Transcript of Day 6 – Tuesday, 11 March 2025

Tuesday, 11 March 2025 (9.58 am)

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. Good morning, everyone. So, Ms Whitehouse, I wonder if you could read the affirmation. MS KAREN WHITEHOUSE (Affirmed).

Questions by MR PHILLIPS KC

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, thank you very much. Mr Phillips, yes.

MR PHILLIPS: Now, Ms Whitehouse, you have provided two witness statements to the Inquiry. The first is dated 8 November, last year, and I think it’s 31 pages, the second was provided to the Inquiry on Thursday evening last week, 6 March — dated 6 March and consists of five pages, is that right?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. Can we start, please, with some questions about your role and your professional background. At the time of the event into which we are enquiring, November 2021, you were a Border Force higher officer employed by the Home Office, is that right?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. And you tell us in your statement and can we have it up please, {INQ010135/1}, paragraph 3, that you joined the Maritime Command Centre in July 2021, is that right?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. So at the time of the incident you had been working there for about four months.

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Before that, you tell us you had been employed by the Home Office, I think since 2019, but in a different role?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. In terms of your professional background, you had been a police officer of some 22 years?

A. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Q. And you are still employed by the Home Office today, but in a different role. You are a senior officer working within the Joint Maritime Security Centre?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. So now going back to the time with which we are concerned, November ’21, can I just ask a little more about your role and responsibilities at that time, and this is paragraph 4, page 1 of the statement. Do you see there, you say: “My day-to-day role at the time involved writing reports, monitoring inboxes, ad hoc tasks as requested by senior managers and looking after the BFM fleet, which consisted of assets all over the [UK], not just in the southeast/Dover area.” So that seems to indicate that your role had a national scope. You weren’t just responsible for what happened in the Channel, is that right?

A. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. Roughly — in November ’21, can you tell us roughly how much of your time was devoted to what was going on in the Channel?

A. The Channel occupied a lot of our time, sir —

Q. Yes.

A. — at that time. It depended on the weather, what was going on nationally, so it peaked and flowed throughout the year. But I would say that it was our most important role and took up the most of our time.

Q. Yes. Sorry, could you keep your voice up?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the mic isn’t picking up everything you say. You also tell us in the same paragraph you undertook work on Operation DEVERAN, but we’ve heard a good deal about that, so I won’t take any further time on that now, and instead focus on the day-to-day. And you say later in the same paragraph, about the day-to-day work {INQ010135/2}: “… primarily to monitor and report on asset availability, ensure the welfare of the crews and co-ordinate between [the coastguard] and the crew on board the vessels.” And then later in your statement, if we can go to this please, paragraph 43, page 19, three lines from the end — it should appear magically on the screen. Yes, {INQ010135/19}, do you see the last sentence: “I always took notice of [Operation] Deveran updates because given BFM’s role in supporting [search and rescue] and SOLAS activity, it was important to know at a moment’s notice what assets I had available. It was my primary role.” Can you just explain for us please, why was it important for your role to know which assets were available at any moment?

A. The assets for Border Force Maritime were divided and — in a sense that some were elsewhere in the country and some were solely designated for Op DEVERAN, it was important for me to know which boat I may need to call at the drop of a hat, if I had had a call from the coastguard, which boat I had available and what they had been up to and their — their general status.

Q. Thank you. Now, not all assets which played a role in responding to small boats were owned by the Home Office, were they?

A. Could you elaborate on which ones?

Q. To give you an example —

A. Yes.

Q. — we know, for example, that some of the assets come from sub contractors, like 2Excel for example, who provided air assets.

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Yes. And there are also voluntary organisations like the RNLI, for example.

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. So what I was saying is that not all the assets involved in search and rescue of small boats were owned by the Home Office, and that’s correct, isn’t it?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. Was it necessary for you, in the role that you have described in your statement, to know what non-home Office assets were available?

A. No, it was not my role to know what else was available during that time.

Q. Okay. Wouldn’t that have helped to give a clearer picture of the total range of assets available to be deployed?

A. We did get notice of aerial assets at that time. But I would say that was it. We didn’t have any involvement with the RNLI directly.

Q. But your primary focus was on the Home Office assets?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that fair?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you explain in your statement the role you played in tasking Border Force assets when the coastguard requested it. And can we look, please, at paragraph 7 of the statement and there, if you can see it in the fourth line, the sentence begins {INQ010135/3}: “I was the conduit between [the coastguard] and the BFM assets if the BFM assets were in port, rather than out at sea.” So is that the distinction? Does control pass at the moment of deployment or is it when the vessel leaves port?

A. Are you asking in relation to search and rescue?

Q. Yes.

A. That was generally the case. It wasn’t to say that we didn’t have any contact with our vessels once they were out at sea, but the responsibility of the search and rescue was led by the coastguard.

Q. So once the vessel — once you had tasked the vessel and it was underway, control passed to the coastguard?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. Then looking on in your statement to paragraph 59, the fifth line, please, {INQ010135/24}, you say there, do you see: “My role was supporting [coastguard] responding to [search and rescue] events by deploying BFM assets, but [the coastguard] retained ownership of decision making around other available assets to render the fastest possible support to a vessel in distress. BFM assets were one piece of the jigsaw.” So looking at that statement of the way things worked and taking it in stages, if I may, first question: were you the person who took the initial decision that a Border Force asset should be tasked?

A. On the night of the 21st?

Q. Generally.

A. Generally. Yes, it was done in collaboration with home — whoever else was in the office with me.

Q. Yes.

A. But, yes, in general.

Q. Well, in collaboration with anyone else who was in the office, did you have authority, when the request came in from coastguard, to task the asset or did you have to seek higher approval up the command chain?

A. No, I didn’t have to seek higher approval.

Q. Thank you. Did you have the power to refuse a request from the coastguard?

A. I cannot think of an occasion where I felt that that was necessary. If I felt that I couldn’t task an asset immediately due to another reason, I would probably have gone to a more senior officer to make that request and discuss it with them.

Q. Yes. Well, let’s look at your statement at paragraph 30, {INQ010135/14}, eight lines down from the top, you see there is a sentence there beginning: “However, I cannot recall a single incident where this [which is the request from coastguard] was refused.” So in practice, I think what you are telling us is they made a request and you tasked a Border Force asset?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. My question though was related to the question of power. In other words, had a situation arisen, and there wasn’t one available for whatever reason, could you have said: no?

A. I can’t see an occasion where — during the events in the Channel where I would have said no.

Q. No.

A. There would have always been a vessel available and we would do our best to assist in any way possible.

Q. Yes. Did you ever task an asset for search and rescue in the context of small boats without having a request come in first from the coastguard?

A. No, I can’t recall any occasions.

Q. So you were, in that sense, responsive —

A. Yes.

Q. — to the coastguard who, as I think you have explained, were the people in overall charge?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. So again, in general terms, when you have tasked your Border Force asset and they are being deployed, at that point, when the search and rescue operation is underway, did you, at Border Force, retain any power or authority over that asset?

A. No, it was the commander’s vessel. We — we had no power over the asset.

Q. Right. So what you have portrayed for us is, in effect, a system whereby authority or control passes from Border Force to coastguard. In your experience, did that system ever lead to any difficulties?

A. Not that I can recall.

Q. No. Thank you. Now, so far then of the question of tasking of these assets to the small boats, again, can we go back to your statement and this time to paragraph 18, {INQ010135/7} right at the beginning of the paragraph on page 7. Do you see there: “We could use the coordinates …”

A. (Nods). Yes.

Q. “… from [coastguard] to determine whether the vessel was in UK waters, or if it was not, when it would be likely to cross the median line into UK waters. Back in 2021 it was preferable for our vessels to arrive at the median line around the same time as a vessel was crossing into UK waters. Having a vessel and crew out at sea for hours unnecessarily waiting would impact upon their ability to assist when assistance was required.” So just so I have understood this. Does it mean that the plan was to wait until it was known that a small boat either was in UK waters or was about to reach UK waters before an asset would be deployed?

A. It depended where the migrant vessel was heading towards. It could take hours for our Border Force vessel to reach a similar place. I think it soon changed after that. So I am unsure, back in 2021 —

Q. Yes.

A. — I am unsure where the line was between when we were reactive and when we became proactive.

Q. Well, it looks as though, in your statement certainly, you were pretty confident, that back in 2021 and the whole point of the statement is to deal with what was going on in ’21, this was what was preferable; in other words, your vessels would arrive as the small boats were crossing into UK waters. It sounds as though that was the plan then at least?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. How did it actually work in practice? How did you manage to get to this position of being there waiting for them as they cross UK waters? How was that put into effect?

A. Details passed to us by the coastguard for the area in which migrant boats had left France. We would try and plot — we would plot up any co-ordinates given and try to the best of our ability to work out how long that might take. If the migrant vessel was followed by a French vessel, we could kind of see the progress that they were making.

Q. Right. You talked about plotting co-ordinates. In your statement, you rather give the impression that you simply took down the co-ordinates that were given to you by the coastguard. Wasn’t that a more normal situation?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Because it sounds as though the plan, ie to meet them halfway, depends on knowing that the small boat is heading towards the median line, which means knowing its position and direction when in French water; is that fair?

A. That would be the preference.

Q. Yes, how did you get that information?

A. Either from the coastguard, or from simply looking at — looking at our monitors and looking at where other vessels were in relation to that migrant vessel, or supposed migrant vessel.

Q. Yes, well, we have heard how very difficult it was to see the small boats on any form of monitor. We heard a lot of evidence about that yesterday.

A. Yes.

Q. And, as far as the coastguards were concerned, by definition, what you are talking about is a small boat in French water. So how regularly did you get information or co-ordinates about small boats on the French side?

A. Back in November ’21, we would receive information from the coastguard and it was quite difficult sometimes to work out what actually was going on. The information would sometimes be everything all at once, or nothing for a considerable time. So it was very difficult to work out where migrant vessels might be.

Q. Yes. Whereas the plan, as you have explained it here, depends on having a good idea so you could get your asset out there to meet them at the halfway point?

A. Yes.

Q. So it was very unlikely, wasn’t it, given what you have said about the inadequacy the coastguard information, that the plan often worked?

A. It was a mixed success, I would say.

Q. Right. More failure than success?

A. I — I couldn’t say exactly the figures.

Q. Right.

A. But back then, we would have many more beach landings than in latter years.

Q. In other words, boats that got across?

A. Yes, boats that had come across.

Q. Which hadn’t been intercepted therefore?

A. That’s right.

Q. Because the other thing you would have to know, again, just thinking about how this plan would work in practice, is you would have to have an idea of the speed of the vessel, not just its co-ordinates and its direction, in order to assess how to get — when to task your asset to get to the median line. You would need the speed, wouldn’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. And how often did you get that about a small boat? Ever?

A. Rarely.

Q. Yes. As a matter of interest, do you remember how long it would usually take the Border Force cutters to get to the median line from their berths in Dover?

A. That would depend on — on where on the median line they were going to. We often had migrants crossing from further down the French coast, and that could take hours for them to get down there. So there isn’t an exact answer to that, I’m afraid.

Q. No, well, that’s exactly what you say in your statement if we look at paragraph 36, please, {INQ010135/16}. You say right at the beginning of the paragraph, do you see the first line: “It is impossible to say how long it would generally take a cutter to reach the median line from Dover …” And then you give a whole series of reasons why that might be. But that, again, is rather a key question, isn’t it? If you are really trying to meet them at the midway point, you have to also know how long your asset’s going to get to go there.

A. Yes.

Q. And you have to know where, as you have just been explaining, on the median line you are talking about, because that makes all the difference?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. Now, you deal with the same point again in paragraph 18, if we can go back to that please, six lines down, {INQ010135/7}, do you see at the end of the line: “If a boat had been identified as it left France then a [Border Force] vessel may not immediately be contacted by our staff … in the middle of the night … try not to interrupt their rest …” Etc. And then this sentence: “There was deemed less risk to the migrants because they were in French waters and the French Coastguard would be aware (or would be made aware by [the coastguard]). It may be hours and hours before the migrant vessel got towards UK waters. [We] would continue to receive updates from [the coastguard] as the boat progressed and we would determine when it was appropriate to awake the crew and inform them of the updated position …” So trying to draw the threads together, if you knew a boat was crossing, you wouldn’t deploy an asset to respond immediately. You would wait, let them have their rest, see how the small boat was getting through French waters and then task at what seemed to be the appropriate moment; is that a fair summary?

A. Yes, that is, yes.

Q. But just going back over the points we have discussed, all of that depends on having pretty precise information about the various moving parts which I think you have told us you didn’t often have, is that fair?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And all of this time the boat is in French water. So that, presumably, led to various consequences, but one of them you have identified is that there was, and I quote again: “… deemed less risk to the migrants because they were in French waters and the French Coastguard would be aware …” Etc. Can I just ask you this: why would a small boat be at less risk in French waters than in UK waters?

A. I think what I am trying to say there is that if the French coastguard were with the migrant vessel, they could be rescued or monitored or assisted by the French whilst they were in French waters.

Q. So, again, the success of the plan depended on the French tracking the relevant small boat?

A. Yes.

Q. Literally shepherding them to the median line?

A. Some of them.

Q. Yes. Well, I was going to ask you that question. How often did that happen?

A. I think it depended on the — on the day or night in question as to how many migrant boats versus how many French assets were available.

Q. So it wasn’t so much the fact that the small boat was in French water; it was that you hoped, at least, that the French would have spotted them and accompanied them to the median line?

A. I would say that that was the safest — the safest way, was with the French.

Q. Yes. I understand that. But, again, in practice, and in reality, how often did that happen?

A. I can’t comment on that, I — I don’t know.

Q. No. Because just to be clear about one thing, there was nothing intrinsically more risky for the boat to be on one side of the line or the other?

A. Yes, I would have to agree with you.

Q. The boat was the boat.

A. Yes.

Q. Most of them were profoundly unseaworthy.

A. Yes.

Q. They were not suited to the voyage and it didn’t matter, frankly, whether they were in French water or UK water; those problems still persisted?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. Thank you. So you have helped with all the various pieces of information, particularly to do with location, that the plan needed to work and on the general question of location, identifying the location of a small boat, that was a very challenging business, wasn’t it?

A. Extremely challenging.

Q. They are small, they don’t have navigation systems, they often don’t have GPS; that’s right, isn’t it?

A. I couldn’t comment about GPS, but the other facts you have said are true, yes.

Q. Yes. And that made the business of finding them in the Channel, of this very, very busy shipping lane, extremely difficult?

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. And, of course, on top of that, as we were hearing yesterday, even when you get co-ordinates for the boat, a lot of them were moving. Many of them underway, in other words with the engines working, and even those that weren’t working, they were drifting in the water. So that whatever co-ordinates you had been given would almost certainly be wrong by the time your cutter made it to the co-ordinates?

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. Thank you. So in order to keep up with that inevitably moving location of a small boat, once you had got original co-ordinates of a boat, did you follow up proactively with coastguard or anyone else, to get updated location information once your asset had been deployed?

A. Yes, regularly.

Q. Okay. And you would take the initiative to do that, would you, rather than waiting for the coastguard to provide it?

A. Yes, once the cutter was on its way, and moving across and we hadn’t had an update from the — excuse me — from the coastguard for some time, we would put in a phone call or chase it up, if they had any further details they were able to give us.

Q. Thank you. Okay. The other problem which we heard about yesterday is the problem of more than one boat being underway in the Channel at the time and I think you would agree that that was very common indeed?

A. Very common.

Q. And we know that November ’21 was a particularly busy month.

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. We also know that it is very difficult to precisely identify small boats, would you agree with that?

A. Yes, I would.

Q. They don’t have AIS, they don’t have a flag, they don’t have a name, they don’t have an identifying number and a lot of them, frankly, look very similar? Is that fair?

A. I personally have only seen the vessels once they have been alongside. I have never been at sea when a migrant vessel has been rescued. But I have been informed on many occasions that that is true, that they did all look very similar.

Q. Yes. And that created particular difficulties, didn’t it, when you were trying to work out the latest situation when there were a number of small boats in play, if I can put it that way, in the Channel?

A. Yes, very much so.

Q. In other words, trying to work out which one was where at any particular moment?

A. Yes.

Q. And in terms of trying to get hold of that important information, and during your conversations with coastguard, would you have a standard list of questions to ask to help you to identify which boat was which?

A. It wasn’t my role to identify which boat was which during Operation DEVERAN.

Q. So that was coastguard’s job, was it?

A. Yes. I could relay information that the coastguard had given me, but it wasn’t my role to delve further.

Q. Right. So you weren’t concerned, for example, that there were — when there were multiple small boats out there, that you needed that information, what had happened to the various boats in order to decide whether further assets — Border Force assets needed to be deployed?

A. Sorry, could you repeat that question?

Q. Yes. Imagine a situation, there are a number of small boats there, a pretty normal situation. Didn’t you have to have a grasp on what was going on with the various small boats in order to decide whether further Border Force assets needed to be deployed?

A. Yes. As the information came in, there would be a discussion about whether we needed to deploy another Border Force asset or — or request further help.

Q. So that discussion, would that be internally, at Border Force, or with coastguard, or both?

A. Both.

Q. Both. And can you remember such occasions, ie where the number of boats was such that you had a discussion, whether internally or with coastguard, about whether you needed to deploy more assets?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes, thank you. And one final question about the location — identification of the small boats. When you were dealing with these incidents, did you have a categorisation of them in terms of the level of urgency needed for the response? No?

A. Sorry, you will have to repeat that question.

Q. When you were dealing with these incidents, did you have a categorisation system denoting the level of urgency needed for a response?

A. No, the coastguard was — would tell us that.

Q. No. Well, we don’t need to go to it now, but there was a document maintained, wasn’t there, called the case register?

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. Yes. And that has a column listed MC — headed “MCGA category” and it categorises all the boats on the night in question as “distressed”. And that was the categorisation applied to all small boats, wasn’t it?

A. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Q. So you didn’t attempt to distinguish between, for example, a small boat that was underway apparently fine, and a small boat that was swamped, or where there were people in the water?

A. No, that wasn’t my role to do that.

Q. No. They were all in distress?

A. They were all in distress.

Q. Thank you. And did — I think it follows from this that your answer will be no, but did it make any difference to the way Border Force went about its response, that information? In other words, that the boat was swamped, that it was taking on water, or indeed, that there were people already in the water; did it make any difference?

A. No, they were all in distress.

Q. Thank you. So far then as training — your training for this role is concerned, we have talked about your years in the police and your background in law enforcement. In your statement, when you moved to this role, you explain at paragraph 3, please, {INQ010135/1}, that you didn’t have any professional qualifications relevant to this new job you had taken on in July, but you did: “… have immigration and customs training and have attended various Home Office courses during my employment.” And then this sentence: “No specific training was required for [your] BFHO role [at Border Force].” So just to understand this, in the four months before the incident, you didn’t have any specialist training for the higher officer role?

A. No, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. And you have just confirmed what you said in your statement, which is that you, personally, have never taken part in a search and rescue operation —

A. No, I haven’t.

Q. — at sea and you have — indeed, you have never seen one?

A. No, I haven’t.

Q. And that was true in November ’21, as it’s true today?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that right?

A. It’s true.

Q. Thank you. In terms then of your role as the deployer of Border Force assets to search and rescue activities, can I take it, then, that you had no specific training in relation to that part of your role?

A. Correct.

Q. Yes. So, nobody trained you in how to assess or triage maritime emergencies or vessels in distress?

A. No.

Q. And you didn’t have training in the risk factors applicable to small boats, specifically?

A. No.

Q. And you didn’t have any expertise in risk assessment or incident response at sea?

A. Not at sea.

Q. No. Or on the legal obligations for SOLAS, for example?

A. I had a working knowledge —

Q. Yes.

A. — from doing the role.

Q. Yes.

A. But no formal training.

Q. You learnt on the job?

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. Yes, thank you. Now, we have already touched on this, but we know that in 2021 there was a significant increase in the number of boats coming across the Channel and you describe in your statement para 30, please, page {INQ010135/13}, how November was “really busy”, third line, do you see there? And that must have been challenging coming into that situation for you as a relatively new staff member. What was it like, your experience there, over those first four months?

A. I found that it was a challenging time to understand a new role. However, I worked with my colleague Tom Willows, who I believe is coming to the Inquiry, who was significantly experienced in maritime, having served time on the cutters. And so with him by my side, I felt that the challenges were — were achievable to — that we were — you know, as a team, we were competent in dealing with — with what was going on, with his maritime experience.

Q. Yes. You were at a higher level than him, weren’t you —

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. — in the hierarchy?

A. Yes.

Q. He was an IO and you were an HO, is that right? Something like that?

A. Yes, he was EO.

Q. Yes, EO, sorry.

A. But I must stress, sir, that this role was role rather than rank and although, ultimately, I had perhaps more decision-making responsibilities than my colleague, his experience was critical in the way that we deployed assets during that time.

Q. On the question of staffing during the busy time more generally, did you have concerns about the adequacy of staffing to respond to the sheer number of incidents coming in?

A. Do you mean that, on the water?

Q. Yes.

A. Looking back, I think at that time I was probably fairly new and probably didn’t have a strong opinion at that time. Obviously, it did increase over the years. But at that — on that time, I was probably too new in the role to form an opinion about that.

Q. Yes. What about the staffing in the office there? Did you think that was adequate?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Right. Well, on that topic, let’s turn to the end of this paragraph, please, the next page, {INQ010135/14}, do you see there’s a sentence about seven lines up: “As I will go on to discuss, on night of 23 November I was working on my own, with a colleague available who was working remotely. A team of colleagues would not have made the job easier because it could have caused confusion as to who was tasking which assets and updating which logs. The level of staffing might appear to be lower than expected to someone outside of the organisation, but in practice, it worked well.” Well, just taking that in stages. We now know, because you have told us in your second statement, that in fact, he was working with you that night; that’s right, isn’t it?

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. Thank you. Now, on the basis of what you say in the next sentence, however, it looks as though what you are allowing for is that his presence in the office with you alongside you, might have caused confusion. Did it, on the night in question?

A. No, I don’t believe there was any confusion on the night of the 23rd November.

Q. Right. So how would a team of colleagues have made the job more difficult and caused confusion?

A. We divide up the tasks in the office. We had a system between Tom and myself, and I think the other teams were fairly similar, and that system was one did all the logs and that one, maybe, did all the communications on the phone and on the radio. And that, actually, when you have a third person come into that, that — that may cause confusion as to who is doing what.

Q. So two was okay, but three would have been a crowd?

A. Possibly.

Q. Yes. Okay, and on night in question, are you saying now that one of you did the calls and one of you entered the information into the logs?

A. Yes, that’s —

Q. And which was it?

A. Sorry. So on the night in question, I believe that Tom made most of the phone calls, that’s not to stay that I didn’t make any phone calls, but I believe Tom made most the phone calls, and that I did most of the logs and updating emails.

Q. Okay, thank you. Well, inevitably, we will be coming back to that. So in terms of your working arrangements in general then, the BFMCC is based in Portsmouth, you tell us in your statement, is that right?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. And you have talked now about Tom Willows and his role. What was the difference between you, as a higher officer, and him as a — did you say, EO?

A. EO, Executive Officer.

Q. Yes.

A. What was the difference?

Q. Yes, what was the difference between your two jobs?

A. In terms of Deveran —

Q. Yes.

A. — there was very little difference.

Q. Right. And I think you have said that in terms of the total number of people working on shift, responding to small boats in the Channel, on the night in question, there would be just the two of you?

A. There was the two of us, but with access to more senior officers if need be.

Q. Right, yes. Well, let’s look at that, please. It is paragraph 43 of your statement, page 19, please, {INQ010135/19}. Do you see, four lines down: “I also had access …”

A. Yes.

Q. “… to the duty senior officer by telephone.”

A. Yes.

Q. So they were available, were they, during the shift, for you to contact?

A. Very much so.

Q. And in what circumstances were you expected to make contact?

A. Perhaps something to do with the welfare of the crew. Perhaps, you know, unforeseen difficulties during any rescue; perhaps the technical issue with the boat, the cutter, something like that.

Q. Yes.

A. Something like that, something a bit unforeseen.

Q. And when you talked earlier about the question of whether to deploy further assets and having an internal discussion —

A. Yes.

Q. — would that person be involved in the discussion?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. Not necessarily. So that was something that you and your — in this case, Tom Willows, had the discussion between you and you would make your decision?

A. Yes, with the coastguard.

Q. Yes, of course.

A. Yes.

Q. But in terms of Border Force —

A. Yes.

Q. — if, for example, you and Tom Willows had had the discussion about tasking further assets, you wouldn’t have needed to get clearance from whoever it was up there?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Thank you. Now, in terms of the shifts are you were working, in the same paragraph — I think it’s at the start of the paragraph, please, so page 18 {INQ010135/18}, yes, you say that the shift started at 20:30 and we know from later in your statement, that it ended at 07:30, so some 11 hours.

A. Yes.

Q. And in paragraph 44, {INQ010135/19} at the start of the paragraph, next page, please, you say: “The shift involved working through without an official break — the break is taken at the end of the shift because of the nature of the work.” So that’s at the end of the 11 hours?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. And not surprisingly: “Comfort breaks are possible by diverting the phones to mobile and taking the airwave handset too. There are opportunities to [having] a snack without leaving any comms unattended.” So effectively, you were on duty for the entire 11 hours?

A. Yes.

Q. Whatever else you were doing, eating, going to the loo, whatever?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Again, at a busy time such as this in November 2021, didn’t that put rather a considerable strain on you both?

A. It depended on the busyness of the shift. I think nights are always difficult, regardless of where you —

Q. Yes.

A. — work. But I would say that that was manageable.

Q. So, no breaks at all, for the 11 hours?

A. Well, you could take a break if you wanted to.

Q. But it wasn’t officially provided for?

A. It was. I could have taken that —

Q. I see.

A. — that break at any time.

Q. I see. So what do you mean then, by that first sentence?

A. I guess that it wasn’t set in that, you know, between midnight and 01:00 you are entitled to your break, or 02:00 and 03:00. It was if we took a break, we were able to do so. If we hadn’t managed to take a proper break, then it could be taken at the end of the shift.

Q. Presumably, you could agree all that with whoever it was who was working with you?

A. Yes.

Q. So he or she could cover?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Right. Next questions, please, on the topic of recording and sharing information. And really I want your help, please, on the different methods of recording and sharing information within the Border Force. So, first, it’s right, isn’t it, that the Border Force maintained a tracker or a log entitled “live updates” which was circulated every hour?

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. Well, first of all, what was that used for, please?

A. That was used to brief senior officers. Perhaps back in November ’21, it would also inform the regional commander control unit of the numbers of migrants crossing — expected to be crossing Channel. And it was also sent to partner agencies, such as the coastguard and the navy. It was during the night. You have to appreciate that there was probably most — most people were still asleep, senior leaders, but in the daytime they were obviously receiving that every hour. We would also send that to other commanders involved in Deveran, so perhaps the CPV that wasn’t deployed, when they wake up they will have that there as an update as to what is going on.

Q. Okay. Let’s have a look at an example together, shall we. This is {INQ000471/1} please. So here’s the covering email, a large number of addresses, mostly redacted. And: “Good morning. “Please find attached Op Deveran Live update 1.” And this is at 01:50. And we can see the live update that went with it just for completeness at {INQ000472/1}. There. So that the status of each incident is given on the left, the letter, is it in UK territorial waters, Border Force MCC notified, co-ordinates and the status, in effect. And the one we are concerned with, as we know, is “C”: “No asset with event. Believed to be already in UK waters. Valiant called.” And we will return to that. Okay, but in terms then — can we have that off the screen, please — in terms, then, of the various places in which information was recorded, that was the live update, the log. But there was also something maintained called the “Operation DEVERAN case register”, is that right?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. And how — I am not going to get you to look at that, but how was that different, do you remember, to the Border Force tracker that we have just looked at, or the log?

A. The tracker would show events that were live and happening.

Q. Yes.

A. The register was to give the event that had been picked up by Border Force a number, so that if we were to refer back to it at any stage, it would have — we would all be talking about the same number.

Q. This is the Mike number that Mr Toy told us about?

A. Yes, this is the Mike, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. And that document had as much information as we had at that time, pretty similar to the — to the email that you just showed.

Q. Yes.

A. But this was after the migrants had been taken on board a Border Force vessel.

Q. I see.

A. Whereas the initial tracking you showed me, that’s the whole overview.

Q. I understand. So that, again, I think Mr Toy explained this to us; that it was when he came alongside a boat that at that point, he would be given the M number, in this case they started at 957 and went on to 959, and that was, as it were, the starting point for the case register because those entries all have a number, an M number, don’t they?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Who was that prepared for, the case register? Who had access to that?

A. That was mainly maritime command. That was for us in the office to record the details of that event so that we could answer any further questions, perhaps the number of migrants rescued during that time. It was for internal use.

Q. Yes. But as you have just been saying, I think, it could — you could only fill in an entry in that register once an M number had been issued?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. Now, we also know that the coastguard had its own trackers and documents to record information. And in relation to them, is it right that you gained access to the coastguard tracker just a few days before this incident on about 21 November ’21?

A. Yes, sir, we had read only access a few days before.

Q. Well, that’s something you have told us for the first time in your second statement. So let’s take a look at that, shall we, and it’s {INQ010698/1} paragraph 3: “At paragraph 20 …” You are referring there to your first statement: “… I stated that in relation to the HMCG events tracker, ”[Border Force] had direct access to the tracker’. I now understand that, as at the date of the incident the inquiry is examining, Border Force … personnel, including myself and my colleague Thomas Willows, only had ‘read-only’ access to the tracker …” Now, that was obviously not something you had remembered when you made your first statement.

A. Correct.

Q. And do I take it that today, as it were, sitting where you are now, that is your evidence; that you only had read-only access to the coastguard tracker?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. Well, let’s have a look at some contemporaneous material on this. Can we look, please, at {INQ007058/1}, the second page, please {INQ007058/2}. Now, this is a record which the Inquiry has obtained showing changes which were made to the coastguard tracker on the night in question. You see the date, “Change Date”?

A. Yes.

Q. And you will see entries 3 and 4 have your email address?

A. Yes.

Q. And entry 17 has Thomas Willow’s email address?

A. Yes.

Q. It suggests, doesn’t it, that Border Force personnel, including the two of you, were indeed, able to change the coastguard tracker that night?

A. That document would suggest that.

Q. Yes, which means, in turn, that your first statement was correct, in paragraph 20?

A. On my original statement?

Q. Yes.

A. If this document here is saying that I had write access.

Q. Yes.

A. I was going on the previous document when I wrote my statement. I don’t recall —

Q. No —

A. — exactly. I can only go on the documents provided to me at the time.

Q. Yes, is that true generally of your account of the events of the night? You are relying on the documents. You don’t have any independent memory?

A. I don’t have any memory of the night in question.

MR PHILLIPS: No, thank you. Sir, would that be a convenient moment?

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes.

MR PHILLIPS: Thank you.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: So, 10 minutes only. Thank you. (10.55 am) (A short break) (11.05 am)

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Mr Phillips.

MR PHILLIPS: We were talking about the coastguard tracker. We’ve heard evidence that the coastguard had another system called the ViSION log. Can you remember whether you have had access to the ViSION log?

A. I have never —

Q. Never heard of it?

A. — never seen the ViSION log.

Q. Thank you. But what is clear from the evidence is there are all sorts of different ways of recording; there was your live updates, there was a case register, the coastguard tracker, the ViSION logs. We also know that the French coastguard maintained their own tracker. The more record — repositories of information you have, the greater the scope for inconsistent recording and confusion, isn’t that right?

A. Possibly.

Q. Yes. Now, can I move on to a completely different topic which is a table-top exercise, which took place in November 2021. It was conducted on 4 November. It was a mass casualty exercise, multi-agency training to prepare for such an event. Now, is that something, before I go any further, which you can remember?

A. Yes, I can.

Q. Thank you, great. We don’t need to go into too much detail, but we can see at {INQ005263/1}, some email traffic between you and somebody called Toby Whale which followed your attendance at that exercise. Who is he, please?

A. Toby Whale is — was, at the time, the senior officer for the MCC.

Q. Right. So was he one of the people you might have contacted if you needed to, as you were explaining earlier?

A. Yes.

Q. Great.

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And it looks from this email chain as though if we go to the next page, please, {INQ005263/2} at the bottom, you see another email from you: “I attended the above table top exercise today (thank you for the invite) and I learnt a huge amount from the variety of agencies that were there … who plays what part in such an event. There were a couple of things I … wanted to ask you …” And then there is a question you raise about landing points. And do you see on the next page, {INQ005263/3}, please, deal with the welfare of people, third point: “separate reporting process”. And it looks as though the net result of this is that you, I think, produced a guidance document after that and indeed, after the incident, which we can see at {INQ002266/1}. So dated November, but I think finalised later than that and after the incident, in I think December, early December of 2021. It looks as though this document — do you remember producing it?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Thank you. It looks as though this was you recognising that there was a gap in the framework of policies and procedures applicable to these sorts of search and rescue incidents and trying to fill it, is that fair?

A. I am not sure that I completely recognised it. I think I was interested in the possibility of what might happen and, therefore, tried to plan what we would do in that situation.

Q. Yes. Because I assume there wasn’t an existing plan for mass casualties at sea?

A. Correct.

Q. Yes, thank you. And if we turn on very quickly, we can see your treatment of mass casualties at the top of page 2 {INQ002266/2}, strategic priorities: save life, preserve public health, etc. Reference to SOLAS, which we have talked about earlier. And the MCC’s role, again, we talked about that, on page 3 {INQ002266/3} and indeed, on page {INQ002266/5}, your role — higher officer role?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, when you set that out in the draft plan which, as I say, was finalised after the incident, were you drawing on your experience of what had happened on 24 November?

A. No, sir. This particular pass — part here was taken from the other standard operating procedure that was already in existence. I didn’t write this word-for-word. This was taken from another document.

Q. Right. So this part, as it were, explained what you already knew about the nature of your role rather than something you had drafted yourself in the light of experience?

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. Thank you very much. So now, to the topic, please, of background information provided about the — about the incident on the night of the 23/24 November and in your statement at paragraph 46, page {INQ010135/20}, you refer to a document which we have at {INQ000566/1}, if we could look at the document, please. I assume this is a standard email you would have received at the time on many occasions?

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. And it sets out, doesn’t it, the assets available —

A. Yes.

Q. — for the coming period: “… see below planning for tonight into tomorrow.” And we see that the Valiant was the primary responder, the Hunter was on standby, the Hurricane — another cutter, I think, is that right?

A. That’s a coastal transit vessel.

Q. CTV?

A. CTV, yes.

Q. Was available at Ramsgate from 06:00 in the morning and so was the safeguard. And reference there to aerial assets, etc. So is this the sort of document you would have at the beginning of your shift?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. It would be vital for you, given what you have explained about your role, to know what was available and where?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Thank you. Now, this document shows aerial coverage — fixed-wing aerial coverage being available. Now, I think you have gathered that, in fact, on the night it was not available. That wasn’t something you knew, I think, at the start of your shift, was it?

A. I can’t remember.

Q. You can’t remember?

A. No.

Q. Thank you. If, when you got a document like this at the start of your shift, your assessment was that what you had available wasn’t likely to be enough, what would you do?

A. Are you asking me if I — if I thought that looking at that that wouldn’t be enough for —

Q. No, imagine a hypothetical situation. You come on shift and you have got the email and it looks as though there really isn’t — given the amount of activity going on, there really isn’t enough available to you by way of assets. What do you do?

A. I would probably have spoken to the coastguard and informed them that resources didn’t appear to be adequate to perhaps give them the heads up that they might need to consider other assets.

Q. Can you remember ever doing that?

A. Not a specific occasion. But things do break during shifts and so if something became suddenly unavailable, that is a conversation that we would have had with the coastguard.

Q. Yes. Can we go to your statement at paragraph 47, please, {INQ010135/20} you say there, in the first line, about aerial assets: “I was not aware that following the report …” The one we have just been looking at: “… the … fixed wing aerial asset would not be available to provide an overview from the sky …” Again, you may not remember, but can you remember when you were first made aware of that?

A. No, I can’t remember.

Q. Would it be likely to have been some time during the shift?

A. I can’t remember.

Q. Thank you. But in general terms, then, just confining ourselves to that, the availability of fixed-wing coverage did have an impact on your role, didn’t it?

A. I would say that my role remained the same, that I was responsible for the Border Force assets and liaison with the coastguard.

Q. Yes.

A. And that whether or not an aerial asset was available didn’t impact what I had available to —

Q. No.

A. — to commit.

Q. But of course, in terms of locating the small boats, it had a very significant impact, didn’t it?

A. Possibly. I — I can’t answer.

Q. You are not able to say?

A. I am not able to say, yes.

Q. We have been told, Mr Toy told us yesterday, that air cover was by far the best method of spotting these boats, for all the reasons we went through earlier and that sounds sensible, doesn’t it?

A. It sounds sensible, yes.

Q. Yes. But it sounds then, from your general answer, that on the night, if you had been told that there was no fixed-wing asset available, it wouldn’t have had any impact on your — on your job, as far as you were concerned?

A. Correct, yes.

Q. Thank you. In the course of your work, did you receive, from time to time, intelligence about the likelihood of crossings during your shift?

A. Yes, that’s true.

Q. Can we look at an example, please at {INQ002267/1}. You see this is an email sent on the evening, the evening of the 23rd, early evening, at 18:26. Again, can I ask you, did you — or can you remember receiving this particular email?

A. I — I can’t remember.

Q. No.

A. No.

Q. But does it fit into the pattern you have just been describing of intelligence coming in about the shift and about what was likely to happen?

A. Yes, and no. I haven’t seen an email quite like this before. It doesn’t look familiar. But we would receive the intel logs with that type of information on it.

Q. Yes. So you haven’t seen this email before?

A. Not that I can recall.

Q. Okay. Well, you see at the bottom, for example, it talks about numbers in the hundreds —

A. Yes.

Q. — likely to come over and this sentence: “With this in mind [this is somebody within Home Office] you may wish to review your resource response in the UK.” Now, can you help us as to whether any such review of resource response was undertaken that night?

A. I — I don’t recall.

Q. You don’t remember?

A. No.

Q. In your statement at paragraph 43 you talk about the handover at the beginning of your shift, page 18 {INQ010135/18}, please, at the bottom of that page, you say: “[The handover] probably took around half an hour.” We don’t have any records of what was — what was contained in the handover. Were the details usually written down?

A. No, sir. We didn’t write the details.

Q. So it was a verbal handover?

A. Verbal handover.

Q. What would it cover?

A. If it was Deveran, it would cover assets available, whether any activity had started, whether any information had been sent out. It would give a current view of what was actually happening. It would cover the rest of the fleet, what they were up to. It would cover our resources in the MCC and anything else, you know, for that night-shift, if it —

Q. To take an example and going back to what we were discussing, would the non-availability of air cover have been something that might have been mentioned in a handover?

A. Possibly, yes.

Q. You should know that: we were expecting air cover, we haven’t got any?

A. Yes, yes that would be —

Q. So in terms of the working arrangements at MCC that night, the — in your second statement, you have told us and this is paragraph 4, can we have that up please, page 2 {INQ010698/2}, thank you, that the expectation was that Border Force personnel — as you see, this is about five lines up from the end — was that: “[Border Force] personnel would be physically based at the [MCC] on ‘red days’ or ‘amber days’ …” And these were amber or red days, weren’t they?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you: “… however, we were able to work some shifts remotely on ‘green days’ …” So that didn’t apply. You have told us you were working in-person, as it were, in Portsmouth that night —

A. (Nods).

Q. — but your recollection about Mr Willows has shifted, or rather, you have learnt more, would that be fair?

A. Yes, as more documents have been made available, yes.

Q. So again, as you fairly said just now, really you are relying on the documents?

A. Yes.

Q. You don’t have any real independent recollection of any of this?

A. No.

Q. No, okay. Because certainly what we have now learnt from your second statement is that Tom Willows, who we have talked about, was not working remotely but was, you think, alongside you —

A. Yes.

Q. — in the office at Portsmouth, the two of you working together?

A. Yes.

Q. I have to say this to you, and put this to you. You were clear about this in your first statement and that statement was signed by you with a statement of truth. It’s not equivocal, you set out a factual position which you have now very radically changed. Can we, the Inquiry, can the Chair take this position, that you are now setting out in your second statement, to be true?

A. Yes, sir. I do apologise for the first statement where I believe Mr Willows was working from home. I had no material at that time to suggest that he was in the office with me. However, as the Inquiry has gone forward, it’s clear that Tom was actually in the office beside me. So it’s very difficult to remember one night during many Op Deveran nights in the MCC and it’s not that this one isn’t important. It was because I didn’t know that this had taken place during my shift.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: That’s accepted. But we can now take it that the second statement is true?

A. I believe that to be true, based on the evidence that — of Tom Willows, of what he will say. I believe that he — he would have been in the office with me.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, well, thank you.

MR PHILLIPS: So just following through the implications of that with you. If we go back, please, to 43 of your statement, bottom of page 18, again {INQ010135/18}, you say — do you see the last sentence of this page: “If I needed to communicate with Mr Willows then I would have done so by mobile telephone. I cannot recall contacting him that night and have not located any emails between us.” Well, we know why that was, because he was sitting next to you; yes?

A. Yes.

Q. So how did you communicate with him that night?

A. Just verbally.

Q. Yes, okay. Can we look, please, at another document. This is {INQ010633/1} and this was a document disclosed to the Inquiry late in February this year which appears to show an extract of communications between you and Tom Willows on 22 November, so the night before the incident. Have you seen it before?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. What form of communication were you using?

A. This was on Teams.

Q. Right.

A. Online.

Q. So again, when you said in your statement, at paragraph 43, you communicated by mobile, you were also able to use Teams?

A. Yes.

Q. And would that be when he was working remotely?

A. Yes, I would have spoken to him verbally if — if he was there.

Q. And would you — when he was working remotely, or perhaps when you were working remotely, was this a method of communication that you were regularly using?

A. Yes. I am trying to remember where Covid came because the Teams all came about as a result of that.

Q. Yes, but now you have told us that you and he were physically present in the office on the night 23/24 November, you wouldn’t, I assume, have been communicating by Teams that night?

A. Unlikely.

Q. Yes. Now going back to paragraph 43 and at the top of page 19, the second line {INQ010135/19} again, against the background of what you were saying then which is that he was remotely — he was working remotely: “Given that we would have agreed who was doing which tasks, there would not have been a need to speak unless either of us had a query.” And presumably, we can forget all about that, because, as you have said, you were sitting next to him?

A. Yes.

Q. And if you needed to speak to each other, you could do so?

A. Yes.

Q. But in that same sentence, you say: “… we would have agreed who was doing which tasks …” And so we wouldn’t have needed to speak. Was that something, ie the allocation of tasks, that was agreed at the beginning of each shift, or was it just a standard way of working?

A. No, we would discuss who was doing what tasks at the start of the shift.

Q. Yes. Thank you. So turning to the events of the night, and, again, I do bear in mind what you have said about the — your recollection. Can we do this by reference to the documents and the first one is your daybook which is at {INQ000565/1} and this starts — the first entry is at 01:12. So 12 minutes past 1 in the morning. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And my understanding is, but please confirm if this is correct, is that this is the entirety of your daybook entry for that shift, ie 23/24 November ’21?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. At 01:12, there are simply co-ordinates and, as you explain in your statement, the time when they had been received by coastguard, in fact. Namely, 23:53, so about 80 minutes before you made the entry and I think you received them. Now in your statement, you say, at paragraph 49, if we could have that, please, it is page 21 of the statement, {INQ01035/20}, if we could zoom in on that, thank you, you describe the entry and you say you think you got those co-ordinates from the coastguard and that it — the note in your daybook relates to a telephone call between you and the coastguard. And you go on to say in paragraph 50: “I do not have access to the initial call but it is possible that I asked for updated coordinates, noting the length of time … [the point I have just put to you, that it was 80 minutes odd] an hour and 20 minutes …” Before the call took place. Now, in that part of your statement, you are talking in terms of “would have”, do you see the fourth line: “I would have put the initial co-ordinates …” Etc. Again, just to confirm, you have no independent recollection now of doing that?

A. No.

Q. No. So does it follow also that you don’t know now, because we haven’t got a record of the call, whether you took part in it?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. In other words, that Mr Willows may have taken the call and passed on the co-ordinates to you, which you then noted in your daybook; is that possible?

A. Yes, that’s possible.

Q. Is it more than possible, is it likely?

A. I — I can’t answer any further than — than that.

Q. No, and can you help with the question of the delay. You have made a note of it, as you say.

A. Mmm.

Q. Would you have been surprised to receive co-ordinates like this so long after they had apparently been obtained?

A. Not necessarily, no.

Q. Well, they show, if they are accurate, a boat which is either in or close to UK waters. And bearing in mind the plan we have talked about this morning, wouldn’t you have wanted a lot more notice of that to get your asset out to meet the boat at the median line?

A. Yes.

Q. So this was far too late, wasn’t it?

A. If it’s already in UK waters.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, it’s late.

Q. The plan wouldn’t work?

A. Yes.

Q. Of course not. Because by the time you got your first plan, we know it took two hours to get to the co-ordinates, the boat would have long been in UK waters and the plan wouldn’t have worked?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. So let’s go back to your daybook please, {INQ000565/1} at 01:24 and again, the entry you have made simply consists of co-ordinates and no other information. You don’t tell us, for example, to which incident those co-ordinates relate, do you?

A. No.

Q. And again, are you able to assist, based on your actual recollection, who took the call which led to those co-ordinates being recorded?

A. I am unable to tell you that.

Q. So you can’t tell, for example, whether in any call that took place at 01:24, other information concerning a small boat was passed on to whoever it was on the end of the call. All you have got is the daybook?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Now we do, in fact, have a transcript of the relevant call and it’s at {INQ007648/1}. There are two speakers, you see there their names are given. Have you seen this document before?

A. If you go to the next page, I might be able to.

Q. Yes, page 2 {INQ007648/2}, please.

A. Yes, I’ve seen this.

Q. It gives two names and neither it yours?

A. Correct.

Q. Yes, and you will see about halfway down this page 2, the speaker from the coastguard says: “Not on the list and more of an issue is migrant 7 …” Which, in fact, turned out to be Charlie: “… which I can give you a position for that.” Tom Willows is recorded as saying: “Okay.” And the position is given. And he then says, on page 3 {INQ007648/3}, if we turn over the page, that the vessel was 0.6 of a nautical mile from UK waters. Do you see at the top of the page?

A. Yes.

Q. And detail is given: “… 30 people on board, 14 have got life jackets … supposedly … 13 women [and] 8 children.” “… dinghy … in good condition.” You see at the bottom of the page. And then phone numbers are given and the speaker on the call, Tom Willows on this transcript, says: “[We will] plot it up … look at getting an asset tasked to it and then if it’s in UK waters …” Do you see in the middle of that page?

A. Yes.

Q. Now again, in your first statement, you talk at some considerable length about this call and explain what you learnt from it and this is paragraphs 52 and 53. Could we go to them, please, {INQ010135/21}: “I believe … I became aware of Incident ‘Charlie’ when I received the second call …” You now accept, I think, that it wasn’t you receiving that call, but you see you give considerable amount of evidence about — to the Inquiry about what was said to you and what information about the boat was passed on. And then, in paragraph 53 third line {INQ010135/22}: “I relayed the information I had to HMC Valiant.” So, given that you have now told us that you didn’t make this call and therefore didn’t receive, directly, the information, are you able to assist us with how the co-ordinates at least came to be in your daybook at the entry for 01:24? Do you want to see that again?

A. Yes, please.

Q. Yes, I think it was — yes, there it is. Do you see, it is just co-ordinates, nothing else, {INQ000565/1}.

A. I can’t answer that. I — I don’t — I don’t know.

Q. No. But what we can see is that none of the other information which Tom Willows received is written down in your daybook?

A. No, it’s not.

Q. Would you have expected him to tell you, after that call, the sort of information that I have highlighted to you; that the boat was 0.6 of a nautical mile off UK waters, there were 14 people with life jackets, 30 people on board etc, etc?

A. Yes, he would have relayed all that information.

Q. That was important information to know, wasn’t it —

A. Yes.

Q. — about the boat —

A. Yes.

Q. — as you went about your decisions on tasking Border Force assets?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Now, in your second statement, again, the change that you have made to your evidence, paragraph 6, please, {INQ010698/3} is that, in relation to this call: “… Mr Willows has since listened to the audio of the call, and has confirmed that the call was made by himself … in order to confirm the accuracy of the coordinates …” And then this important sentence: “I now believe that all telephone calls made by [Border Force] to [coastguard], or received by [Border Force] from [coastguard], on the night … were made or received by Mr Willows.” So, again, may I ask you, is that your position, your evidence to the Inquiry today?

A. I cannot say 100% that I didn’t make or receive a call. But I have no evidence to offer as to whether I did or I didn’t. But I — I can’t say 100% that I didn’t pick up the phone at any point in the evening.

Q. Okay. Well, that’s rather less definite than the last sentence at paragraph 6, isn’t it?

A. Yes.

Q. So it sounds as though the real position is that you actually don’t know?

A. Unless I hear those calls and hear the voices —

Q. Yes.

A. — I — I don’t know.

Q. Yes.

A. But I believe that when we split up the tasks to do for the evening, that Tom would have taken on the calls and the communications. But that’s not to say that if he left the room for a break, that I wouldn’t have picked up the phone or —

Q. No.

A. But —

Q. Well, let’s just take a specific example in your first statement, you said it was when that you first became aware of Charlie, the incident, when you received this call, the one we have been looking at the transcript of, at 01:24. So we know that’s not true, but do you have any recollection now of when you first became aware of Incident Charlie?

A. I have no recollection of that night. I can only go with the notebook entry.

Q. Yes, and the notebook entry doesn’t tell you very much, to be honest, does it?

A. No.

Q. Thank you. But again, using your memory such, as it is, of the way things generally worked, assume a telephone call like this, assume information passed on to Tom Willows, how do we get from that moment to the tasking of the Valiant, which we know took place at 01:30, so very shortly afterwards? Would you expect there to have been a conversation between Tom Willows, once he had got off the phone, and yourself in order to discuss what to do?

A. Yes, we would have had a conversation.

Q. Because, as we saw from the document you yourself drafted after the event, the mass casualty event, it was the higher officer’s responsibility to decide on and do the asset allocation and tasking for Border Force assets?

A. That was usual, but at that time, on that night, I didn’t know that there was a mass casualty event.

Q. Right. I see. So do you think it possible that Tom Willows himself tasked the Valiant?

A. Do you mean verbally, picked up the phone to —

Q. Yes.

A. Maybe.

Q. But you can’t say one way or the other?

A. I can’t say.

Q. Now can we go back and look at the live update, and this is the one for 01:50, which we looked at briefly before. The email, we have already seen, so can we actually look at the spreadsheet itself, the update, which is at {INQ000472/1}. And again, if you remember, you have to look on the right to see the relevant text: “No asset with event. Believed to already be in UK waters. Valiant called.” So this, as I said, was 01:50. It is about half an hour after the tasking of the Valiant and we can see the co-ordinates have been entered there. As a matter of fact, they don’t actually match the ones which were given by the coastguard, but let’s put that to one side. What it says, the update is: “No asset with event. Believed to already be in UK waters. Valiant called.” Can you help with this: do you know who made this entry on the spreadsheet?

A. I don’t recall specifically, but I would say that I would have made that entry.

Q. Yes.

A. Between me and Tom, I would have probably done that.

Q. Yes. So in terms of — do you remember you talked earlier about the allocation of tasks at the beginning of the shift?

A. Yes.

Q. You would have responsibility, would you, for filling in the — the updates?

A. Yes.

Q. It doesn’t contain any of the information which was given to you about nature of the people on board and all of that, does it?

A. No, it doesn’t.

Q. No. So where was that information recorded?

A. It may not be recorded anywhere.

Q. No, so it’s not in your daybook, we know that, that was just the co-ordinates, it’s not on the update. We haven’t seen any other written record of it at all. So how are you meant to use that, in the office? It was just something you two knew about, you discussed?

A. Yes, we — we would have discussed it together.

Q. Yes. And what about when your shift ended and the next people came on? How do you deal with it?

A. What, the detail?

Q. Yes.

A. That wouldn’t be necessarily something that we would hand over between ourselves.

Q. I see, because it wasn’t important enough?

A. Not because it wasn’t important. But because that information would have been passed to Valiant already.

Q. So it wasn’t important for you, back at base as it were, the MCC, to have the key information which coastguard had passed on to you recorded on this update?

A. Not necessarily.

Q. Or — and nowhere else, in fact?

A. Yes, not necessarily.

Q. Okay. So then in terms of tasking the Valiant, certainly in your first statement you told us, at paragraph 53 {INQ010135/22}, second line, that you telephoned the Valiant. And again, are you sure about that? What’s your position today?

A. I believe that I would have called Commander Toy. But I — I can’t be certain because I don’t recall specifically.

Q. And in terms of the information you gave him, it looks as though you would have been reliant on Tom Willows passing it on, passing information on from the coastguard?

A. Yes.

Q. And I assume, going back to your daybook, at {INQ000565/1} thank you, you say, at 01:25: “Call to Valiant re event C.” So event C, or Charlie, has now appeared for the first time in your daybook. There is no record of any other information passed on to Valiant. And I am assuming from what you have told us that there won’t be any, or there was, no other record of any other information?

A. Correct.

Q. No. If we go to Commander Toy’s daybook {INQ00205/1} which we looked at yesterday in great detail, for the same moment, and that is — remarkable, they have already got it — his writing, if I may say so, is nothing like as clear as yours, but he did explain to us what it said. And it was: “Call from MCC, deploy to …” And then there was a series of co-ordinates and then the rest of it, the rest of the entry was what he then did, which was effectively to summon the crew and there was going to be a “CFI”, do you see, on board. That’s in the second line? So it looks as though — well, this daybook is also — this entry is also free of the sort of information the coastguard passed on. In your first statement, paragraph 61, you say, this is page 25 now, please, {INQ010135/25}, thank you: “I [don’t] recall receiving a physical description of [Charlie], but any relevant information I was given I relayed directly to [the] Valiant.” And again, we have really only got your word for that, haven’t we? Because it’s not in your daybook, it’s nowhere else at MCC and it’s not in Commander Toy’s daybook.

A. Yes.

Q. And you can’t remember?

A. No.

Q. Now, at paragraph 16 of your statement, {INQ010135/6}, you give a fairly lengthy description of what your general practice was, or what the system was, how the coastguard would telephone to provide co-ordinates of a boat, confirm — and you would confirm if you could send an asset, and make a note of the co-ordinates: “… and any other relevant information [the coastguard] could pass on, such as …” And then there is a very long list indeed of the relevant information: the number of persons on board, relevant to determining the appropriate asset; the time of the siting at the co-ordinates given. And again, we had here an example where your first co-ordinates were 80 minutes late, as it were: the course; the direction; the speed; any mitigating factors; children on board; someone unwell; whether an engine had failed or fallen off; the type of boat: “… and anything else which would assist [you] in terms of allocating an asset and would assist the [Border Force Maritime] crew in locating and identifying the boat. Essentially we took as much information as we could from [coastguard] because when we contacted our vessels we knew they would ask for [going over the page 7, {INQ010135/7}] the information. In November … some of this information would initially be entered manually into the officer’s daybook.” And going back to paragraph 16, {INQ010135/6} the reason you have listed all the information is because it’s obviously relevant — back to paragraph 16, please — obviously relevant information for the Valiant to identify the craft, the small boat it was being sent to rescue; that is correct, isn’t it?

A. The initial call to Valiant would have been to stand up the boat, to get the engines fired up and to prepare to leave Dover.

Q. Yes.

A. This type of information, even if I had it or — did or did not have it written down, would have been something that they would have called the coastguard to — whilst en route, to —

Q. But that’s not what you are saying in your statement. You are saying the reverse of that in your statement. You are saying that you would make a note of all of this information in order to determine, for example, the appropriate asset.

A. Okay. Yes.

Q. Well, which is it?

A. I’m sorry, I don’t understand where you are coming from.

Q. Well, in paragraph 16 you are going to some length to explain what was important information and why it was important for you. And we know that no information of this kind was recorded by you in your daybook or anywhere else.

A. Yes, it’s not recorded.

Q. Can you give an explanation of that now?

A. I am unable to give an explanation.

Q. Is it because you actually thought it wasn’t important?

A. Some of the information isn’t important at that stage.

Q. Well, can you name anything in paragraph 16 which isn’t important?

A. At the stage that I called Valiant, some of that information isn’t — isn’t relevant.

Q. Yes, so are you saying that there would have come a later stage when it would have been relevant or important and you would, then, have passed it on?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, if that was part of your system, why wasn’t any of it ever written down?

A. I can’t answer that.

Q. You can see how it looks very, very sloppy now, can’t you?

A. Yes, I can. And in hindsight, which is a wonderful thing, I wish I had written far more detail.

Q. Okay. Can we turn, then, to the topic of the Mayday Relay and start by looking at the next tracker which went out, at 02:43. And we can see the covering email in standard form at {INQ000507/1}. Again, we saw the earlier one. The same thing and this time it’s 02:50. And we can see the tracker itself, or the log, I think you call it, or life update at {INQ000508/1}, please, the second page, it is the spreadsheet, if you remember, {INQ000508/2}. And I think I am right in saying that the red type indicates new information since the last issue of the update, is that correct?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. Thank you. And you will see the red information for Charlie, Incident C, is: “Valiant attending. ETA 1 [hour] to location. Now a Mayday.”

A. Yes, I can see that.

Q. So again, doing your best today, who do you think made that entry?

A. Doing my best today, I would say that I made that entry.

Q. Yes. So we know that, certainly by that stage, if that’s right, that you were aware that a Mayday had been issued in relation to Incident Charlie?

A. Yes.

Q. And if we go back to your daybook, {INQ000565/1}, please, we can see a record of that at 02:34, so some 15, 16 minutes before this: “C — Mayday. Valiant still going.” Now, just to check one thing. Did you yourself hear the Mayday call?

A. No. We don’t have VHF in our office, so I wouldn’t have heard that.

Q. And can you remember now whether, in your time in the role by 24 November, you had ever had an incident for which a Mayday had been called?

A. No, I don’t recall any incidents.

Q. No, it was a very rare occurrence, wasn’t it?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. In paragraph 57 of your first statement, you say — sorry, this is page 23 {INQ010135/23} of the statement, thank you — you talked, first of all, about the entry in the daybook we have seen, 02:34: “… ‘C’ was a mayday … Valiant was still going to it. I am unsure who told me that ‘C’ was a mayday event but it did not make any difference to my role, in that I had tasked an asset which was on its way.” What, if anything, did the fact that a Mayday call had been issued tell you about the status of Incident Charlie?

A. I would imagine — I can’t remember my thoughts on that day, but I would imagine that I thought the situation had worsened in some way.

Q. Yes, and it was sufficiently unusual, as you have explained, it had never happened before, it must have brought home to you, surely, that this was a more urgent than usual situation?

A. At that time, four months into a new role, I am not sure whether I was expecting to hear a Mayday or not.

Q. No.

A. Since then, I, you know, can draw on my own experience since then, in that a Mayday is unusual.

Q. Well, picking up what you have just said. If you were relatively new in the role and you have never heard a Mayday before, did you think to discuss this with your senior officer?

A. No, no.

Q. Why was that?

A. Not that I recall. I — I don’t know. I can’t answer. I don’t know.

Q. Because it didn’t make any difference?

A. Because the Valiant was still going, there was no further demand for Border Force.

Q. Because — in other words, because coastguard wasn’t asking you for more?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you think it would be a good idea to check that Valiant was aware of this change of status, that the incident was now a Mayday?

A. I can’t recall. I — I — possibly.

Q. Did you take any steps to get any more information, having been told it was a Mayday?

A. I don’t recall.

Q. No. Did you try to find out any more about the nature of the incident and what had led to the Mayday call being made?

A. I can’t recall.

MR PHILLIPS: No. Sir, would that be a convenient moment?

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. So just 10 minutes. (11.58 am) short break (A short break) (12.07 pm)

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Mr Phillips.

MR PHILLIPS: We were talking about Mayday calls. One of the things which you will have learnt about Mayday calls is that there’s an obligation on other vessels to respond to them, to go and assist; that’s right, isn’t it?

A. Yes.

Q. And wasn’t that a good reason for you to get in touch with Valiant so that the commander was aware, first if he hadn’t heard it, there was a Mayday out, but, secondly, that that meant that other vessels would also be hearing it and may come to assist, which would make a difference to his approach to the boat? That would be something you would want to know, wouldn’t it?

A. Yes.

Q. So if you didn’t make contact with him to tell him, you were, what, relying on his having picked up the Mayday call himself?

A. I would say by that point that Commander Toy would have been liaising with the coastguard rather than us —

Q. Yes.

A. — for further information.

Q. So you didn’t feel any need yourselves to make sure he had that information?

A. I can’t remember whether we did or we didn’t.

Q. But in general, it sounds as though you were relying on the coastguard?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in your first statement at paragraph 59, page 24, {INQ010135/24} you talk about whether you were made aware that Charlie was taking water, sinking or that anyone was in the water and then you say this: “I would have thought I would make a note of that information in my daybook, but regardless, that information would not impact my decision making because I simply could not make BFM vessels go any faster than they safely could.” So, first of all, on the question of making a note of information in your daybook, we know that there is no information like that in your daybook, is there?

A. About the Mayday, or?

Q. No, about taking on water —

A. No, there’s not.

Q. — sinking, anyone in the water.

A. No, no there is not.

Q. There isn’t very much information in the daybook?

A. Correct.

Q. Now we also know that the information that Charlie, the boat, was taking on water was broadcast in the Mayday Relay. If you had been told that information, that the boat was taking on water, or it was sinking, or that there were people in the water, would that not have changed your approach to your work that night and made you take some proactive step?

A. I — I can’t answer, I don’t know.

Q. Not even based on your experience of other incidents; getting information like that doesn’t make you think: well, I had better deal with this in a different way because it’s more urgent?

A. The only way we would have known that it was a Mayday is from the coastguard. And I would have assumed, at the time, that they had passed that information to Valiant. Because by that point, Valiant would have been under their control or direction to the — to the incident.

Q. I see. So again, it was — it was the coastguard’s job, really?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. And is that why you say that even if you had had information like that been passed to you, it wouldn’t have impacted your decision-making?

A. Not at that stage.

Q. Because actually, you had passed the responsibility to coastguard?

A. Yes.

Q. So it wasn’t so much, as you say there, that you simply couldn’t make the vessel go any faster, it was that it was out of your hands. It was a coastguard responsibility; is that a fairer way of putting it?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Thank you. Now, in terms of Valiant and the time it did take to get to the asset — to the incident, I’m sorry — we know that it was deployed at about 01:30 and it took, in the end, about two hours to get to the last known location or co-ordinates. Can I just ask you this, again, drawing on your general experience, appreciating you can’t remember what happened on the night, would you have been monitoring its progress during that two-hour period?

A. Very likely.

Q. And given what we know about the Mayday, and the sense of this boat really needing help, wouldn’t you have recognised that two hours to get to the boat was too slow, in terms of a search and rescue response?

A. I think the distance that they had to travel was — probably had an impact and I — I can’t answer that with any certainty.

Q. Well, as you have said very frankly, you don’t have any direct experience of search and rescue yourself?

A. No, I don’t.

Q. You have never been out there on the water?

A. Not during a search and rescue.

Q. No. Now, we do know that there was a call from the coastguard to Border Force at 03:11, an important call, which I think was taken by your colleague, Tom Willows and you deal with this in paragraph 70 of your statement, page 28, {INQ010135/28}. You say about it, in contrast to the other calls you gave evidence about: “I do not recall being aware of that call at the time, nor would I necessarily expect to have been.” Now, we know that on that call, the coastguard provided important information to Tom Willows about Charlie and so I want to look at the transcript of the call, please, to see whether that is information you would, in fact, expect to have been given. So if we can look at, please, {INQ007602/1}. And then on to page 3, please, {INQ007602/3} you will see, the participants are Neal Gibson of the coastguard and Tom Willows. And in the first exchange: “… Valiant is proceeding to Charlie, which is southwest of the Sandettie Lightvessel at the minute.” And Tom Willows says: “Is that still a Mayday situation at the moment or not …?” And the reply is: “Well, they’ve told me it’s full of water.” And then he explains why he did the Mayday call, to get a response from a French vessel which was nearby. But just pausing there and thinking about what information, from this call, you would have expected Tom Willows to tell you, was the information that Charlie was full of water something that you would have expected him to pass on?

A. I think given the time of night and the fact that there was just two of us in the room, it’s probably something he would have told me.

Q. Yes. Well, that’s not what you said in your statement, where you said: I don’t recall being aware of that call at the time, nor would I necessarily expect to have been. I think what you are now saying is there you were, the two of you in your room, you would know what was being said; is that right?

A. I can’t answer for that night. I —

Q. No.

A. — but in general, I would — I would know what was going on. When the phone rings, you hear one side of it, or another. But I — I can’t recall the phone calls and what Tom may or may not have said to me afterwards.

Q. No. But the second thing that was passed on was that the French vessel had basically ignored the Mayday; in other words, that the normal response, the legal obligation to respond, had been ignored. That was important information, obviously, wasn’t it?

A. We dealt with a lot of incidents with the French coming and going.

Q. But never one in which a Mayday had been issued, as you have told us. So it was important information that the Mayday had been issued and had been ignored?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. And the call also included information about the number of boats and the number of people involved. If we go to the bottom of page 4, I think that’s the next page, please, {INQ007602/4}. Do you see the reference there, to: “… potentially 110 [people], worst-case scenario, which is probably pushing our luck for Valiant.” Again, I know you won’t remember what, if anything, was passed on about this call. But you had tasked the Valiant and if you received information in the MCC, during any night, indicating that there were more people on the relevant boats than Valiant could cope with, that was important for you to know, wasn’t it, because it meant that your asset was inadequate to deal with the situation?

A. Yes.

Q. And what would you then have done?

A. We would probably have spoken to the coastguard and made representation that Valiant would need to be turning back towards the shore to offload the migrants that they had on board.

Q. Well, this information was telling you, surely, is that Valiant wouldn’t be able to take on all of those people because it exceeded its capacity?

A. I know that their capacity is 100 —

Q. Yes.

A. — but Valiant would have done everything in their power to take 110. Between 100 and 110, that’s not too many more.

Q. Is that a situation you had actually had experience of?

A. Yes, and since then.

Q. Right. Well, we heard yesterday from Commander Toy about him waiting alongside the small boat for help to arrive, in effect, in the form of another responder, be it the RNLI or whoever else it was. But that meant that somebody somewhere had to task the other vessel to come to assist the Valiant. Now, that was something you ought to have considered, surely, whether Valiant needed help?

A. Yes, yes. Perhaps, yes.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. But you have no recollection of that?

A. No.

Q. If we go back to the bottom of page 3 {INQ007602/3} you will see, in terms of the number of assets out, Neal Gibson is recorded as saying: “That’s the dream, isn’t it, don’t get more than one out.” Now, was that an approach, ie that the dream situation was only to have to deploy one asset, that you were aware of, or had heard about at the time?

A. No, I don’t — I don’t believe so.

Q. Do you agree with it?

A. No. No, I don’t.

Q. No. And as far as you can remember, accepting all of the deficiencies in your memory, but was there anything to stop you tasking another asset on that night, had you been asked to do so?

A. No.

Q. No. And you say, if we go on to the very end of your statement, please, at paragraph 77, {INQ010135/31}: “It is very sad to think that the occupants of event ‘C’ or anyone was out in distress in the Channel that night when we had resources out there (and could have sent further resources if asked) …” And that’s your evidence today, isn’t it? Had you been asked to task more assets, you could have done so?

A. Yes.

Q. We saw that there were other vessels on standby and available.

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. But in the statement — the first statement, earlier in the statement and at paragraph 60, you say, at the top of page 25 {INQ010135/25}: “Given that HMC Valiant was tasked to a single event at the time, I did not feel the need to task another vessel. One event … [within] approximately 30 migrants was well within the cutter’s capabilities.” But, of course, what we have just been looking at is the conversation later in the night, 03:11, where we are talking 110, not 30. So what you say there doesn’t really apply, does it?

A. At the start of the night when, Valiant is tasked to — to a single event —

Q. Yes.

A. — there didn’t — it didn’t seem that we needed another vessel.

Q. But things changed.

A. But things changed and yes, I could have called another vessel if asked to.

Q. Yes, and with hindsight, do you wish that you had?

A. I don’t know where I would have sent the CPV if — if I had asked it to come out. I didn’t know that we were missing an event. So I wouldn’t have had anywhere to send the CPV.

Q. Well, in the conversation we have just looked at —

A. Do you mean after, with the 110?

Q. Yes, at 03:11 —

A. I get what you mean.

Q. — they are talking about the number of boats, I think there were four listed —

A. Yes.

Q. — in the — southwest of the Sandettie Lightvessel. You knew where that was?

A. Yes.

Q. You could have sent the other vessel there?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you wish you had done?

A. If asked, I would have done.

Q. Yes, but you weren’t asked?

A. I wasn’t asked, no.

Q. Just one other thing about assets, if I may. The Inquiry has received some evidence that there was an aerial asset provided by a company called RVL/Reveal, which was tasked by the Home Office that night. Was that an asset you were aware of on the night?

A. I have never heard of RVL until this Inquiry.

Q. Thank you. Now, we looked at the transcript of the call at 03:11. Can we look, please, at the next Border Force update, which is at {INQ000540/1}. Standard form. We have seen the emails before. And then the update itself, please, at {INQ000541/1}. And there is “C”, again, the incident is open. And do you remember, we saw last time that there was red text for an update. This is the update after — half an hour or so after the conversation with Tom Willows. And we can see, can’t we, that none of the information that was passed on to him then is recorded in the update?

A. Yes.

Q. And again, I think you said, doing the best you can, that you think you would have been responsible for completing this update?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. One question, if I may, about the French authorities. You say in your statement, and it is 61, please on page 25 {INQ010135/25}, that you don’t — you didn’t interact with any French authorities during this event. Just to check, is that based on the documents or based on whatever recollection you have?

A. We didn’t directly liaise with the French, that was always through the coastguard. But we did have the update from them, from Gris-Nez.

Q. Yes.

A. And that was something that had started to happen around that time. I am not sure on the exact dates for that.

Q. Thank you.

A. But that was something that we came to receive, which was their — I guess their tracker.

Q. Yes.

A. But I didn’t speak to anybody —

Q. No.

A. — on the French side.

Q. And I think what you are saying is that if you wanted to make contact with the French authorities, it was done through coastguard —

A. Yes.

Q. — is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes, thank you. Well, that takes us to the arrival of the Valiant at the last known location of Charlie and as we know from the evidence yesterday, that was at 03:27. Can we look back, please, at your daybook and the entry for 03:48 {INQ000565/1} so shortly after that. And can you just read what it says? “M957” is how it begins.

A. Yes, and then it is the co-ordinates: “2 migrant crafts stopped in water. 40 POB, [persons on board], estimated. Believed [to be] Incident C [Charlie].”

Q. Right. Can you now remember — and I appreciate — I think I know what the answer is going to be — where you got that information from: believed incident Charlie?

A. Yes, I — I can’t answer that.

Q. And then the relevant spreadsheet at {INQ000572/1}, please. This is the actual spreadsheet, not the covering email. And, again, to the right-hand side, we see the new information this time, at 04:50, is: “Vessel found and Valiant embarked a number of migrants.” So what you are recording on the tracker is that incident Charlie, the vessel C, on this, had been found and the Valiant had embarked a number of migrants and again, are you able to help us as to where that information came from?

A. No, I can’t — I can’t answer that.

Q. And did it ever occur to you during the shift — again, as far as you can recall — that there was any doubt that the Valiant had found Incident Charlie?

A. I believed on that night that Valiant had picked up event Charlie.

Q. Yes. And is that why you say, at the end of your statement in paragraph 76, if we can have that, please, {INQ010135/30}, thank you: “I was confident that HMC Valiant had rescued all taskings.” In other words, at the end of the shift, as far as you were concerned, Valiant had gone to the incident, and had taken on board the migrants from that boat, Charlie?

A. Yes.

Q. Excuse me a moment. And we can see — sorry, I should have got you to point this out for us — if we can go back to the spreadsheet, I am so sorry. That was at {INQ000572/}, thank you, that now, new information is the Mike number we discussed before?

A. Yes.

Q. So we can take it, can we, that by this time, 04:50, that number had been issued?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And at the end of your shift, you tell us, at paragraph 69 of your statement, if we could have that up briefly, please, {INQ010135/27} it ended at 07:30, the shift, and you handed over to another Border Force employee. And you confirm — and not really a surprise — that there are “no separate notes”, do you see the fourth line, “of the handover”? And I imagine, from what you have just been — do you see that? The fourth line of paragraph 69: “There are no separate notes of the handover.”?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And I imagine that you won’t be able to assist with what you might have told whoever took over from you at 07:30 about what had happened during the shift?

A. No.

Q. No. And my understanding from your first statement is that you were not working the next day, during the day while the recovery operation took place. And you say, in your statement, at paragraph 76, that {INQ010135/30} when you saw the news about the deaths in the Channel, you didn’t realise that there was a connection between those deaths and your shift.

A. I had no idea —

Q. Yes.

A. — until weeks or maybe months later, that event Charlie was not event Charlie.

Q. Yes, well in your statement you say, first of all, at paragraph 71, that you were not interviewed by the MAIB, or involved in their investigation at all; is that right?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Yes. And the impression you give in this first statement is it wasn’t really until the MAIB report was published that you understood the connection between the shift you did that night and what had happened to Incident Charlie?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. And we know that that didn’t happen, the publication, until November 2023?

A. (Nods).

MR PHILLIPS: Well, thank you very much for answering my questions. Is there anything else you would like to say to the Inquiry?

A. No. Thank you, sir.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, thank you very much for your evidence, Ms Whitehouse. It has been very helpful. Mr Phillips, I am not sure if we would come back at 1.30, or —

MR PHILLIPS: That sounds very sensible, sir.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Is that acceptable by everyone else? It doesn’t — MR MAXWELL-SCOTT: We think so, yes. It is our witness.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, I know, yes. Mr Golden. Well, let’s assume 1.30 pm, unless there is some force majeure. Right, well, thanks very much. (12.33 pm) (The Lunch Break) (1.29 pm)

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, good afternoon, Mr Golden. Alice Meredith will have some questions for you in a moment, but could you just read the affirmation. MR DOMINIC GOLDEN (affirmed)

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, thank you very much. Ms Meredith.

Questions by MS MEREDITH

MS MEREDITH: Could you give the Inquiry your full name, please.

A. Yes. Dominic Golden.

Q. And you made a statement for the Inquiry which you signed on 24 October 2024. That statement was 37 pages, wasn’t it?

A. That’s correct.

Q. In November 2021, you were employed by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, or the MCA, and your role was Aviation Tactical Commander, that’s right, isn’t it?

A. That’s correct, yes.

Q. You worked in the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre, known as the ARCC, which was based in the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre?

A. That’s correct, yes.

Q. And you explain in your statement that you had joined the MCA as an Aviation Operator at the beginning of 2019 and that after completing your aviation operator training, you were promoted to Aviation Tactical Commander in April or May 2019?

A. That’s correct, yes.

Q. Before joining the MCA, you had served for 33 years as a Warfare Officer in the Royal Navy?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. And it is right, isn’t it, this had given you operational and tactical decision-making experience which was relevant to your later role as an Aviation Tactical Commander?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. And then in June 2022, you returned to your previous employment as a Royal Navy Warfare Officer?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Are you still in that role now?

A. I am, yes.

Q. And have you had any involvement in responding to small boat crossings in your role as Royal Navy Warfare Officer since 2022?

A. I, for two years, worked at the Joint Maritime Security Centre, which is looking at all maritime security incidents, that range from illegal fishing through to counterterrorism at sea, which does include a little bit on migrant crossings.

Q. Does your role now involve anything to do with —

A. No, I am now working to do with security in the Indian Ocean.

Q. Thank you. Please bring up {INQ009628/5}. Mr Golden, this is a copy of your statement and you will see halfway down the page, paragraphs 11 and 12 of your statement and this is where you explain your role as Aviation Tactical Commander. Briefly, you say at 11, that you were responsible for the co-ordination of the aviation response to search and rescue incidents and for keeping a strategic overview of all aviation assets. And at paragraph 12, in summary, you say first, that your role involved managing the effective and efficient co-ordination of the response to incidents requiring SAR aviation assets; secondly, at (b), authorising the tasking and deployment of the most suitable SAR aviation asset and ensuring that such requests were a relevant and appropriate use of the assets. Moving to page 6 {INQ009628/6}, thirdly, supervising and providing advice and guidance to the ARCC team; fourthly, assisting and supporting the Tactical Commander (Maritime); and finally, being responsible for ensuring a culture of safety and compliance with procedures and guidance and ensuring technical knowledge and expertise was up to date. So I think that provides a summary of your role at the time?

A. (Nods).

Q. Turning back to page 2 {INQ009628/2} of the document, at paragraph 4, we see there that you explain the training you received when you joined the MCA as an Aviation Operator. You say that it was focused on the various systems operated at the ARCC, which included the HM Coast Guard information system, ViSION, from which, you say, you could access all HMCG policies and procedures. Were all of the HMCG policies and procedures relevant to you in your role or were some documents identified to you as relevant?

A. No, not all because that covered the wide range and spectrum of work that the coastguard undertakes. Clearly, my focus would be on those relevant to aviation. But in theory, I had access to all coastguard SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) and documentation, I believe, through that system.

Q. And were relevant policies, particularly, if new policies were created after your training, identified to you, or —

A. Yes.

Q. How did that happen?

A. Sorry to interrupt. Yes, that would be correct. That would be, effectively, a general email to all users to say that the latest guidance and direction, or whatever, had been issued. And you were, I believe — forgive me, I am trying to remember here now, but I think there was almost an administrative process where you would be required to almost sign or tick to acknowledge that you had read that latest policy.

Q. And would you be specifically contacted about policies that were relevant to your role or would you need to assess which ones related to your role?

A. No, I — I sadly, unfortunately, we were — bombarded is a harsh word to use — but I think the system didn’t have the flexibility to filter down those that would be relevant and so it was up to myself to judge which ones I need to read, which ones can I avoid to park aside for another day.

Q. I see and turning to your paragraph 5, you say that the classroom aspect of your initial training provided a brief overview of the maritime environment, including the use of maps and charts, but not more complex topics like search planning. And I think it’s right to say that you did not receive training in relation to the maritime environment beyond this basic overview, even when you became an Aviation Tactical Commander —

A. That is correct.

Q. — from your statement? And you did not receive any training on search plans when you became —

A. Not from the coastguard, no.

Q. Who was responsible for the search planning?

A. That’s the maritime domain, entirely.

Q. Turning to page 4 of the document and your paragraph 8, {INQ009628/4} you explain there that when you joined the ARCC in 2019, small boat crossings were not common and that you did not receive any specific training in relation to responding to small boat incidents. To confirm, you didn’t receive small boat specific training in your initial training and is it right to say you didn’t receive this at any time prior to the incident, apart from an exercise you were involved in on 11 November, that you describe at your paragraph 9?

A. Yes, that’s correct. So I think the best way to surmise that would be the coastguard’s attitude towards migrant vessels was to treat them no differently than any other vessel in distress. So arguably, there was no additional training required, certainly at this stage. I happened to represent the ARCC on 11 November, on an exercise in South Wales where it was becoming apparent that we were going to have to revisit how we would deal with mass casualties. If I surmise even more, typically, in the maritime domain I am looking at providing rescue to one or two individuals, at most a handful of individuals. We were now suddenly being faced with the very real possibility of having to conduct mass casualty rescue from — from the water. Hence, this exercise was generated to try — in two parts; it was a live demonstration of as yet untried capability of life raft being deployed from a helicopter because the reality was a helicopter wouldn’t be able to lift more than 6 to 8 people anyway. How would you rescue upwards of 30, 40 people in the water? And the second part of that exercise was a table-top exercise where, having brought together the heads of Border Force, RNLI and other key players, an opportunity to sort of really whiteboard what we could do, were there better ways of dealing with these if, God forbid, something should come along?

Q. And you say that was a mass rescue exercise. Was it the understanding of everyone present that this was being conducted specifically in relation to small boats, or that that was the reason —

A. Yes, it was. For — I’m conscious that this may be — the exercise was deliberately conducted in South Wales at Milford Haven, so as not to attract overt attention. If we had conducted the same training exercises on the south coast, it may have given away a concern because there was, obviously, at this point, growing media interest in — in how we were responding to — to migrant incidents.

Q. And so —

A. Sorry.

Q. — effectively, the exercise was conducted to avoid attention?

A. No, no it was, it was —

Q. Whose attention?

A. I am being clumsy there and probably going a rabbit-hole. This was an exercise aimed at acknowledging the growing concerns of the migrant numbers and small boats crossing the Channel. And we were almost whiteboarding what other methods can we use, have we thought of everything? And a conscious decision was taken to hold the exercise not on the south coast, but away in Milford Haven, so as just to avoid difficult questions should they have arisen from media, etc.

Q. I see. And you have confirmed that you hadn’t received any specific training in relation to small boats. Were you aware of any HM Coastguard written guidance policies or procedures which specifically related to small boats and which was relevant to your role?

A. No, not that I am aware of, no.

Q. The Inquiry has received evidence suggesting that in some cases, callers from small boats may have — whether intentionally or otherwise — exaggerated the seriousness of their situation in their calls. If I ask to turn to page 22, which is your paragraph 55, halfway down the page, {INQ009628/22} you explain there that by November 2021, you were aware, via verbal briefings and discussions, that there was a growing trend of inaccurate and exaggerated information being passed and you explain there the impact of this. Do you recall when you first became aware of this as an issue?

A. I believe it’s the summer of — of 2021.

Q. And what was the nature of the verbal briefings you describe about this? Was it informal information provided by colleagues, or was there formal notification of this issue by management?

A. I honestly can’t remember. I am certainly aware of discussions informally, ie — so it’s definitely from several sources — there was nothing in writing to confirm this, but several sources had — yes, reiterated and given examples of what they were saying. And the reason it was shared with me, for the reasons explained there, it did have a — an impact on — on aviation.

Q. And so when you say had it had an impact on aviation, did you understand that you should be taking into account, when responding to calls about small boats, the fact that there was potential exaggeration and that that should be impacting on your decision-making?

A. Yes. I think probably the best way to answer that would be I am tasking an aircraft to a vessel with a description of 20 people and no one wearing life jackets and it is sinking. When I now send a helicopter to that incident and it sees a boat with 40 people who are wearing life jackets and the boat is clearly still underway, do I now have to dismiss that as being not the boat that the call came from and therefore, I need to continue looking somewhere else, or is that the boat that the call originated from? So it’s adding another layer of complexity to management. I think I refer to, in my statement, that we make informed decisions based on the accuracy of the information we have. In 2021, an organisation, the coastguard that, by its nature, is doing its best to rescue people in distress, the concept of trying to assist people, that had provided misinformation was quite a — I cannot find the right word here — but it was, it was — difficult to understand why that would be the case and made the management role more challenging.

Q. And so from your description, the fact of potential exaggeration would be relevant to identifying a boat and whether this was a boat that had been reported or a different vessel. Would potential exaggeration have been relevant to your decision as to whether to task an asset at all, or which asset to task?

A. I think the staff answer I have to give is no, because we have, already as a coastguard policy, decided that all small boats are deemed to be in distress. But there is, at the back of your mind, a nervousness that — I would hate to use the — the expression this is almost becoming normal practice, but you know, how — how significant is that incident, in terms of distress. My nervousness as a commander as opposed to an operator, is that if I allocate resource to a call that has said that they are sinking, that asset is now tied into something that could be a false alarm, of cry wolf, when I now have a real incident 10 miles along the coast, or considering the size of the regions that one helicopter is trying to cover, and I am now torn between how would I allocate bias or preference to deal with it. But the answer is — and the answer has to be, we would treat all calls as an emergency call and therefore as vessel in distress.

Q. So effectively, if I understand you rightly, you are saying the policy was and formally, you had to treat all vessels as being in distress?

A. Correct.

Q. But in the back of your mind — and potentially, that may have had some impact on decision-making, was the fact that you were aware that you needed to task to all incidents and that the information about this incident, if it was a small boat incident, might be inaccurate?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q. And you have described becoming aware of this potential exaggeration. To confirm, you would not have received any calls directly from callers in small boats. So any information about exaggeration would be something that you received secondhand from someone else, or through reports back about what had been found on taskings?

A. Yes, I have the advantage that, effectively, the call collection in the maritime demain is sifted, for want of a better word, before it comes to me. So if there had been 99 calls to the maritime coastguard, the challenge that maritime coastguard had was to condense that to one request to my aviation team for a helicopter.

Q. And you have explained that, I think, by — was it early 2021, you said exaggeration became an issue?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was something that you were having to deal with in your decision-making and decide to what degree, if at all, that should impact your tasking decisions. Did you see any formal coastguard document providing information, advice or guidance, or any policy or procedure which related to the issue of potential exaggeration and how you should respond to that?

A. No, no formal documentation.

Q. Was it your understanding that you had any role in assessing the veracity or reliability of information provided by small boat callers?

A. No, I didn’t have that role. But going back to the previous discussion we had about my — my role as the commander, as opposed to an operator who was operating in that reactive space, I think the commander’s space — as I should have put in my statement — is I am in that one to six hours looking ahead piece about how I manage my resources. So I think having an awareness of it is wholly appropriate, but I am certainly not aware of any direction and would it influence my decision-making? No, but an awareness of it would certainly — would be a consideration.

Q. And you have explained in your statement, both at paragraph 8 and 55, that despite the issue of exaggeration, all small boats were recorded and treated as boats in distress and responded to accordingly. Do you recall how you knew that this was the policy, if you weren’t aware of specific policies about small boats?

A. I don’t recall, but I am fairly certain I have seen in writing an email from either the Chief Coastguard or one of his deputies, just reminding us all that that was the case.

Q. And were you aware of the reason for that approach?

A. Yes. I mean, in very simple terms — I think this was explained verbally — the small boats are certainly not designed to go on the — the high seas. And that’s the size of the boats anyway. When you then factor in the poor construction used, the size of the engine, the fact that the majority of passengers are likely to be non-swimmers and back in 2021, many of them didn’t even have life jackets, you know, all those factors together totally support that decision that they should be treated as being in distress.

Q. And from your point of view, taking into account both those circumstances, the distress categorisation and the information you were aware of about exaggeration, if you had two calls, one involving a small boat categorised formally as being in distress and the other involving a different type of vessel, but which had reported itself to be in circumstances which meant it was in distress, would those vessels be given equal priority? How would you deal with that situation?

A. A very good hypothetical question. I think in providing a helicopter, bearing in mind a helicopter is not always the optimum solution to effect a rescue, I am having to satisfy myself that of the numerous calls I am getting — and this is no different from covering the mountains in North Wales in summer, when there are four of five calls coming in at the same time, you can only go with the information you have been given. So I almost can’t answer that question. I would — the exaggeration is at the back of my mind, but I am going with the information I’ve got. And luckily for me — and this is a very lazy answer to give — maritime have done that work for me. They have sifted it. They, in theory, are going to prioritise for me. In fact, having allocated a helicopter to support that incident, that helicopter in the maritime domain, is passed — Operational Control is passed to the Maritime Coastguard almost within minutes of launching. So again, it sounds like a very selfish answer to give, but likely for me, that decision is taken from my hands. I continue to monitor because if another incident took place that really was even more urgent, then I could jump back in and take control of the helicopter back.

Q. I now want to ask you some questions about the rest of the aviation team at the ARCC. Turning to page 6 of your statement, {INQ009628/6} we see there paragraph 13 and you explain that on each shift at the ARCC there would be an aviation commander or team leader acting as the aviation supervisor, sometimes just one, and the team would normally consist of four of five SAOOs, that’s Senior Aviation Operations Officers. You explain that those would usually be responsible for answering telephones or manning the radios, but you would also assist on busy shifts or if short-staffed. But you would seek to pass that back to retain a tactical overview as soon as possible. To what degree was it your experience latterly, in 2021 and in the lead up to this incident, that you were having to assist with those calls on a regular basis?

A. I suppose the coastguard aviation rescue is very seasonal. You could plot out a sine wave of demand on the activity. So it’s not rocket science to work out that in the summer when the beaches are packed and everybody is in the mountains, it’s very much all hands to the pumps and we are all busy. I try, as much as I can, to allow my team to manage — as I have stated there, the calls and the radios, but occasionally would have to lean in to do so. So in the summer, typically, if we were experiencing upwards of 15 to 20 incidents in a 12-hour shift, which doesn’t sound much compared to the ambulance service — actually those incidents are quite labour-intensive, in the summer I would typically lean in and perhaps run with one or two of them. In the winter on, for example, the night of the 23/24th, I think we only had about three incidents we were called to, not including this incident in the Dover Straights. So there was no need for me to lean in to take phone calls and answer the radio.

Q. So increasing numbers of small boat crossings during that period was not something that impacted on your team?

A. Not really because — and I — forgive me, I am going down — in answering here, a lot of the maritime — and this, again, sounds a very lazy answer, once we have allocated the resource, that resource is now being managed by the maritime coastguard, either Dover or whoever. And the only role for the aviation team, for my operators, is to just reach in, either on a long-range radio or to ring the maritime coastguard direct to have a sit rep, an update on the fuel states, etc.

Q. I think if we turn to page 7 {INQ009628/7} you explain at paragraph 14 what you have told us already which is —

A. Yes.

Q. — that calls were effectively sifted for you and you would only receive one call in relation to each incident. If we turn to page 17 {INQ009628/17}, and paragraph 42, in terms of the way that you were interacting with the maritime team, you explain that you were using a different ViSION system from the maritime team and that meant you only had access to incidents related to aviation. By this do you mean that you would only have access to incidents recorded on ViSION 5 and information conveyed by the maritime team to someone who was on your team and therefore, recording into ViSION 5?

A. Yes, yes. So I can now, with hindsight, read that statement. It’s not very clear. So if maritime had an incident, they would have recorded that in their ViSION 4 system. If aviation was deemed a probable solution, and we were called, we would have to recreate an entry into ViSION 5 to create that incident.

Q. And would that be done by them telephoning —

A. Yes.

Q. — and you then recording it? They wouldn’t send a block of text to you, or details in —

A. No, certainly not.

Q. — writing?

A. But I should point out, or you may well be coming to this, that’s no different from how I would receive incident calls from the ambulance service, the fire service or the police, because there is no information exchange between their systems and ours. So it — it doesn’t really add much to — in my opinion, doesn’t add much delay to the sortie. And in many ways is preferential because when you are receiving a call, what we teach people is to take charge of that call. So rather than have, unfair on maritime colleagues, a lengthy dialogue, you can be more direct and giving the: what, where — where is it? What do you want me to do? You can take charge. So actually, I — I did not see being on two different systems a hindrance.

Q. Albeit it would be right to say that you would only know the details about an incident that maritime chose to share —

A. Correct.

Q. — so there might be something recorded on their system that was relevant, but unless they chose to tell you, you wouldn’t know anything about it?

A. Absolutely and in this case — sorry if again, I’m probably jumping ahead of where you wish to go with this question — but being located in Fareham with the southern coastguard, I am not seeing any of Dover coastguard entry, unless it has been phoned in to my operators to make a record of it for ViSION 5.

Q. And did you have any access to any other documents recording information about ongoing incidents? In particular, were you aware of a coastguard tracker recording small boat crossings and did you have access to that document?

A. No, didn’t have access to it. We have access to — I mean, this is really irrelevant now, but mountain rescue run their own chat page. We have access to that. We have access to other systems to do with aviation round the UK. But not —

Q. Not that tracker?

A. — not that tracker.

Q. And you wouldn’t have access to logs on ViSION 4 described as the migrant administration log?

A. No, that’s correct.

Q. And that wouldn’t have been sent to you in any other way?

A. No.

Q. And there was a network management log on ViSION 5 for aviation incidents which you would have had access to?

A. Yes.

Q. But you wouldn’t have had access to the maritime network management ViSION log on system 4?

A. That’s correct.

Q. You joined the coastguard at the beginning of 2019 and you said in your statement that the switch to ViSION 5 took place in approximately May 2019. So you would have had a period when you did have access to the same system?

A. Yes.

Q. When you did have access to their system, if you were called about an incident, would you open up the entry about that incident —

A. Yes.

Q. — if you needed more information, and check it?

A. Yes, we would.

Q. And could — and would ARCC staff have made entries on maritime logs on ViSION about the status of aviation assets, if that was relevant?

A. Yes, so in the — in that brief — in my time, rather, I should add, when we were on the same system, which subsequently — I believe the coastguard is now all on the same system again today, that’s exactly that. All the incidents are on one system.

Q. I want to ask you now about the air assets that were available for the use of the coastguard in November 2021. If we turn to page 11 of the document on screen, this is your statement still and at paragraph 26 onwards, {INQ009628/11} — we will turn from this to the next page quite shortly — you set out the air asset providers to the MCA.

A. Yes.

Q. You see, first, we have Bristows, starting at paragraph 26, who were contracted to provide a 24 hour a day, all year round, SAR helicopter or SAR-H service and we have heard evidence from the Director of SAR at Bristow, Mr Hamilton. And from Mr Trubshaw, the captain of R 163 and I think you mentioned you have listen to that evidence?

A. I have, yes.

Q. Then at paragraph 30, we see that 2Excel Aviation Limited were contracted to provide fixed-wing aircraft out of Doncaster Airport. And we have heard from Mr Norton of 2Excel, in particular, about how the weather could impact their ability to operate, and that poor weather at their scheduled destination may mean that they need to have confirmed alternative airports that would be willing to accept them on diversion. Is that your experience —

A. Yes, I understand that.

Q. — as well? Then we see at paragraph 36 at page 15 {INQ009628/15}, you describe that there was RVL, an organisation which also provided fixed-wing provision to the MCA and then at page 16 {INQ009628/16} at paragraph 38, Tekever, who provided unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, which delivered a similar function to the fixed-wing aircraft?

A. That’s correct. Yes.

Q. And I think you indicate that the MCA had a contract with Tekever. Were you confident that this was the MCA rather than the Home Office?

A. No, it was the Home Office. So, again, this is me trying to write a statement three and a half years after.

Q. And you explain that although the Tekevers were not constrained by a requirement for diversion airfields like the fixed-wing assets, they were more susceptible to poor weather at their base?

A. Yes, in fact, on the evening of the 23rd/24th, to highlight that, when they were able to confirm to me they were going to get airborne at 06:00, they were already stating that they were expecting to have to bring the drone back by 10:00 because of forecast rain. So they were very susceptible to weather.

Q. I see. In a different way from the fixed-wing?

A. Yes, very much so. It’s not the diversion issue, it is just weather affecting the performance of these — these aircraft.

Q. And could the ARCC, in your understanding, task or re-task Tekever UAVs as required in response to maritime requests for SOLAS or SAR, including in relation to small boat incidents?

A. Again, I am — I am going to play the — I am struggling to remember, but I am fairly certain that the nature of the flights that these drones flew were very much pre — pre-prescribed. They were — I mean, we talk about searches. I think — we would look at the fixed-wing as flying what I would call a patrol. And for the drones, they are flying — I am getting very technical here, but they are flying a profile known as beyond line of visual sight. And as a consequence, they are flying along fixed waypoints. So when they are airborne, one of their operators — sorry, they are based at Lydd Airport, but one of their operators is co-located, I believe, in the Dover Coastguard MRCC and they have the ability to, effectively, move waypoints, if requested, to react to a request coming through. But, do the Tekever generally — or certainly, in 2021, I don’t believe had an aircraft at an alert status. So they were contracted and agreed to fly certain hours and I don’t believe, although, we had an emergency call-out number, there was no mechanism for sort of asking them to bring in their teams who lived off the airfield to come in and generate an additional flight.

Q. I see. So as I understand it from what you have said, they were based with an operator co-located at Dover MRCC?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say they could move points, if they were requested, to react to a request coming through. Would that request, in fact, come from the MRCC at Dover then rather than from you?

A. Yes, it would do. In the same way — as I answered earlier, that a helicopter asset that I will have generated, once it’s in the maritime domain, its operational control is now sitting with the appropriate MRCC, who can then change its search co-ordinates, its parameters, or re-task it.

Q. So to the degree that it could be re-tasked, that would be not for you to consider, but someone else?

A. Correct. The only consideration I would have is a safety factor, that in 2021 there were very strict rules on operating UAVs in the same piece of airspace as a helicopter or other assets. Again, I don’t wish to go down the rabbit-hole of how to de-conflict laterally or vertically —

Q. But that would form part of your role?

A. — but it is certainly — correct, certainly my consideration, yes.

Q. And in relation, finally, at page 16 and paragraph 39 the Ministry of Defence, you explain that the MCA could request to use those assets —

A. Yes.

Q. — “through the Military Aid to Civil Authorities … process.” And that’s at your page 17 {INQ009628/17}, paragraph 41. You explain that the Ministry of Defence did not, however, maintain helicopters at readiness for SAR and several hour’s notice would be required to task them. And that whilst they had a fixed-wing capability, three hours’ notice would be required to task it. So on a day-to-day basis, did you consider that Ministry of Defence assets were something that you could realistically task in response to ongoing small boat incidents?

A. A good question. The Ministry of Defence assets, whilst having a declared national tasking ability, ie one airframe helicopter, one airframe fixed-wing is maintained, as I said there, for national tasking at three hours, they are both far from ideal to conduct searches for small boats. I am really looking at Ministry of Defence fixed-wing for those very long range search and rescue operations out into the Atlantic Ocean and for helicopters, this is really — I think Covid, when we had an awful lot of casualties that needed to be moved into — into hospital transfers, where you can use effectively a — a flying bus, for want of an awful expression — and I am sure someone will have a go at me later — so in terms of their search capabilities at night, you know, and what is the competency of the crews to go and do so, almost no, no and no?

Q. And had you ever requested a tasking for small boat crossings?

A. No, not for small boats. I believe — and I can’t put a date on it, there was — I think was it 2022 when the MoD took —

Q. Of course.

A. — over, they then initially allocated their own Kingairs to come down and support the small boat patrolling. But, but no, not — not specifically into the search areas.

Q. If I could ask you to take down this document and bring up document {INQ005198/1}, at page 1, you will see in front of you the coastguard’s operation EOS tasking policy. If we could turn to page 3 {INQ005198/3} and the top paragraph, this explains that the coastguard had a policy of tasking aerial assets proactively for safety of life at sea taskings, is that right?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. And those were called EOS tasking. And the document defines the policy by reference to what were known as Op Deveran weather assessments.

A. Yes.

Q. So those assess the likelihood of crossing attempts based on the weather. They could be highly unlikely, they could be likely, a realistic possibility, likely, which was referred to as ‘amber days’, or highly likely, which was referred to as ‘red days’?

A. That’s correct. I believe, as a matter of fact, it is the wave height. So it’s not so much the — it is — the wave height is — is where that is considered the most important factor.

Q. And if we bring up, alongside this document, document {INQ00150/1}, I think you will see this is an example of an Operation Deveran weather assessment, in this case dated 23 November 2021.

A. Yes.

Q. And this is the type of assessment which is being referred to?

A. That’s correct, yes.

Q. And we can see — I don’t know if we can make it a little bit larger, but on the right-hand side there, yes, it’s a little bit blurred, but we have an entry for 23 November to 06UTC and on the right-hand side of that top line, the likelihood is “likely”, amber. And then, on the row below, for 24 November, again, to the early hours of the 25th, we have an entry which is “highly likely” in red.

A. Yes. Excuse me.

Q. If you could remove document {INQ00150/1}, but leave the other document. At page 3 {INQ005198/3} then of this document, we see the section entitled “Criteria” and this explains that the policy was that a fixed-wing aircraft could be requested to conduct proactive surveillance patrols when Op Deveran assessments stated that the crossings were deemed as a realistic possibility or greater, or during periods where crossings were deemed unlikely but there was intelligence that was received, that the Tekever — and the Tekever drone was unable to fly. And then at page 4 {INQ005198/4} if we turn to that, we have the tasking process, which is set out for the Op EOS process. Turning back to page 3 {INQ005198/3}, there are tracked amendments to the policy and would it be right to say that this reflects the temporary operating instruction that you refer to in your statement?

A. I am just reading it now, but yes, that — almost certainly, that ties in with that, yes.

Q. And that was for end of day sweep-tasking, which was effectively, as I understand it, seeking to reconcile the migrant tracker with the recognised maritime picture found, is that right?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Turning to the bottom of page 3, we can see that the arrangement was that there would be a — an aircraft on scene from 09:30 on red days to support the coastguard and prepositioned at Lydd, or Southend on amber days. And that was to inform and support maritime operations?

A. That’s correct. In fact, I — I — I would go as far as to say not necessarily Lydd, somewhere on the south coast, but that’s getting too technical. But an aircraft available on the south coast.

Q. On the south coast. If we could remove this document and bring up {INQ009628/8}, this is back to your statement. And you address, in your statement, reactive taskings as well as these proactive taskings. So those would be the calls from the police, the maritime coastguard, etc.

A. Yes.

Q. You explain that majority of those calls — at paragraph 16 — are straightforward and the factors that would be considered before tasking an asset, including whether there was a threat to life, or likelihood of serious life changing injury, whether using an aviation asset was the correct solution and whether a task could be met more effectively by using other emergency services. But you say one should give the benefit of the doubt in tasking. You also emphasise, at paragraph 17, that while SAR-H could solve many incidents, all flying came at risk and cost, another emergency service might be more optimum, and SAR-H might be the only solution to another competing request. So that was part of what you were thinking about as the Commander?

A. Yes, very much so.

Q. If we turn to paragraph 18, you explain that your role was focused on the looking forward and ensuring assets remained available to respond to potentially competing demands. If we move to page 21 of your statement at paragraph 53 {INQ009628/21}, you explain there that you were becoming aware of the increased number of small boats in part due to increased fixed-wing tasking and request for SAR-H, including to assist in reconciliation, which I think we have seen in the temporary operating instruction.

A. Yes.

Q. You say that caused you concern because SAR-H time was being used up in reconciliation missions, which could catch you out if a later, subsequent, more traditional, request was received. Then if we turn to page 22 {INQ009628/22} at paragraphs 54-55, you also explain there that was an increase in small boats, an increasing likelihood of SAR-H being deployed to be involved in rescue, and you also had to consider the nationwide demand on SAR-H. If we look at the last sentence of paragraph 54, you say there: “No Commander wanted to be the focus of hindsight scrutiny by management when he was unable to provide a SAR-H to an incident in the North Sea, for example, because he had made the decision to pre deploy that region’s SAR-H to Dover hours earlier.” Then we see at paragraph 55 that you refer again to the awareness of exaggerated information. So it would be right to say, I think, that for you, considerations of the requirement for SAR-H to be used elsewhere, factored into your decision-making?

A. Yes, very much so. Yes.

Q. And I think you have explained already that to some degree at least, awareness of potential exaggeration was a relevant factor for you?

A. Yes, and I think, if I can just add a sentence there. So when that contract was made with Bristows from the military in 2016, the then considered optimum solution was 10 rescue helicopters, evenly spaced around the United Kingdom, based on statistical data over the previous 20 years. What we are seeing here now in 2021, is a sudden shift in the bias of — of sorties that we are performing and at some point, you know, a rethink, possibly, of where we would wish to base those assets might need to be done.

Q. And in terms of what sort of tasking it was, when you became aware that there was a small boat in the Channel and that was treated as being in distress, would you treat a request to accepted assets, without further information about the specific circumstance of that boat, as a request effectively for proactive surveillance tasking, or its equivalent, or as a reactive SAR tasking, that this was a SAR-H incident that needed to be responded to?

A. I — yes, sorry, can I ask you to repeat that question?

Q. If you were given a report that there was a small boat in the Channel —

A. Yes.

Q. — with no further information as to what its circumstances were or why it might be considered to be in distress, beyond the fact it was a small boat, and you were asked to task to that, would you be considering that tasking, if it was to locate the boat, to be equivalent to a surveillance type tasking, or a reactive search and rescue to an incident, tasking?

A. Okay, thank you. I would consider that a reactive. I think, if I can expand that further, it goes back to my comment earlier where, certainly, a SAR helicopter, the Crown jewel, as it were — it can do a huge variety of tasks — is that the best asset to deal with that incident? So if I had received, in the words you have used, that call from maritime, not wishing to add delay to the process, but I would be wanting to specify: why is it that the helicopter is deemed the best solution to the problem you have? And part of that decision process would be: how long would it take me from pressing the button on the desk and picking up the phone to get the helicopter moving? At nighttime, we are talking 45 minutes. Then there is a good 30-minute transit out to the Dover Straights, whereas, there may already be an RLNI lifeboat or a Border Force cutter that’s within that sort of one hour 15 minutes, so therefore, the helicopter is not necessarily the most appropriate asset to deal with it. So there is a whole range of factors that I am now trying to consider to make that decision. But if maritime has sold to me that, no, the demand for a helicopter is to overcome speedy response, or to overcome search of a reasonable-sized area at pace, yes. Then my answer is going to be, yes, you can have the helicopter. I can always call the helicopter back, but you can never resend a helicopter if you are 20 minutes late, if that makes sense.

Q. And you describe, in your statement, the increase in small boat crossings and the impact that had. Did you feel constrained in your ability to task, as you considered would be appropriate, to small boat incidents, due to limitations on resources available and the need to reserve assets for other incidents?

A. Yes, yes. In — I mention there the SAR helicopters as being the Crown jewel because not only can they do patrolling, they can do searching and they can effect a rescue. Whereas, if I was to use a drone or a fixed-wing aircraft, it can achieve the search and the patrolling, but nothing else. So therefore, if the task for an aviation asset was just merely to conduct a patrol or a search, my preference, depending on the timelines and the urgency, would be to try and use another asset, to therefore preserve the hours on my helicopter that I really wanted to keep in reserve for something that could come along, that only they can solve.

Q. So if you had an infinite number of SAR-Hs, you might have tasked for of them to this type of incident?

A. Yes. Yes, of course.

Q. And you have also explained at page 23 {INQ009628/23}, paragraph 56 of your statement, issues that arose because of the increased demand on resources, including in relation to the fixed-wing assets. And we can see, at paragraphs 57 and onwards, some of the steps that were taken to address this. So intelligence and trend analysis, identifying the peak of small boats and then determining when the fixed-wing tasking would be, at your paragraph 57. The temporary operating instruction, which we have already discussed, and having — your paragraph 59, I think, on further down, the Humberside SAR-H helicopter prepositioned at Lydd on red days.

A. Yes. So I think this might lead into a question further on this afternoon, but on a winter’s evening, there was — and I hate to say the word “normal”, but there was an established battle rhythm of what time the boats would typically set off and allowing for an average speed of advance, there was a fairly accurate prediction of what time they would cross into UK waters. When you also factor in the flying time down from Doncaster and factor in that on a 24-hour duty, the crews of those fixed-wing aircraft wanted to swap out at eight, there was and the optimum window of when to spread your aviation assets to — to deliver the best effect in — in providing approximate patrolling and surveillance.

Q. But it would be right, I think, to say that in practice the optimum surveillance solution could not always be achieved because of various factors?

A. Correct, correct. Again, I mean no disparity to — to 2Excel, but when, only two years previously, I believe, they had got the contract to provide fixed-wing aviation for the coastguard, that was predicted on so many hours per month. So an aircraft is — is not measured in time, it’s measured in how many hours he flies. And suddenly, we were almost doubling the hours these airframes were flying, which meant that the mandatory maintenance on these airframes wasn’t now happening once a month, they were almost once every couple of weeks. So this was all, in turn, impacting. And the same with the UAV Home Office drones, so their wear and tear was meaning more and more gaps in the programme, due to the asset availability.

Q. And in your view, then, was there a need for an increase in aviation assets, in particular fixed-wing aircraft, to meet the increased demand?

A. Yes, I think. But already, there were — I was aware of — of background policy looking at bringing in other assets to do so. So, in the same way that fixed-wing contract had, by good fortune, just been made with 2Excel a year and a half before the migrant boats — sorry, the small boats came along, the same way that the Home Office had that contract. And there was always, options — I know the coastguard has certainly brought in, since my time, more UAVs, and they have brought in additional fixed-wing aircraft under another contract to provide that surveillance there. Or provide the redundancy, would be a better word.

Q. Yes. But in relation to the workload at the ARCC, am I right in understanding that, in your experience, that increase — from what your answer was previously, there was a sufficient number of staff on shift to cope with any increased workload associated with small boats?

A. Oh, yes. Yes, comfortably so.

Q. If we turn back to {INQ00150/1}, the Operation Deveran weather assessment. We have already looked at this and it showed that the assessment was likely, or amber, for the night 23rd to 24th. And that particular assessment was issued at 11:50 on 22 November. If we now bring up {INQ000223/1}. We have there the aviation network management log for the 23 November 2021 and looking at page 1, we can see an entry at 00:28 hours under your name, and that’s on 23 November 2021. It indicates 22 to 23 November, night shift, 19:00 to 07:00 hours. So is it right to understand from that, that you were on shift the previous night —

A. Yes —

Q. — 22nd and 23rd?

A. — so I had just completed three day shifts, so Friday, Saturday, Sunday. And then the two night shifts for Monday and this Tuesday night.

Q. And if we look on to page 4 {INQ000223/4} of that document, there is an entry at 19:24, again by you, and that’s on 23 November. So again, I think that’s showing the start of your shift on the night of 23rd/24th, which would have been from 19:00 to 07:00 hours?

A. That’s correct, yes.

Q. And if we keep that on screen, we can see that you were the duty supervisor and it shows that there were there was an individual who was on sick leave at the time and annual leave is also referred to there.

A. Yes.

Q. And in your statement you explain that there were five people on duty that night, with one trainee on the phones, one person sick, and one on annual leave?

A. That’s right.

Q. If we bring up your statement again, so that’s {INQ009628/24}, at page 24, we can see at paragraph 62 just going to the bottom of the page, you explain that you were leading four aviation operators, including — on to the next page 25 {INQ009628/25} — a trainee, due to leave and a team member being off sick. You would have two on the radios and two on telephones. And you explain there, that you don’t recall, at paragraph 63, taking a full break, that is an hour, because of, presumably, pressures on staff, as you explain. Would that have had any impact on your performance during that night and your able to respond?

A. No, certainly not — the minimum of four operators is the defined — otherwise, we would never be able to take leave. So in fact, the sickness and — made no difference there. I felt — as I have commented there, I do remember it actually, feeling very fresh. The body — I adjust very quickly to the night pattern. So on my last night, I am comfortable to press on through. If you had looked at the statement the previous night, I think I probably would have taken, certainly, a half hour break.

Q. I see. And did you, on this occasion, do you recall, have to assist with telephone and radio?

A. I made the offer and I think I certainly did take a couple of calls, if I look at the incident log but that’s allowing my team to — so from that two and two, allowing one of those to go off an hour-long break. So there would be would have been a window in the middle of the night where all of my four operators probably would have taken an hour’s break at some point. But against the — mitigated against the fact that I could quite comfortably pick up the phone or radio if required.

Q. And did that have any impact on the strategic aspect of your role?

A. No, not on that night. And again, very grown up rules, you know, if something developed that was going to be busy, then we were all mature enough to recognise that a quick shout and you need to sort of bring yourself back into the ops room to carry on.

Q. On page 25 {INQ009628/25} at paragraph 64, you explain what happened at the start of your shift, that is that you reviewed weather information on Helibrief, the weather app that was used, and you say that visibility was forecast to be very poor and you anticipated that the large proportion of any taskings would be declined. So it would be right to say, I think, that at the start of your shift you were alive to the fact, potentially, that the fixed-wing aircraft might cancel shifts?

A. Yes, very much so.

Q. And their flights. And it is right to say there would be a regular conference call at 9 pm between you and a maritime representative from each of the stations across the country?

A. Yes.

Q. Ahead of that call, you explain in your statement, if we turn to page 26 {INQ009628/26} and paragraph 66, that before that call you spoke to the 2Excel Operations Controller — we have that transcript, but I don’t think we need to go to it — he explained that they had a flight planned to depart Doncaster Airport at 23:30 hours to be on scene at 00:30 hours. Is that your recollection? I can bring up the transcript.

A. Yes, I am now struggling to remember, what — what — but I was certainly — ahead of the 9 o’clock call —

Q. Yes.

A. — that’s my opportunity to — because I am expecting to brief the wider network on what I think is going to be flying that evening, as a rule of thumb, I would very quickly ring the ops desk at 2Excel to say: just reaffirm to me, or confirm for me, that what I have on paper here is what you are intending to fly. So that would be the basis of why I made that call.

Q. Yes. Perhaps if we bring it up, in fact {INQ008827/1}. So this is a call at 20:01 hours on 23 November and if we turn to page 3 {INQ008827/3}, we can see there that there is a plan at the top of the page being explained to you to depart at 23:30 and be on scene at 00:30?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is an explanation, effectively, in this call that they intend to fly two aircraft overnight so they would have the whole night covered.

A. Yes, and the difference there — there were occasions when, for maintenance, serviceability, crew issues, they might only be able to generate one aircraft, and so at risk, I would accept that that one aircraft would drop into Southend for refuel. It would be off-task from Dover for about an hour from end to end. So here, I am reassured that by having two aircraft, they will have an overlap and continuous coverage.

Q. You have looked already, I think, at the weather forecast for that night. Did you realise, at the time of this call, that the weather was likely to jeopardise 2Excel’s taskings?

A. Yes, likely. Yes.

Q. And it doesn’t appear that 2Excel conveyed to you any concerns that they may have had about their ability to complete the taskings in view of the weather?

A. No. But I am acknowledging here — I am speaking to just the operator at their — their operations desk, not one of — the pilot who was going to fly the sortie, or the pilots flying those sorties wouldn’t be in until maybe or one or two hours before they were due it take off and fly.

Q. So are you suggesting the person you were speaking to would not have been able to assess the likelihood of being able to —

A. Indeed, I am being unfair to Jacob Lugg here. I am — I am suggesting that possibly, he would not have an eye on the weather. Ultimately, it’s the aircraft captain that will make a decision, but, you know, my experience would suggest that the weather conditions were clearly going to either impact their flying from the home base, the weather at their likely diversions, or the weather on scene where we were going to ask them to patrol.

Q. Would it have been helpful for you if you had been able to speak to someone who could make that assessment and could give you an indication of the likelihood that those flights would either go ahead or not?

A. Possibly. But there is an element here — when I came on watch at 19:00, the weather, although poor, was not giving an indication it was going to be as bad as it was. So that beginning of watch statement we looked at earlier, I think I put the line in there was the possibility of fog. And in fact, my bigger concern then was the freezing conditions in the north and how that would hamper any jobs I had on in Scotland. By 21:00, or whenever this call was made, just before 21:00, now my Helibrief tool was forecasting that actually the conditions were changing quite dramatically. And therefore, I was coming to the conclusion very quickly that it was likely to be a factor. Ultimately, it’s the aircraft captain’s decision to make. Like a lot of these things, you can almost “what if?” too much, too far in advance. I think we will call — we will refer to it later. I refer to something called plan B; this is my only plan for aviation patrolling aircraft that night. So whether they are going to fly or not, there is very little I can do at this point to change any plans.

Q. I see. So in terms of having a plan B, you say this was your only plan.

A. Correct.

Q. Is that because you didn’t have access, that you were aware of, to any assets that you could task if 2Excel could not fly?

A. Yes. But I would argue, when you look at the weather conditions at night, I could have thousands of aeroplanes in the UK and not one of them, I don’t think, would have ever been able to conduct the patrolling that we were looking for in this area later that night.

Q. So —

A. They were all — you know, they are all going to be affected by the same issues of airfields to take off from, diversion airfields, and weather on scene.

Q. Am I right in understanding then that you understood that 2Excel was plan A.

A. Yes.

Q. If plan A was not able to be effected, the reason for that would prevent you putting in place any plan B with the assets that you had available?

A. Almost certainly, correct.

Q. At your paragraph 66, if we go back to your statement again, which is {INQ009628/26} you also explain that you spoke, that evening, to RVL and you were aware that they were on tasking as well that evening?

A. Yes, that’s correct.

MS MEREDITH: Okay. And I think, sir, I note that we are approaching an hour. Would this be a convenient time to take a break?

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. So, just 10 minutes, thank you. (2.29 pm) (A short break) (2.39 pm)

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Ms Meredith.

MS MEREDITH: Thank you, sir. Can we bring up {INQ008822/1}, please. We have, there, a transcript of a call that was led by you and David Jones. It says there 24 November, but in fact, I think this would have been 23 November 2021, at 21:00. If we turn to page 4 {INQ008822/4}, you will see there David Jones, the third entry down, says: “Good evening, everybody. Tuesday 23 November. 2100.” Turning to page 7 {INQ008822/7}, we can see the entry that has your name next to it and this is where you relay information about the air asset operations in that call. Your report starts with the weather. You note that any precipitation is likely to come down as snow. There may be quite thick fog and mist by the early hours of the morning on the French and English side of the Channel. And then you set out the aviation assets, saying that you will have aircraft flying from about 9.45 pm to 9 am on 24 November and a Tekever drone going up at 05:30. You conclude, I think at the end of this entry, moving on to the next page, {INQ008822/8} that it is all weather dependent, because if the weather goes out of limits, that is going to happen. So presumably, you are making sure that people are aware that the fixed-wing aircraft could potentially cancel due to poor weather?

A. Yes, that is what I am trying to convey. But there is two parts to that. The UK — those in the north, at Belfast, Shetlands, there is — if I recall rightly, there was a frontal system lying Lands End through to the Humber. So north of that, it’s going to be snow and sleet with poor visibility. So if the Belfast coastguard etc, were calling in helicopters to come and search, we were going to be very constrained on how to do it. And for those to the south, in particular, my audience here really being the Dover coastguard, yes, there is fixed-wing. Plan A is in place still, however, I — I am beginning to speculate that we are going to have an issue with the weather and being able to achieve that mission.

Q. And your understand, I think, from your previous evidence, was that there was no contingency plan that could be put in place, in terms of having that picture?

A. No. Bear in mind, I am — how shall I answer this? For the commanders, it is about making informed decisions based on information. There are a number of sources of information — I am going to use the word target queuing here, but I don’t mean target in a negative sense, but there is a rhythm of bits of information that would come through that evening and one of the key pieces to that was provided by the aviation. So if the aviation couldn’t fly, what else were we going to do? Actually, you know — I am speculating here really, but in my opinion, we had no alternative sources of aviation. And even if we did, I don’t believe the weather was going to allow anybody else to achieve mission success.

Q. And did you think you needed to convey, expressly that, in this call: if weather does prevent 2Excel from flying, I have no other alternatives to provide to you?

A. I could have done. Would it have done any harm? Probably not, but actually, the audience for that is really Dover coastguard, not the entire network.

Q. Did you make Dover coastguard aware at that stage by another means?

A. I don’t recall having done so, but I certainly — verbally, I am fairly certain I discussed it with David Jones, who was the Maritime Commander next to me. And I know later on that evening when it really became apparent we were going to have a problem, we had that conversation.

Q. So your recollection is that at around the time of this call, you would have verbally spoken to David Jones and explained: I don’t have a backup; I don’t have a plan B?

A. I don’t believe I said that I don’t have a back-up plan to him. I don’t think I made assertion to him. I think in my own mind I am now beginning to scratch my head to think: what else can I do to provide the information? But part of me is reassured, at this stage — I mention there, there was several sources of information. I will be a bit generic here and I don’t mean to be flippant, but the battle rhythm would start with a — the French providing a warning that people were now mustering on the beach, the French then are providing the boats are setting off, the French potentially having boats accompanying or monitoring those vessels. So in a sense, that target queuing, the indicators and warnings, are all in place, of which my fixed-wing aviation was going to be but one piece in that puzzle. So at this point, at 21:00, although my contribution to the evening was going to be the aviation I am beginning to suspect might have a problem, I still remain confident that the other information queuing metrics were still going to be met.

Q. And in your experience, was the French source of information a reliable and timely one?

A. Again, I really can’t comment because, you know, I am on the aviation side. So I wasn’t privy to those calls.

Q. So you didn’t have experience of when that information came through from France about —

A. No, because although on this particular evening I happened to be sat co-located with the maritime commander, this is on the back end of the Covid year where, actually, even operating the same ops room had not occurred very often.

Q. But on this occasion, you were?

A. I was, yes.

Q. If we could bring up {INQ000224/1} at page 1 to start with, you will see this is the ViSION log for aerial surveillance and if we turn to page 2 {INQ000224/2}, bottom of the page, that starts: “ARCC Message”. And it refers to 2Excel: “Can’t complete this tasking.” So I think that confirms that 2Excel had cancelled their first scheduled flight, which was using a PA31 Panther, which was planned to depart Doncaster at 23:30 hours and this was due to the weather, is that right?

A. Yes, so I think this was quite a significant time on this. This 23:50 is where 2Excel have now confirmed that the two smaller aircraft, the two Panthers that they were intending to provide were not going to fly, but they have said they are going to reassess and make a decision later for the larger, more capable, King Air airframe.

Q. And if we bring up, now {INQ000225/1}, that is the network management log for the 24 November 2021. If we turn to page 3 {INQ000225/3}, you will see, there, the 14:46:34 21 entry at the top of the page, 00:38:51 under your name: “Dominic Golden. Action plans.” And that shows that at this time, you were aware of the cancellation because in that first paragraph you say: “Already 2Excel have postponed their sortie due to their concerns for suitable … diversions for aircraft.” And in the second paragraph, you say: “Concern is that with poor visibility and our surveillance aircraft being limited to conduct mission we are effectively blind.” You go on to explain: “Both commanders agree that caution of allowing ourselves to be drawn into relaxing and expecting a normal migrant crossing at night whereas this has the potential to be very dangerous.” So this entry here, you are referring to the lack of a recognised maritime picture creating that risk, are you?

A. Yes. So what am I trying to record there? I am capturing my thoughts. I then had that discussion with the maritime commander because — and this is all — this sounds like me trying to tell him his job; not at all. But I want to sort of just scratch that itch in the back of my mind, that — that — was he now aware that the — the normal queue of information that he was expecting was now suddenly going to become disrupted and I felt — I just felt it appropriate to capture those thoughts and put it down on the narrative so it would be on the record.

Q. And so at this stage, you were aware that part of your maritime picture was not there, but that you might be, effectively, blind. Did you think there was any alternative option for generating a maritime picture using aviation options at this stage?

A. I think — and again, I am talking now from three years plus — but I think I’m still waiting — you know, the ever-optimist that I am, that 2Excel might be able to come through with the King Air aircraft that the previous call an hour previously had said they were still reassessing. But this was now — what are we — here, about 00:30?

Q. Yes, around that.

A. This is now the beginning of: actually, I now need to start really getting my head in the game here about what can we do. How are we going to generate — I call it here this recognised maritime picture. If I’ve got no aviation, what else can we do? I am partly — again, this sounds very arrogant, I don’t mean so — I am trying to nudge the Maritime Commander possibly into thinking is there something that he can provide with his assets he’s got available, that he might be able to start going, but realistically, when I look at that with hindsight — with the advantage of hindsight, no, there is nothing he could have done either.

Q. Do you recall expressly saying to him: is there anything that you can do to assist on that?

A. No, I don’t recall saying that to him.

Q. And did you consider tasking the R-163 or a SAR-H helicopter, at this stage?

A. I believe I did, but I have not recorded that in my thoughts in the narrative. But again, that’s really now my — my back pocket thought process. But again, at this point, I am — as I have just said, I’m — the ever-optimist, holding out for possibly the 2Excel aircraft being able to get up and do something.

Q. You also knew that RVL were flying a tasking that night. Did you consider that they were available to you for tasking for SAR and did you consider re-tasking them for that purpose?

A. I considered very briefly, but I think the answer I formed very quickly in my head, hence not recorded. So they are arguably flying on behalf of another Government department, the Home Office. And they are not at alert. So their aircrew are already briefed and flying a slightly different profile. And I don’t believe their aircrew would have had the competency or the capability to now switch to flying at a few hundred feet above the sea in poor conditions.

Q. And in your experience, was this something that RVL could be tasked to, when they had already been tasked on —

A. (Overspeaking) No, I don’t believe so. So — so, again, without trying to sort of bore the audience here, RVL, although flying a King Air aircraft with similar capabilities to 2Excel, their primary mission, outside of supporting the Dover Straights, was looking for oil spillages, etc. I don’t believe their aircrew are competent and qualified to fly the sort of patrol that we would be looking for at night at low level.

Q. And had you ever tasked them to do that before?

A. No.

Q. If we could bring up {INQ007824/1}, please. We have there, you will see, a call on 24 November 2021 at 02:04 hours. And that’s between 2Excel and you. If we turn to page 2 {INQ007824/2}, we can see there an entry from you at the bottom of the page and that goes into page 3 {INQ007824/3}. It reflects an awareness that you are now aware of small boats beginning to enter the UK side of the Channel. You say: “… the French are now reporting to us that [there] are upwards of at least 11 vessels … on their way across …” And you, I think, reflect a delay in telling them, when you say: “… they forgot to tell us until just now.”

A. Yes, so that is a little bit flippant: they forgot to tell us right now, but I think that was the case. I think the French, on this evening, were late in sharing information. But again, I don’t have access to the maritime log. If I can, can I explain a little bit of a timeline here. I, in my mind, am working to an optimum time of the small boats reaching the boundary, the territorial limit of about 03:00. So whatever solution I am going to come up with needs to workaround that, that 03:00 position. So therefore, my decision points are working backwards from that. So I have explained earlier, although I didn’t capture this in my narrative, that I am already considering the helicopter as a possible solution, aware that the helicopter takes 45 minutes from being called to getting airborne, really 02:00 and this conversation, I think, is about 02:10. I now need to really start just ticking those boxes to reach that decision point. So I have left that conversation with 2Excel as late as I possibly can, until just after 02:00, hence this call here to say: right, where are we going with this King Air aircraft? And this conversation is 2Excel and the captain of that aircraft who is now in, ie a more proficient and competent individual, to look at the weather, to confirm for me that he is not going to be able to fly.

Q. In relation to your estimate that it would be around 3 am that small boats would reach the boundary?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a timing that you discussed with a maritime commander or with anyone else, or was this derived from your general experience rather than any information on that night?

A. Derived from general experience and also the fact that actually, that’s when the fixed-wing patrol was due to be on task for. So the standard patrolling of aircraft for Op EOS, generally, were on scene from 3 o’clock. So — and that was supported, I understand, by historical evidence, that that is about the time, on a winter’s evening, that the boats would typically arrive.

Q. And would you confirm that, or seek to confirm that with someone?

A. Very probably, but again, missing here, and missing in the narrative, is almost certainly a conversation that I either overheard, or was part of, between maritime — because clearly I’ve got from somewhere that they have reported — where did I get the information that there was upwards 11 boats? Well, that’s clearly — I have overheard or been informed that that’s coming — that’s through. So this is now the transition from the amber evening, where there was — what was it, likely crossing, to now confirmation that they were crossing.

Q. And if we have a look at the third page of this document {INQ007824/3}, we can see, as we go through your text there, that you say: “I’m thinking now about calling the SAR captain at Lydd to get him out of bed to give his thoughts as to the weather.” That, I think, is the reference to the SAR-H, the SAR —

A. Yes, it is. Yes.

Q. — helicopter. And you say: “We’re beginning to get the 999 calls now from the guys in the boats claiming they have no idea where they are. But that’s just the normal SOP.” What did that refer to?

A. So, I am now trying to — I have just said, this is the transition from amber where we have no certainty that there were boats coming, to now the information is beginning to arrive that boats are coming. So part of that process is a call from the French, albeit it would appear to be late in coming and also now, again, I am hearing in the background while I am making this call, that — I can hear a discussion of maritime, saying that the first of the emergency calls are beginning to arrive. But we would expect that because they always make the 999 calls.

Q. And when you say “claiming they have no idea where they are”, is there a suggestion there that they did know where they were, but —

A. No, not at all. They won’t know where they are. How could they? They have no navigational aids. But that’s why we are trying to generate aviation to go and find out where they are.

Q. There is then a discussion between you and the 2Excel pilot, which explores potential limitations on the ability of diversion airfields —

A. Yes.

Q. — and a discussion about limitations on visibility. As it your consideration, at this stage, that even if 2Excel could safely operate with a sufficient diversion airfield, there would be no benefit in them doing so due to the reduced visibility?

A. Yes, my understanding at the time was that for them to operate at night over the sea, they had to have 3,000-foot clearance between the surface of the sea and the lower end of the cloud limit. The weather tools I was having, was suggesting that the weather was possibly as — the cloud base was as low as 1,000 feet so — I am always putting words into his mouth with a leading question, but I am suggesting that the weather on scene, from what I can see from the systems in front of me, was suggesting that regardless of diversion issues, I think the weather on scene was going to be — it would be unable to execute his mission successfully.

Q. In considering tasking the SAR-H R 163, is it right to say that that could operate at a different altitude so it could potentially have visibility and contribute to the —

A. Yes, he could certainly — he would be more comfortable at the speeds he flies, operating beneath the cloud base of 1,000 feet.

Q. And if we turn to page {INQ007824/6} of this document, we have there, in the middle of the page 6, your text, where you say: “I’m not going to waste and take risk if it’s a, you know, the return for the effort is minimal risk versus reward.” And you go on to say: “I think we don’t know yet whether this is going to be an all-day armada, or whether it’s just going to be a wave that’s coming across now, and the rest of them are going to wait for tomorrow.” In terms of the use of that term “armada”, you say you were not certain whether it be one wave of small boat activity or whether there would be significantly more. Armada, it means a fleet of war ships. Is that what you thought?

A. No, what I am trying to say there is — again, this is all about preservation of assets. We are aware, or I am aware, that they — up to 11 boats. Have those 11 boats come in one wave, or actually are we now seeing the beginning of a trickle — well, trickle is perhaps the wrong — a flood of vessels that are now going to carry on into the early hours of the morning?

Q. And that particular terminology that you used, “armada”, was there a particular reason you used that term?

A. It’s 2 o’clock in the morning, you know, I mean, I am sure we are going to find other words I have used that come to mind, but no.

Q. And if we go to page 7 {INQ007824/7}, we can see there, there is an entry from you, again, the second entry down, and you say to the 2Excel pilot, towards the end of that paragraph: “… surprise surprise, you know, the plan doesn’t always work. So what’s our plan B?” And you say earlier in that section: “… we’ve dropped back into the assumption that we are always going to get aircraft …” But you know now that that may not be the case. In terms of a plan B, who did you understand was responsible for it?

A. That’s a rhetorical question by me. This is me now speaking one-to-one with an individual and I am almost thinking out loud: where am I going now? I’m really running out of options. I’ve got one option left in my back pocket. Irrelevant — the 2Excel pilot doesn’t need to know that. That’s a rhetorical question from me: right, where am I going, plan B?

Q. In terms of your plan B, at that stage, it was SAR-H?

A. It was going to hopefully be SAR-H. I have still got to make that hard sell to the captain of Rescue 163 at Lydd.

Q. And in your statement, you have explained, again, how you — why it was that you believed small boats would reach the waters around 3 o’clock. So at this stage, were you considering any urgency in trying to get the SAR-H up in the air, or —

A. No, I am trying to — how am I trying to factor this in? I am working to an assumption that the — based on historical data, that it’s from about 3 o’clock that the small boats will begin to reach the territorial water boundary. I am aware that if I go for my plan B, I am going to get about two hours of flying from the helicopter before he’s going to have to come off-task and refuel. And assuming he is not too fatigued, then go back out. I have still got the Tekever drone that, at the moment, is due to get airborne at 05:30. So I am now trying to work to when is the optimum time, assuming the pilot at 163 is prepared to go, to play that two-hour sortie. So we are now approaching as is called my decision point of allowing for that sort of 45 minutes from call to getting airborne, I am now approaching that point where, yes, I want him to go. So I really want that helicopter, if I am going to go down that route, to sort of be on scene from after 03:00, 03:30, something like that.

Q. And in terms of the Tekever drone that you refer to, am I right in understanding you didn’t understand that you could re-task that to start at an earlier point?

A. Because there is no — yes, although I had an emergency call-out number, they are all — I guarantee, they are not going to come in any earlier.

Q. If we could look now at {INQ010697/1} if we look at the first page there you can see that’s, again, the 24 November, 02:23 hours and this is a conversation that you are having now with Christopher Trubshaw, who is the captain of the R 163 helicopter. If we turn into the substance of that, you explain that you are looking at the weather and you are thinking of tasking him to conduct a sweep along the boundary. You ask him to call you back to discuss that proposal. And if we move to {INQ010697/2}, apologies, so this is the second call. You have already had a call with him.

A. Yes.

Q. You have indicated that you are going to speak to him and then this at 02:23, is when you have that conversation. So at page 2, the pilot has had the opportunity to consider the request which you put to him and then the entry halfway down the page entitled “Lydd”, which is the pilot, a couple of sentences in, he says: “I think we can do it.” Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And then if we move to your response, the ARCC, you then say: “Clearly yes, the visibility is worse, bizarrely the fixed-wing.” You say: “… the visibility in the Dover Straits is not brilliant, but it’s not mission impossible.” And then you take him through. If we move on to the next page, {INQ010697/3}, you explain again that fixed-wing is not your solution. You say the only information source is the French dealing with 10 vessels crossing and you highlight again: “… they’ve been aware of that since nine o’clock but didn’t bother to tell us … And then you go on to say: “Now, as usual, that catalogue of phone calls is beginning to trickle in of the, you know, the classic, I’m lost, I’m sinking, my mother’s wheelchair is falling over the side, et cetera.” In relation to that last comment, I think it’s right to say you hadn’t received information from anyone that there had been a call saying: my mother’s wheelchair is falling over the side, is that right?

A. Yes, well, we were looking here at a one individual to one individual phone call. This is me speaking in the comfort of a heated ops room trying to persuade a gentleman that’s just been asleep to get up and put his life and his crew on the line, to go and fly in what I would consider extremely marginal conditions. So in the cold light of day, a very unwise choice of words. But I am just trying to make a hard sell to him as to why I think he should go out and I am beginning to sort of introduce into the conversation all the normal triggers, the thresholds that would need to be crossed to make this a mission to go. At this 02:25 call, I am not scrambling the aircraft, I am not directly tasking him, although that comes later because I have more evidence at 02:50 that we are now really dealing with boats in distress. This is purely dealing with I believe that we have up to 10 or 11 vessels having been reported to us. I am now trying to persuade him not to go out and rescue, not to go out and do a search. I merely want him to fly and do a patrol, but at considerable risk in very poor conditions.

Q. The choice of phrase would perhaps appear to be a reference to a belief that some of the calls were exaggerated, would you agree with that?

A. Yes.

Q. And I am not sure I fully understand how suggesting to the SAR helicopter pilot that calls were being received that were potentially exaggerating their situation would assist in persuading him to operate —

A. No.

Q. — in a situation where you say he was potentially putting himself and his crew at risk?

A. But the threshold — I am — I am now raising the point that from just one source of information — remember, I referred earlier to numerous bits of information to make informed decisions. So the only information that I had up to that point was there were upwards of 10, 11 vessels crossing. I am now, I believe, aware that there are now some of the 999 calls being received by Dover. So there’s two bits of information there. So the fact that I have added on a flippant comment is, in a one-to-one conversation — I agree now with the cold light of day is irrelevant. But I am trying to get across to him that two pieces of information in that decision matrix as to why I am asking him to go, have now been crossed.

Q. And if we turn now to page 6 {INQ010687/6} of that document, there’s a further discussion there and in relation to distress, you say at the bottom of the page: “There’s an option … we’ve had that discussion, I appreciate I’ve dragged you out. [You say] the option is now we wait, and we have the discussion again, when I get the distress call come in. It may well be they don’t call us for distress, but I suspect their SOP is just dial 999 when they deem they’ve got halfway across.” So, first of all, do you understand you have started receiving 999 calls at this stage?

A. I can’t remember. I believe so. If I have put that — if I mentioned that in the phone call, then yes, I must be aware of it.

Q. And when you say “when I get the distress call come in,” is it right to say that even if there were no 999 calls, because of the policy of the coastguard, those boats that you knew were in the Channel were to be treated as being in distress, regardless of the position on 999 calls?

A. Yes. So what this one-to-one conversation is not highlighting is a subtle nuance. This phone call between myself and the captain of 163 is trying to persuade him to go and fly a mission. As of yet, I haven’t been requested by maritime to generate this flight. So this is me, off my own back, wanting to get something going. And whilst he is now getting himself ready because it takes 45 minutes from sort of taking this call to getting moving, I am assessing that at some point, that formal distress request will come through from the maritime coastguard which will, effectively, endorse being allowed to task him. The rules are — I am trying to clear my back and clear his back that this is a request for a mission that is slightly outside the normal because it’s not in response to a direct request for a SAR asset. This is a — me making an assumption that we are going to need something flying and I am asking him to go.

Q. So am I right in understanding your understanding at this point was you could not task the SAR-H helicopter without a 999 distress call? It was insufficient effectively to know that there were small boats in the Channel, there needed to be a call to expressly state one of them was in a greater state of distress?

A. Correct. So there is a document that the helicopter crews fly under, I think it’s called CAP 999, I can’t remember its title, it allows them to fly not outside the rules of aviation but effectively it’s like putting a blue light on and being able to drive through lights. To achieve — for him to fly that mission under the rules of Cap 999 he technically has to be responding to a tasking request from me that is in response to a call for assistance. At this point, at 02:20, this is still myself trying to generate an aircraft to fly a patrol without that direct request from maritime to respond to a distress. But I am saying there that I have no doubt that between now and you walking out to the aircraft to get flying we will have received that distress call.

Q. Then just continuing below that, the paragraph at the bottom of the page and moving on to the next page, if we can have them side by side, you say there: “To put it into context Border Force at the moment, they’ve only put one vessel out because not far off from the mark from what you said. Until we can convince them that there are people in real danger they are not prepared to bring in their crews who are pretty knackered anyway to go. So, all this is (inaudible) so it’s potential.” So just to understand that. Was it your understanding at this stage that Border Force was not willing to put more assets out into the Channel?

A. Again, I –I am not maritime. I can’t comment. But all I will offer as a suggestion here is that this was an amber night, having had a red night I think previously whenever. So this is, I would speculate that this is Border Force trying to conserve their resources rather than put out the maximum number of boats every night. They are reacting to red nights, but on amber nights they would reduce that resource on task. But I am not — I am speaking now on behalf of Border Force and maritime. That’s not my remit to do so.

Q. If we turn now to {INQ007389/1}, you will see that this is a call, a further call between you and the captain of the R 163 Christopher Trubshaw and this is at 02:41 hours. If we turn to the top of page 3, we can see there that you confirm or he confirms with you: “So we’ll have an agreement with yourselves an hour-and-a-half on that patrol line, see if we can find stuff …” Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. You give him, in the next section, an initial start and finish point.

A. Yes.

Q. And then you describe, towards the bottom of that paragraph, that there are calls coming in. So the last couple of sentences of the first paragraph: “One, we will possibly cross into (inaudible) so the first couple of calls, as you can imagine, are coming in now, of sharks with lasers surrounding the boats and we’re all dying type thing coming in. So legally, we’re now dealing with a distress.” So again, I think it’s right to say you hadn’t received any information that there were calls suggesting there were sharks and lasers. What were you referring to in this section?

A. So I am now — this is, as predicted in that previous call, here are the confirmation, as I speculated, that we or Dover Coastguard are now receiving 999 calls from small boats.

Q. Was it your intention to reflect that you believed that information obtained from small boats was exaggerated or unreliable?

A. No, not at all. I am again — in the cold light of day, a flippant comment. Again, I can’t stress I am trying to persuade somebody to undertake what I would consider a very hazardous flight and I am just trying to break down the conversation to be, to be less formal. The purpose of referring to the 999 calls is to reassure him that as I was just discussing reference to the CAP 999 that although I haven’t yet still received a call from Dover requesting an aircraft to effectively scramble out there and go, here is that piece of evidence that suggests that we are now, because there are 999 calls, effectively tasking you to respond to a certified distress call.

Q. And did you consider that using that sort of terminology might undermine the likelihood that he would consider this was an event he should attend given the risk to himself?

A. No, not really.

Q. Do you think it would have been helpful for you to find out before speaking to him what the details of the calls that were coming in on 999 were?

A. No. All I needed to know that there were now 999 calls. So in that queue of information we are now, I now have certainty that the French have told us there are 11 boats. I now have hearsay, from listening to the maritime conversations in my ops room, that the 999 calls are being received.

Q. So that I can understand how this all fits together, if you had received information about a boat in the Channel that was not a small boat, that was in distress and that had come in through a 999 call, am I right in understanding you could have immediately scrambled a helicopter —

A. Yes.

Q. — because those conditions would have been met?

A. Correct. But both of —

Q. But your understand was that is for a small boat in the Channel the fact of knowing it was there was not sufficient in this situation for you to request R 163 to task. You needed to await a 999 call before you could formally ask him to task?

A. Yes, that is correct. But I think I should add here, there is a little bit of assumption, planning assumption by me here. I am beginning to suspect, and I can’t see that in the text there but I am fairly certain this is the case, that Dover Coastguard now their workload has suddenly accelerated. And so in an ideal world, I now would have had to the ARCC a formal request from Dover Coastguard for a helicopter. I have already heard in conversation that the 999 calls have been received. It’s just a matter of time before that call is formally recorded. In fact looking at the narratives, I don’t think they even made a call requesting the helicopter, which is a metric of just how busy Dover maritime coastguard must have been at the time.

Q. And you had a clear understanding that you couldn’t task R 163 until there had been a 999 call. Do you know whether the maritime team understood that they needed to make you aware of a 999 call before you could task the R 163?

A. No, I — I’m picking holes here in your question. Dover Coastguard would only look to request a helicopter to come and rescue somebody or potentially conduct a search. At this point, my thought process is on achieving a patrol, so this isn’t now searching for an individual vessel. I think the priority here to allow the maritime commander and his subordinate down in Dover good information, so they can make those informed decisions is to conduct a patrol so we can begin to confirm how many vessels are we dealing with.

Q. So your understanding is that you could only task when you had a 999 call, but in fact the maritime team wouldn’t even appreciate that they could potentially task for a patrol; they would only be able to request that when they had a specific call to bring to you?

A. I — yes, I think so is the answer there.

Q. And if we look on page 3 of that document, you refer, towards the bottom of that first large paragraph, you say: “So legally we are now dealing with a distress.”

A. Yes.

Q. So again, formally, the position was from the coastguard that those boats were already in distress but what you are referring to there, if I understand correctly, is that there have been 999 calls?

A. Yes. So this is me trying to convince the pilot, if he still had any doubt, that we had now crossed a threshold where this was a — my request or my task to him to fly was in direct response to a genuine — “emergency” is the wrong word here — a distress instance. So, yes, all boats are considered to be in distress but I have now got that chain of evidence that says that actually the 999 calls are yet again — and more supporting evidence that we are dealing with vessels in distress.

Q. And I think you make a later reference to a true SAR incident?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it right to say that that is to describe the same distinction between an incident where there is a 999 call or, in your view, would that create — would that require more even than a 999 call?

A. No, no. Just more simple to the fact that again I go back to that helicopter being the Crown jewel. This is all about a discussion about getting an aircraft to conduct a patrol, yes, and, as I have said earlier, the helicopter can do far more than that. But if I am just using him to conduct a patrol that leaves me nothing in the bag should I now have what I’ve used there, the expression: a true SAR incident, where the helicopter is in fact the only viable solution to effecting a rescue or a whatever-it-is-I-needed-to-do search.

Q. And if you had been told at an earlier stage of the evening that there was a boat taking on water or there were people in the water, would you then have treated that or understood that to be a true SAR incident from that point?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Were you ever, during the course of the evening, told that there was a boat taking on water or people in the water?

A. No.

Q. By the end of the call that we have been looking at, and we can take that document down now, the R 163 had been tasked to conduct effectively a surveillance flight, is that right?

A. Yes, I — I use the word “patrol”. But, yes, surveillance flight I think is I think what I used in my narrative at the time.

Q. And that was almost three hours since you had first been notified of the 2Excel cancellation of the first flight?

A. Yes, the 11.30 cancellation, yes.

Q. And two hours since you’d discussed the dangers of a lack of recognised maritime picture with a maritime Tactical Commander?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time of the call at 02:41, there had been a Mayday Relay broadcast in respect of one of the small boat incidents, Incident Charlie, saying that it was taking on water and required immediate assistance. Am I right in understanding you were not aware of that Mayday Relay?

A. No.

Q. You were not aware of that specific incident, Incident Charlie, or of the fact that there were people in the water?

A. No, not at all. So, in fact, I think the language I use in my narrative was I use the expression “I am formally tasking you at 02:50”, so that’s a good five minutes after the sequence of events you have just described.

Q. And as far as you are aware nowhere in the ARCC was aware that there was a vessel sinking or people in the water?

A. No.

Q. You say in your statement when describing it that as far as you were concerned this was just a search without reports of vessels sinking and so that effectively was the position as you understood it?

A. Yes. In fact, if you look at the timelines and incidents there I had prescribed a patrol to the aircraft giving him a start and finish position and a line to follow. He, the captain, then actually spoke to Dover Coastguard before he got airborne, but I had assumed he would speak to him after he got airborne, where that patrol was changed to a search and more formal search instructions were given.

Q. But you weren’t aware of that?

A. No, not at all.

Q. And if you had been aware, would you have considered tasking a SAR-H at an earlier time or tasking additional SAR-H to that incident?

A. So in answer to the first question, I don’t think so because in theory I had already started the stopwatch when I made that call at quarter past 2. The discussion, which is a very good one, about would I have considered backfilling and bringing another helicopter in either from Lee-on-Solent, which was about an hour away, or from Humberside, which is an hour and a half away, I would have loved to be able to say, yes. But I actually regard — independent of knowing a boat was sinking, I had already considered those as backups for searching anyway and I was concerned that the weather would be out of limits.

Q. Would you have explored that further if you had been aware of an incident?

A. I think, yes, I possibly would have called the captain of those aircraft and we will never know what the answer would have been. But the weather conditions at their respective airfields was worse than it was at Lydd and the advantage Lydd had, if he got airborne, if the weather deteriorated back at his airbase he only had a 20-minute dash to get back in, whereas if I had brought down Lee-on-Solent and Humber they were going to get stuck an hour away from anywhere to get back.

Q. And in relation to your training and your training in the maritime environment, you have said that was limited. Do you think that impacted your decision-making on the night of this event?

A. No. If I am arrogant, I think I could have offered more, but I would need to be aware of that information to do so and the — you know, it is good fortune that on that evening I happened to be sat co-located — and I believe the coastguard have taken that forward since that and that the maritime and aviation commanders do now sit next to each other. But on that year 2021, for the majority of that year, the aviation commander had sat totally separate from the maritime commander. So my awareness of what was going on in the maritime domain was limited.

Q. And you have said that the ViSION 5 system has since been rolled out to the maritime team?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that while you were still employed?

A. No, that had happened after I left.

Q. And it was in June 2022 that you left the MCA and returned to your role with the Royal Navy?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And in your statement you had explained that you assisted in some ways in developing the training programme for aviation and Tactical Commanders and it had been intended that the aviation and maritime tactical commanders would be trained together in future. Did that happen whilst you were still employed by the MCA?

A. No. I think a unique set of circumstances. The — there are four aviation commanders. By good fortune for me, within a month of joining, one of those had left and an opportunity arose. But the previous three had all effectively been trained up as commanders back in 2016. So I was the first commander to be taught in-house, and effectively because I have an instructor background we developed a training book and a syllabus for doing that. But that was entirely focused on the aviation side. Again in the maritime domain, I think the role of aviation is to support the supported. I am very much providing assets to maritime who are better judged to make decisions on how to employ those assets in the maritime domain. The role of aviation as an operator is merely to monitor for fuel states and for the commander just to be aware in case he has competing demands or he’s thinking ahead in that six-hour space.

Q. But your understanding is that it would have been helpful for maritime and aviation commanders to be trained?

A. Possibly, because if I had have been co-trained perhaps I could have taken some of the workload off maritime that night, but that might have been at the expense of aviation.

Q. Do you think if you had had, each of you, a better understanding of the role of the maritime or the aviation commander, that might have resulted in any different course being taken on that night?

A. No, I don’t think so. I think the plan B that we came up with, to use the helicopter to conduct a patrol, which subsequently became a search, that is, you know, even today, I can’t think with hindsight what else could have been done.

Q. I think you have confirmed that you say in the summer of 2021 you moved to sit with the maritime Tactical Commanders and that it was an embryonic idea. But was that something that was in place formally by the time you left the MCA?

A. I believe so. I can’t remember. I think so.

Q. And Op Cesar became operational in early 2022. Was there an increase in aviation assets available to you to task for proactive and reactive SOLAS or SAR tasking?

A. Yes. I think in that last six months, between this November incident and me leaving, they were additional — an additional fixed-wing contract was brought in, again managed through 2Excel, but it was a different company providing aircraft.

Q. You have said you didn’t consider that you had sufficient assets effectively to task in response to small boats at the time in November 2021?

A. Yes. Sorry, I — yes, I am being very unclear here. I think, again I am offering an opinion here, not a factual answer, but based on the weather that evening if I had 1,000 airplanes I don’t think they would have been able to fly that evening not least of which, in weather conditions that bad, you are into all sorts of — you will be trying to compress more than one aircraft into the same bit of air space under a cloud base of 1,000 feet, which is one the reasons why the Tekever drone has to be separated by time from flying when we have got other assets there.

Q. You left in June 2022. Apart from the Op Cesar increase in assets, were there any other key changes or improvements to the way in which the ARCC or the role of the aviation Tactical Commander operated after the events of 23 and 24 November 2021 that you were aware of?

A. Not that I’m — I mean we’re all — there is — obviously this tragedy was a trigger to focus the mind, but I can’t recall. There may well have been, I can’t recall what other additional measures might have been brought in.

Q. Are there any other key changes or improvements that you personally considered would improve the ARCC responses to small boats SAR following that incident?

A. No, I think — excuse my voice there — I think that co-location of the two commanders which was, as I said there, embryonic at the time, that to me in my opinion is a very positive step forward. You raised a good question a minute ago about had I been aware that there was a boat sinking or people in the water, would that have changed my outcome? I think by that co-location the opportunity to become aware of that certainly going on to the same shared ViSION system would have highlighted that issue. So I think, yes, the coastguard has by default already fallen into improved measures to go forward.

MS MEREDITH: Thank you, I don’t have any further questions. Thank you, sir.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Thank you very much, Mr Golden. Thanks very much for your statement and also your evidence this afternoon, it’s been very helpful.

A. Thank you.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: So, thank you. Right. We will be back tomorrow. Good. (3.28 pm) (The Inquiry adjourned until 10 o’clock, on Wednesday, 12 March 2025)

INDEX MS KAREN WHITEHOUSE (Affirmed). ………………….1

Questions by MR PHILLIPS KC …………………1

MR DOMINIC GOLDEN (affirmed) ……………………91

Questions by MS MEREDITH …………………..91