen Victoria [INQ010438; INQ010441]. It is separate from HMCG, independent of government, and is governed according to its Royal Charter and bye-laws as amended over time [INQ010101 at para 5].
104. The RNLI's charitable aim is to end preventable drowning through rescue, lifeguarding and water safety education [INQ010101 at para 4]. As well as its educational programmes and campaigns, the RNLI operates 238 lifeguard units and a 24/7 SAR lifeboat service across the UK, Channel Islands, Isle of Man and Ireland [INQ010101 at paras 7, 13]. The RNLI has 8 lifeboat stations which serve the Dover Strait [INQ010101 at para 14].

Roles and responsibilities within Royal National Lifeboat Institution

105. The RNLI has an executive team led by a Chief Executive who is accountable to the Charity's Trustees [INQ010101 at para 6]. The Trustees are supported by the RNLI's Council on broad policy and strategy issues which are not addressed by its advisory committees, and the Council also supports the Chief Executive on an ad hoc basis [INQ010439 at page 30].
106. The Executive Team manages the RNLI Support Centre in Poole which supports the delivery of the RNLI's lifesaving work [INQ010439 at page 78]. In 2021, the RNLI had 'Area Lifesaving Managers' who were responsible for the safe, efficient and effective delivery of the RNLI's policies, standards and external legislation within a defined geographical region [INQ010101 at 8].

107. The RNLI's governance and management structure is set out in INQ009009 (n.b. this is as at 2023, not 2021). Its current Head of Lifeboats is Simon Ling, who reports directly to the Lifesaving Operations Director [INQ010101 at para 2]. The RNLI is staffed overwhelmingly by volunteers, many of whom have full time jobs, and receives 94% of its funding from charitable donations [INQ010101 at paras 4 and 12].

Royal National Lifeboat Institution relationship to His Majesty's Coastguard

108. The RNLI is a Declared SAR Facility to HMCG (see paragraph 44 above) and can be tasked by them to conduct SAR [INQ010101 at para 22; INQ010098 at paras 2.32-2.33]. The RNLI does not make decisions about how to deploy assets, and whilst it is able to self-deploy it generally does not do so [INQ010101 at paras 22 and 36]. Its relationship with HMCG at the time of the incident was governed by a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 01 October 2020 ('the HMCG MoU'), the object of which was to formalise the RNLI's assistance to HMCG as a declared facility [INQ000096 at para 2.2].

109. Pursuant to the HMCG MoU, the RNLI was to provide lifeboats on a 'best endeavours' basis, 'when and where practicable', with the ultimate decision to launch being made by the RNLI launch authority according to a range of dynamic factors, such as the nature of the tasking, fuel and weather conditions [INQ000096 at paras 2.3, 2.4, 5.5 and Annex 2]. There was no transfer of funds from the MCA to the RNLI for this service [INQ000096 at para 7.1].

110. The RNLI first became involved in small boat SAR in 2015, when it responded to a request for help from the Hellenic Rescue Team ('HRT') in Greece [INQ010101 at paras 32-33]. This led to the deployment of 2 lifeboats and a training team around the island of Lesbos [INQ010101 at para 34]. The RNLI had no operational involvement on the night of 23/24 November 2021. They were, however, tasked at

around 1337 on 24 November 2021 in respect of the rescue and recovery operation (incident 'XRAY 2') [INQ000320 at page 6; INQ000663].

Ministry of Defence

111. The Ministry of Defence is a UK Government department formed by the Ministry of Defence Act 1946 to unify the policy development of the Armed Forces [INQ010427 at para 1.2.2]. Its purpose is '*to protect the people of the United Kingdom, prevent conflict, and be ready to fight [its] enemies...*' [INQ010427 at para 1.1.1]. Its legal authority for conducting the defence of the UK derives from the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Act 1964, which unified the policy making functions and administration of the 3 main military services, and established the Defence Council [INQ010427 at paras 1.2.4 and 1.3.7].
112. The MOD is led by the Secretary of State for Defence (or 'Defence Secretary'). The Defence Secretary is supported by the Chief of Defence Staff ('CDS') who is the professional head of the Armed Forces and principal military adviser to the Secretary of State and government [INQ010427 at para 1.1.9]. At the time of the incident, the Defence Secretary was the Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP [INQ004298; INQ008171 at page 9], who sat on the Defence Council with the Permanent Secretary and the CDS [INQ010427 at para 1.3.7].
113. Although the Defence Council provides the primary authority for the MOD's work, the day-to-day strategic leadership of the MOD is conducted through the Defence Board which is chaired by the Defence Secretary [INQ010432 at page 3].
114. The overarching policy framework for the MOD is provided by the National Security Council ('NSC') [INQ010427 at para 1.1.11].
115. Generally, the MOD had no direct policy responsibilities in relation to small boats but was able to support other government departments through the Military Aid

to the Civil Authorities ('MACA') process [INQ009649 at paras 1.6, 1.7, 2.1 and 2.2]. Their vessels are exempted from the SOLAS Convention (although there is an expectation that they will behave consistently so far as is reasonable and practicable) and their duties under the UNCLOS are qualified [INQ009649 at paras 2.5, 2.7 and 2.8]. However, it is noted that between April 2022 and January 2023, 'primacy' for the operational maritime response to small boats was transferred to the MoD pursuant to 'Operation ISOTROPE' and the policy of 'military primacy' [INQ010134 at para 52; INQ001009].

116. MACA activity is coordinated by the Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom) ('SJC UK') which is based in Aldershot [INQ009649 at para 2.9; INQ010430]. The SJC UK is led by a 3* General and focuses on the delivery of land resilience and security operations in the UK [INQ009649 at 2.14].

117. The power to deploy military resources to civilian tasks comes from prerogative power, Defence Council Orders under the Emergency Powers Act 1964, or Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, depending on the nature of the required deployment [INQ008935 at para 2.12]. Deployments of MACA must be approved at ministerial level unless there is an immediate risk to life or property, in which case a local military commander may authorise its deployment [INQ008935 at paras 1.4 and 2.6]. Strategic oversight of MACA tasks was undertaken by the Security Policy and Operations Division who was based at MOD Head Office [INQ009649 at para 2.15].

118. MACA will be deployed if: (i) there is a need to act and the task requested is clear, (ii) other options such as commercial and voluntary assistance have been discounted, and either (a) civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or (b) the civil authority has all or some of the capability or capacity but it may not be immediately available or to the required scale and the urgency of the task

requires rapid external support from the MOD. These criteria may be waived by MoD ministers temporarily if the exigencies of the event in question so require [INQ008935 at paras 1.4 and 2.5].

MOD's involvement in small boat activity

119. Between January 2019 and July 2021, the MOD provided support to the HO through the MACA process, which included providing extra cutter crew, a CCTC liaison, intelligence aircraft, Defence Estate for migrant reception facilities, planning expertise and assistance in developing turnaround tactics [INQ009649 at paras 2.3, 2.10 onwards, 3.6-3.7 and e.g. INQ008962]

120. The MOD had staff (Royal Navy personnel) embedded in the JMSC who would have been aware of when crossings took place (see above), but the clear division of responsibilities between CCTC and JMSC meant that Royal Navy personnel and JMSC would have had no role in responding to small boats [INQ009649 at para 3.7; INQ010337 at paras 61 and 63].

121. The MOD had no operational involvement in the events of 23/24 November 2021 [INQ009649 at paras 1.4, 2.12, 6.1]. No requests were received for MACA in November 2021 or on the night [INQ009649 at paras 2.3, 2.11, 6.3]. The MOD had deployed vessels (HMS RANGER and HMS TRUMPETER) in the Channel as part of 'Exercise Joint Blockade, which was a training exercise arranged by the JMSC (250 nautical miles from the incident itself) [INQ009649 at paras 5.10 - 6.2; INQ010337 at para 89 onwards].

The French Authorities: International Cooperation in the Channel

122. In France, 'government action at sea' is based on interministerial coordination [INQ010420 at page 2]. The Prime Minister chairs the 'Interministerial Maritime Committee' which '*brings together all ministers concerned*' and '*sets the government's maritime policy guidelines*' [INQ010420 at page 2; INQ010422].

123. General Secretariat of the Sea ('Secrétariat général de la Mer' or 'SG Mer') is responsible for leading and coordinating maritime policy development [INQ010422; INQ010421 at page 1] and coordinating the action of maritime prefects ('Préfet Maritime' or 'PREMAR'), and delegates of the overseas French government, regarding State action at sea [INQ010421 at page 3].

124. Around France, there are 3 coastal regions with Maritime Prefects appointed in respect of each. They are the Atlantic ('Atlantique'), the Mediterranean ('Méditerranée'), and the Channel and North Sea ('Manche et Mer du Nord') [INQ010419 at page 2]. Operations in the Dover Strait fall to the latter, whose 'prefecture' is based in Cherbourg, France [INQ010419 at page 2].

Mancheplan

125. The relationship between the UK and France in respect of SAR operations in the Channel is governed by an agreement known as the 'Mancheplan'. The Inquiry has been provided with two versions of this document: one dated 2013 [INQ000002] which was the initial agreement, and the other dated 30 May 2018 [INQ000095], which was in force at the time of the incident.

126. The purpose of the Mancheplan was to '*establish the policy and procedures for incident response management and co-operation in the event of an accident in the geographical sea area covered by the Plan*' [INQ000095 at Article 3.1]. An event to which the Mancheplan applies is known as an 'Event at sea for which Coordination is Necessary' or 'ECN' [INQ000095 at Article 2.1]. This includes maritime SAR specifically [INQ000095 at article 11.1] and '*where one of the States is not in a position to cope alone with a complex event at sea and requires the support of the other State*' [INQ000095 at article 11.2].

127. The Agreement makes provision for geographical jurisdiction (Articles 5-7 and Annexes 1 and 2), information sharing and joint exercises (Articles 12-16 and 21), responsibility for coordinating a SAR (Articles 17-20), and asset sharing (Article 22).
128. The Mancheplan applies to SAR in the Dover Strait [INQ000095 at Articles 5-7, 31 and Annexes 1 and 2].
129. In terms of communication, at an operational level parties were required to have regular meetings and share feedback regarding significant incidents [INQ000095 at Articles 29, 15]. The agreement provided for a Mancheplan point of contact in each operational centre [INQ000095 at Article 14.2].
130. The SAR requirements of the Mancheplan can be summarised as follows. Responsibility for coordinating SAR depends on the location of the incident and specifically which side of the 'Mancheline' (see [INQ000095 at Article 6]) the incident takes place [INQ000095 at Article 19]. However, this can be transferred by agreement [INQ000095 at Article 20], depending on two factors: (i) which state will probably be deploying the majority of assets to the incident, and (ii) the most appropriate point of disembarkation [INQ000095 at Article 32]. Such arrangements are made by telephone call between operational centres and are subsequently confirmed in writing [INQ000095 at Article 33].
131. The coordinating state may call on the other to provide assets to assist an operation they are coordinating [INQ000095 at Article 35]. Such requests are through operational centres and may be made by email, fax or telephone and subsequently confirmed in writing [INQ000095 at Article 36]. If assets are provided, they will operate according to the Coordinating Operational Centre [INQ000095 at Articles 37].

Anglo-French Accident Technical Group

132. Pursuant to Article 2.2 of the Mancheplan, from 2016 bi-annual meetings took place between the UK and France known as the 'Anglo-French Accident Technical Group' ('AFATG'). [INQ010098 at paras 4.10 and 4.11; INQ000170; INQ000173; INQ000174; INQ000175; INQ000176; INQ000172; INQ000177; INQ000184; INQ000192; INQ001333]. These meetings were chaired jointly by France and the United Kingdom [INQ000095 at Article 2.2]. Generally, they would be attended by the MCA and PREMAR [INQ010098 at para 4.10]. Prior to the meeting an official exchange of information regarding any significant changes with an impact on the Mancheplan was to take place [INQ000095 at Articles 13-14].

Sandhurst Treaty

133. On the 18 January 2018, the UK and France signed the Sandhurst Treaty concerning the reinforcement of cooperation for the coordinated management of the shared border [INQ010134 at 29]. As part of this agreement, the UK committed £45m to create the 'Centre Conjoint d'Information et Coordination' or 'CCIC' at the port of Coquelles [INQ010134 at 29]. The UK BF officers stationed at the CCIC maintained close links with the CCTC and contributed to its operational planning and this location became the main operational centre for planning and coordinating French deployments to prevent crossings [INQ010134 at 29].

Diplomatic/ministerial relations

134. In relation to small boats issues, the Home Office was the primary department which liaised with the French at an inter-governmental level [INQ010337 at paras 214-215; INQ005223; INQ005227; INQ005216; INQ001028; INQ002224; INQ002225; INQ000629; INQ000630; INQ003902; INQ003904; INQ003900; INQ003901; INQ009059]. The DfT were also able to engage with France at a senior and ministerial level [INQ010337 at para 214; and e.g. INQ004260; INQ004244; INQ004312; INQ005341]. The MOD did not have a role in liaising with

the French at the time of the incident given their limited involvement in small boats matters [INQ009649 at para 4.6].

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