Thursday, 20 March 2025 (10.00 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr Whitton.
A. Good morning, sir.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: There are a few questions from Mr Phillips in a moment, but first of all, could you read the affirmation?
A. Certainly, sir.
MR STEPHEN JOHN WHITTON OBE (affirmed)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, thanks very much indeed. Mr Phillips, yes.
Questions by MR PHILLIPS
MR PHILLIPS: Good morning, Mr Whitton. You have provided a witness statement to the Inquiry dated 11 November last year, which consists of 50 pages. That’s right, isn’t it?
A. Yes, it is, sir. Yes.
Q. That’s {INQ010137}. I think before I ask you any of my questions, you have got an error that you would like to correct in the statement. Could you do that now?
A. Yes. Thank you, sir. Page 6, paragraph 15(a), it refers to a date of 2018 in relation to when we started putting a dedicated liaison officer into Dover Coastguard. It was actually 2019. So, I apologise, sir, for that — for that error.
Q. Great, thank you very much. Just so we have all got an idea of the shape of the day, the Home Office has put forward two separate corporate witnesses today and we are going to hear from your Border Force colleague, as he was then, Mr O’Mahoney, this afternoon.
A. Sir.
Q. Could you explain to us just at the outset how you have divided the topics between you?
A. Yes, certainly, sir. My role as Head of Border Force Maritime Command meant that in terms of the support to the small boats issue in the southeast, I was the strategic lead for the Border Force contribution to the — the at-sea operation. And that operation sat within — within the overall plan for tackling small boats off Altair, which Mr O’Mahoney was the commander for. So my operation sat within the overarching campaign plan. So my evidence can concentrate on the Home Office Border Force response at sea, whereas Mr O’Mahoney can talk about the wider campaign — plan to tackle small boats.
Q. Thank you very much. Now going back to paragraph 1 of your statement, if I may, {INQ010137/1} you say you have been the Head of Border Force Maritime Command since March 2019. Do you see there in the second line? So it’s about six years now; is that right?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. And you joined them just a little while before then in November 2018, initially as an assistant director, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And before that, as you say at the bottom of this page on the screen, you were in the police service for 32 years ending up as chief superintendent?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. Now, in this paragraph and elsewhere, but starting with this paragraph you explain your role as Head of the Border Force Maritime Command and identify the responsibility to give advice and strategic direction to a range of maritime operations and again, can we take it that that’s correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Thank you. You say to us that you are not yourself a professionally qualified or experienced mariner. So just pausing there, would it follow from that that you will be reliant on the advice, and indeed experience, of others within the command for the practicalities of maritime operations?
A. Yes, absolutely, sir.
Q. Thank you. But I think it’s right, isn’t it, that you have yourself been out on the boats, if I can put it that way, and had some experience on sea, or at sea, during the period of your command?
A. Yes, that’s correct, sir. I have been within the command now for, as I say, over six years and I do spend time out at sea in various operations, support —
Q. Can you give us an idea of what you have done during that period to get out on to sea?
A. Yes, certainly. There’s been quite a focus in the southeast and making sure I have been out to sea with both in the early days with the cutters, coastal patrol vessels and then the crew transfer vessels more recently. So I have been involved in — in migrant operations and rescues in support of the crews. Also spent time out in the Mediterranean when we had crews deployed out supporting the search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, but also been out involved with the crews on wider law enforcement operations, round the rest of the UK.
Q. Yes. So just picking up one point on that. So you have had, as it were, hands-on experience of search and rescue operations in the Channel?
A. I have certainly been out as an observer. I have never been out as part of the crew, but I would have been observing and then obviously involved in lots of debriefs and discussions about our operational response.
Q. Thank you. The next topic I want to ask you some questions about, please, is the role of the Home Office, or Border Force, in responding to small boats and, in particular, the organisation or structure of it. In your statement, you tell us at paragraph 7, if we could have that on the screen, please, {INQ010137/3} that Border Force is a law enforcement command within the Home Office and that’s obviously right. You also say it’s part of national operations, slightly further down, do you see paragraph 8 there? What does that mean, please?
A. Border Force is divided up into a number of regions and the regions would deal with the — you know, the airports, the seaports and the sort of more traditional Border Force work. There is an overarching command, operations command, which is a national operations command, which will deal with the some of the specialist capabilities that will cross across the whole of Border Force and that included my command, maritime. That has now changed. There is a new structure that’s been introduced in the last couple of months within Border Force, but at the time and up until recently, we were part of the national operation. So it is a national capability.
Q. Thank you. And you explain in that same paragraph how your maritime command vessels carry out a range of law enforcement work. You mention surveillance, security, maritime interceptions and then you add this, that your focus has also been on counter-narcotics, organised immigration crime, people smuggling — if we can turn over the page, please — {INQ010137/4} other smuggled goods bound for the UK: “We are responsible for delivering [Border Force]’s maritime enforcement capability and in so doing, prevent and disrupt organised crime from exploiting the UK’s territorial waters for illegal purposes including drug trafficking, illegal immigration and modern slavery.” So as you have said and as that list confirms, Border Force is primarily a law enforcement body?
A. Absolutely, sir.
Q. And its purpose, amongst other things, is to keep the UK’s borders secure and to identify and counter criminal activity?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. For example, at the very end of this paragraph, you see the last sentence of paragraph 8, when you are talking about the cutters and then the CTVs — we will come back to that: “This allowed my cutters and … [CPVs] to be deployed to their core law enforcement role around the UK.” And that was true in 2021; that was their core role and it’s true today?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. Thank you. Then again, in keeping with this, you say that — in the next paragraph, do you see at the bottom of the screen, Mr Whitton: “My role involves the operational delivery of maritime operations in support of border security, which is our top priority.” And you then list the elements of what you describe as your mission, (a) to (d), and we can see them on this page, thank you very much, and on the next {INQ010137/5} on the screen there on the right. And of course, the — it’s no part of that mission, is it, to conduct search and rescue operations?
A. Not directly, sir. But as any maritime organisation, safety of life at sea will always be the priority. So whether we are on a law enforcement operation or proactive patrols or supporting the response to a search and rescue, that would always be prioritised, as any maritime organisation would do.
Q. Exactly, because Border Force vessels are like any other vessels and the vessel and its crew and commander have SOLAS responsibilities which are primary?
A. Absolutely, sir.
Q. Thank you. In terms though of search and rescue, you go on to deal with that helpfully at paragraph 12 and, yes, thank you, page 5 {INQ010137/5}. And there you make the point that responsibility for the national search and rescue capability and its policies rests with the Department of Transport and you go on to explain, in the next paragraph, about the statutory duty on His Majesty’s Coastguard in relation to that. But as you have just indicated, your vessels, your crews in Border Force, have SOLAS obligations just as part of their maritime work; that’s fair, isn’t it?
A. Yes. Absolutely, sir.
Q. And then in 14 {INQ010137/6} you explain more specifically, and fortunately for us, that in support of the response to the small boat situation in the Channel, BFMC has had an enduring role in supporting SAR. Because I think it follows from what you have said to me that search and rescue responsibility cannot be completely abrogated to the coastguard, can it?
A. Not in terms of responding to the particular search and rescue at sea, sir, no.
Q. Yes. But as we know, Border Force officers have played a direct role in responding to vessels in distress by, for example, tasking assets to assist; that’s correct, isn’t it?
A. Yes, absolutely. And not just in the southeast in response to small boats, but around the whole of the UK. It’s not uncommon for my assets to be involved in search and rescue elsewhere round the UK.
Q. No, and in the Channel specifically, we know that your surface assets have been involved to a very large degree over the years in conducting search and rescue operations for small boats?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. And that no doubt explains why if we go back in your statement to paragraph 3, you say, on page 2 {INQ010137/2}, please: “In broad terms I would describe my role as having two main elements:” Then, the first one: “(a) border security …” Which we have talked about now, but then the second one: “(b) supporting the Home Office maritime response to small boats in the southeast with the focus on maintaining an effective rescue capability, and provide a maritime law enforcement response where appropriate …” That looks as though it’s a statement of your role and the makeup of it at the time you made the statement. But was it also a fair statement of your role in November 2021?
A. Yes. Yes, it would be, sir.
Q. Thank you. Now looking on in your statement to paragraph 94 and I’m sorry to jump about a bit, page {INQ010137/36}, please. You deal there — and this is in the section dealing with events in — at the time with which we are concerned. You deal there with the circumstances in which the RNLI and Border Force might be deployed to deal with search and rescue. But you make the point, in the middle of the paragraph that at that time, and I think you mean in November 2021, approximately 90% of rescues were being done by your command without the lifeboats being needed. And is that your evidence today?
A. Yes, it is, sir, and throughout the duration of the small boats issue in the southeast, my assets and Border Force assets have dealt with on average about 90%. What I can’t comment on though is how many of those would have also had the support of the RNLI in some form around the operation, but actually 90% of those rescued on average is by Border Force officers.
Q. Yes. So although His Majesty’s Coastguard had the statutory responsibility, in practice, the vast majority of the work, the search and rescue operations, was then being undertaken by Border Force?
A. Absolutely, and I think the point I would make with that, sir, is that this was a border security issue in the southeast and although within it was obviously a significant search and rescue and SOLAS risk, it was a border security issue. And we provided the main response to that wider border security role and obviously the search and rescue within the capabilities of our vessel. But it was never the full search and rescue capability required for the southeast.
Q. Because as you said earlier, the core role, for example, of the surface assets, was and remained law enforcement?
A. Absolutely, that was what the vessels were designed to do.
Q. Yes. Yes. But what you explain in your statement, and we will come back to this in a moment, is that — and this is paragraph 8 now, again, jumping back to the beginning, page 4 {INQ010137/4}, four lines down: “Since November 2018 … [Border Force] vessels and crews had been increasingly deployed to respond to the threat posed by small boats crossing the Dover Strait and the significant threat to life that this dangerous activity poses.” Now with all of that in mind, Mr Whitton, can we now look at a document which was drafted just after the incident and this is {INQ007125/1}, please. Top right-hand corner, the date you will see literally a month after the incident, and the senior civil servant responsible is Mr O’Mahoney who is giving evidence this afternoon. But we can see, for example, on the circulation list at page 4 {INQ007125/4} at the bottom that you were very much part of this. Were you involved in drafting the submission, that you can remember?
A. I don’t recall being directly involved in drafting, but it would have been very likely that I would have seen drafts.
Q. Yes.
A. And was certainly involved in the preceding discussions, particularly throughout 2021, where we needed to be looking at a different capability —
Q. Yes.
A. — to respond to small boats in the southeast from a search and rescue perspective.
Q. Yes, well you have seized exactly on the theme of the submission, as we see. If we go to page 1 {INQ007125/1} you will see the subject: “Increasing surface assets for safety of life at sea … operations in the Dover Strait and moving responsibility from Border Force to the Coastguard.” So it sounds from what you have just said as though there had been discussions about the need for change over months. This document didn’t appear, as it were, out of the blue?
A. No, not at all, sir, no.
Q. Thank you. We will come back to this document again later. But if we could look, please, to page 2 {INQ007125/2} and paragraph 4 — no, sorry of the same document. Thank you very much. It says: “Border Force … provide all of the business as usual surface assets deployed to search and rescue of small boats in the channel. Approximately 50% of [Border Force] Maritime resource is now based in the English Channel and they respond to 89% of [search and rescue] events. With the remaining 11% picked up by RNLI volunteers. This has a significant impact on [Border Force] Maritime’s capability to conduct high priority law enforcement work, including maritime tactics against small boats, operations against the smuggling of drugs and firearms as well as the wider clandestine immigration threat.” So, first of all, that very much bears out the evidence you have given in your statement about the very high proportion of search and rescue work you were doing, nearly 90%. In terms of the significant impacts, the fifth line, it looks as though what the submission is making clear is that this amount of search and rescue work was detracting from Border Force’s maritime law enforcement operations; is that a fair summary?
A. Yes, it is. Yes, it is, sir.
Q. Thank you. And then looking then at 5, from this point on you — or the author of the submission is setting out three options. This, I should have said, is a submission addressed to the second permanent secretary of the Minister for Justice, the Minister for Future Borders and the Home Secretary. In 5, it says: “Maintain the status quo. “To continue with current [Border Force] resourcing levels and vessels. This would continue to see a 50% reduction in law enforcement activity around the UK …” So not just in the Channel: “… with consequent negative impacts [on] border security.” And in the next paragraph, with — it deals not only with direct, but indirect costs in the second sentence, do you see: “… opportunity cost in diverting law enforcement resources to SAR and an indirect cost from the consequent increased harm to the UK.” So can we take it then that this is how you and your senior colleagues in the command viewed the situation immediately after this incident?
A. That’s correct, sir. And I think that could be reinforced by looking at the period of time since we have had a more bespoke, dedicated response in the southeast, of the five crew transfer vessels, where I have been able to get the bulk of the law enforcement capability back into the rest of the UK. If you look at the last year, it’s probably one of the most successful years on record in terms of at-sea drug seizures and law enforcement operations around the UK.
Q. So it’s taken a little time then to get the balance right, but you think over the last year you have got it right, is that fair?
A. Since the — the — we, the more significant change and approach where we introduced five crew transfer vessels in March, April 2022 —
Q. Exactly.
A. — that period up until this date, we’ve seen a gradual increase because there was an element of re-skilling, rebuilding relationships around our wider law enforcement role, but the results over the last 12, 18 months will reinforce how effective that has been.
Q. Yes, and we will come back to this, but I think you say in your statement that it was when you had your five CTVs deployed, that from that time you were — you felt you were providing a reasonable maritime search and rescue response?
A. I — just to expand on that slightly, sir —
Q. Yes.
A. — I think that if you go back to when small boats started to increase and became — become more of a significant problem, back in 2018/2019 —
Q. Yes.
A. — our initial deployment profile which evolved into the introduction of Operation Deveran, which was then a dedicated commitment of a cutter and two coastal patrol vessels, subsequently replaced by a crew transfer vessel, that was very, very effective in — in supporting both the search and rescue requirements and the wider border security role. But the problem continued to — to — to increase, get significantly worse. The profile of the boats we were rescuing changed. So at the point we got into sort of 2021, that was no longer sufficient.
Q. Yes.
A. So at the early days, and I think the other point for me which is really important is that what we had within Border Force maritime is quite a unique capability. I had commercially qualified, very experienced mariners who had a huge amount of experience in terms of working in the Mediterranean, dealing with tens of thousands of rescues and that experience was able to be transferred back into the southeast. But also the fact that they were law enforcement officers and that gave you a unique capability, in terms of being able to manage risk, being able to deal with very challenging operations at sea, which is what our core business is. So it provided quite a unique capability, I think, to really tackle and develop the response in the southeast, accepting the limitations and that our core role is law enforcement.
Q. Yes, thank you. But this document — going back to this document, December 2021, this captures the view of you and your senior colleagues, doesn’t it, as to how you were dealing with this huge increase which we know took place during 2021?
A. That — that’s correct, sir.
Q. And the message, putting it very simply — and again, we will come back to this — is that something needed to change?
A. Absolutely, sir.
Q. Thank you very much. Now going back a little bit in time, please, to — during the history you have described, to July 2019. Can we have, please, {INQ006137/1}. This is, as it says: “Small Boats Response: Lessons Learned Review, June 2019.” First of all, can I just ask you, how did this review come about?
A. Sorry, sir, you probably just need to remind me of the details. There is a huge amount of material I have been …
Q. Of course.
A. Just …
Q. We know from your statement that certainly by the latter part of 2018, the small boat problem was beginning to grow and we have heard a good —
A. Yes.
Q. — deal of evidence about Operation Deveran etc, coming in, in I think, 2019. This is a Home Office document —
A. Yes.
Q. — and perhaps the best thing is we can look at various passages of it together. But we will see that it set out a number of key lessons for the Home Office to improve responses to small boats in the Channel. So if we start, please, at page 18 of the document, paragraph 6.3.1, {INQ006137/18}, this is reflecting, as it were, the consultation process that the reviewers had undertaken. They had gone to the people who were actually doing the work to seek their views. Does that remind you, were you —
A. Yes.
Q. — were you interviewed about it?
A. No, absolutely —
Q. Yes.
A. — I’m very clear now about the process how this — this review came about at that point in time.
Q. Please tell us, how did it come about?
A. Well, we moved from, obviously 2018 into 2019 —
Q. Yes.
A. — when the small boats problem had started to increase.
Q. Yes.
A. At that point, in those early stages, the operation, from the Home Office’s perspective, was actually being fitted into normal business and there wasn’t really a — a properly fit for purpose structure that was able to deal with what was a completely unprecedented problem that, you know, was stretching all of us in terms of how we would respond to that. And this review was then commissioned within the Home Office to actually just have a stocktake and look at where we are, what have we done so far, in those first sort of six, seven months? So fairly early stages because there had been a number of initiatives that had been explored such as whether we could return at sea direct to France. A number of discussions I was having with French colleagues around that. And this was a stocktake in terms of an internal review, to talk about — to involve all the people who had been involved at that point, to try and make some recommendation as to how this operation would move forward.
Q. Thank you. And you will see, in 6.3.1, in the second line: “The contradiction of SOLAS (saving of life at sea) versus a law enforcement approach did not sit well with some members of Border Force but this did not seem to reach the Gold Group.” So the senior commanders. And you will see a quotation there from somebody who was obviously not content at this point, second sentence: “‘The focus is SOLAS, which is Home Sec’s view too. We also have a Border Security role too, but this needs to be tackled in the UK or in France, not the bit in the middle. It is too dangerous.'” So it look as though this tension between saving lives at sea, on the one hand and law enforcement, was a live issue amongst those who were actually doing the work at the time?
A. Yes, SOLAS is always going to be the top priority within any law enforcement and border security operation, as well as of course those operations which — which are being coordinated as a search and rescue. So it’s always going to be a difficult balance in relation to the safety risks, as opposed to any law enforcement objectives. And this was a border security risk to the UK.
Q. Yes.
A. It’s I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t use the word “conflict”. It’s something that has to be managed and balanced.
Q. But then you were part of the gold group?
A. Yes, I mean, at this point there was a huge number of people involved —
Q. Yes.
A. — in discussions around how the Home Office should be responding to this problem.
Q. Yes.
A. And I was certainly part of those discussions. And although the SOLAS and the search and rescue was inextricably linked to the border security role, we needed to — to — to work out the best way of balancing that. But also — and certainly, my view at the time and — and continues to be, is that, you know, the risks are significant at sea and the best way to solve the problem is ashore.
Q. Yes, but in terms of this tension that is talked about here and in the review, can you remember what steps were taken after the review was issued or the report was issued, to help to address that tension between law enforcement on the one hand and saving lives at sea on the other?
A. I — I think, sir, that this is what probably generated the move towards the creation of the Channel Threat Command which was a much more over — you know, bespoke, overarching command, led by Mr O’Mahoney, to actually start to corral and pull together the sort of whole system approach to small boats. Of course — of course within that was a significant element of the — the safety side and that was absolutely the priority within the Op Altair gold strategy, but how we could get the whole system from the investigative, working upstream, as well as the response at sea, as well as what was happening within the UK. So this was the early sort of discussions which created that new structure which was absolutely needed.
Q. Yes. But in terms, then, of the very practical side of this, when attending when your crews were attending a small boat incident in the Channel, which was prioritised; was it law enforcement or SOLAS?
A. Absolutely SOLAS, as it would — even if we were out on a drugs operation, safety of life would always be the priority.
Q. So when the cutter commanders, at the time we are concerned with, in 2021 and their crew were interacting with people on the small boats, were they treating them as potential suspects, or as people requiring rescue?
A. They were treating them as casualties.
Q. Yes.
A. I’ve got no doubt around that and I think that’s why as the search and rescue demand increased, it meant that the sole role of my teams was search and rescue at that point in terms of the southeast. And we needed to develop a more bespoke model from that, overlaid by the law enforcement requirement in terms of the — the significant criminality that was underpinning these incredibly dangerous journeys.
Q. Thank you. Well, taking the specific example of the Valiant being tasked on the night in question, the incident, we know there was somebody referred to as a CFI on board that night whose role was solely forensic and who was focused on law enforcement only. Was there always, or usually, a Border Force officer of that kind on board the cutters when they were tasked?
A. Well, all of the crew on a cutter are law enforcement officers.
Q. Yes.
A. So they are all dual role, they are all law enforcement officers. What this was, is just bringing on an additional capability with the focus of who wasn’t then part of the core crew, that could focus on some of the evidential support, to support the wider law enforcement investigation into the criminality behind small boats.
Q. But that was my question really. Was there usually someone on board who was not part of the crew with their experience, but was simply there for law enforcement purposes?
A. In terms of small boats only, sir?
Q. Yes.
A. As I recall, certainly we were — we had got to the stage — and part of Op Deveran was to include people from the investigative side because, although my crews are all law enforcement officers, they are not investigators. Whereas, we wanted people on board who were then going to pick up the subsequent investigation, if there was any you know significant witnesses or potential offenders or facilitators that were being identified. So it was just trying to streamline that process and support the effectiveness of the response at sea.
Q. Thank you. Looking at the history which you have explained in the context of this — of the review we were looking at together, can we go back to your statement, and paragraph 15 please on page 6 {INQ010137/6}. So do you see (c) there begins at the bottom of the page, if we can turn over to page 7 {INQ010137/7}, please, because there you refer to — at the top of the page, the implementation of Operation Deveran, which we have already talked about briefly. You explain there that it was implemented in May that year, and continued until March ’22 when the MoD took primacy. So it was in force, being implemented, at the time of the incident in November ’21, wasn’t it?
A. Yes, it was, sir.
Q. And you then say: “Although Op Deveran fully acknowledged our border security role, it prioritised Safety of Life at Sea … and the humanitarian rescue of migrants from small boats under the coordination of [the Coastguard].” So can we take it from that, that at the time we are concerned with, that was the position; that Operation Deveran was striking the balance, if I can put it that way, in that way?
A. Absolutely. Absolutely, sir. It was very clear that safety of life was the priority, but it was — it was — it was the operation governing the Border Force maritime response from the Home Office —
Q. Yes.
A. — to a border security threat in the southeast.
Q. And so at the time we are concerned with, in November 2021, and going back please to paragraph 3 of your statement on page 2 {INQ010137/2} and the two elements to your role, the two main elements, as you put it, can you help us with an idea of what proportion of your time was spent on each of them, in November ’21?
A. In terms of me personally, sir?
Q. Yes.
A. I would say at that point, 80, 90% of my time was spent focusing on the southeast, but in terms — from a law enforcement perspective, in terms of how, from a maritime perspective, we could deliver any change in operation that would stop small boats from crossing.
Q. So most — the vast majority of your time then was spent on the law enforcement aspect of small boats and, effectively, how to stop them?
A. Absolutely, sir, but I had the strategic lead for Op Deveran which was our standard deployment there.
Q. Yes.
A. Which was a set resource with the ability to surge additional resources if we should need.
Q. But it sounds as though that aspect, the effective rescue capability wasn’t taking up, of your personal time, that much?
A. No, that wasn’t my responsibility.
Q. Thank you. So, next topic please, the relationship with the Coastguard. If an operation in which Border Force assets were involved was under way, is it right to say that the Coastguard took primacy?
A. If it had been declared a search and rescue and we were then being tasked under their co-ordination, then the — we would work — we would be working directly in support of them as the lead agency at that point, sir, yes.
Q. But of course, to the extent there was a law enforcement element in what your crews were doing, Border Force retained and remained in control?
A. We remained in command of our own assets, but at the point they were tasked to a search and rescue, they would be working under the co-ordination of the Coastguard, as would any other maritime vessel being deployed to a SAR.
Q. Yes, and you set that out for us at paragraph 15(b) on page 6 {INQ010137/6}, towards the end of the subparagraph: “Where a [search and rescue] [I assume incident] is declared [Coastguard] is then responsible for co-ordinating any SAR response.” So just so we are clear on this, the moment, as it were, a tasking becomes a search and rescue incident, the Coastguard takes over?
A. Absolutely, and that could happen within a law enforcement operation we were running, if it suddenly — it developed into — we would have had to declare a SAR, the Coastguard would then take primacy for co-ordinating the appropriate support to that.
Q. And that’s the sort of example you are looking at, at the beginning of subparagraph (b), isn’t it?
A. Not exactly, sir, insofar as this is about if they were just out on patrol and they came across a vessel which they felt was in distress or — or — or needed a SAR response, they would immediately advise HM Coastguard, as any other maritime asset would do. That’s separate to if we were already engaged on a planned law enforcement operation.
Q. And in terms of the — thank you, and in terms of the moment at which the Coastguard took over, as it were, the search and rescue aspect, how would that be communicated or recorded?
A. Well, in a number of ways. Obviously, the Coastguard would be recording the — the — all the information and — that was available around the — those who were considered in risk — at risk at sea. And they would obviously be recording their command and control systems, the fact that we were then supporting that. In terms of then the asset that was deployed, if, for example, it was a cutter, the commander of that cutter would be recording in the ship’s log, they would also be recording within their own notebook if they felt that appropriate and it was practicable at the time, and they would also be notifying my Maritime Command Centre in Portsmouth to let them know that they had been tasked and had been diverted or were going to support a search and rescue.
Q. Thank you. And going back to the question of primacy, or control. What about operations which, as it were, from the start, are both search and rescue and law enforcement operations, who’s in charge?
A. Sorry, could you repeat the question again, sir, please?
Q. Looking at the question of command —
A. Yes.
Q. — and imagining an operation where, from the start, it’s clear there were both law enforcement and search and rescue elements, who would be in charge? Border Force or Coastguard?
A. We always retain command of our own vessels, our own assets — assets. So we are in command of our own vessels and obviously both, in terms of as an organisation and the individual responsibilities on the master of that vessel at the time. But in terms of who had primacy for the response to the incident, if it was a declared search and rescue, it would be His Majesty’s Coastguard.
Q. So at that point, your cutters, your crews, would be effectively directed and controlled by the Coastguard?
A. Yes, I mean, they would use the word “coordinated”, sir, but yes, a similar principle.
Q. Of course. With the result that your personnel, who are not trained for search and rescue operations and who certainly weren’t recruited for that purpose, are effectively being directed, coordinated, however you want to put it, to conduct search and rescue by a different organisation?
A. Absolutely, which is standard practice in terms of —
Q. Yes.
A. — safety of life at sea and responding to a search and rescue. And although on the point you mentioned, sir, around not trained —
Q. Yes.
A. — these are professionally qualified mariners. The masters of cutters are commercially qualified —
Q. Yes.
A. — you know, to a high standard and that involves, you know, training in — in IAMSAR —
Q. Yes.
A. — in maritime law. So they are very clear on their responsibilities and their capabilities. And within that, we had a huge amount of experience which had been developed into our SOPs, so our operating procedures around responding to search and rescue.
Q. So the latter was really training on the job which Commander Toy talked about?
A. Yes. Training — training on the job, but that was then supported by, you know, the documented operating procedures, reviews, and a sort of management governance structure, through our safety management team and through our command structure, that enabled to make sure we were learning and we were developing, you know, the best capability that we could within the limitations of our assets which weren’t dedicated search and rescue assets.
Q. No, no. We will come back to training in a moment. But certainly the evidence we have been given by your officers is that there was no specific training they received for small boat search and rescue in the Channel?
A. Yes, I — I — you know, there was no dedicated training course or — or — but what we did have, we did — as you say, there was some training when people went out to the Mediterranean. It was limited, but there was an assurance process to make sure that people understood their roles and understood the equipment that we were developing and the SOPs we were developing. And that was regularly assured. So all of our SOPs around things like, you know, migrant rescues, around managing migrants on board, these SOPs were regularly reviewed, involving the experience of the commanders and those involved, as well as our safety team, as well as the wider command.
Q. So you are saying, are you, that there were standard operating procedures relating to this search and rescue work in force within your command at the time of the incident?
A. Yes, we had Op Deveran and then that was supported by a number of SOPs that had been developed, both through our work in the Mediterranean and obviously the experience that we were gaining through the — you know, the deployment to what was a significant challenge in the southeast.
Q. Thank you. Looking, then, at the thing slightly more broadly. The situation we have been discussion where you were working together with the Coastguard and you and your officers working out how to deploy your assets to respond, relied, didn’t it, on effective planning and co-working between you, Border Force, and the Coastguard?
A. Absolutely, sir. As any cross-agency operation requires, you know, good understanding of each other’s capabilities, good communication and, you know, building good relationships.
Q. Yes. And presumably you would also accept that the greater the pressure on the small boats rescue work in terms of number of boats, numbers of people, etc, the more important that effective co-operation and close working with other organisations became?
A. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Q. Now, let’s look, please, at your colleague Mr O’Mahoney’s statement at paragraph 16 {INQ010134/6}. Because he makes the point here that as far as he’s aware, and he ought to have been aware, there was no written agreement or memorandum of understanding between the Coastguard and the Border Force at this time. Is that also your understanding?
A. Yes, that’s correct, sir. There was no — yes, formal agreement in terms of what capability we were providing to search and rescue.
Q. Yes, so the question that arises is:how can you have an effective operational relationship of this kind in these difficult conditions without any governing document?
A. Well, I — I suppose in terms of a response to a search and rescue, the — unless we are particularly declaring a certain capability, which we don’t do, as I understand it, the RNLI will declare a set SAR capability, what we do is we provide vessels that can be tasked, the same as the Coastguard could call upon any passing ship or pleasure craft for support. Now that can then respond within the capabilities of that vessel and that’s a decision for the master based on the circumstances at the time. But what we were doing is regularly discussing our capability, our limitations, around our search and rescue capability with our colleagues within the Coastguard. And, you know, I would say that was a very strong relationship. We were constantly — and certainly at the point we moved into 2022, one of the things that the MoD did when they took primacy under Isotrope, is we — we created capability cards for every asset that was being deployed in the southeast, which clearly set out the operating parameters for that particular vessel. And so that’s — that was — that holds good today in terms of, you know, the capabilities of the crew transfer vessels that we predominantly provide now.
Q. Just looking at some of the things you said then. You were providing, at the time we are concerned with, about 90% of the assets, or you were dealing with 90% of the incidents?
A. (Nods).
Q. And what you are suggesting, I think, is that the working relationship worked because you had regular discussions. Again, you were, as it were, learning on the job. But what if something goes wrong? What if, for example, Coastguard requests you to deploy an asset and you refuse? Where does that leave them without some form of governing agreement?
A. But that could happen within any situation, if the — because the final decision is that of the master of the vessel that’s being deployed, that they can offer assistance if it is a search and rescue, without unnecessarily endangering their own vessel or crew.
Q. Yes.
A. So that’s always a judgment that they will make — make based on the circumstances. So there are circumstances where a master could say:I — I can’t support this safely.
Q. But that’s to equate the commanders of your vessels with the commander of any vessel in the Channel, who receives a request from Coastguard to respond. What we are looking at here is a very particular problem where you were actually turning up for 90%.
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, the operation couldn’t have succeeded at all without your support. So it is a very different situation, isn’t it?
A. Yes, absolutely, but what that also shows was that support that we were providing which was, you know, primarily focusing in on — on responding to taskings through the coastguard, was very effective. And I — and although every day we get — when we get small boats crossing, is one boat away from another mass fatality incident and we are really, really clear about that. There has been no fatalities linked to any of the — well, in excess of 130,000 people that have been rescued by my crews, which shows how effective they have been at what they do and how they do it. But again, making the point that we only provide one part of the search and rescue capability because we have limitations, we are not a dedicated rescue team. And we will always need around that, in my view, the specialist capabilities of people like the RNLI to deal with those sort of more challenging higher risk incidents.
Q. But we know, at the time, you were not just any force responding to Coastguard’s request, but effectively being relied on to provide the vast majority of the assets — that’s fair, isn’t it?
A. Absolutely, sir. Absolutely.
Q. Yes, and we know they had no assets of their own, no surface assets of their own?
A. No, they don’t, sir, no.
Q. So it was you and the RNLI, of which you were providing the vast majority of — of the responses. The question though that arises from all of this, given that huge reliance on Border Force, is would it not have been better to have had in place an agreement between you which set out the respective responsibilities and expectations, so that, for example, Coastguard had some recourse should there be a refusal by a Border Force commander?
A. In thinking about your question, sir, I am not sure what difference that would have made.
Q. Thank you. So what we do know is that there was, as you have said, a good deal of discussion and meetings about this problem and can we look at, firstly, a meeting that took place on 18 November 2021, and that’s {INQ009957/1}. This is the Operation Deveran Joint Activity Review Meeting, as you see. And if we could go, please, to generated item 5 at the bottom of page 2 {INQ009957/2}, and if we can have this page and the next page up, that would be excellent, {INQ009957/3}: “It was recognised that both Border Force Maritime and RNLI surface assets are functioning at the highest level of their capacity to respond to the increasing number of migrant incidents in 2021. For Border Force Maritime, this situation is at a critical level which will need to be resolved to ensure they remain an effective responder in their main areas of responsibility (i.e. Law Enforcement etc.) This may come from an increase in their own assets, further use of external contractors or a withdrawal from a focus on SAR response. This last option may result in further demand on existing declared [search and rescue] assets and an increased risk of controlled/uncontrolled beach landings, with a consequent impact on Immigration Enforcement, Police and Coastguard Rescue Service … responders.” So at this point, 18 November, as I said, there was a discussion, wasn’t there, as to how to manage incidents with insufficient assets and a recognition that your situation and your command was at a critical level?
A. That’s — that’s correct, sir. We — we — we talked about that that period from 2018 —
Q. Yes.
A. — through sort of 2019, 2020. As we got into 2021, person becoming increasingly concerned around, you know, not only the — the — the capacity of our response to deal with the demand, but there was significant issues for me around the welfare of the crews, the — the pressure they were under, at all stages of the operation, which is why we were — we were working hard to try and develop a — a — a more appropriate response in the southeast. Not only to alleviate the demand which had started to increasingly increase during 2021, but also to — to get the — the cutters and particularly the — the coastal patrol vessels back into wider UK-wide search and rescue. And that’s why, as you are aware, sir, we brought in, after a short trial, Hurricane in — in April that year —
Q. It was — it was trialled in April, wasn’t it?
A. And brought in July.
Q. It was deployed in July. Yes, thank you.
A. That’s right, sir, yes, excuse me. And then we were obviously working to try and develop the — the — what we felt then was the — the best model of using those two transfer vessels.
Q. Yes. But it looks — going back to what this actually says, it looks as though what you were experiencing at this point in November ’21 is that the situation was critical and there was a danger, wasn’t there, that you would be overwhelmed?
A. Absolutely, sir. And, as we know, that November ’21 time was a significant — you know, it was a hugely challenging month —
Q. Yes.
A. — in terms of numbers of crossings and what the crews were dealing with across the board, including the RNLI.
Q. And none of the solutions which you have mentioned had been put in place, had they, by the time of the incident on 23 November?
A. No, we still only had one crew transfer vessel.
Q. Yes. So, with hindsight, wasn’t it predictable that something would go horribly wrong in November 2021?
A. We had recognised the — the increase in demand. We had recognised how much pressure the crews were under. But you know, the incredible job they were still managing to do, but the risks that underpinned that. And — and certainly anticipated that the numbers would continue to increase into 2022. So there was absolutely a requirement that had been identified, from an operational perspective, to increase the — well, not only increase the number of assets available, but also the type. Because it was also about the fact that the types of rescues would be going — starting to go beyond the capability of the vessels that we were using, the cutters and particularly the — sorry, the coastal patrol vessels, so our smaller in-shore vessels, that were restricted in how many they could safely take on, on board.
Q. Yes, well, we know from other evidence that the numbers of people on the small boats was beginning to increase and became much, much larger and that still pertains today. But just going back to the narrative, it looks as though, at this stage — and we saw it also in the submission in December that we looked at — you and your senior colleagues were issuing warnings, but you weren’t in a position, yet, to put in place solutions?
A. That’s correct, sir. But again, I would reinforce that the Home Office was not responsible for search and rescue. That wasn’t our primary role. But we were obviously providing the main assets to support that.
Q. You were doing the work?
A. Absolutely, absolutely.
Q. You were in the best position to issue the warnings and that’s what you were doing?
A. But, absolutely. But also because we are not a dedicated rescue capability, there was always going to be limitations. We were never going to be the sole solution with — the Home Office, with the assets and capabilities that we were providing.
Q. Thank you. Now, in terms of other meetings — and again, coming up closer to the incident, can we look, please, at {INQ008328/1}. This is an email from you in relation to the weekly scheduled small boats response planning meeting, explaining that you were not able to attend the meeting which was to take place later that day. And you say: “It seems we have a weather window overnight on Wednesday into Thursday which could be busy and we are planning to ensure we have good Op Deveran coverage from Border Force Maritime.” And if we look, please, then at the minutes of the meeting that did take place later that day at 4 o’clock, they are {INQ006329/1}, we can see under paragraph 1 there, your apologies are recorded. We can see that there is a large cast of attendees including the Chief Coastguard, Mr Mizen. But nobody attending from Border Force; that’s right, isn’t it?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. We have heard a lot about these migrant red days’ meetings. Was it your practice to attend them?
A. I did regularly attend them, sir, yes.
Q. And if you weren’t available, did you normally send a more junior officer from Border Force?
A. Occasionally, a deputy would cover for me, or in these circumstances, where, you know, I gave fairly late notice there was, there was no one covering me.
Q. No.
A. But I didn’t have any concerns about that at that time, sir.
Q. Right well, you said in the email we saw that you thought it was going to be a busy time with a weather window overnight Wednesday into Thursday. You don’t feel it appropriate to try and get somebody along to this meeting?
A. I — it — it wouldn’t be essential, in my view, because it wasn’t at that point — and that meeting wouldn’t have changed our posture. We had — we had our dedicated commitment to Op Deveran cutter, crew transfer vessel, coastal patrol vessel, and a number of other assets that were supporting the inshore response. And the meeting would not have changed our posture. If, however, outside of that, there would have been anything else coming to my knowledge or my team’s knowledge around specific intelligence, or additional issues we would consider, we would have considered them at that point.
Q. Mr Phillips, just so everyone knows, you are going to press on until about 20 past 11?
MR PHILLIPS: I am, yes. Thank you.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: That’s all right with Mr Whitton?
A. Certainly, sir, yes.
MR PHILLIPS: Yes, well presumably, if anything was discussed of importance in this meeting which you weren’t attending, you would have to pick it up from the minutes?
A. I wouldn’t have been relying on the minutes. I would have expected a call or someone to get in contact with me. And most the people on those calls would — would have had my mobile phone number, would have had direct contact with my Maritime Command Centre. So the relationship was very dynamic. It was — it wasn’t relying on — the meetings were important, sort of, check points, but there was a lot of business obviously being done —
Q. Yes.
A. — outside of that.
Q. Well, in your statement, and there is no need to go to it, let’s keep this on the screen, please, you say that you don’t remember receiving the minutes of this meeting and you haven’t been able to find a copy. Do you have any memory of anybody making contact with you after the meeting to raise any concerns?
A. No, I don’t recall that, sir.
Q. Okay, thank you. In terms of the minutes if you go down to the bottom of the page, we see the projected red days, this is a comment from the Coastguard, are from 3 o’clock in the morning on the 24th to 9 o’clock in the morning on the 25th. And if we then go on, please, to {INQ001190/1}, we can see an email which you didn’t send or receive, but it was sent by one of the attendees from 2Excel, one of the aircraft companies providing aerial assets to Coastguard, setting out the — their take on what was being discussed in the meeting, “There’s significant risk”, do you see at the top of the page “in this period”. Again, is that something you remember having flagged up to you after this meeting?
A. No, no, it isn’t, sir.
Q. No.
A. It was, it was had been identified as, as a red window, which was sufficient, particularly when we had seen the amount of crossings that we had seen recently through November that that was, you know, going to result in all likelihood of a — of a significant number of crossings.
Q. So as far as you were concerned, there was nothing to alert you to any particular problems coming up during the period with which we are concerned?
A. No, they were all really challenging days.
Q. Thank you. Then some questions if I may, please, about assets, their management and their adequacy. We have talked about the extent to which Border Force was doing the actual work. In terms of the assets, surface assets, it’s right, isn’t it, that at the time of the incident all the vessels used for search and rescue other than the voluntary assets were owned by, supplied by, Border Force?
A. The majority of the rescues were being undertaken by Border Force vessels, yes, sir. The — but of course, with any search and rescue, there is — it is a — obviously a decision of the Coastguard as to whether it wants to engage wider assets. Not just the RNLI, but potentially other — other shipping.
Q. Well, it looks in practice as though it was 90% your assets, and about 10% —
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. — RNLI. There’s no reference in any of the material to, as it were, 3% passing vessels?
A. No, no.
Q. So in reality, that was the situation. And although Coastguard didn’t own any of their own surface assets, as you have confirmed, they did own some aerial assets, didn’t they?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. Now can I just ask you some questions about that. If we go to your statement at paragraph 18 on page 8, please, {INQ010137/8}, please, you see: “[Coastguard] only has aerial assets directly under their command and control – the helicopter and fixed wing assets.” So again, just to confirm. You, Border Force, have no control over those aerial assets?
A. Not those, sir, no.
Q. Right. And turning then to the night in question, the first thing to get clear is you yourself were not involved in, and took no part in, the Border Force activity on the night in question, did you?
A. No, I didn’t, sir.
Q. Thank you. You have dealt with what happened in your statement between paragraphs 111 and 131, but that’s based on your reading of the documents thereafter, as you explain?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. Thank you. So far as the aerial assets on the night is concerned then, and with that caveat about your position, can we go to 113 of your statement on page 41 {INQ010137/41}. There you say with the sensible caveat: “I note from the documents that … the [Coastguard’s] fixed wing asset …” Do you see the second line: “… was late taking off so that there was not [and I quote] a complete maritime picture available.” Now, in fact, we know that the 2Excel aircraft didn’t fly that night at all; that’s correct, isn’t it?
A. That’s correct, sir, yes.
Q. And you comment there, in the third line: “This [ie late taking off] would be a concern for me because the first objective of [the Coastguard] is SOLAS.” What do you mean by that?
A. I think probably to slightly broaden that, my concern would be the — there was a number of ways that small boats were being identified and an important backstop to that was good surveillance and good aerial coverage. Because that would not only ensure that we could provide effective support, but it would also make sure that there was no uncontrolled beach landings, so vessels weren’t making it all the way to the UK undetected. So although there was — obviously, the aerial capability was only one part of the way that they were being identified, it was a really important part because at-sea vessels are not the best way to identify migrant boats.
Q. Exactly what I was just going to suggest to you. And in fact, you deal with this in your statement at paragraph 19, if we could go to that, please, page 9 {INQ010137/9}. You have a comment there in the broader context of search and rescue, do you see, about eight lines down, the sentence begins: “There are over 600 square miles of sea in the Dover Strait and a distance of over 40 miles where MVs were crossing into UK waters [and then this] and in my opinion a good aerial surveillance capability provides for more successful searches than that conducted by surface assets.” That’s effectively what you were just saying, isn’t it?
A. Absolutely, sir.
Q. And with that in mind, and going back to the paragraph we were looking at, please, 113, page 41 {INQ010137/41} — and it is point you have just been making to me, you — the absence of the fixed-wing asset on the night would undermine your law enforcement objectives, the point you made about untracked landings, if I can put it that way, and you say there: “… in response …” Do you see, about eight lines down: “… to reduced aerial availability [Border Force] could increase shoreside control, potentially by deploying its RHIBs or jet-skis.” But that, presumably, is something in relation to law enforcement and the business of looking at the landings on the coasts, is that right? Rather than search and rescue at sea?
A. Absolutely, the — the sort — the jet-skis and smaller RHIBs, so the rigid hull inflatable boats that we deploy, you know, they are not search and rescue vessels. Although they can provide a rescue and have done on many occasions in the past, they are not — I wouldn’t consider them part of our dedicated support to a search and rescue. They are about surveillance and patrols of the coastguard line.
Q. Yes.
A. To make sure any boats that hadn’t been detected further out to sea, were intercepted before they got to the shore.
Q. And that sort of tasking to the RHIBs and jet-skis that’s something a law enforcement capability that could — presumably, your officers could have tasked those assets unilaterally, they didn’t need the Coastguard’s say so for that?
A. No, and that was part of our plan — for most days is to — particularly red days, is to not only look at the — the primary response of the cutter, coastal patrol vessel and crew transfer vessel, but any additional assets that we were going to deploy. So RHIBs —
Q. Yes.
A. — and certainly, you know, on the — the day in question in November, there was additional daytime capabilities. These were assets for the day though, they were not assets to be deployed at night.
Q. At night, exactly. Now, in terms of search and rescue and the non-availability of the aerial assets, we know from the evidence that the Border Force officers who were on duty were not aware of the absence of this air cover and that put them at a disadvantage, didn’t it, because how could they make decisions about tasking if they are not told that the aerial asset is not in operation?
A. They weren’t making any decisions around tasking in terms of support to search and rescue, which was the primary role of the — the Op Deveran cutter and CTV and CPV. That was a matter for the Coastguard.
Q. So it was also a matter for the Coastguard, was it, to deal with the problems in not getting what you have called the complete maritime picture as a result of the absence of the air assets?
A. In terms of SOLAS —
Q. Yes.
A. — and SAR, absolutely. In terms of any impact then on border security then the — the Op Altair and wider operation would have considered that.
Q. So when you make the comments here about the air assets being much more effective in identifying picking up small boat crossings, that is — that’s, as it were, a point you make, but it is a responsibility and a difficulty for Coastguard? Is that a fair way of putting it?
A. Yes. I think that it’s — there’s two elements of it because if you look at the — the — you know, there’s been a real focus from the Home Office’s perspective to develop the surveillance capability within the Channel. And air assets is only one part of that and that’s then — I think the effectiveness of that has been demonstrated in as much as — although we have seen some significantly challenging days of crossings, there’s been no uncontrolled beach landings since sort of early 2022.
Q. Yes.
A. Because that surveillance now is very, very good.
Q. But that’s very much with your law enforcement hat on?
A. It is, but we are working very closely with His Majesty’s Coastguard to make sure that the safety of life, which is the overarching objective of the whole operation, regardless which agency is leading, is — is fully supported as well.
Q. Yes. Now in terms of the exchange of information about asset availability, do you remember I told you what the officers explained, that they weren’t aware that this air asset wasn’t available, what has changed in the arrangements between you and Coastguard since November 2021?
A. Well, we have a — a much greater at-sea capability in terms of the five crew transfer vessels and through what was developed through the clandestine Channel threat command and subsequently then, through Op Isotrope with the military and then — now, Op Kirstead and the small boats command, is a fairly — is a very comprehensive sort of command and control setup within the joint control room at Dover. So it’s inextricably linked, which means that my Maritime Command Centre at Portsmouth has a very limited role, if any role now, in — in supporting small boats’ response. So it is all joined up in the same location, people working together.
Q. So, in a sense, the problem of sharing information about asset availability has been dealt by reducing your officers’ role within the overall operation?
A. My personal officers —
Q. Yes.
A. — sir, but not the Home Office’s officers and small boats within Border Force. So we are one team, but it’s just a different part of that team now.
Q. So does co-location — is that what you are saying, has that improved the sharing of information about asset availability?
A. Partly. But also some significant developments in technology and assets that had been deployed and the systems that are supporting, then, the — the joint control room at Dover.
MR PHILLIPS: Okay. Sir, would that be a convenient moment?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. Just 10 minutes then?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Right, well, thanks very much. (11.16 am) (A short break) (11.27 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Mr Phillips.
MR PHILLIPS: Mr Whitton, can we just go back a step. You confirmed earlier that the Coastguard owned no surface assets and I think in an exchange between us I suggested to you that they owned aerial assets, but I think that’s actually wrong, their aerial assets came by way of contract from companies such as 2Excel and Bristow, so I just wanted to correct that.
A. That’s correct, sir. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, in terms of other aerial assets we know that there was an aerial asset which was tasked and operated by the Home Office over the Channel and in the vicinity of Incident Charlie on 24 November. It’s a fixed-wing asset from a company called RVL and the Inquiry has heard evidence that neither of the Border Force officers responsible for the management of Border Force assets that night were aware of the asset, so that’s Karen Whitehouse and Tom Willows and so they weren’t aware that there was any possibly of redeploying that asset for search and rescue purposes. Can you say anything to assist us with how that situation came about?
A. Yes, sir, although the — there was no responsibility on the officers working in the Maritime Command Centre at Portsmouth to be considering redeploying any aerial assets, or any other assets in terms of search and rescue, so they — they would have had no role in any decision-making around that.
Q. That’s helpful. So in terms of the limits of their role, it was simply to respond to requests that came in for tasking from the Coastguard?
A. In terms of search and rescue, it was just to make — to make the provision of an asset.
Q. Yes, thank you. Now just staying with the question of assets and this time going back to surface assets, can I ask you some questions, please, about cutters. We know that at the time of the incident, Border Force was relying primarily on cutters as your responding asset for search and rescue, that’s correct, isn’t it?
A. We had three different types of vessels that were deployed at that time. We had the cutter, we had the coastal patrol vessel and we had the crew transfer vessel which was the new commercially provided charter vessel that we had been using since July ’21.
Q. Thank you. But is it fair to say, in terms of actual work, that it was the cutters that did the majority of it?
A. No. I don’t think that would be accurate, sir. I think by that time, the crew transfer vessels we were trying to focus on — on — to the times of greatest demand, because they had greater capacity and that was exactly why we were — we had introduced them.
Q. Well, you say because they had greater capacity. But wasn’t it also because the cutters were simply not suited to the tasking of rescuing migrants?
A. Well, all the vessels that we were using had limitations. They weren’t dedicated search and rescue assets. The cutters had shown that they were very effective within the rescues that they had been conducting, but that was smaller boats, smaller numbers of people, which they couldn’t embark as quickly as, for example now, the crew transfer vessel. The same with the coastal patrol vessel. It had a limitation in terms of, certainly, numbers and we restricted the numbers on board to no more than rescuing 50 and that became — that was a stability issue, as well as the ability for the crew to still safely run that vessel in terms of any emergency procedures or managing a large group on board.
Q. Okay. Well, let’s look at what Mr O’Mahoney has to say about this, please. Can we look at {INQ010134/1} and it is his paragraph 66, please, at page 24 {INQ010134/24}. Do you see the second line: “It was recognised from early on in the small boats situation that cutters were unsuited to the task of rescuing migrants.” Do you agree with him?
A. They were unsuited to the way that the problem had evolved and was continuing to evolve in terms of the numbers.
Q. Well, it says it was recognised from early on, Mr Whitton.
A. I mean the — the — the cutters had provided a — a good rescue capability for the vessels we had initially seen coming across, which was, you know, sort of 4, 5-metre RHIBs with maybe 14, 16 people on board. They were very effective at that, but that wasn’t their core role.
Q. No.
A. As those boats got bigger, particularly as more people were on board, that was absolutely then going beyond the ideal operation for the cutter, in terms of search and rescue.
Q. Okay. Well, let’s look in your own statement, please at paragraph 21, page 10 {INQ010137/10}, thank you. Do you see five lines down: “Our maritime capability was based on effective maritime law enforcement response and the vessels were not designed nor equipped as dedicated rescue vessels or to carry out mass rescues.” That’s correct, isn’t it?
A. That’s correct, sir, yes.
Q. Well, given what Mr O’Mahoney says about an early recognition that the cutters were unsuited to the tasking of rescuing migrants and what you have said there, what steps were taken to address the issue?
A. Well, we had — we trialled and developed the introduction — and introduced the crew transfer vessels.
Q. That was in 2021?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said the first one was operational by July?
A. July 2021, sir, yes.
Q. Was that the first step you had taken?
A. We had started trialling them in about March that year.
Q. Yes.
A. But that was the first time. At the point before that, the — for me, at the early stages of the small boats challenge, it was more about detracting from our core law enforcement capability around the cutters, rather than their capability because what we had is — is a lot of experience and some very effective working practices within the constraints of what we were dealing with.
Q. Yes.
A. As we moved into 2021, it was absolutely then a — a capability issue for all our vessels, which is with why we needed another solution.
Q. Yes, and that’s what you describe later in this paragraph, do you see, a few lines down: “This was initially realised …” The need to: “… develop a more bespoke maritime rescue capability …” Do you see: “This was initially realised that the deployment of CTV Hurricane in July [as you have just said] after a short trial … which [we] started in March [21] followed by an additional four CTVs …” And again, you have told us about this: “… in April 2022. This has been an effective and enduring maritime [search and rescue] response since that time.” So in other words, what you set out there has, I think you are saying, been an effective and enduring maritime response since then. But it follows, doesn’t it, that in November 2021, you weren’t able to provide an effective and enduring maritime search and rescue response?
A. That wasn’t our responsibility, sir, to provide an effective search and rescue response.
Q. Well, it is something you have talked about here in your evidence.
A. But what we were providing was our dedicated commitment to Op Deveran and what we were finding is those vessels were then increasingly being shown to be not suited. As well as the need for us to be able it deploy in our wider law enforcement role, we were never responsible for determining what was the most appropriate search and rescue response to the southeast. That sits with the — His Majesty’s Coastguard.
Q. Yes, but we have already seen in the submission, for example, that was produced in December 2021, that you were very concerned, to put it no higher, that on what you then had, in terms of assets and resources, there was a danger that you would be overwhelmed?
A. Yes, in terms of the individual assets that we were deploying, not in terms of what was necessary for the wider search and rescue response in the Channel. And that was about focus on my responsibility to — to my crews and the operation that we were delivering in support of the — the wider response.
Q. Okay. Well, let’s look further on in your statement, please, to paragraph 34 and another event that happened in the immediate aftermath of the incident, at the beginning of December, {INQ010137/15}: “I recall a workshop with the chief coastguard with all the relevant organisations present on 02 December …” This is about a week after the incident, and I assume —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. — it was held, at least in part, in response to what had happened?
A. I don’t recall it was held directly in response. But it was absolutely held in — in recognition of the increasing challenge within small boats and the need to get all the agencies together to look at how that response needed to develop.
Q. Because all of the agencies were really struggling to deal with the huge numbers of search and rescue operations that they were having to deal with during November ’21?
A. And the preceding months before that, sir.
Q. And the preceding months before that, exactly, yes.
A. The whole of ’21 was extremely busy. I think August/September were also really busy months that year, sir.
Q. Yes. And you say there that one of the conclusions of the workshop which you describe as important was that there needed to be 11 assets at sea to properly respond to the increasing search and rescue activity. Do you mean, by that, surface assets, or are you including aerial assets?
A. That — particularly that — that particular comment relates to surface assets, sir, but that was in terms of the — the whole search and rescue response, not the contribution to that, that the Home Office and through Border Force maritime were making. So that was the whole capability.
Q. But the Border Force and maritime response was 90% of the effort. We know that.
A. It was previously and it continued to be, but that wasn’t what that discussion was about. It was about — in terms of providing the whole capability in the southeast in terms of search and rescue, there was all the organisations — appropriate organisations represented and it was obviously chaired by the chief Coastguard, was to look at the whole search and rescue in its entirety, of which we were just providing one small part, accepting that it was the majority of the rescues, because our role was around the border security element.
Q. Do you remember whether that conclusion meant that there needed to be more assets at sea, to respond to the increasing search and rescue activity?
A. That was certainly the conclusion of that workshop, sir.
Q. In other words, that at the time of the incident, there were insufficient assets at sea?
A. The — the workshop was to look at the optimum model for dealing with the — not only the — the demand as it was evolving, but what was anticipated to be the likely consequences of 2022 when we were all anticipating that the numbers would continue to increase.
Q. So you are saying you were only looking forward and not back to the incident that had happened just a week before, that’s rather unrealistic, isn’t it?
A. Well, I think it would have been both.
Q. Yes.
A. But, I — as I say, I was — I was part of that workshop, of which there was quite a significant number of people present. But I wasn’t leading it, so I am just trying to recall my perception of — of what came out of that.
Q. Let me help you with that because we have got a note of it at {INQ009954/1}. You will see the purpose of the workshop there: “… to bring the various organisations together who are currently responding to small boat incidents in the … Channel. Two scenarios …” And then a third scenario. And if you look at the outcome summary, and indeed, the rest of the document, you will have to take it from me there is nothing there about 11 vessels, or assets at sea, being needed. That detail isn’t in here, so that must be something you have remembered independently. But if you look at the last full paragraph at the bottom of the page, you will see what was, according to this note, agreed: “[It] was felt that there were insufficient maritime surface search and rescue assets available and the rising number of small boats crossing were making the current levels of response unsustainable and increasing the risk to loss of life.” And does that accord with what you remember of that, the conclusion of that workshop?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Thank you. Then over to page 2 {INQ009954/2}, please and paragraph 4: “There was recognition that maritime assets were being stretched to the limit and with the recent increase in migrant activity volumes, if this were to continue current maritime assets will be unsustainable on the current trajectory to provide an adequate and appropriate level of response. Those at the workshop agreed to set up a working group to identify the user requirements and specifications for additional maritime assets …” Etc. And again, does that accord with your recollection of the conclusion of those present at the workshop?
A. Yes, that’s correct, sir.
Q. Thank you. On the question of your cutters and that particular surface asset, we have heard some evidence now about response times, in other words, how quickly the cutters could get out in response to a search and rescue tasking, from the Coastguard. And both Commander Toy and Karen Whitehouse told us that they didn’t know the average response time for a cutter to reach the median line. You say something rather similar in your statement, if we go please to the statement at page 12 {INQ010137/12}, paragraph 25, you say, do you see in the third line: “It is difficult to say with any accuracy how long a cutter would ordinarily take to reach the Median line from Dover as there are numerous factors that would affect the speed at which she could safely travel such as her loading, the sea state, visibility, other maritime traffic in the area and in particular the TSS but from Dover Strait out to the median line is approximately 11 [nautical miles].” Can we take it that at the time of the incident, in November 2021, you and your officers at Border Force were not, as it were, using or working on an average time to get them out to the median line?
A. We were working to the 30 minutes’ notice —
Q. Yes.
A. — to sea, which is a standard deployment. Now, I can’t see any reason why we would start to map a response to the median line because it wasn’t about a response to the median line, it was a response to whatever coordinates we were given that we were tasking our asset to. And what we would then be able to do and the commanders of those vessels would be able to do, is make a fairly good judgment, based on all the factors they would need to consider, as how long it was going to take them to get there. So to give sort of average response times to places at sea, from my view would have been of no value. So it was about getting them to sea. They would then make a judgment on how long it was going to take them to get to the coordinates they had been given as to the start point for their response and then it would be for — if it was a search and rescue, the co-ordinating authority, so His Majesty’s Coastguard, to decide whether that was sufficient or not or whether they would need to consider alternative options.
Q. So it was, as you have just been saying, I think, important for the Coastguard, the co-ordinating authority, to know from your team from your officers, given the coordinates that they were providing: there is a small boat in this position, how long they thought, on average, and allowing for all of the variables you have indicated, the cutter or whatever it was, would get there?
A. Yes. The coastguard would know where our asset was, so they would know, in these circumstances, that the cutter was at Dover. We would have been notified of the request that they wanted us to task the cutter to deploy. At the point that cutter then deploys, the commander will then be looking at the co-ordinates they had been given and then be having conversations on, probably VHF, with the Coastguard as to how long it is going to take them. That’s then very much a conversation between the master of the vessel and His Majesty’s Coastguard in terms of their response and that would be direct.
Q. So in what part — in all of that, what part do your Border Force officers actually play? Is it really not for them to form any view about how quickly their assets can get to the coordinates they have been given?
A. No, it’s not their role, sir.
Q. I see.
A. And part of the reason for that is, well, 1) because we are providing an asset to respond to a search and rescue and what we are not, is we are not in possession of all the information that’s generated. We are not receiving the 999 calls, we are not receiving the information that’s influencing any decision-making around that response.
Q. But what you would know is where your assets were and therefore, where they were in relation to the coordinates. Surely, it was important that your officers had an idea, at least, of how long it would take from where the asset was to get to the coordinates, in order to form a view about what should be tasked, which vessel should be tasked?
A. It wasn’t our decision as to what vessels should be tasked. What we were doing is providing a vessel and it was then that the Coastguard’s decision as to whether that was appropriate in — in the circumstances. Which is why the communication between the master of the vessel and His Majesty’s Coastguard, at that point, is really, really important.
Q. Yes.
A. Because that is that direct line in terms of: we are now responding to a — a SAR tasking or a Mayday and we can give you our estimate of how long it’s going to take us to get there, based on our assessment of the conditions at the time. That then helps you inform any further decision-making you may make around a search and rescue.
Q. But are you saying then that the Coastguard would not only request assistance from Border Force, but actually say: we want you to deploy the Valiant or asset X. In other words, to decide for themselves which Border Force asset should be deployed?
A. No. They were coming to us asking for an asset.
Q. Yes.
A. They knew that the — in these particular circumstances, that Valiant was the primary responder.
Q. Yes.
A. And where it was. And we then, obviously, would make the decision to make that asset available to them for them then to decide. In these circumstances, they wouldn’t be coming to us saying: we want that rather than that, at this stage.
Q. No.
A. Because we had already agreed what assets would be available.
Q. But I am trying to work out what your Border Force officers were actually doing when the request comes in. If the request comes in: we need a vessel to go to these co-ordinates because there is a small boat there. Was it not their job to decide which Border Force asset was most appropriate to be deployed to that search and rescue?
A. No, we already had a plan in terms of Op Deveran and our commitment to that night. We had the cutter as the primary vessel and we had a coastal patrol vessel on — you know, on standby, that was focused on the day. The request to us is: we want you to deploy your asset that you have got available, which was Valiant and then my staff will make the decision: yes, we can support that. And that vessel is now being mobilised for you to then deploy.
Q. So there were no circumstances in which your officers took their own decision about what was best suited to the particular task they were being given?
A. Well, what they would be thinking about is knowing the capabilities and limitations of the vessel. So, for example, if you were going to be sending a — one of our coastal patrol vessels to a migrant event where we had already identified there was 80 people on board, that would be beyond the capability of that vessel. So we would already be saying — and although it would be for the Coastguard to provide the additional support, I would expect my officers to say: look, we will send the CPV, but it’s got limitations. You need to be considering another asset because it won’t be able to rescue 80 people safely. Or if it does, it is going to be outside of what we would consider its safe parameters.
Q. But other than the case of capability then, you don’t think that a judgment call was — fell to Border Force to make in terms of which asset to tasking?
A. It wasn’t our responsibility. But I would expect as I would — you know, we were — we were dealing with incredibly difficult circumstances and — excuse me — would expect the people to be supporting each other with any advice or comments they felt would be helpful. But it wasn’t their decision.
Q. And in terms of where all this was laid down, ie the respective responsibilities for tasking and Coastguard’s role and Border Force, we know that there was nothing in writing, because you have told us?
A. Yes, you — we were clear in terms of how we operated and how we could operate and our operating procedures and obviously Coastguard were the overall co-ordinating authority. We also developed — perhaps being clear through these — I mentioned these capability cards, so that we were clearly setting out for all agencies, particularly when the military became more involved so that there was real clarity around the capability of the vessels, including what the RNLI provided. But that was just sort of good practice as we were evolving.
Q. So were the capabilities cards which you have mentioned before, which came in when the MoD took over primacy, were they filling a gap?
A. I think they were — they were identified as good practice.
Q. Yes.
A. And it wasn’t then relying on people automatic knowing that. I mean, most people knew, but it was actually making sure it was documented so everybody knew.
Q. It was something written down?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Which is actually helpful in an urgent situation where everybody is under a lot of pressure?
A. Yes, of course, sir.
Q. Yes, thank you. Now, in terms of your personnel, your workforce, can we look, please, at {INQ004359/1}. This is a very hard to read RNLI internal report regarding an incident on 20 November, so just a few days before the — our incident, if I can put it that way. You see date of incident or event 20 November. If we turn to page 2 please {INQ004359/2} and blow up the text so that we can all read it. Thank you: “Migrant incident in the Dover Strait …” Do you see there? And the reviewer observations include that there was accident in the vicinity of the Sandettie Lightvessel and then I quote: “RNLI Ramsgate were paged as UKBF [so Border Force] assets were restricted due to their working hours and Dover MRCC only had … Valiant available at the time …” And then further down, it says: “Initial call from [name redacted] responding to the page refused the tasking stating ‘that if UKBF won’t attend then we won’t go afloat either.'” And then completing the reading, if we look further down, in terms of the reasoning given for the absence of Border Force assets, we will see: “The reason UKBF are not out is due to their restricted working hours and no asset available until 6 am.” Again, there is some more redacted. “… responded as saying ‘it’s UKBF not doing their job. We are volunteers. All their crew is paid to be out [it’s] getting ridiculous’.” And we know about this particular incident, that there was no one available to respond until your asset, the Hurricane, came online at 6 o’clock in the morning. The Hurricane was delayed a further 40 minutes, you see there the last full paragraph that we are looking at, unknown reason. And the search and rescue proceeded successfully, it has to be said, after that. So this is an example of an incident, on its face anyway, just three days before the incident with which we are concerned, where it seems that Border Force had insufficient personnel and assets to respond. So just looking at the points that are made in there, what does it mean, please, by the reference to “working hours restrictions”, what’s that about?
A. Well, with — with any — with any organisation and particularly a maritime organisation, we need to comply with international law and we need to comply with working time at sea for seafarers.
Q. Yes.
A. And that’s about safety.
Q. Yes.
A. That’s about safety. It’s not anything other than that to ensure that crews are getting appropriate rest periods. Now, I think for me the really important point of — when I read this, is that 2021 was one of the most challenging years I think many of us had ever had. I mean, I have been in law enforcement for almost 40 years. 2021 was one of the most challenging years in — in all my time within law enforcement. We had a huge amount of pressure to try and develop tactics and operations to try and prevent small boats crossing, but also, we are trying to provide the bulk of the support to search and rescue. And not only was — and that pressure was right across the command and I think, you know, other people have said, you know, as organisations, us, the RNLI and other support organisations, including the Coastguard, were on our knees in terms of the pressure we were under and it was getting hugely challenging and —
Q. So — sorry.
A. — this is a reflection of that, I think.
Q. So was it actually not an untypical problem at the time, finding the right number of people and the right assets available to deal with this massive pressure of search and rescue?
A. Well, from a Border Force and Home Office perspective, I had the assets that I had.
Q. Yes.
A. And we were making the best use of those and we were pushing them incredibly hard. And, you know, again, you know, hugely proud of what they were achieving on a daily basis. Now, in terms of then the wider pressure on the system around search and rescue in the southeast, we were only part of that. That wasn’t our responsibility.
Q. No. But obviously, from what you have said, and again, I think this is just common sense, if you had had more assets at this point and more people, you wouldn’t have been so appallingly stretched?
A. Absolutely, sir, but it was about the more assets available to deliver the search and rescue requirement. We were providing, yes, the bulk of that, but our role was border security providing the law enforcement capability for what was a border security threat to the UK.
Q. Yes. Yes. Now, I want to explore with you whether — how this worked out in practice in terms of your team, your Border Force officers, because we have heard some evidence from, for example, Karen Whitehouse, that staff at the time, so in November 2021, were expected to work through their 11-hour shifts without an official break. Was that the situation then?
A. Well, I think we were — it would — it was — we were — we were best endeavours in terms of, yes, you know, crews were very, very rarely getting breaks, working very, very long hours under a huge amount of pressure in, in a very, very high risk environment.
Q. Yes.
A. Which is why we were trying to not only develop a different capability, but also to rotate the crews, get crews out into other parts of our work around the UK because of the pressure they — they were under. It was hugely challenging and I certainly had many very, very difficult conversations with vessel commanders about the pressure they were under and we were very, very conscious of that.
Q. Well, for example, on that topic, Mr Willows, I think it was, told us that he was frequently working on his own at BFMCC, covering the work of effectively, two people. And is that another good example of how everybody was stretched very thin at this time?
A. Yes, absolutely and — but I also thought from a command’s perspective, looking at Border Force Maritime Command, from 2015 we had had a big commitment out in the Mediterranean and we were just starting to rebuild our capability back in the UK, which included the Maritime Command Centre, which only really went to a sort of 24/7 capability probably in end of 2021. So it was still evolving and we were still looking at building the resources that we would need just for our normal business, let alone the support we continued to provide to the southeast. But alongside that, obviously the joint control room, the campaign plan from the Channel threat command was also developing and had developed. Which was obviously putting in place a lot of the infrastructure that was needed because one of the big challenges — we talked a lot about what happens at sea, but the key for our resilience was how quickly we could offload people and disembark people back ashore so we can either get in to rest or get back out to the next job. And that was a real focus in building capability which the MoD massively supported when they — when they came in, in the following year.
Q. Well, you will see here, going back to the RNLI document, that one of the — as it were, the themes, the complaints from the RNLI station at Ramsgate, is that there was simply not enough Border Force assets. Were you aware at the time, I assume you were, that things had reached the stage where the RNLI were simply refusing to assist for that reason?
A. Well, I was absolutely aware of the pressure that the RNLI was under, as well as our own staff.
Q. Yes.
A. And how difficult that was. We were having a number of conversations around how we could best manage that and obviously, the workshop that was held back in the beginning — well, in December? In December, was part of that — the chief Coastguard getting everybody together to say: let’s all get round the table and really try and work this through as a collective.
Q. And do you remember any specific — taking any specific steps to deal with the problem that was addressed — that had come up here, whereby the lifeboat were effectively saying: we are not going to help because there aren’t — the Border Force assets are not pulling their weight? Was that something you dealt with at the time, do you remember?
A. Well, there was — there was no question that the Border Force assets were not pulling their weight. As — as I have mentioned, they were being stretched to the limit in incredibly difficult circumstances and doing a fantastic job.
Q. Just there weren’t enough of them?
A. There just wasn’t enough capability to support the whole SAR response, of which we were only part. So it was lots of — well, predominantly, it was just us and the RNLI, but we were both stretched to the limit.
Q. Well, that’s the point, isn’t it? That you have explained that you were doing 90% of the work and they were doing 10%. So for that 10%, you were relying on them doing what didn’t happen at Ramsgate?
A. Yes, but that, but a lot of that 10% was — was dealing with the rescues that were beyond our capability. In terms of —
Q. In terms of the number of people, do you mean?
A. Not in terms of the number of people, but in terms of the sea conditions at the time. You know, our capability, and certainly the crew transfer vessels were designed very much around, you know, the red days when small boats were crossing on fairly benign conditions and that’s where — so they could manage the rescue of large numbers. What the RNLI provides obviously is the very specialist capability, in terms of the much — the more challenging rescues particularly when the sea states deteriorated.
Q. Yes, well, they could cope with all sea conditions —
A. Absolutely.
Q. — and your vessels which were not primarily designed for search and rescue, couldn’t?
A. They couldn’t rescue in all sea conditions.
Q. No. So looking, then, at the question of capacity for a moment. Your statement, please, again on page 12, paragraph 24 {INQ010137/12}. We can see here you are talking about the capacity — the maximum capacity of the cutter and what should happen in circumstances where there were more people than the maximum capacity, which I think Commander Toy tells us was actually 100, and you say there: “However, embarkation of a number of migrants in excess of the suggested maximum capacity might indicate that additional mitigation measures should be put in place, for instance, the provision of an RNLI lifeboat on standby to assist.” So in the situation that we know pertained on the night, where the information the Coastguard has there were more than 100 people, potentially at least, in those boats, are you suggesting that the right course there would have been to contact the RNLI and task them to give that assistance?
A. It would never have been our responsibility to task the RNLI.
Q. That’s not what I asked you. Are you saying that in those circumstances, that would have been the right course to take, based on your experience?
A. What — what we did is that we set this sort of suggested maximum capability of 100 people on the cutters and that was based on a number of factors, including the lifesaving equipment that the cutters were carrying, the number of life jackets, the ability to manage that number of people safety in terms of the size of the crew. It — it wasn’t a hard and fast upper limit. But what the — the — the strong recommendation was, what the guidance was, if you were getting close to that capacity, or you hit that capacity, as the commander of the vessel you need to consider what additional mitigation needs to be put in place. Now, you might decide none whatsoever. I am happy that the 120 people I’ve got on board, I can manage safely. It’s good visibility, the sea state’s causing me no concern. We are only 30 minutes from Dover. I am happy now to, to — to go into Dover. But what they might decide is: no, I now need to ask for additional support. They would do that through the Coastguard. So it was a judgment. We were just asking them to have that — you know, make this those considerations and to add to that, what we did is debrief every job to make sure we were learning from that, from where they were perhaps putting in additional mitigation, which might have been not coming back in, staying where they are and perhaps putting some life rafts out into the water.
Q. But what I think you are saying is that that call, that decision, would be primarily for the commander of the vessel to make?
A. Absolutely, in consultation with the Coastguard. We would expect them to be having a conversation with the coastguard around that.
Q. But in the particular example you have chosen to use here in paragraph 24, where you refer to the provision of a lifeboat on standby, did you have concerns, based on the incident in Ramsgate, that that approach might not work, because the station might simply refuse?
A. No, because in the context of the point I am making, it is the additional mitigation which could be that we are going to send another one of our — another one of our vessels needs to be deployed there. It could be, depending on the location, that we are going to deploy some of the shore-based RHIBs that we had available out to support the rescuing asset, just to provide some cover should there be an emergency procedure or a man overboard or — or some other factor. It wasn’t — I used it as an example rather than it being a — I suppose, an issue around whether the lifeboats could or could not support that.
Q. Okay. Let’s look at the levels of coverage that were planned, at least, for the 24 November, together. And that’s {INQ000566/1}, please. You see the date of the email is 12 minutes past 5 on the 23rd. Valiant is listed as the primary responder. And Hunter also on standby. Then Hurricane, which I think was the first of the CTVs you have mentioned —
A. That’s right, sir.
Q. — was available from 6 o’clock the following morning. So on the 24th. And Safeguard, was that a cutter, was that a CPV, what was that?
A. That was a RHIB, sir.
Q. Thank you, from 6.30. So on the face of this, there was nothing, was there, to prevent Hunter being deployed by way of back-up to Valiant on the evening of the 23rd?
A. If — on that day, if the Coastguard had asked us if we could have provided another asset, we could have considered deploying Hunter.
Q. Yes.
A. If they had asked for another asset, but obviously that would have then reduced the capability through the day.
Q. Yes. Well, on that topic, Mr Willows said he was concerned that there would be insufficient Border Force assets for the following day, so the 24th, if more than one asset was deployed during the night, in other words the night of the 23rd to the 24th?
A. (Nods).
Q. And this, in the context of the discussion which I mentioned which took place between him and the Coastguard representative, that the number of people potentially in the small boats in the Sandettie Lightvessel area exceeded the capacity of the Valiant. But — so bearing that evidence in mind and looking at this table, we have seen Valiant and Hunter. We have looked together at Hurricane and the other assets available for the next morning, from 6 onwards and you have — we won’t look at this now, but you have confirmed the availability in your statement at paragraph 107. So looking at that, and given the availability of Hurricane and other assets, if the Hunter had been deployed, that night, the 23rd, to assist in the search for Incident Charlie, would there have been a problem with insufficient assets for the following morning?
A. I am — I am aware that Hunter did deploy and carry out a number of rescues during the day, the — the following day. But I would go back to the — to the point that Hunter was on standby —
Q. Yes.
A. — and Valiant was primary. And if there had been a request to us to task additional assets in support of whatever was going on at sea at the time, then we — we could have considered that. But it would never have been our decision to make.
Q. No, but what you wouldn’t have done is to say: thank you for that request for a further asset, but we are worried about availability for the next day. Because you can see there were assets available for the next day?
A. What, in terms of the rest on that list?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, no, because if you look at Safeguard, Juno5 and 6, Athena and Artemis, they are RHIBs and tactical water craft.
Q. Yes.
A. They are not going to go out and rescue large groups of people. So they weren’t going to provide a — a credible sort of rescue capability.
Q. But Hurricane would have done?
A. Hurricane certainly would have done and Hunter was the coastal patrol rescue —
Q. Yes.
A. — so again, provide a rescue —
Q. Would and could have done?
A. Absolutely, they were there to support the search and rescue.
Q. Yes, thank you. Now let’s look, please, at things from the Coastguard’s perspective in the aftermath of the incident. This is {INQ003735/1}, please. This is an email chain. Again, of course, you weren’t involved in it and I doubt you have seen it until this Inquiry, headed “Observations from [the 24 November]”, sent on the 26th, as you see, within the Coastguard. And one of the points raised in the discussion of what had happened is a concern about the lack of available assets from Border Force. If we go to the next page, please, {INQ003735/2}, the writer says he would like to start, 1) with the lack of availability from UK Border Force: “It became very apparent …” Do you see there: “… during the day shift of 23rd November that the 24th was going to be a heavy day …” We have seen the material on that: “… asset availability was going to be stretched for what had initially been prescribed as an Amber forecast. With that in mind, matters were not helped when the Valiant went off service and returned to Ramsgate, effectively leaving us with only Hurricane and Hunter to deal with the migrant operations during the day. This is simply not sustainable for us to have to work with high numbers of migrant calls with two waterborne Border Force assets. The RNLI are already stretched with crews becoming more reluctant …” And again, we have seen that: “… to turn out for migrant taskings … I don’t know how this can be put to [UK Border Force], but during Red and Amber days becoming more and more busy, their need to have more officers from [UK Border Force] trained in boat handling, and their deck crews to ensure we have got adequate coverage for a 24-hour period must be addressed.” It looks, though, as though what the Coastguard officer is saying here is that Border Force, in terms of contribution at this very busy time, was seriously under-resourced. Would you accept that?
A. Would I accept that there was not sufficient assets to — to respond at sea to, you know, the demands we were seeing? Absolutely.
Q. Yes.
A. Was that Border Force’s responsibility? Then I would say no, it wasn’t. And you know, our focus was very much on, you know, developing law enforcement tactics, looking at how to prevent the boats from crossing, as well as providing a — an agreed level of support to the search and rescue, which was the cutter, the CPV and the crew … And that was the best we could do within the resources that we had available. And as has already been mentioned, sir, we have already talked about how we were looking to try and increase that capability with additional crew transfer vessels.
Q. But that only occurred, in effect, after this event?
A. We were — we were already looking at trying to — to put that in place.
Q. Yes?
A. As a command we were very, very keen to — to deliver that.
Q. But were you aware, at the time, of these sorts of concerns within the Coastguard?
A. Absolutely but it was — it’s absolutely right for the Coastguard to be considering that because it was their responsibility to — to — to look at the — the capability in its wider sense of search and rescue, of which what we provide within Border Force is only one part of that. You have got the RNLI and I know that we didn’t have had very few incidents where any other vessels got involved, they could have got involved. And there was, obviously always, as there is in any search and rescue, the opportunity to — to ask for assistance from another passing vessel.
Q. But so far as the UK government’s response to the major small boat problem, no part of that relied on passing vessels, did it?
A. It hadn’t done, to my knowledge. But in terms of the way that Coastguard would work, it could do, because obviously they can — if there is a Mayday, then, you know, any vessels in the area should be offering assistance if they can do safely.
Q. So you are saying, are you, that at this time in November 2021, one of the assets available, or resources potentially available to Coastguard, was passing traffic?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay, thank you. In terms, then, of the way in which your assets were actually deployed, can we look back to your statement, please, and paragraph 8, page 4, no page 3, I’m sorry, {INQ010137/3}. Here, you talk about, in the fourth line, do you see: “BFMC vessels carry out both reactive and proactive, intelligence-led maritime law enforcement operations including …” And we talked about that earlier. Moving on to paragraph 19 of your statement, bearing that in mind, at the bottom of page 8, please, {INQ010137/8}: “Although [Border Force] vessels historically would carry out proactive patrols within the Channel, as the number of [small boats, effectively] increased, it was a judgment around resourcing and making the best use of those resources, hence patrolling was significantly reduced and vessels became more ‘reactive’.” And again, just to complete the picture in terms of your evidence, to 28, please, at page 13 at the bottom, {INQ010137/13} thank you: “When the response to small boats began [we have talked about that] [the Border Force] had two cutters deployed which we would rotate to provide 24/7 coverage.” So taking all that together and trying to see where it gets us, the original plan then, when this problem began in 2018, was to have two of your surface assets patrolling proactively in the Channel looking for small boats, is that correct?
A. Yes. So over that, sort of, Christmas period of 2018/2019 into early part of 2019, we had — yes, we had a cutter — 24 hours one would be on, 24 hours rest, then it would go out to sea for 24 hours, and they would rotate. And that was also supplemented at some point during those early months with — with one of the offshore patrol vessels for the Royal Navy, through a — a military aid to the civil authorities request, and they were doing proactive patrols up and down. But that was a very, very different scenario to what then developed through 2020, 2021. Because what we found in those days is that, you know, approximately — roughly 50% of migrant vessels were already identified within French waters. So they were already identified well before they — they got to UK waters and more often than not, would have a French asset with them. If they hadn’t been identified by France beforehand, then we would be getting 999 calls and then there was a significant number within that remaining 50% that were being identified through 999 calls. And then the others were being identified through just passing traffic. You have got, obviously, significant traffic in the Dover Strait including cross channel ferries. So actually, the migrant boats that were identified through proactive patrolling of the cutters was very, very few and far between. It wasn’t the best way to identify them and I think that, you know, there’s been obviously lots of discussion around why they are not the best asset to — to identify these small boats. The best way to do it is to, obviously then, improve the surveillance.
Q. The air?
A. From the air, or the shore, or other means.
Q. Yes.
A. But also as we got into the demand significantly increasing, it was a better and more effective use of the resource to be reactive than proactive. 1) because the hours people were working and also, you never know where the right place was going to be. And I think that’s reinforced if you look at what happens now, we have got five dedicated crew transfer vessels which are still dealing with 90% of the patrols. Only one of those works nights, the other four tend to work days and late. So only one is on nights. On red days, there will be a consideration to put it out proactively. But that’s not an essential requirement of it because the surveillance is so strong now across the Channel in terms of identifying boats. The best way to identify small boats is not through proactive patrols with surface assets.
Q. But it sounds as though, in the considerations which you say led to the ending of the patrolling, you were — or you came to be reliant on reports from the French. You have just been describing how many small boats were identified to you or to Coastguard by the French and in some cases, as you have explained, escorting them to the median line, is that fair?
A. Yes, I recollect that in that — in that — those early years, it was about 50% were always identified in French waters, probably slightly higher in some circumstances. Whether there was a French asset in attendance or not, was another matter, but generally most — most were identified already in French waters.
Q. Yes, and you have also said that you had some reliance on passing traffic. I am not going to go into that again, but I think you have just said that you came to expect that about 50% of the small boats would be identified by the French. What about the other 50% if you are not patrolling, how are you going to pick them up?
A. Well, the — the majority of small boats crossing the Channel are not trying to avoid detection. So directly they are in UK waters, they are going to be calling the emergency services. So they will be calling 999. So a significant number then outside of that would have been identified by the — the occupants of the vessel themselves and then another proportion — because this is a really busy sea area, so vessels would be reporting that they have seen a suspected small boat, whether that be a cross-channel ferry, or a fishing vessel, or another vessel transiting the traffic lanes, would have been reporting that they have seen one and reporting that to the Coastguard. So through those three methods, the majority of small boats were being identified at that time, and that was then being enhanced by much better surveillance to make sure that none were being undetected and ending up as an uncontrolled beach landing.
Q. Well, we know, in the case of the incident with which the Inquiry is concerned, that by the time Coastguard had any idea that that small boat was on its journey, it had reached, or nearly reached, UK waters, which presumably means that the time that it then takes for your vessels to get out, has to be measured from that rather late information, in that case coming from the French?
A. Well, I mean the — the information that the Dover Coastguard had would have obviously been developing at the point they were initially notified of the incident by the French.
Q. Indeed, but that’s what I am getting at. If you rely on the French, then if they don’t, in a particular case, give you fair warning, that a boat is in their waters making its way towards UK waters, the system is difficult to operate successfully, isn’t it?
A. Well, I think it was a — there was a number of ways that small boats were identified, as I have mentioned earlier. So — and that was then being enhanced by developing the — the surveillance and aerial capability.
Q. Yes. But just returning to the question of patrolling. You say, in your statement in paragraph 19, and this is on page 9, {INQ010137/9} some seven lines down, you say that: “… if a vessel was only routine patrolling, it could result in it being further away from the [search and rescue] event …” Than if it had been at, you know, its berth in Dover, for example. And later, you say: “The evidence we had from patrolling showed that, in practice, not many [small boats] were encountered during patrols.” So you don’t accept, do you, that if there had been Border Force vessels out patrolling, they would have been quicker to deal with search and rescue incidents?
A. Well, if — if you have already got a vessel out at sea and it is in the right area, then of course, the response time to a tasking, of course, is going to be quicker.
Q. Yes.
A. But it was actually what was realistically achievable at this time with the assets that we had available, which at this point, from a Border Force perspective, was the cutter, the coastal patrol vessel and the crew transfer vessel.
Q. Yes.
A. So actually, it wasn’t efficient to be having them out on patrol. But of course, if there had been several vessels out there, permanently, then obviously, you are going to reduce the response time.
Q. Of course. The situation, as you have explained very — in detail, is that there simply weren’t the resources available to you, to have that sort of three or four people out there all the time?
A. No. But we were developing our capability around — it was around law enforcement of border security, was our main priority.
Q. Yes, well, just thinking then about the situation as it was in November, so no patrolling. We know it took over 50 minutes from the tasking of the cutter, the Valiant, for it to leave the port, leave the port of Dover and there’s been no suggestion that that was a particularly slow or long period of time. So you are adding about 50 minutes on top of the time to actually get to the coordinates provided, to assist with the search and rescue, aren’t you?
A. Yes. The —
Q. Yes.
A. — there are clear — we are providing a very clear capability in terms of 30 minutes’ notice to sea.
Q. Yes.
A. And then whatever the response time is to the — the — the task we have been given.
Q. Yes. And then in terms of the task you have been given and the way it worked in practice, can we go to paragraph 16 of your statement, please, and here you explain on page 7, {INQ010137/7} that: “All suspected migrant events involving small boats, on entering UK [territorial waters], are initially assessed by [the Coastguard] as vessels in distress …” And then you explain about the IAMSAR provisions: “… as a situation where there is a reasonable certainty that a person, vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance …” So there were — as we have heard from other witnesses, there were no, as it were, refinements, levels of urgency; they were all categorised as in distress, is that correct?
A. That’s correct, sir.
Q. So that meant that in a particular incident, there was no ability, was there, to distinguish between different levels of urgency, in terms of response?
A. Well, not in terms of the — the — I suppose, the definition in its simplest form, but obviously within that definition, the people making the decision on the response are making an assessment of that particular incident, in terms of the — you know, the urgency of the response, the risks involved in it.
Q. Yes.
A. Which is a really dynamic situation. So — and there is no doubt that — because of the demand, that issues were having to be prioritised within a distress category.
Q. Yes. And it serves, doesn’t it — the fact that everybody is within the same category and the importance of the detail you have been describing it, serves to underline the importance of the specific information that Coastguard had to know how urgent, in other words, within this overall category of distress, what the particular urgency in any particular situation was?
A. Yes. The coastguard were having to make that difficult decision.
Q. Yes, because there is a world of difference, in terms of search and rescue, between a boat which is making its way, the engine is working, it is underway. And another one which is taking on water and where there are already, for example, people in the water. It is a wholly different search and rescue situation?
A. It is, sir. But the moment people got into a small boat to cross the Dover Strait, they were putting their lives at serious risk. And although, yes, whether it was making way, whether it had shipped water, whether the sponson and the construction were still intact, could change at a moment. And there was never any doubt, really, around the potential risks that were involved at every stage of that journey, although of course that risk is going to change depending on the specific circumstances. Which is why you know for — from my perspective and also the perspective of my crews, they were in no doubt about how quickly a situation can change, regardless of whether the vessel was making way at that point, regardless of whether — of where it was within the Dover Strait.
Q. Yes, and that served, didn’t it, going back to your statement, to underline the importance of — within the IAMSAR definition there, immediate assistance? That’s the aim; that’s what you have got to do in search and rescue, isn’t it?
A. Absolutely, sir.
Q. That’s right. And we know, in fact, in this situation that it took two hours for the Border Force asset to reach the coordinates from the time that it was first tasked in port. That isn’t, is it, consistent with providing immediate assistance?
A. That is consistent with providing the best response that that vessel could provide.
Q. That’s not the same this thing, is it, Mr Whitton?
A. It’s not, but that’s whether we were able to offer —
Q. Yes.
A. — and provide when tasking Valiant to support the incident. As to what the immediate assistance — in terms of making a decision around what immediate assistance was required, that was a matter for His Majesty’s Coastguard.
Q. Thank you. Now, just picking up the point we have touched on briefly on a number of occasions about the development of this problem, the increase in the small boats problem and we have seen that reflected in the December 21 submission, the table-top exercise notes we looked at earlier. And you recognise it in your statement, for example, at paragraph 29, {INQ010137/14} where you refer, on page 14, to: “… the numbers started significantly increasing and the MVs [the boats] got larger. As a command we were concerned about [the Border Force’s] capacity to manage the increasing numbers and the time officers were having to spend at sea without rest …” And again, we have covered all of that and its part —
A. Yes.
Q. — as you explained, and you say there, to the background to the introduction of the first CTV. Just so we have got a clear picture and as you have already pointed out, the November statistics were not the first increased statistics of ’21, it was a building picture. During that period, up to November 2021, did your command receive an increase in funding in relation to its response to small boats?
A. Not directly, but we were part of a much bigger operation in response to small boats and in terms of the — the Home Office’s commitment through the Channel threat command, so it was a much bigger discussion than whether my command would be given more assets.
Q. But were you given more funding or assets in that period?
A. No. The — the CTV was the first additional asset.
Q. Thank you.
A. No additional people.
Q. Now, if we go back to the lesson learning review of 2019 and go please to {INQ006137/1}, and page 19 of that document, {INQ006137/19}, do you remember we looked at this a little earlier?
A. Sorry, sir, can I just actually add something else to that previous comment?
Q. Yes.
A. Is that we were given no additional assets to manage the search and rescue response —
Q. Yes.
A. — but we did get additional assets to develop our law enforcement capability and some of our tactics.
Q. I see, right.
A. So there was additional specialist teams we developed around the use of tactical water craft, around RHIBs, that was additional capability that we were going into the command. But it wasn’t about search and rescue.
Q. No. So, you got more, as it were, but not for search and rescue?
A. No.
Q. Thank you very much. Sorry. Then back to the review and page 19 and paragraph 6.4.4. So this is in 2019, to remind you: “An additional complicating factor is funding …” This is the report’s authors. “Overseas Development Agency money paid for Cutters in the Mediterranean and only funded for search and rescue. No funding for Cutters in the UK has been agreed and approximately 80% of the Maritime budget has been sent on the small boats response and concerns were raised about the future funding for work in the Mediterranean. There is work underway in Border Force to look at the complexities of this issue and deliver a strategy, protocols and detailed instructions to attempt to address these issues. This needs to be looked at in the wider context of maritime activity in the [Channel] …” Etc. It looks, from what you have now said though, that that point, having been identified in the summer of 2019, what you have described for us is an increase on the law enforcement side, but not, as it happens, in terms of Border Force Command, your maritime command, on search and rescue?
A. That’s correct, sir. And this obviously was also around the discussion around — in terms of where was that — where does that responsibility sit to fund an increased search and rescue capability.
Q. Indeed. Yes, one can sense a very familiar jostling between Government departments. That’s absolute right, thank you. Now, page {INQ007125/1} next, please, and that is the submission we looked at before on the subject of increasing surface assets. And the question of the need for more, as it were, is identified on the first page as being that the UK government has an inadequate number of — do you see under “Issue” — sorry, I should have said, second paragraph: “UK Government has an inadequate number of surface assets to deliver SOLAS operations in 2022.” There had been a prediction, hadn’t there, that a huge number of individuals were expected to cross in the following year, making things, as it were, even worse: “This presents a significant threat to life. Moving provision to the Coastguard Agency will mitigate this threat and free up Border Force Maritime to focus on its core role of Maritime Border Security.” And, as we saw before, at “1” under “Discussion”: “The increased volume of crossings is now regularly overwhelming existing [Border Force] Maritime and RNLI assets.” And that, from everything you have said so far, is a fair description of the situation, as you knew it at the time?
A. Absolutely sir, yes.
Q. Thank you. And there were three options discussed, as you see in the paper at page 2, please {INQ007125/2}. “Option 1 …” Do nothing. “Option 2: Bolster …” We have looked at that. “Bolster the current [Border Force] effort with additional support from contractors under Home Office contracts and command.” And then: “Option 3: return [your] vessels and staff to border security … and significantly increase the use of contractors, with [the Coastguard] contracting the resource as well as co-ordinating the [search and rescue] operations …” So it looks as though this suggestion was, effectively, to deal with the insufficiency of Border Force assets by moving control and responsibility to the Coastguard?
A. For the search and rescue, sir, yes.
Q. Yes, option 3, but we know, in fact, that wasn’t adopted, was it?
A. No, it wasn’t, sir, no.
Q. And it looks as though the — if any of these options was adopted, it was probably option 2, is that correct?
A. That’s correct, and that came into fruition when the Ministry of Defence took over as part of Isotrope.
Q. Yes, and that was in 2022.
A. Yes, in March/April.
Q. Now, dealing with the general topic, please, of the challenges of small boat search and rescue work. We know, first of all, that identifying the boats can be very difficult and we have talked about that. They are small, they don’t have navigational systems, they often don’t have GPS. And yet, we also know, don’t we, that the success of a search and rescue operation depends on having reasonably reliable coordinates to get there to provide — and again, quoting IAMSAR — immediate assistance. So that, presumably, was a continuing difficulty of these operations, wasn’t it?
A. Absolutely — well, the start has to be to locate the vessel.
Q. Yes, and of course, the other problem, which again, we have heard evidence about, is that the vessels move; that’s the point, whether they are underway or drifting. So it was vital for an effective search and rescue operation, wasn’t it, to have updates — or updating of the vessel’s coordinates?
A. Absolutely, as much information as we can to try and locate the vessel that’s requiring assistance, absolutely.
Q. Did you regard it as part of your officers’ role to proactively seek updates, further information about coordinates?
A. No. It was very much the responsibility of the co-ordinating authority to be working direct to any task — working direct with any tasked asset to a search and rescue. I would certainly expect my Maritime Command Centre in Portsmouth to be keeping an eye on that because I think we were very conscious of busy the Coastguard were and if there was anything else we could add to support that, I would expect staff to do it. But it absolutely wasn’t their responsibility and I wouldn’t have expected them to try and intervene into that with the risk of causing confusion between a very clear relationship between the tasked asset and the co-ordinating authority.
Q. So it was, as it were, Coastguard’s primary responsibility, but there may have been occasions where they could make a contribution usefully, I mean “they” being your officers?
A. Absolutely, sir.
Q. Thank you. In terms of distinguishing between the various boats that were often in play, if I can put it that way, in the Channel at the same time, we know from the evidence that your Border Force officers were taking calls from Coastguard regularly with information about small boats and as part of their tasking requests. And we have seen the transcript of a call, in particular, between Tom Willows, one of your officers, and the Coastguard at about 01:24 on the mornings of the 24th. In terms of your side of those calls, was there any guidance or policy available to your officers to deal with the question of how those calls with Coastguard should be conducted? What information should be sought and obtained?
A. We had a standard operating procedure with the MCC around migrant rescues and around the responsibility then to notify and tasks our assets and make it available to the Coastguard. But in terms of then anything that would be straying into, for me, command and control and decision-making around making sure that asset was used in an appropriate way in response to a particular incident, that — that that wasn’t their role. So on that basis, there wouldn’t be any specific guidance.
Q. So they didn’t have, as it were, a checklist of points they had to cover in any such conversation?
A. Well, as I said, there was the Maritime Command Centre SOP around migrant rescues, but it was more around things they would need to consider in tasking the asset and making it available.
Q. Yes, it was more about the asset, wasn’t it, rather than the small boat?
A. Yes, although you know, I would expect a — you know, a Maritime Command Centre and the officers in there to be, you know, asking the right questions to help inform the role they have got, in making a decision to support the tasking. Such as, you know, yes, numbers, and the location and things that were important, just in case it was quickly identified by us that they weren’t going to be the right asset.
Q. Yes.
A. But —
Q. But at a later stage on deployment, it was also important for the commanders of your vessels to have as much information as possible about the vessel they were looking for, so that they could identify that they got as it were the right one? That’s obvious, isn’t it?
A. Yes, absolutely, I would expect to be given the best possible situational awareness that there could be.
Q. Yes, well, you see Commander Toy who gave evidence to the Inquiry told us that in November, he wasn’t able to tell whether the boat he encountered in the Channel was the one he had been tasked to locate. And that obviously is very unsatisfactory, isn’t it?
A. What Commander Toy and any commander should be able to do is report back the exact circumstances that they found and they have encountered, which should enable them to go back into the — at the area which is — have got the oversight of the operation that’s received the 999 call, has got the best situational awareness, to make a judgment on that.
Q. And you mean, by that, the Coastguard?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Yes.
A. The Coastguard. But for — for — is it the commander of the vessel’s responsibility to say: the vessel I have been sent to is the vessel I’ve got … Absolutely not. Because they are not in possession of all the information.
Q. But how, then, will he know that he’s complete the task which was assigned to him, if he doesn’t know it is the right boat?
A. Well, what he will know is what he’s done and he needs to report that back accurately. And if there is things he can do to support the Coastguard in reconciling that, so for example, if there was particular 999 calls that could be identified, then, you know, the crews could ask questions to say, you know: did people make 999 calls? Is there someone with a particular name, or a particular — who — who — who could be identified to assist with that? But it’s assisting the co-ordinating authority who have got an incredibly difficult job of trying to reconcile, you know, numerous emergency calls, numerous pieces of information, with potentially lots of different incidents crossing in extremely dangerous circumstances.
Q. Yes. But it follows, doesn’t it, from what you have said, that the responsibility for determining whether one of your vessels had completed the task to which — which it had been assigned to, was with Coastguard?
A. Absolutely. And I think that’s reinforced by the fact that the — it’s the Coastguard’s decision to decide that a search and rescue can be terminated, that it’s been — the assistance necessary has been offered.
Q. Thank you. Can I ask you this: at the time of the incident, November ’21, were your officers on the cutters, your commanders and others, given any training in identifying or distinguishing between different small boats?
A. What they were given training in was — was a number of factors in terms of assessing the vulnerability of the people on board once they got there. They — there was training around assessing the vulnerability of the vessels in terms of its construction and any, you know, problems with the vessels, any — and thirdly, they were obviously very, very experienced and also training around assessing the environmental conditions at the time. And those three factors will help them inform — inform them as to how they conduct that rescue.
Q. Indeed. But on the specific question of identifying, distinguishing between different small boats which, as we have heard, is a significant problem they didn’t receive any training, I think is what you are saying?
A. Yes, I probably — I am not understanding probably what training they could have received around that because what they weren’t doing is they weren’t managing the calls, they weren’t managing the emergency calls, to be able to try and establish whether the vessel you were dealing with was the vessel that — or that wasn’t their role. But what they did get training in is what was their role. And that was assessing the risks at the time and providing the — the best possible rescue they could in the circumstances.
Q. And on the basis that you have explained, that all of this is the responsibility of the Coastguard, did they receive any training in what information Coastguard would need to receive from them when they were on the scene?
A. Not specifically to my knowledge, sir, no.
Q. No. Have they now, since November ’21, received training of these kinds?
A. Not specifically around that, sir, no.
Q. No, thank you. In terms of training more generally and again, we touched on this earlier, we have heard before your evidence, from three Border Force officers. Each of them had considerable involvement in responding to small boat search and rescue incidents and indeed, in responding to this incident. They were making the tasking decisions that we have been discussing. But certainly, their evidence is that not one of them had received any specific training at all in relation to small boat search and rescue. Is that right?
A. Sorry, sir, which — which specific officers are we talking about?
Q. We are talking about Karen Whitehouse —
A. Right.
Q. — Tom Willows and Commander Toy.
A. Well, in terms of Tom and Karen who working in the Maritime Command Centre.
Q. Yes.
A. There was no specific training around how they managed the response to a search and rescue because that wasn’t their role. What they did have training around is as law enforcement officers and how to plan and manage law enforcement operations, but not around search and rescue. In terms of the vessel commanders, they have the training that they have as professional mariners, in terms of their understanding of IAMSAR, in terms of maritime law. But also, what they had is considerable experience.
Q. Yes. And has there been any change in that situation, in terms of training, since the incident, since November ’21?
A. With the crew transfer vessels now, we have got a very bespoke capability, in terms of the equipment they carry, the lifesaving equipment they carry, the — the additional equipment that they carry to support rescues. And the officers that are deployed on it go through an assurance and training process to make sure that they are properly prepared to undertake the tasking that they, that — that they deliver on those crew transfer vessels.
Q. Can we, then, turn to a slightly different topic and this, you deal with at paragraph 74 of your statement, page 28 at the bottom, {INQ010137/28} you talk about table-top exercises and: “We had structured forums …” Etc. With our stakeholders, such as the RNLI and the MCA. We did hear, though, in relation to the same officers, the Border Force officers, that they had not, themselves, taken part in joint exercises or drills. In other words, where they were working in the exercise with officers from the Coastguard or indeed, the RNLI. Is that — is that correct?
A. Yes, there would have been practitioners from the team that would have been involved in those exercises.
Q. Yes.
A. But actually, it wasn’t involving, generally, the teams. What the teams were involved in is the training we were doing around law enforcement.
Q. Yes.
A. And developing tactics around that. But with any of the table-top exercises and any of the bigger exercises that we are involved in, including the mass casualty exercise that the RNLI were running, that we went along as observers to, we were bringing back the learning from that and making sure we were incorporating it into our operating model.
Q. Right. And bringing the position right up to date and looking at the situation now in March ’25, are Border Force officers involved in search and rescue for small boats, are they able to take part in joint exercises of this kind with other stakeholders?
A. It’s been very limited to date because of capacity.
Q. Yes.
A. But we are continuing to look at opportunities where we can get them more involved, in terms of the joint exercises moving forward. But the — it’s very difficult to extract somebody that is — is so dedicated to providing an operational response.
Q. I understand. Mayday Relays, then, quickly. We know that neither of the two officers based at Portsmouth that day, your Border Force officers, heard the Mayday Relay, which as you know, was issued in this case at about half past 2 and they said that they hadn’t received any training or guidance as to what to do in the event of a Mayday Relay. Can you explain why that was?
A. They have got no role in a Mayday Relay and they wouldn’t be monitoring the VHF where a Mayday Relay would be.
Q. So as far as you were concerned there was no reason whatever to give them that training?
A. No, sir.
Q. Thank you. And can I take it from that, that is still the position; that those based in dealing with the tasking at Border Force don’t have training or guidance as to how to respond to Maydays?
A. Not within the Maritime Command Centre, to my knowledge, sir, no.
Q. Now then, on the question of recordkeeping, the evidence that we have received shows that the recordkeeping on the night by your officers was poor. Karen Whitehouse accepted in her evidence that it was sloppy. And Tom Willows, for example, didn’t use his daybook for a period of about eight months in the period 2021 to 2022. Can I just ask you about that. Poor recordkeeping obviously causes difficulties for the Inquiry in investigating after the event and for the MAIB, for example. But doesn’t it also have an impact on the time — at the time because it means that there isn’t a record of the sort of important information about incidents that we discussed and for — and no record of what was said or discussed at handovers, for example? Have you taken steps since the incident to improve the position on recordkeeping?
A. In terms of recordkeeping, we are a law enforcement command and so I would expect accurate recordkeeping around evidential issues, I would expect accurate recordkeeping around the rationale behind decisions that we are responsible for making and also recording information that we then need to accurately pass on to other people within that law enforcement operation. Now, in terms of law enforcement operations, we have got a very robust structure in terms of how we record operations —
Q. Yes.
A. — risk assessments, operational plans, and officers are trained in being able to support that. And then all the other rules of evidence around, you know, accurately recording the time you are making your notes and rules around that are clearly understood. In terms of the responsibilities around our support to search and rescue, that’s very much dealt with now in the joint control room, not within my Maritime Command Centre as the bespoke structure that’s been set up in support of small boats down at Dover.
Q. So to the extent we are talking about search and rescue recordkeeping, the solution is in this joint command, is that right?
A. Yes, although, it’s important that we keep records in terms of the decisions and the actions that — that we are accountable for and need to be able to —
Q. Yes.
A. — not —
Q. But insofar as you are concerned, therefore, the search and rescue didn’t fit into that category and therefore, the law enforcement rules about recordkeeping didn’t apply?
A. Well, I would have expected people to record the decisions they made and the rational for those decisions and in terms of the particular incident, subject to the Inquiry, that was about recording the fact that we had made a cutter available to be tasked in support of the — the request from the Coastguard on that night.
Q. And are you —
A. As to any more than that, I wouldn’t have expected much more detail.
Q. So that was the limit of what was required, in your view?
A. In — in — yes, in terms of whatever decisions we were responsible for making.
Q. Thank you. Now, just on the question of trackers, we have heard a huge amount of evidence about trackers, Border Force trackers, Coastguard trackers, the ViSION log, the French tracker, etc. And the evidence from your officers, again, is that none of them had received any training into how to go about inputting onto, for example, the shared tracker which they had been given access to just a few days before the event. Is that correct, as far as you are aware?
A. Yes, there’s — there should only be one — you know, one overall document that’s recording the operational response to accident and that would have been what — the system that His Majesty’s Coastguard was managing. The role within the Maritime Command Centre was to just record additional information once the matter’s been resolved, such as people have been safely rescued onto one of our vessels. And then the ongoing reporting to support the landside response and to support the internal briefing. It wouldn’t have had any bearing or any role within the command and control and decision-making around a particular incident; it was sort of follow up admin really.
Q. Okay.
A. So that’s, for me, just basic recordkeeping to know that we have been involved in the incident, these are the number of people rescued, this is the makeup of those people. And that we had communicated that to the land-based response who were then receiving them at the Tug Haven or Western Jet Foil for or whatever facility.
MR PHILLIPS: Thank you. Sir, we have got about 10 more minutes, would you like to adjourn now or shall we proceed?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: I am just wondering about the shorthand writer. Okay, yes.
MR PHILLIPS: Thank you. Just on this question of trackers, could we turn up, please {INQ009957/1}. And this is the minutes — we have seen them before, I think — of the planning meeting, review meeting. If we go to page 2 {INQ009957/2}, we will see at the top item 3 was the Joint UK Migrant Incident Tracker and there is an action there to share the tracker between the Coastguard and the Home Office. It says, in the second paragraph: “It was also recognised that once the Joint Tracker was able to be shared, there would need to be the creation and/or the delivery of guidance notes to those able to input into the Tracker to ensure that each are person understands their responsibility with regard to data entry and further sharing.” Do you know whether guidance notes were produced for your officers? It sounds from what you have just said as though the answer to that question is no?
A. Not that I am aware of, sir.
Q. No.
A. But it — it quite possibly could have happened. But, again, this was not about running the operation or the command and control of the operation, which I think is really, really important. This is a sort of supplementary bit on the back of that, just to make sure all data, all the information that was needed for sort of future planning and reporting up was — was recorded and for the investigative side. It was not to do with command and control which is the critical part of that initial response.
Q. But are you aware that, at the time of the incident, there were discussions between Coastguard and Border Force regarding the problems that were being experienced in co-operation where there was joint use of the trackers?
A. I was aware that there was an ongoing, yes, work by my team and Coastguard in terms of the best way to record information post-event. But it was — it was not to do with reconciling all of the emergency calls with incidents or the command and control.
Q. I see.
A. But I was aware of the ongoing discussions from — just to make sure, you know, it was — it was joined up.
Q. Yes. But would it be right, in the light of your other answers, that you would regard responsibility for that and for the trackers as being with Coastguard?
A. Absolutely, sir, yes.
Q. Thank you. So then in terms of lesson learning and improvements generally since the incident, is it right that there was no review or internal investigation within the Home Office in relation to Incident Charlie?
A. Not that I am aware of, sir. Obviously there was the maritime accident investigation.
Q. Well, that was an independent investigation about safety.
A. (Nods).
Q. My question was, was there an internal investigation or review following this incident?
A. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Q. Do you know why that was?
A. No. I — I wouldn’t have been involved in those discussions.
Q. No.
A. I’m not sure if Mr O’Mahoney can help at all with that subsequently.
Q. Well, we have seen the internal review for 2019 and you have explained to us what you thought were the circumstances which led to that. But anyway, it looks as though it may have been above your paygrade, as it were, but it was —
A. Quite possibly, sir.
Q. — decided that there wasn’t going to be an internal review. What process has Home Office or Border Force undertaken to learn the lessons of this incident?
A. I think the focus from the Home Office’s perspective is around continuing to develop the ISR, so the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance plan around small boats, which I think Mr O’Mahoney can talk about in more detail. But the effect of that is now we’ve got very, very good coverage of the — that search and rescue region for the UK in the southeast, which is, I suppose shown by the — that there’s been no undetected beach landings and migrant vessels are identified very, very quickly.
Q. Thank you. Then one final point on your statement. This is paragraph 17 at page 8, please, {INQ01013718/8}. You say this at the beginning: “Of over 127,000 persons who have arrived in the UK by small boat or been rescued en route in the Channel by Border Force officers since 2018 there has not been any loss of life during those operations directly involving my teams …” And then you say: “… which, although we must not underestimate the significant risks involved demonstrates the skills, experience and dedication my team have in ensuring the safety of migrants at sea when they are deployed to an incident.” But that statistic ignores, doesn’t it, the people who died in this incident on 24 November 2021?
A. It doesn’t ignore them, sir, and, and, you know, any fatality in the Channel, you know, hits all of us really hard because we have given so much to try to save life and protect people in what are incredibly difficult journeys, dangerous journeys being facilitated by, you know, serious organised criminals and it’s a huge tragedy when anybody does lose their life as a result. Now, in terms of the point I’m making is that my teams have rescued tens of thousands of people in what have often been incredibly challenging circumstances, which just makes testament to, you know, what they have achieved in really difficult circumstances in no — in no way for me diverts away from, you know — a single loss of life in the Channel is an absolute tragedy but it can happen any day. What this shows is that generally the response has been really effective based on the — the — the sort of current threat.
Q. But in terms of the way you phrase this “… there has not been any loss of life”, would you, thinking about it again, care to rephrase it?
A. If that could be interpreted that, you know, I don’t recognise the huge tragedy of any loss of life then absolutely. But the point I was making is that, you know, there are — there are tens of thousands of people still alive today as a result of the tremendous efforts by my team, the RNLI and the people who have worked, you know, tirelessly in support of the small boat problem and the supporting agencies, His Majesty’s Coastguard and all the other assets around that. But of course if that in any way could be misinterpreted that this isn’t a huge tragedy, when there is a single loss of life, then absolutely I would change it.
MR PHILLIPS: Thank you. Thank you for answering my questions. Is there anything else you want to say to the Inquiry today, Mr Whitton?
A. No, I don’t think so, sir.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Mr Whitton, thank you very much for your evidence. It has been very helpful. So thank you. Shall we come back at about five minutes past 2.
MR PHILLIPS: Yes.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Thanks very much. (1.06 pm) (The Lunch Break) (2.05 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Good afternoon, everyone and good afternoon, Mr O’Mahoney. Ms Woods has some questions for you but first of all could you just read the affirmation.
A. Yes.
MR DANIEL O’MAHONEY (affirmed)
Questions by MS WOODS
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, thank you very much.
MS WOODS: Thank you, Chair. Good morning, please could you give your full name for the Inquiry record.
A. Dan O’Mahoney.
Q. Mr O’Mahoney, you have very helpfully provided a witness statement to this Inquiry, which is dated 12 November 2024, and I believe that statement consists of 45 pages of evidence, is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you very much. This morning we heard from your colleague Mr Whitton, who appeared as a corporate witness on behalf of the Home Office. You have also attended in that same capacity. Could you help us to understand the distinction between your areas of specialism, your evidence, and that of your colleague?
A. Yes. So I was the director of the clandestine channel threat command. My job was to cohere the whole of the UK’s Government’s response to illegal immigration in small boats. As part of that, there was a cross-government campaign plan. One of the pillars of that plan was to control arrivals and within that, was Operation Deveran, which Mr Whitton was the overall commander of the maritime surface asset element of that.
Q. I am going to take a little bit of time in a minute to go through those different structures to try to understand how that works in practice and how it fits together. Mr Whitton this morning essentially said that his evidence was concentrating on the Border Force response at sea, whereas yours was about the wider issue of tackling small boats. Is this a fair distinction? You were working on policy, structures, rather than the practical response in the Channel, is that right?
A. I was working on both. So I was working on the whole Government response to illegal migration in small boats. Some of that involved policy, a lot of it involved international engagement and quite a lot of it involved operations.
Q. Understood. Thank you very much. Before I begin asking you questions, I understand there is a matter in your statement which you wish to correct. Could I ask — just one minute, I will bring the document up for you. Could I ask we turn to your statement {INQ010134/1}, paragraph 114 which is page 37, {INQ010134/37} so we have that on screen there for you?
A. Since writing this statement I have realised I was indeed in Belgium for work purposes. But at the morning of the 24th, I was actually in The Hague visiting Europol and I travelled to Belgium at some point in the afternoon.
Q. So in all other respects that paragraph is correct, it’s simply that you went to Belgium later in the day?
A. Correct.
Q. Understood, thank you very much. That can come down off the screen. I want to ask you a little bit about your own background and how you came to hold the role you have told us about within the Home Office structures. In fact, can we bring up the statement again paragraph 2, which is on page 2, the bottom of page 2, {INQ010134/1}. So you tell us there you first joined the Home Office in 2014, and then jumping forward, you say that you moved from the National Crime Agency in February 2019. Can you tell us, in broad outline, between first joining the Home Office in 2004 and that 2019 date, what was your professional experience and background?
A. So I worked in a number of different roles in the Home Office, in, — in policing policy and then private office. I then held a number of operational roles in Border Force. I moved to the National Crime Agency in February 2019. I then went on to be the founding director of the Joint Maritime Security Centre until August 2020, following which, I was appointed as the director of the Clandestine Channel Threat Command in August 2020.
Q. Understood, thank you very much. As part of that background, those 20 odd years within the Home Office, did you have any practical experience of maritime operations? Were you on a cutter, were you undertaking search and rescue?
A. I have some maritime practical maritime experience. Before I joined the Home Office, I was in the Royal Marines and I served in a small boat unit there as well as it being generally an amphibious light infantry capability. Whilst I was Director Joint Maritime Security Centre and as the Director of the Clandestine Channel Threat Command I — I spent a fair amount of time at sea with the various different Border Force maritime assets. I also flew in each of the different aircraft types that we deployed over the Channel and so had a good working knowledge of what that looked like in terms of its operational deployment.
Q. Given your background in the marines, is it fair to say you had previous training or understanding of SOLAS obligations, safety of life at sea, and the law regarding that?
A. Not particularly because of my experience in the Royal Marines, but as somebody who’s served in a number of different contexts around maritime security, yes.
Q. Thank you. Is it right that you no longer work for the Home Office?
A. I am on a career break from the Home Office. I currently work at the Post Office, where I am the Interim Chief Operating Officer.
Q. You say Interim Chief Operating Officer. We can see in your statement at the time you wrote this, that in fact you were the Inquiry Director for Post Office Limited?
A. That’s right.
Q. When did you change roles within the Post Office?
A. In December last year.
Q. Thank you very much. Turning then to paragraph 10 of your statement, {INQ010134/4}, I want to understand a little bit about the role of the Home Office in terms of the response to small boats in the Channel. So in your statement here you explain that the Home Office was and is the lead government department for illegal migration, but you go on to explain that DfT is the lead department for the safety of life at sea?
A. That’s right.
Q. You then say the operational agency with the lead for safety of life at sea is HM Coastguard and if we turn over to paragraph 11 at the top of page 5, {INQ010134/5} you explain that DfT is the lead department for co-ordinating maritime interests across Whitehall. So I want to understand a little bit about how that intersects. So just taking that last point, that DfT is the lead department for co-ordinating maritime interests across Whitehall, how did what work in practice, given that we know DfT didn’t own maritime assets operating in the Channel in response to small boats? What does that co-ordination role look like?
A. So the Department for Transport is a policy department and it’s responsible for maritime interests across Government, which include commercial maritime interests and ports and so on, as well as international maritime interests. The Home Office’s lead responsibility is illegal migration which, particularly in the context of small boats, there is a big maritime component to it. So it necessitated a lot of close working between the Home Office and the Department for Transport and many other Government departments and agencies.
Q. This morning in evidence we heard some discussion about the use of the word “co-ordinating” and in particular, this morning we heard it applied to directing or tasking assets in the Channel. Is it fair to say when you say this in your statement, it doesn’t mean that DfT was, in practice, managing Home Office assets in the Channel does it? It is a co-ordination and policy role?
A. It is a policy role and in discharging that policy role, it is necessary for DfT to work across a number of different Government departments to co-ordinate and cohere that work.
Q. Thank you. And you say in paragraph 11 that it is DfT which ensures that the Home Office’s aims are compatible with international law obligations for SOLAS. Do you accept that the Home Office itself is bound by international maritime law obligations in respect of SOLAS?
A. Sorry, could you repeat the first part of your question?
Q. So reading this paragraph, paragraph 11, we can see DfT, in the second line, is the lead department for co-ordinating maritime interests across Whitehall, we have just talked through that. And that involves ensuring that the Home Office’s aims are compatible with the core functions of HM Coastguard and compliant with a range of international law obligations relating to safety of life at sea —
A. Yes.
Q. — UN Convention on law of sea. My question to you is that obligation, the international law obligations for SOLAS, they don’t just sit with DfT do they? They adhere to the Home Office and its work in a maritime context as well?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Can you assist us with how then that responsibility sits with DfT? Given, in practice, Home Office assets in the Channel must comply with those obligations as well, how is it DfT’s responsibility for ensuring that the Home Office’s aims are compatible with that legislation?
A. Yes, so what I think that sentence means is that the DfT is the lead department responsible for overseeing the work of His Majesty’s Coastguard and in that respect, has a function to ensure the compatibility of the Home Office’s aims with the work of HMCG, and it is the lead department with responsibility for all of those different legal requirements in relation to maritime security. But, I mean, going back to your previous question, I absolutely accept the Home Office has an independent responsibility and all of the operational parts of the department have an independent responsibility to ensure that our activity is in line with UNCLOS, SOLAS and the SAR convention and COLREGS.
Q. Does it mean that, in practice, DfT was monitoring or supervising the Home Office’s compliance with safety of life at sea obligations?
A. I wouldn’t characterise it in that way. We had, and continue to have, a very close productive working relationship with DfT. And we are — we are both concerned to ensure compliance with all of those conventions and it is one of the concerns of DfT to ensure that that’s working in the way that it should.
Q. That’s very helpful, thank you. Could we turn to paragraph 15, please, {INQ010134/6}. We can see at the top of that paragraph there: “HM [Coastguard] describes itself as the national maritime emergency service.” To be clear, Border Force itself is not a national maritime emergency service, is that right? That is not a way Border Force or Home Office would describe it is?
A. That’s correct.
Q. We heard this morning in evidence that 90% of rescues in the Channel were being undertaken, in practice, by Border Force.
A. Yes.
Q. Is it wrong to suggest that in 2021 Border Force was, in effect, undertaking the work of a maritime emergency service in the Channel?
A. I wouldn’t characterise it in that way. I think the reason that Border Force are — Border Force Maritime is involved in the way it is in search and rescue in the Channel is partly historic. In 2018, when the small boats phenomenon first became a really significant national issue, Border Force were deployed in — in the Aegean and there was a logical reason for Border Force then to deploy to the Channel when the then Home Secretary declared a critical incident in the Channel. And have continued to serve there since. It is the responsibility of any maritime organisation and any ship deployed in any location to — to prioritise search and rescue and support to the Coastguard over other things. And given that the Coastguard then and indeed, now, has no surface assets and this is an illegal migration phenomenon, it makes sense for Border Force to provide that service. But I don’t — I don’t agree that it’s replacing or doing somebody else’s job.
Q. I did not intend to suggest that it was replacing Coastguard or doing its job. But fair to say that the Coastguard was undertaking functions of a national maritime emergency service in the Channel and that work was being conducted by Border Force assets and Border Force personnel operating on those assets in the Channel?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this a fair summary then of the broad structures, please do stop me if it’s incorrect: that DfT has the statutory responsibility for this area of work, but does not itself do the operational work in the Channel?
A. This area of work being search and rescue?
Q. Search and rescue in Channel, in response to small boats in the Channel?
A. Search and rescue, yes. The response to small boats in the Channel, no.
Q. Search and rescue in response to small boats in the Channel?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Whereas HM Coastguard has operational responsibility, but because it does not own surface assets in the Channel, it does not undertake those operations at sea in practice?
A. It — it doesn’t. No, it doesn’t have surface assets, so it can’t deploy surface assets to search and rescue in the Channel.
Q. Whereas the Home Office has no formal responsibility for search and rescue, but in practice, was undertaking 90% of those rescues in the Channel?
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. Can you assist us with how that structure came about? Why is it divided in that way, where formal responsibility, operational responsibility and the practical work are split across three different departments?
A. Yes, certainly. I think it is the nature of Government at a national level when complex issues occur that have a national profile, that many different Government departments will work together in this way. As I said, part of the — part of the reason that the operational model is what it is, is historic, but also this is primarily a phenomenon of illegal migration. The reason that people are getting into these dangerous boats and crossing the Channel is because they want to go to the UK — to migrate to the UK and therefore, this is primarily an illegal migration problem. If any organisation is to operate in the maritime environment in order to deliver its aims, it is absolutely clear that the primary risk in that environment is safety of life at sea. So anything we seek to achieve in — in that area, any surface assets we deploy, any surveillance capability that we deploy, any people that we deploy, it is necessary for those people and assets and capability to — to be multifunctional and for that capability to primarily serve the needs of search and rescue.
Q. Thank you. Can I ask you a little bit then about how your particular organisation, so first JMSC, JMOCC and then CCTC sits within that structure. So, first looking at JMSC. So you told us that you held a role within the Joint Maritime Operations Co-ordination centre. Can I ask, do you call that J-M-O-C-C, or is it JMOCC?
A. It is called both, JMOCC is probably easier, yes.
Q. Within JMOCC, and is it right that JMOCC is a part of the JMSC?
A. Yes. So when I was first appointed, I was director at JMOCC, I think, for a short period of time. One of my tasks — or my primary task was to cohere the various different units and capabilities at that location in Portsdown in Portsmouth, one of which was JMOCC, the other of which was NMIC, the National Maritime Information Centre. And to create something that was greater than the sum of its parts. And in so doing, create a single location for the UK where both international and UK maritime security capability could be fused in terms of the information and intelligence feeds and that there could be some sort of co-ordination capability for UK territorial waters.
Q. Is it right that there are three separate bodies which sit within JMSC? So one is JMOCC, which you have just told us a little bit about, the second was, do you call it NMIC, the National Maritime Information Centre?
A. That’s right.
Q. And the third was the Maritime Intelligence Bureau, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we turn to paragraph 19 of your statement, please. {INQ010134/7}. We can see there an explanation of the purpose of the JMSC, and you say: “[It] was created in 2019 to provide law enforcement and security agencies with a common operating picture across the UK maritime area.” Is it right that its purpose was to assist law enforcement and security rather than search and rescue?
A. Not just law enforcement and security. All types of maritime operational interest in — in the UK, but not search and rescue.
Q. Not search and rescue. Was it right that JMSC played no role in relation to, I suppose, planning and preparation for search and rescue operations?
A. That, that’s right. There was at the time and may still be a Coastguard liaison officer, co-located in the Joint Maritime Security Centre, but that is more for creating joint situational awareness than any tasking or co-ordination role.
Q. Understood. Could you help us to understand the difference between JMOCC and NMIC, those two bodies within the JMSC? I know it is a lot of acronyms.
A. Yes, so JMOCC is an operational co-ordination function and its remit is limited to the UK. NMIC is an information and intelligence fusion function and has both a UK and international scope.
Q. Understood. Was JMOCC undertaking work in relation to the management of maritime assets, or the co-ordination of maritime assets?
A. A limited role around the co-ordination of maritime assets. So it’s primarily around generating situational awareness of threats and also where maritime assets are deployed and what they are deployed on in UK waters. It is rare for JMOCC to stand up a formal co-ordination role and that normally only happens where the threat that the UK government is required to respond to outstrips the capability in a single organisation and then it can, in certain circumstances, deliver a formal co-ordination role.
Q. Understood. But ordinarily, in the course of normal operations in the Channel, for example, it would not be JMOCC that was co-ordinating Border Force assets, for example?
A. No. JMOCC played — I mean, really almost no role in — in the small boats threats.
Q. That’s very helpful, thank you. If we look at paragraph 21, still on the screen there, we can see reference to something called the Clandestine Operations Response Team, or CORT. And we can see it was a dedicated response team within immigration enforcement, that’s what the IE is, is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. “… a dedicated response team to address the increasing numbers of small boats crossing the Channel.” Can you help us with what that means in practice? Were they focused on policy, were they playing any operational role?
A. They were an operational team within immigration enforcement. So it might be helpful to explain the three main operational parts of the Home Office that were involved in this response were Border Force, which included Border Force Maritime, Immigration Enforcement which is a UK based operational capability that responds to illegal migration threats in the UK, and UK Visas and Immigration, which in the case of small boats, was primarily concerned with finding asylum accommodation for small boat arrivals. So the CORT team was a team within Immigration Enforcement. It was established, as it says, shortly before I was appointed as the director of the Clandestine Channel Threat Command and it formed the core of the land-based response that dealt with migrants as they arrived in the UK on — on land from — from Border Force maritime and RNLI assets.
Q. Given its undertaking and operational role within the Channel, but it sits within Immigration Enforcement and not within Border Force, how did its work interact with that of Border Force officers responding to small boats in the Channel?
A. Well, I mean, this was really one of the reasons that the Clandestine Channel Threat Command was created. So to cohere both the operational elements of the Home Office to a single strategy and a single plan. And across Government as well, but in respect of the Home Office, it was a much more of a command and control relationship rather than across Government which is more of a co-ordination and influencing relationship. So at that time, the CORT team had a role to play landside. I think it is probably fair to say that their plans were — could have been better aligned with Border Force Maritime’s plans, Kent Police’s plans, the Coastguard plans, etc. So one of the really early tasks in the creation of the Clandestine Channel Threat Command was to establish a single operational plan to cover all of those agencies that I have just mentioned and — and some more, and that was under the plan called Operation Altair.
Q. We can see that at the bottom of the paragraph just there, 21. You say: “… at this point …” I think that’s talking about June 2020, the time when CORT was operational, you say: “… at this point, each element of the Home Office and partner agencies were working mostly in isolation without a unifying strategy and operational plan.” Is that what you were just talking about in terms of could have been better working with other partners?
A. That’s right.
Q. At this point, you hadn’t yet come into the role within CCTC, you were in JMSC, in JMOCC, in fact?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Were you aware of and working with CORT and its operations in respect of small boats, or were you undertaking an entirely separate role at that time?
A. Given the CORT were a land-based organisation and I was working in the Joint Maritime Security Centre, I don’t remember being aware of them and I wouldn’t expect to be aware of them.
Q. Understood. If we scroll down slightly to look at paragraph 22, we can see the reference to CCTC being created as a new command, again, within Immigration Enforcement, to unify the Government’s response to the small boat situation. Now, that was done in August 2020.
A. Yes.
Q. We can see in the paragraph above, CORT was formed in June 2020. So was CORT only operational for two months or so?
A. That would appear to be the case, yes.
Q. Okay and CORT then was absorbed into CCTC. We can see that right at the bottom the page there.
A. Yes.
Q. I want to ask about how, in practice, CCTC unified the different strands of the Home Office responding to small boats. So CCTC sat within Immigration Enforcement, we can see that in your statement there. But again, Border Force played a direct role in responding to small boats. So how did CCTC work in relation to Border Force? Did they have overlapping roles, did one manage the other?
A. Yes, so the CCTC was established within Immigration Enforcement so that I, as a sort of two-start director had a line management chain into a director general and that was the director general of immigration enforcement, but I also had a direct reporting line into the Home Secretary, who, at the time, was Priti Patel. So I had — although I was line managed in Immigration Enforcement, in reality, I had a much broader role and was expected to work across any and all areas of the Home Office that were required to deliver the response and indeed, to co-ordinate across the whole of Government and with international partners.
Q. So was the role of the CCTC primarily one of co-ordinating other bodies within the Home Office?
A. It was — its role was to co-ordinate other bodies within the Home Office and to co-ordinate across Government and to lead with operational partners in the international arena and to plug any capability gaps that we thought was necessary and it was appropriate for the Home Office to fill.
Q. Did the CCTC have its own staff, members of the Home Office, for example, working directly for it?
A. Yes.
Q. Did it have control over Border Force staff members who were working on the same subject matter?
A. We — I, and we in CCTC, had a mandate to work across all areas of the Home Office, not a direct command relationship. So I would characterise our relationship with Border Force Maritime, for instance, as being a co-ordinating and influencing relationship rather than a command and control relationship.
Q. Understood. Can we turn to paragraph 51, please. It is page 19, if that assists {INQ010134/19}. So just to give a practical example to try and apply this. You can see at the third line down: “HM [Coastguard] staffing of the JCR was 247, whilst Home Office staffing usually began in the early hours of the morning of a red day.” It is right, you are talking there about Home Office staff physically being present in the JCR working in response to small boats, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Are those staff members, working in the JCR alongside HM Coastguard, CCTC staff? Are they Border Force staff? Who are they?
A. At the time that the joint control room was established, which was late 2020/early 2021, I believe there was a Border Force liaison officer from Border Force Maritime and there would have been a number of CCTC staff in there, or a member at least. There would also have been a liaison officer from Tekever, who operated the drone capability. And there would, at various times, be somebody from Kent Police, particularly at the beginning of an operational period and potentially others as well.
Q. So members of staff from lots of different departments, if I can call them departments —
A. Indeed.
Q. — within the Home Office and also other stakeholders?
A. Correct.
Q. And what about the staff who would have been located at the MCC in Portsmouth in Portsdown? Are those CCTC staff members operating there?
A. Those were Border Force Maritime.
Q. Border Force Maritime?
A. Yes.
Q. Looking there at some information about the JCR, if we go to paragraph 37, which is page 13, {INQ010134/13}, you explain how the JCR was set up. You say it was established in autumn of 2020 and located at the MRCC. That’s in Dover, isn’t it?
A. It is, yes.
Q. It says: “The JCR is a land-based location where the Home Office, including CCTC, has direct access to necessary communications and imagery to be able to effectively undertake our role alongside HMCG, where HMCG is leading and co-ordinating the response to SAR in the Channel.” Search and rescue in the Channel.
A. Yes.
Q. We have heard evidence in this Inquiry that Home Office staff members, Border Force staff members, responsible for managing assets alongside HM Coastguard in response to calls from small boats in the Channel were based not in the joint control room, but in Portsmouth. If, as you say here, the JCR has access to necessary communications and imagery to be able to effectively undertake that role, why were the persons undertaking that role in an entirely different site at the time?
A. So there were — there were different roles. So the people that were necessary to create the joint situational awareness were based in the joint control room and I believe at that time that included a liaison officer from Border Force Maritime. Certainly, that’s my recollection. The people that dealt with the tasking authority for all of Border Force Maritime’s activity, including law enforcement were based at Portsdown in Portsmouth and those were the people that I believe you heard evidence from earlier in the Inquiry. But their — their role was not to generate situational awareness in terms of the situation in the Channel. Their role was a national role in tasking Border Force Maritime assets, including for operations in support of the Coastguard in the Channel, but also including any other law enforcement deployments that they might undertake.
Q. So is the reasoning that their role was national rather than specific to the Channel primarily?
A. National and multi-threat, rather than exclusively about rescuing migrants in the Channel, but I should say, just to repeat, Border Force Maritime had a liaison officer in the joint control room at, I think, around this time and then certainly, at various times during the life of Operation Altair.
Q. So if we look at paragraph 38 on the screen, we can see reference to a clandestine operations liaison officer, HM Coastguard role. That’s different to the liaison officer you are talking about, is that right?
A. That is a member of His Majesty’s Coastguard.
Q. That — the COLO is a Coastguard role?
A. I believe so.
Q. There was also a role within Border Force Maritime which was responsible for undertaking a very similar role, a liaison role between the two agencies, is that right?
A. I wouldn’t say it is a similar role to the COLO, if that’s what you mean.
Q. I wonder if you could help us to understand. So we have seen reference to something called a CGLO, a Coastguard Liaison Officer. Is that the role you are talking about within Border Force?
A. I don’t know whether that is the job title, but I — I just make the point that the COLO is a Coastguard role.
Q. Yes.
A. And the Border Force Maritime liaison officer is — works for Border Force. So therefore — I mean, they are both liaison officers so they are similar in that respect, but they work for different organisations and therefore have a different role.
Q. I understand that. I am trying to understand what the arrangements were for liaising in a situation where people who were working on tasking assets in a Channel were at a different site. And you are talking about the importance of the situational awareness picture there, being able to work alongside HM Coastguard.
A. Yes.
Q. In those circumstances, that liaison role is critical, isn’t it?
A. And that — yes, the one of the principles of joint agency working is that, where possible, agencies should be co-located and Border Force Maritime was co-located and is co-located that joint control room now from what I understand. But the tasking authority for Border Force Maritime assets was based in Portsmouth and that was a tasking authority for all of their activity, including but not limited to deploying in support of Operation Deveran.
Q. Okay. As part of your role within JMSC, so before you went to the CCTC, were you involved in marshalling information, situation reports and other information circulated to stakeholders, to assist in planning?
A. That was and is one of the core roles of JMSC, yes.
Q. And at your — at paragraph 47 of your statement, page 17, please, {INQ010134/17}. We can see you talk about one particular aspect of information sharing and planning in advance, and that is Channel crossing assessments. Going down to 47, please, next page, thank you, {INQ010134/18}, we can see there one of the priorities, you say, for the efficient allocation of resources under Op Altair was development of forecasting, essentially, which we have referred to as a RAG rating, a red, amber, green rating. Is that something you had involvement in, in your role?
A. I commissioned that product when — but that was when I was director of the Clandestine Channel Threat Command. I commissioned that product, yes.
Q. So it was something that came in after the CCTC was created and as a result of your work through that organisation?
A. That’s my recollection yes. It was one of the very early tasks that we undertook.
Q. Was the idea of that product that assessing the likelihood of crossings in advance would enable better planning, in order to meet resources and response required?
A. Yes. So I — as I think I say in the statement, this is more than a weather forecast. It is a predictive analysis product that uses historical data and recent data on crossings, as well as data on wave heights and weather conditions. And it gives the — or it gave the likelihood of crossings on three common areas of departure on French beaches and also gave an assessment of whether are our aerial assets were likely to be able to be deployed in any given operational period.
Q. Can you assist us with how the planning or the response was different based on whether a day was classed as, for example, red versus amber, what changed if a day was red?
A. So if a day was red — so, it’s probably helpful to say that the — there were many different operational planning meetings that happened at the strategic, tactical and operational level. So the CCTC had at least weekly and sometimes more frequently meetings with ministers to brief them on all of our work, which would include operational readiness, we would then have a gold call, which would happen at least weekly, sometimes more frequently, which would be chaired by the gold commander for Operation Altair. And then there would be further meetings, including the red day call that the Coastguard chaired, following that at an operational and tactical level. All of which would be looking at this assessment and other intelligence products that we had available to us. And that would be used to deploy land-based resources which relied, at the time, very much on flexible resources from Border Force Immigration Enforcement to make sure that our land-based capability was stood up and ready. It would inform the deployment of surveillance and aerial assets. So we wouldn’t fly missions when it was unlikely that crossings would happen. And it would inform our readiness for maritime assets as well.
Q. I think we can take this off the screen. Was there any formal structure to the response to RAG ratings? So for example, were there minimum requirements for the provision of assets or personnel, or aerial coverage, in response to a red versus an amber day? Was there any policy which set out how the response should be different based on that assessment?
A. It — it wasn’t a rigid, set in stone, operational model and it would change based on lots of different aspects, including things that might be happening elsewhere in — so, you know, for policing, for Border Force, for Immigration Enforcement, these were multi-functional people and multi-functional assets, as were the aircraft and — and other aspects of the deployment. So it certainly wasn’t set in stone, but there was a lot of planning that went into it and there was a very regular drum beat of meetings that gave assurance around whether we thought we had the optimum deployment of assets, based on what was available at the time.
Q. So rather than being set in stone, it was a matter for the individual judgment and discussion of those attending planning meetings?
A. That’s right.
Q. Thank you. I want to understand a bit more about your specific role within the CCTC, if I can. We don’t need to go to it, but in your statement you say that your primary responsibility was making small boat crossings unviable. That’s at 23 of your statement. Could we turn to a document called {INQ001960/1}, please. This is a letter dated 12 August 2020, I think addressed to you from the Home Secretary, on your appointment to your role as the first director of the CCTC?
A. Yes.
Q. We can see that it mirrors there, in bold, what you have said in your statement, that your key objective will be to make small boat crossings of the Channel unviable. Can I ask what your understanding of that objective was, what did it mean to make crossings of the Channel unviable?
A. So, I and the Clandestine Channel Threat Command interpreted that through the campaign plan, which we formulated very early on in the creation of CCTC. And that described the different pillars of activity that we needed to undertake if we were to get to the point where migrants were making a different decision about whether to cross the Channel or not, organised crime gangs found it too difficult and not profitable enough to operate in northern France, to completely control the maritime environment and save lives and so on. So it is, it’s not a short form response in terms of what unviable means, but the campaign plan articulated that in quite a lot of detail.
Q. If we turn over the page, {INQ001960/2}, we can see a list of different objectives and taskings for you as part of that role, quite a long list of different areas of focus.
A. Yes.
Q. Were these matters you were working directly on in your role or were you delegating to different department leads with specific responsibilities?
A. So I — I was overseeing all of this work at a strategic level, but I delegated different elements of it to different directors within my team and through relationships that we had across Government.
Q. If we go to the sixth bullet point down, we can see that one of your areas of work was to: “Be responsible for the direct tasking and co-ordination of all Home Office operational capabilities dedicated to tackling Small Boats and other forms of clandestine entry.” And then you can see there, it lists responsibility for: “Border Force maritime assets in the Channel assigned to small boats activity – currently one cutter and two … CPVs [and it says] operational accountability [continues] to rest with [the] commanders).”
A. (Nods).
Q. Looking below that, we can see that you were responsible for acting as the overall Home Office lead engagement on small boats issues with other maritime agencies, including the MCA and other organisations.
A. Yes.
Q. Is it right, therefore, that your work directly touched on the practical operational response to small boats in the Channel?
A. Very much so, yes.
Q. And that you were responsible for leading on engagement with the MCA in relation to that area of work?
A. Yes, that’s right and I had an extremely good relationship with the MCA, probably the best operational relationship I had across all of those responsibilities that you see there.
Q. And how did you communicate with the MCA? How did you build that relationship?
A. I would say, I had regular meetings with the exec team at the Coastguard agency, relatively informal ones, but they were also part of the governance of the delivery of our campaign plan. And we — all of those planning meetings that I just mentioned, bar the ministerial meetings, there would be a Coastguard presence at those, from what I remember. And then, you know, a series of — you know, we were co-located at the Coastguard MCC in Dover, so we had informal contact with the Coastguard on a daily basis.
Q. Could we turn back to your statement, please, page 9, paragraph 26, {INQ010134/9}. You are telling us about the taskings you were undertaking as part of your role in the CCTC and you say: “One of the key lines of effort … was to ‘control’ the maritime environment in the Channel …” What does “control” mean in that context?
A. Well, when I was appointed in August 2020, the — the operation in the Channel was getting — it was getting to the point where it was difficult to know where all of the boats were in the Channel, where they were landing, how we were going to disembark migrants from boats onto the land. I remember very clearly a day that I went down there in the summer and we had, I think, six or seven beach landings simultaneously, you know, from Folkestone all the way down to Dungeness and it was pretty chaotic, in truth. And so a really early priority was to grip that and control it, to generate really clear situational awareness of what was going on in the Channel, to improve co-ordination and communication between all of the different agencies that were responsible for different parts of it and ensuring that the — the — every stage from intercepting migrants close to the median line, through to point in which we were moving them into asylum accommodation was a continuous and smooth process.
Q. And we can see that, sort of, elaborated in this paragraph. You say: “In order it achieve this …” So four lines down: “… it was necessary to deliver changes in the UK government’s ability to …” And then you list a number of, sort of, tasks that would help you to control the maritime environment in the Channel.
A. That’s right.
Q. So you mention delivering changes in the UK Government’s ability to identify the location of vessels in the Channel as early as possible.
A. (Nods).
Q. Then the second is to continue to track them, once identified. So that’s going to that situational awareness you were talking about, is that right?
A. Yes, and it’s fair to say of all of those different tasks, different agencies have different levels of priority attached to those. So identifying vessels in the Channel and intercepting them is, you know, something that’s extremely important to the Coastguard agency, it is very important to the Home Office. Conversely, whether a boat lands in an uncontrolled fashion on a beach or not, less of a concern to the Coastguard because they may well do that completely safely. Much more of a concern to Kent Police and the local community and a great concern to us in Immigration Enforcement because it spread our people and assets over a huge area as we sought to — to collect all of those migrants and move them to a central location. Again, collecting intelligence from — to begin the process of prosecuting facilitators and the people who put those migrants in such a dangerous situation in the first place, very important to the Home Office, very important to the National Crime Agency, much less so to others. And so all of the assets that we used, whether they were aerial assets, surveillance assets, surface assets and the people, needed to be balanced across all of those priorities. Hence the need for interoperability and the joint control room, the co-ordination structure that was provided Operation Altair and all times recognising that safety of life at sea had primacy over everything else.
Q. And we can see, if we go on to another one there, which is to: “… have sufficient surface assets to intercept and rescue the vessels.” It’s fair to say, that’s one that was a priority for both the Home Office and HM Coastguard, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you help me to understand what was achieved in relation to each of those different aspects in your time at the CCTC? So talking about from when you were appointed August 2020, through to the night of Incident Charlie, November 2021. Starting with the first one: identifying the location of vessels in the Channel. What steps were taken by the CCTC to improve that capability to gain situational awareness in the Channel?
A. Yes, I think it’s important to say, and I think Mr Whitton sort of alluded to this in his evidence this morning, that surface assets are extremely important, but they are not the game-changer in terms of controlling the maritime environment. The game-changer is surveillance and technological surveillance. And in fact, when I was appointed, the first appointment that I made in my team was a Chief Technology Officer to deliver on these requirements, and we defined them very early on. And we got to the point, I would say, probably in mid-2022/late 2022 when most of those aspects were in place and we had a level of situational awareness that started by predicting with a very high level of accuracy where boats are going to leave from France and when, to have complete situational awareness of where all the vessels are in the Channel and to be able to continue to track them. And that is delivered today by a combination of the assets that were — the aerial assets that were planned to be deployed on the night, so two 2Excel aircraft operating early in the night right on the median line, two further 2Excel aircraft operating slightly later in the night over UK territorial waters. And then two UAVs, drones, operating much closer to the shoreline in the daylight hours. So that that was already in place in November 2023 and it is extremely unfortunate that on the night, none of those assets, apart from one of the drones for a short period of time, was actually able to deploy. So all of those were in — in place. We were also developing, at some considerable pace, a predictive intelligence capability which is in place today, shore-based persistent detection capability — and by “persistent”, I mean it is always there, rather than something that is flying on a — high risk periods of time. And some other drone capability that could be deployed from — from the back of boats. And indeed, further tasking lines on those existing drones that were in place in November. We now have additional tasking lines from those and a third drone, the AR4, which is now operational. So it is a very comprehensive surveillance capability. And, I mean, it would be unwise to talk in absolutes, but I think it’s fair to say if these circumstances that happened on the night of the 23 November happened again today, one could provide a fairly high level of assurance that the outcome would have been different. Cold comfort, I know, to the — to the families of those who died that night, but I make the point to illustrate that we were on a trajectory of capability development at that point in time. We had delivered a lot of that surveillance capability in November 2021. But the key element that was not in place was the surveillance capability that was both persistent and not affected by low cloud, which is in place today.
Q. And by that, you are referring to, for example, aerial assets that were able to conduct surveillance in adverse weather conditions, is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. I want to ask a little bit about surface assets, if I can. We know, we have heard in evidence, that Border Force owned and deployed the assets used for search and rescue in the Channel by HM Coastguard, but as you have just been discussing, capability development fell within the role of the CCTC, is that right? It was part of your role developing the capabilities you have just been telling us about?
A. I mean, a lot of the capability development I referred to was a shared endeavour between us and the Coastguard. And in fact, the — although we were deploying some of those aircraft ourselves through a direct tasking line, they were on a contract that was owned by the Coastguard, so it was very much a joint endeavour.
Q. Understood. I want to ask you specifically about cutters, if I can. Could we turn to page 24 of your statement, paragraph 66 {INQ010134/24}. So you give us a little context about cutters. You say: “From 2018 to early 2021, [Border Force] cutters and … CPVs provided coverage for migrant operations in the Channel.” That’s coastal patrol vessels. You say: “It was recognised from early on in the small boats situation that cutters were unsuited to the task of rescuing migrants.” Then you tell us a little about the reasons why they were unsuited. They were designed for law enforcement, they had limited deck space, they didn’t have much sheltered accommodation, so people who were being embarked were often exposed to the elements. And you say: “CPVs, which came into service in 2016 and 2018, were similarly ill equipped for migrant rescue. [And] accordingly, new solutions were being explored …” If it was recognised by the Home Office, from early on in that period, that cutters were not suitable for search and rescue, why were we still reliant on cutters as a significant part of that search and rescue response three years later, in 2021?
A. Yes, so I would say that the CPVs and the cutters — I mean, it is a fact, neither of those vessels were designed for migrant rescue. They had some characteristics which were helpful. They were pretty fast, both of them for instance, but actually the fact that they are fast is a disadvantage in that it means they are not very stable. So they can get out to sea relatively quickly. They are not particularly stable and actually getting migrants of their boats and onto CPVs and cutters is quite — is quite challenging. I think given those limitations, from 2018 to probably early 2020, Border Force Maritime did a pretty good job with them and they were good enough for the job. But by the time I was appointed in August 2020, it was becoming more challenging and we set about looking for alternative models pretty much as soon as the CCTC was established. The first proposal that we worked through is emergency rescue vessel, which we were pretty close to deploying, but — but ended up going with a different alternative in — in the end.
Q. I am going to ask you about that in due course.
A. And so the — the CTV was — was made available and that was both because it was much more suitable. It had a bigger are deck space, it was still pretty fast, but it was very stable. But also market availability was an important factor, so these are the same vessels as take commercial organisations out to wind farms and that sort of thing and there are lot of them in the market. So it was — it was easier to deploy those more quickly.
Q. Just coming back to that question. If it was recognised early on that they were unsuited — the cutters were unsuited, I mean, you say there new solutions were explored between 2020 and 2022. Why weren’t steps taken, once the recognition was there that they were not suited, to obtain alternatives to use for search and rescue? We are in a situation where the cutters were still the primary relied upon response asset for search and rescue three years down the line. How did that come about?
A. Yes, so I think the point I am making in my statement really is that they are not designed for that task, but as I have said, I think that all of those limitations accepted, Border Force Maritime did a good enough job with them up until about 2020 when the strain was really starting to show and the numbers started increasing quite dramatically. And so when I was appointed and the CCTC was created we set about finding a replacement very quickly and we deployed the CTV as a trial because of course, it had never been used in this type of environment before, in — in sort of spring/summer 2021.
Q. I might be able to assist you there. If we turn to the next page, 25 {INQ010134/25} and look at paragraph 69 you tell us there about the CTV and you say it was brought into live service in July 2021. I think we have heard some evidence that it was being trialled in April of 2021.
A. That’s right.
Q. Can you help us with the difference between a CTV and a CPV?
A. Yes. So the CPV is a relatively small, fast vessel. It’s — it’s sort of like a large RHIB, that’s a rigid hull inflatable boat, but it has a structure on it. They were used, as I understand it, originally to transport people out to oil rigs. So again, they are pretty fast, but they are really unstable, in terms of they roll a lot in the water. Sorry, “unstable” is probably the wrong word. They roll a lot in the water, so they are not — they don’t have great stability. They are very light. A CTV is twin-hulled platform. It’s much larger. It has a much higher wheelhouse and crucially, it has sheltered accommodation — well, I say accommodation. There is space inside it to accommodate migrants, which there isn’t on a cutter or a CPV.
Q. Now we know that in practice on the night of the 23 to 24 November 2021 the CTV was not available and in fact, the assets that were available, there were no drones, no CTV, there was a cutter, the Valiant, which we have heard about, and a single CPV which I think is called the Hunter, which would be potentially available for deployment. Are you able to assist us with how that situation came about? That despite this work to try and improve capabilities, on that night when it came down to it, there was only one cutter and one CPV available?
A. Well, I think Mr Whitton has sort of dealt with this partially in his evidence. The — I mean, there was a — it’s worth sort of explaining that the point in time in November 2021, there was an increase, undoubtedly, in the number of migrants arriving in the UK by small boat throughout that year. But that point in time in November was extremely unusual in terms of the number of boats, 209, that crossed in November 2021. More boats crossed in November 2021 than in any month in the history of small boats arrivals, despite the fact it was a winter month. And so the deployment of Border Force Maritime assets that you have just described throughout most of that year was adequate. It was — we were starting to feel pressure, absolutely, but the expectation was that when we went into the winter months there would be an easing of the numbers because that’s what had happened in every other year. We actually had extremely accurate predictions of the number of migrants that had crossed the Channel in any given month, to sort of minus 3% accuracy, and that proved to be completely inaccurate in November 2021. So we, of course, had started thinking about what the deployment pattern for the following year might look like and we had discussed alternatives with ministers at that point, but we hadn’t deployed them yet because, frankly, we did not expect November 2021 to be quite as exceptionally busy as it actually was.
MS WOODS: I do want to ask you very briefly about drones. I am mindful of the time. I think I can do that very briefly and then we can turn for a break, if that is suitable, Chair?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes.
MS WOODS: Thank you. If we can turn to paragraph 70 of this page, you can see it down the bottom there, you talk about UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles, otherwise known as drones. And you tell us that drones were contracted from a company called Tekever, that they were — you tell us about their equipment. And that they were used to locate migrant boats and produce images of suspected facilitators and boats and migrants themselves. You go on to tell us, I don’t think we need to turn to it, essentially, that they could update Border Force officers in realtime when they found vessels at sea?
A. They could update anybody who was in the JCR, which would include Border Force officers, yes.
Q. Once again, we know that the drones weren’t available on 23 to 24 November. I want to understand what the Plan B was. What would the Home Office do, when that capability was not available on a given night, what was the backup, or the alternative?
A. For completeness, I think one of the drones did fly for a short period of time at 07:30 in the morning of the 24th.
Q. In the morning. But I am talking about the overnight —
A. But in the period in question, you are absolutely right, they didn’t fly. And the Plan B, as the MAIB described it, is a very important question. That Plan B is in place today, in terms of the much more sophisticated aircraft capability that we have flying over the Channel and the challenge really was how you could a) fly when there is low-lying cloud, how you could actually take off from an airport in low-lying cloud, and then how you could see through that cloud to deliver that capability. That, that Plan B is delivered today through that more sophisticated aerial asset and through the shore-based persistent surveillance that I described earlier. I think it is fair to say that the — the technical challenge of delivering that was immense and we went all over the world, spoke to companies — technology companies all over the world, spoke to military, and all sorts of things to actually get to the point where we could find a capability that could deliver that reliably. It is a regret that that was not in place in November 2021, but we were developing and trying to deliver that capability at some pace.
Q. So is it fair to say that on that night, that capability was being developed, it was in train, but actually in the moment, there was no Plan B which could be deployed in the event that the drones couldn’t be used?
A. That’s correct.
MS WOODS: Chair, if that’s a suitable moment for a break?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. So just 10 minutes. Thanks very much. (3.06 pm) (A short break) (3.16 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Ms Woods.
MS WOODS: Thank you very much, sir. I want to understand a little, if I can, about what was known within the Home Office about the situation in the Channel and the increase in small boats over time. Could we turn to your statement, page 23, paragraph 64, please, {INQ010134/23}. You say there: “Having commenced my CCTC role in the summer of 2020, my initial assessment was that the problem of small boats would continue to get worse without a significant shift in our approach across operations, communications, policy and legislation.” And you say: “Given the number of red days would decrease in the winter, any red day should be expected to be busy with a surge of crossings.” Earlier, I think you mentioned that the expectation in general was that winter would be less busy, there would be a decrease in the winter in terms of crossings because of the weather, is that right?
A. Yes, and that has proven to be the case, I think, in every other year, bar 2021.
Q. And what you are saying here is that you anticipated that, given the fewer favourable days available in the winter for crossing, the expectation was that where a red day arose in the winter, it would be busier. You say: “Given the number of red days would decrease in the winter …”
A. Yes.
Q. “… any red day should be expected to be busy a surge of crossings.”
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. Is it fair to say this means that the crossings in the winter were more concentrated into those fewer days when it was possible to cross, because of the conditions?
A. That’s right.
Q. This is something you recognised in 2020 when you first joined the CCTC. We know that in preparation for that winter, for December 2020, you drafted a submission for the Home Secretary.
A. Yes.
Q. Can we turn to that submission. It is {INQ008338/1}. So we can see your name up there in the top corner and the date, 3 December 2020, and if we turn to page 2 {INQ008338/2}, looking at paragraph 3, we can see a very similar assessment here: “Our professional assessment of clandestine activity over the winter period is that we will see an increase of small boats arrivals, likely concentrated on a single day with favourable conditions.” So you are saying the same thing to the Home Secretary, essentially: we think it is going to increase in general and we think in the winter months, it is going to be more contract concentrated on the days when conditions are favourable. Is that right?
A. It’s — it says that the — there will be an increase on a single day. It doesn’t say it would necessary in general, I don’t think.
Q. You say: “Our professional assessment of clandestine activity over the winter period is that we will see an increase of small boats arrivals …”
A. Sorry, yes, it does say that.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. If we can turn to page 13 {INQ008330/13}, please, we can see there is a section talking about what happens at sea. You say the response by Border Force maintained throughout the year, doesn’t change in winter. Then it talks about some of the specific risks of crossings in the winter time. It says: “Given the increased risk of hypothermia during the crossing attempts in winter it is imperative that events are responded to quickly.” So it was recognised as early as 2020 that crossings in the winter entailed greater risk to the persons crossing because of hypothermia, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you go on to say: “The availability of aerial surveillance assets significantly enhances the operational co-ordination [of the MCA] facilitating the quick identification of vessels.” I think that touches on what you were saying before about the importance of situational awareness and the role which aerial surveillance plays in that, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Essentially, it is easier to find small boats in the Channel if aerial assets are available for surveillance?
A. Yes.
Q. And it acknowledges there, the topic we were talking about immediately before the break, that there would be days when aerial assets could not be deployed. There, it says due to poor visibility.
A. Yes.
Q. In those instances, it is likely we will see beach landings?
A. Yes.
Q. So even a year in advance, it was known that where the aerial surveillance wasn’t able to be in place, due to weather for example, that the result would be a detrimental impact to the situational awareness, or the recognised maritime picture in the Channel?
A. Yes.
Q. You set out there, in the next paragraph down, the standard deployment. You say: “We have a standard deployment of one Cutter (with 10 crew) and 2 Coastal Patrol vessels (with 5 crew on each) available in the South East everyday throughout the whole year working from both Ramsgate and Dover.” And you go on to talk about how it is different for red days and a second cutter which can be deployed within 12 hours if operationally necessary?
A. Yes.
Q. And four RHIBs in addition, working out of Dover on red days when the risk of crossings was high. Can I ask, you talk about this being the standard deployment. What did that mean? Was that a minimum requirement? Was it a target to be met by Border Force? Was it the expectation for, sort of, every day of the year as you say?
A. I — I mean I think it means — what it — what it says there. Standard deployment was a cutter and two coastal patrol vessels and at that time, that was considered sufficient to respond to the level of demand that we were experiencing.
Q. Was it, therefore, a target to aim for, sufficient level of provision, or was it a minimum requirement that had to be met in order for safe provision of response to search and rescue?
A. It was the standard deployment at — at the time. I wouldn’t recognise it as being a minimum deployment or a target to reach, it was the standard deployment that was considered adequate for the demand that we were experiencing at the time.
Q. Did the Home Office, or CCTC, or Border Force track whether that standard deployment was being met over time? Did it monitor days when there was — that standard was not met?
A. So, as I said earlier, there was a very regular rhythm of meetings, operational co-ordination meetings, at the strategic, operational and tactical level and had those requirements not been met, or more importantly, had those requirements proved to be inadequate, we certainly would have known about it and we would have sought to adjust the deployments.
Q. We know that on 23 to 24 November, overnight, that the standard deployment there — listed there, was not met. What was the response by the Home Office? What should have been done where that standard deployment couldn’t be met on a given day? Particularly a red day, as the 23 to 24th became?
A. So I think that — can you remind me of the date of this submission?
Q. Yes, of course. This is a submission from the 3 December 2020.
A. Yes. So I think that the standard deployment had changed by November 2021. So we had — so we had a cutter, a coastal patrol vessel and a CTV on that night. So I wouldn’t — I wouldn’t agree that the standard deployment wasn’t met. It was different at that point.
Q. We know that there was no CTV that night. There was one cutter and one CPV, so even applying this —
A. I think the CTV was available later in the —
Q. I think during the day, but not overnight is what we have seen. We can bring it up, if that’s helpful.
A. I would define the deployment period as from the early hours of the morning, in the night, through to daylight hours. And we need to cover the entire period because a lot of the boats would commonly be landing right up until, I would say at this time, probably around midday. And then, as the small boat threat evolved, even into after the afternoon and early evening. So there were three — there were three assets available, one of which was a CTV which had a higher lift capacity than the assets that we are looking at here and we had to deploy them in a way that ensured that we had coverage across the whole of the operational period, not just the night.
Q. So to be clear, when you talk about a standard deployment, that’s not for a shift, that’s for a full 24-hour period?
A. Well, it’s for the period in which small boats are likely to be in UK waters, which is both night and the day.
Q. I am so sorry. I am sure it’s me misunderstanding. Could you assist me with what the period for a standard deployment of this kind is?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Is it a set period of time for a given day, is it a 24-hour period? How does it work?
A. So it’s dynamic depending on when small boats enter UK waters. So typically around this time, I would estimate, based on what I’ve seen around the aerial deployments and when they were in — when they were deployed, we were looking at an operational period of around midnight to 01:00 am and that might extend up to midday the next day, in daylight hours, but I — I give that as an example rather than telling you exactly what the deployment period was at that time. And also it was reactive. So we would be relying — so the first deployment of a Border Force vessel would occur when we became aware that there was a small boat entering UK waters and then those deployments would continue and as I said, sometimes into the early evening and even — you know, even the operational periods would sometimes run into each other. So you would have a 24-hour period. That’s why we don’t deploy all three of assets at the same time because as soon as you deploy them the clock starts ticking on the hours that the crews are able to operate safely and if you deployed all three of them at the beginning of the night, you would then have none later in the day.
Q. Understood. So if the period changed, based on when the small boats were likely to arrive, and was determined on an ad hoc basis, how could you plan for a standard deployment, not knowing in advance what those times were likely to be?
A. So what the standard deployment is describing is the vessels that will be available when they are required in any, let’s say, a 24-hour period for the sake of argument. But they would be deployed when required on a reactive basis. And that’s also the reason that we — you know, we didn’t patrol proactively. Because if we had sent one of these vessels out, or Valiant out proactively in anticipation of a small boat arriving, we — we then start burning through the crew’s hours as soon as they go out to sea and there may not be any boats there for them to rescue or intercept, or as Mr Whitton said this morning, if that vessel happened to be in Dungeness and the first small boat is up near Folkestone or somewhere, then you could be three hours away or maybe — you know, more — you know, you could be in completely the wrong place. So you would be burning up sea hours for no benefit whatsoever.
Q. What was the plan for when the standard deployment couldn’t be met?
A. Well, in this case, it was the standby cutter, I think it says there: “In addition, we have a second Cutter (with 10 crew) available to be deployed [in] the area within 12 hours notice if operationally necessary.”
Q. I think that is part of that standard deployment provision. It is saying: we have a standard deployment and you have the cutter to be deployed. I am saying when you couldn’t meet that requirement, and we have heard that was a reoccurring problem during 2021. There were strained resources and it was often difficult to ensure there were sufficient personnel or assets. If that standard deployment couldn’t be met, what should Border Force be doing, what should Home Office be doing?
A. Border Force has a larger fleet than what’s detailed there and we would — and we did — we would have conversations with Border Force Maritime and my operational commanders would have conversations with Border Force Maritime on an ongoing basis. And it might be necessary to deploy another asset in from another location around the UK and they did that on occasion.
Q. Okay. Looking at the submission, we can see quite a few of the risk factors which did, in fact, eventuate in November 2021. Winter, the cold, the increased crossings on a red day, and the increasing crossings over time, recognised about a year in advance. Now, we know, of course, that the number of small boats increased even more dramatically than I think anybody expected in the course of 2021. But looking at your statement, I don’t think we need to turn to it, but paragraph 78 you say month by month, the CCTC accurately predicted arrivals for the entire year of 2021 up to October. It was foreseeable, wasn’t it, that more assets would be required by the end of 2021 than those which were available in 2020?
A. What we foresaw was that in 2022 we would likely need more assets. What we definitely did not foresee, and I — I am strongly of the opinion it was not foreseeable, just how unusual the level of boats and migrants arriving was in November 2021. It is — it has still, to date, not been matched despite the overall numbers in a year being much higher, there has never been a month where 209 boats have crossed the Channel. We did not foresee that and I would argue it was not foreseeable.
Q. The risk from the winter months, the overall increase in the number of crossings and the increase on red days in winter, was foreseen, wasn’t it?
A. I mean, I am looking at this submission now and thinking all of those things are self evidential true. What is not foreseen is the scale of the numbers. So, you know, is the risk higher in winter? Of course, that is a common sense deduction that you can make. But applying right number of assets and people to the scale of the threat is a much more difficult thing to predict and despite the fact that we were very good at predicting numbers at that time, we did not predict what happened in November 2021.
Q. I appreciate the scale of the increase in that month was not predicted, but as we have seen in this submission, the fact that there would be a general increase was predicted. And I want to understand what was done to obtain more assets in preparation for that recognised increase?
A. So I — I agree that we predicted that crossings would be clustered around the red days where crossings were possible. I mean I am, I’m — I certainly — I mean, I am reading it and thinking, you know: did we say that crossings would increase generally through the winter months? I mean, I wouldn’t agree with that. I don’t — that wasn’t the sense that I was certainly giving at the time. I can see how that might be intended from that, but I — certainly none of our models said: you should expect more arrivals in the winter. Because that generally had never happened and has never happened since.
Q. If we go back to page 2, paragraph 3, {INQ008330/2}, it does say that in terms, doesn’t it?
A. I can —
Q. “Our professional assessment of clandestine activity over the winter period is that we will see an increase of small boats arrivals …”
A. Yes, I am reading that now and I can see that that is what it says. But I think in general terms, that is not what we were predicting or planning for. In every other year, before and since, the overall number of arrivals and then overall number of boats has decreased during the winter, but it’s certainly true that they tend to cluster around the few red days that are available. But I would just go back to what I said earlier, that November 2021 was a complete anomaly and I — I — I don’t think — my professional opinion is that it was not predictable what happened on that — in that month.
Q. Winter or summer, it was predicted and recognised in 2020, that there would be a steady increase — or continuing increase, perhaps not steady, but a continuing increase in the number of crossings?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to understand what was done in that period to obtain additional resourcing, to meet that increased demand?
A. Yes. Well, I mean, a huge amount was done over that period. I have talked about the surveillance capability, both aerial surveillance, intelligence capability and other things. So a huge amount was in place in November 2021 that was not in place at the time that I wrote this submission, particularly in terms of aerial surveillance.
Q. Just —
A. We also had a crew transfer vessel that we had brought in to service and we had also explored a number of other capabilities which we eventually ruled out. We had built the Western Jet Foil, which was a much more fit for purpose landside accommodation site. So a huge amount had been done in the 12 months between — or the 11 months between the submission being written and November 2021.
Q. I am really asking about surface assets because we heard from Mr Whitton this morning that in that period from 2018 through to November 2021, that single CTV was the only additional surface asset obtained in that period of time. Why isn’t this submission, or the other submissions that have been disclosed to the Inquiry, why isn’t it asking for additional assets, additional funding, additional resourcing?
A. Well, I think during 2021, and for most of the year, the asset surface provision was sufficient for what was being experienced. It — it certainly didn’t feel sufficient in November 2021 and you have heard a lot of evidence to support that. But as I say, if I had known, if we had known, and if we had predicted what was going to happen in November 2021, I am sure we would have been — we would have been introducing additional capability for surface assets more quickly than we actually did.
Q. Your submission — I think, in fact, it is best to go to it in your statement. Can we turn to your statement at page 25, paragraph 68, please, {INQ010134/25}. But both that submission and your statement refer to your efforts to obtain something called an “ERV”, an Emergency Rescue Vehicle and I think you raised this earlier in evidence and I mentioned we would come back to it. So it explains there, in 68, you say: “CCTC explored an entirely new operating model for migrant rescue … with the introduction of an emergency rescue vehicle …” You say it could be: “… used as a ‘mothership’ with a number of tasks previously conducted on shore being moved [onto the ERV], which would be positioned in the centre of [and] operating area, close to the median line.” You say that that meant that the amount of time Border Force vehicles spent at sea could be increased because it was reducing the transits back and forth from Dover and alleviating pressure on the shore facilities. Can you tell us a little bit about this ERV? Was this a project you initiated when you came to the CCTC?
A. Yes. So we were looking at capability development in a number of different areas, shoreside, in terms of surface assets, in terms of aerial assets, as I said earlier. This was a concept which could solve a number of problems at the same time. So the infrastructure at Tug Haven, as my statement says, was entirely inadequate for the purpose we needed it for. Offloading migrants at Tug Haven was extremely difficult and slow, and we recognised that the transit time from Dover out to the operational area and back again was something that we could potentially reduce with this platform. So this was a very big or relatively big ship with a flat-deck where we could replicate some of the processes that we conducted at Tug Haven at sea and the model was predicated on the basis that as you noted in my statement that the rescue vessels could spend less time transiting, depending on where the migrant vessel actually was.
Q. Does this mean that it was a vessel which could take a larger number of people disembarked from small boats?
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. So effectively, they could be rescued by the rescue vessels and then dropped off on the ERV and some elements of the processing could be undertaken there?
A. Correct.
Q. I want to look at another document, please — actually, no, let’s stay here if we can, apologies. You explain here that this proposal was not approved by ministers, at the end of that paragraph, and therefore did not progress to live operational delivery. And I think we can just do this on the basis of your statement. Are you able to say anything about why that didn’t progress? I think you said earlier this morning that it got quite advanced, you went a long way in pursuing this as an option.
A. That’s right.
Q. What happened?
A. So my understanding at the time was that ministers felt that it would, effectively, act as a magnet for migrants. Because it was such a large visible platform, that it might in fact encourage migrants to cross the Channel rather than deter them.
Q. When you say “encourage to cross the Channel”, do you mean those who had already set out would seek to go to the ERV, or do you mean it would not act as a deterrent to crossings in the Channel?
A. I think both, yes.
Q. And —
A. That was my understanding at the time.
Q. — part of your role was to ensure that crossings were not viable. Was it considered that this was counter to that objective?
A. That was my understanding of the response from ministers at the time, yes.
Q. Thank you. Could we turn, now, to {INQ007125/1}. This is a submission we looked at this morning with Mr Whitton, a submission dated 23 December 2021, so we are moving forward in time somewhat. And we can see your name up the top. What does “SCS” mean next to your name?
A. Senior Civil Servant.
Q. Was this a submission which you played a role in drafting?
A. I would have thought so, yes. Yes.
Q. We can see it’s gone out in your name but would you have seen drafts and preparations of this?
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. We can see the issue is set out there on page 1: “UK Government has an inadequate number of surface assets to deliver SOLAS operations in 2022. This presents a significant threat to life.” And the proposal then is to move provision to the Coastguard agency to mitigate this threat, free up Border Force Maritime to focus on its core role of border security. This seems to mark a different — a different concern being raised with the Home Secretary at this time compared to the submission we looked at from a year prior. This is the first time we are starting to see concerns being raised about an inadequate number of surface assets. When was that recognised? When did that first start to be raised?
A. I think, as 2021 went on and we started modelling what we thought was going to happen in 2022 based on the increasing amount of data we had available and the improved intelligence, we recognised that this threat was going to get worse and the numbers were going to increase and if that was the case, the — the asset provision that we had, in terms of surface assets, which was already proving to be put under a significant amount of strain was going to be insufficient the following year.
Q. We can see that reflected at paragraph 1 under “Discussion” there: “There has been a significant increase in the number of migrants crossing the Channel with the 2020/2021 yearly total already more than 25,000.” You say: “The increased volume of crossings is now regularly overwhelming existing [Border Force] Maritime and [RNLI, I think that’s meant to be] assets.”
A. Yes.
Q. You say RNLI has resorted to the deployment of a mothballed asset: “… we anticipate crossing attempts in 2022 will exceed those in 2021.” Looking down at “3”, we can see you saying that: “[Border Force] have continued to support the MCGA coordinated search and rescue operation as numbers have increased but this is not the primary role of [Border Force] Maritime and their fleet is not suited to the role.” This was something that was clearly recognised here in December 2021. Presumably, this submission comes against the background of discussions with senior colleagues, meetings and planning? When was it first recognised that this is not a fleet that is suited to the role of search and rescue?
A. I think as I said fairly early on in the small boats phenomenon, it was recognised that fleet that we were using was designed for a different task, but was adequate in the first few years for delivering what we needed it to. I think as 2021 went on, it became much clearer that we needed a different type of surface asset to deliver the lift capacity that we needed to and to mitigate the weather-related hypothermia risk that happened in the winter. And frankly, we just needed more boats.
Q. Turning on to page 2 {INQ007125/2}, we can see the three options that we discussed in evidence this morning with Mr Whitton. Option 1, maintaining the status quo; option 2 bolstering the current effort by Border Force with additional support from contractors, but remaining under Home Office contracts and command; and then option 3, returning Border Force Maritime vessels and staff to border security work while significantly increasing the use of contractors and essentially, passing responsibility for that work over to HM Coastguard. And it’s clear here that it is that third option which you were endorsing in this submission?
A. (Nods).
Q. My first question is: were there discussions with HM Coastguard about this proposal to shift responsibility, this option 3?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the position of HM Coastguard, as you understood it from those discussions?
A. I think, ultimately, this was always going to be a ministerial decision. It was an extremely high profile subject that involved a number of Government departments. And whether that responsibility was going to shift from one department of the Home Office to the Coastguard and therefore the Department of Transport was always ultimately going to be a ministerial decision. So we had conversations at an operational level, a senior operational level about whether this could be a viable option and we — we discussed how we would execute on the plan if ministers approved it. But I don’t think there was a very strong feeling in either organisation about which was the right course of action as such from an operational point of view because really what I was concerned about and I am sure what the Coastguard were concerned about was that we had sufficient assets to save lives in the Channel, you know, who actually was responsible for those is really a — a political decision.
Q. Did you believe at the time that option 3 was the right cause of action to achieve that?
A. I think it was very finely balanced. I think the reason that we recommended that course of action was because, you know, we were sort of getting to the point where the Home Office would have, you know, in — in procuring a large number of CTVs which have no other role apart from saving lives at sea, we were sort of crossing the line where we were saying: you know, we are in this for the long-run here, and we are going to procure a set of vessels that have no law enforcement role or very, very limited law enforcement role and moving it to HM Coastguard could allow more of a long-term capability investment. That said, it wouldn’t be a quick process, you know, Border Force Maritime was well suited to deliver this capability because it had all of the assurance and health and safety and training and governance that’s required to operate maritime vessels and the Coastguard didn’t have that because — and doesn’t have that because it doesn’t operate any maritime vessels. So if — if it were the right answer, you know, it would have taken a very long time. And hence, I go back to the point I made earlier for me, as an operational commander, my priority was to make sure that we had sufficient assets and we didn’t, at the time. So really it was finely balanced. Either of these recommendations I think would have given us that.
Q. In fact we know that option 2, we heard this morning, was the option which was adopted.
A. Well, I think just to clarify that point. I mean that — that is what happened. I don’t recall getting a formal response to this submission. That’s not to say that I didn’t, but in fact, it was superseded by operational primacy of the Ministry of Defence. And therefore, you know, whether option 2 was actually approved or not is a moot point. We went on to have — we contracted five CTVs, we still have five CTVs, but the decision-making around that and the options analysis around that, from my recollection, was superseded by military primacy.
Q. You have anticipated exactly my next question. So was there a positive decision within the Home Office to choose one of these three options, or was it the default because events overtook it with Operation Isotrope?
A. As I say, I don’t remember getting ministerial decision on the submission. I suspect it was superseded by military primacy.
Q. I appreciate that you have now left the Home Office and do say if you are unable to answer. But I want to ask whether it remains your view that responsibility for search and rescue in this way and the ownership of assets or the contracting of assets should move from Border Force to HM Coastguard?
A. I –I don’t think I said that was my view. I said from an operational commander’s point of view, my priority was making sure we had sufficient assets and which Government department they belong to is less relevant.
Q. We can see in the submission, you have endorsed the third option rather than the second. It doesn’t say it is equivocal, both will achieve the same outcome and the only priority is to ensure there are sufficient assets. Why here have you endorsed 3 rather than 2?
A. Because I am making a recommendation to ministers and I can see that there is a presentational or political aspect to this as well.
Q. And would you still endorse 3 over 2, in terms of that decision-making?
A. As I said, hypothetical question. I haven’t been in the Home Office for a year, so I can’t really answer it.
Q. Understood. If we could go back to your statement please to paragraph 90, {INQ010134/32}, thank you very much. We can see you are talking about this submission, in fact, we don’t need to go backwards, but this is talking specifically about that submission in December 2021. And you say: “I did not perceive the lack of suitable assets at the time of this submission as being related to an inability to access sufficient funding.” My question is, was that a reason why — I should rephrase that. My question is: if assets had been requested, are you confident that they could have been provided within the funding arrangement which was in place?
A. Yes. I mean, to be entirely transparent, for most of the time that I was director CCTC, we didn’t have a formal budget line. I didn’t often find that funding was a barrier to delivering the capability that we needed because it was such a huge priority for the Home Office and for Government.
Q. Understood. In this paragraph, you go on to say: “[Border Force] found itself providing more [search and rescue] support because of the huge increase in crossings and because of the limited number of assets available from other agencies, in particular, the RNLI. As it became clear that the number of crossings would continue to increase, it was time to plan for the future, to increase the resources available to meet the increasing demand.” Stepping back, the time to plan for the future was, in fact, 2020 or before then, when it first became evident that the crossings were going to increase, wasn’t it? Not 2021 in the wake of Incident Charlie?
A. Yes, I mean, we were always planning for the future. I think the point that I am making in the statement here was really that there became a point in November 2021 where we were — we were planning for 2022 and I think it was the first point at which it became self-evident that we needed a dramatic increase in our lift capacity for surface assets.
Q. Understood. Can I take you to another document now {INQ009671/1}, please. This is the independent review of Border Force which was undertaken by Alexander Downer and it was published, as we can see there, in July of 2022. This report is extensive and there are a broad range of recommendations contained within it. I particularly want to ask you about page 43, paragraph 10.1. Forgive me, it is page 43 down the bottom. No, apologies, that’s page 39. The numbering is different to the numbering on screen. If we can go to paragraph 10.1, apologies to Ankit. So it is two further pages along {INQ009671/47}. There we are. “Recommendations”. These are recommendations in relation to small boats in the Channel.
A. Yes.
Q. And the first recommendation made by the independent reviewer is that: “Border Force Maritime should not be providing an ongoing search and rescue function in the English Channel. Neither Border Force nor Royal Navy vessels are appropriate to this tasking. Appropriate vessels and crews should be sought under contract to conduct this task.” And if we look at the paragraph underneath, we can see that he is saying essentially what that submission we were just looking at from December 2021 was saying; that the vessel should be under the command and control of either the Coastguard or the Royal Navy.
A. (Nods).
Q. This is some time down the track, six months down the track. This is post Operation Isotrope, post the introduction of some new CTVs coming in and yet still, at this stage, we have an independent external reviewer who is making a recommendation, a formal recommendation to the Home Office, that that option 3, the transfer of responsibility for search and rescue, should be considered.
A. Yes. So I think, that — at the point that Mr Downer was actually conducting this review, ie before it was published. It was slightly earlier on. I can’t remember exactly how long it took to — to publish it, but the timeline was probably slightly different. I met with Mr Downer, I think, on three occasions and — and took him out in Dover to show him the operation. And he — he made these comments to me and I reassured him that we were already contracting these vessels, so we had done — so, one part of his recommendation. I mean, ultimately this was a — this was a review commissioned by the Home Secretary. The recommendation that he’s making here is, I think, a political decision rather than an operational decision. It’s not something for — for officials. But yes, I can see — I can see the logic for it and mirrors, to an extent, the advice in that submission, yes.
Q. Are you able to tell us anything about the outcome of this report? Were the recommendations approved, adopted, put into place?
A. I think a number of them were. I can’t say with absolute certainty whether all of them were accepted, but I know the majority of them were.
Q. I think we know that this one was not because this is not —
A. Indeed.
Q. — the change which has been made. Are you able to tell us anything about why that was? Were you involved in discussions or decision-making about this recommendation?
A. So as I said a moment ago, the military primacy sort of superseded the decision-making at the point that I had written the submission we were just looking at. Military primacy then ran for most of the following year and when we — when operational and strategic command was handed back to the Home Office, I don’t recall the issue surfacing again. And it wasn’t sufficiently important at that particular moment in time for us to readdress it. We had what we considered to be sufficient level of surface assets and we had other priorities, I think, at the time to concentrate on.
Q. I do want to ask you a little bit about military primacy, if I can. Can we turn back to your statement, please, the bottom of page 19, paragraph 52, {INQ010134/19}. So we can see you explain something called Operation Isotrope and you say: “Op Isotrope was MoD’s plan for military primacy and control of maritime counter migration operations.” Can you explain Op Isotrope to us in lay terms?
A. So we were informed in December 2022 that the Prime Minister had directed that the military should take overall command of small boats operations. Overall and we set about working out the optimal way in which to do that. The Home Office command structure, essentially, slotted in under the military command structure. In a large part, the operation continued to be delivered as it had been before, but the military provided some resource on the ground, at the Western Jet Foil and thickened our headquarters’ functions and command and control functions, which is a role that they are extremely good at. But in a large part, as I say, the — the operation itself continued to be delivered in a very similar way with similar people and similar assets to how it had been before. There were some additional assets, but they didn’t conduct migrant rescue, they didn’t contribute to the ISR capability that we had in place and were continuing to develop. But it was, you know, very welcome to have additional people in our command structures and there was a lot of skills transfer that happened during that period as well.
Q. If we turn over the page and look at paragraph 53, please, {INQ010134/20}, we can see you saying essentially what you have just told us, which is: “Whilst primacy for the operational response … rested with MoD between [that period], [it] did not lead to any material changes in … frontline operational response to Channel crossings.” You are saying the same personnel were doing the same activities in the same way and operations were managed much as they had been before. You say: “The main contribution of MoD primacy was to add personnel to command and control functions.” Is that what you were just telling us in terms of the changes, shoreside for example, and the change in the leadership structure?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to understand the impact of Isotrope. So if we could turn to {INQ009649/1}, please. This is a statement provided to the Inquiry by the Ministry of Defence. If we turn to page 2 {INQ009649/2}, paragraph 1.8, please, we can see that Op Isotrope is described there in much the same terms. It explains at the very bottom of that paragraph that it took place against a particularly challenging backdrop. There was a near doubling of migrant arrivals from 28,526 in 2021 to 45,755 in 2022. So there is a significant increase in the number of crossings in that period.
A. (Nods).
Q. But this witness says that the number of uncontrolled landings, just above, has decreased in that period from 39 in 2021 to seven in the period when Op Isotrope was operating. You say in your statement, we don’t need to go to it, paragraph 80 you say that the number of deaths decreased significantly metre period of Op Isotrope as well, from 34 dead and two missing in between to just four dead in one incident in the period of Op Isotrope.
A. Yes. Although, just on that point, I am not sure I am drawing a causal link between any of those things in my statement.
Q. No, I don’t understand you to be in your statement. We can go to it, if helpful, but —
A. No, that’s fine. I just wanted to clarify.
Q. It changed statistically in the number of deaths experienced in 2021 versus that period in 2022 when primacy rested with the MoD?
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. What I want to put to you is that, in fact, there was a significant increase in resourcing as a result of the introduction of Op Isotrope, that funding assets and personnel increased dramatically with the change in maritime primacy. Is that something you would agree?
A. The number of CTVs increased. I think that probably would have happened anyway, as you will have seen from the advice that I wrote to the Home Secretary. I think it helped that the military planners originally proposed — I think the evidence this morning was 11, I think they proposed 10 CTVs because the operating model that they were proposing was persistent presence at sea, which is essentially doubling the number of assets that we would have had. I think that was helpful making the argument for additional surface assets. Certainly, I think, it may be more credible coming from the military, in many ways. There was an increase in personnel at the Western Jet Foil, which was certainly very helpful. Elsewhere, the increase in personnel really was around headquarters’s functions. I don’t — I mean, it’s almost impossible to say but I — I think you know the reduction in the number of uncontrolled landings in my view would probably have been delivered anyway because the capabilities that’s required to stop those was not military capability. I am sure the strengthening of our headquarter’s function helped, but I don’t think it was the — the one thing that made that difference and that sort of borne out. Since military primacy has finished, there have been no uncontrolled beach landings whatsoever.
Q. Is it your view that the increase in the provision of surface assets may have contributed to the reduction in uncontrolled beach landings?
A. I don’t think it was a huge factor, in truth. I think, as Mr Whitton said this morning, the game-changer is ISR, it’s not surface assets.
Q. I think we can look at something about the levels of resourcing provided by Op Isotrope. If we turn to page 15 of this statement, I think it is at 17.2 {INQ/009649/15}, 7.2, forgive me. We can see the different assets described there at 7.2. It says: “… additional Defence assets … attributed to responding to small boat migration. These include an offshore patrol vessel, up to six archer-class patrol vessels, one Wildcat helicopter, and three rigid hulled inflatable boats … additional surface personnel … deployed on land …” Which I think you were referring to earlier, to assist Home Office officials in processing. If we turn, then, to 7.3 on the next page, please, {INQ/009649/16}, we can see the MoD was able to obtain an uplift of £50 million for this operation and part of that was used to obtain the additional CTVs, you can see: “… hire [of] five crew transfer vessels and a recovery vessel [which was] safer and more suitable for migrant interceptions …” So there was an increase in the budget as a result of the specific budget allocated to Op Isotrope and part of that budgeting was used to obtain additional surface assets, is that right?
A. That’s correct, yes. But, I mean, just to expand on the point I was making earlier, so to take one example, the Wildcat helicopter, it certainly wouldn’t be true to say that increased our ISR capable. I mean, the reason that we did not procure any helicopters as part of CCTC is that they are very expensive, they can only fly for short periods of time, etc. So the Wildcat helicopter did a sweep at the end of the day to see if there were any abandoned small boats that the — I can’t remember how it is described, but there was another — the recovery vessel, sorry, in, in Ms Stewart’s(?) statement would then go and rescue those abandoned migrant boats. So absolutely, there was an uplift in funding, much of which was extremely useful. I am not sure I would say that that massively contributed to our ISR capability, our capability to rescue migrants because as I said, I think we would have gone up to five CTVs anyway. But it was very — it was very welcome and very helpful and it gave us a lot of headspace to do the planning that we needed to do for that year and to bring a bit of stability to the command structures.
Q. If we turn to page 18, paragraph 7.8 {INQ009649/18}, this witness says: “The legacy of Op Isotrope included the procurement of [CTVs that we were just talking about] for Border Force’s use, an uplift in the infrastructure available in the … operations rooms managing the response to small boats, and enhanced multi-agency working.” Is that something you would accept, Mr O’Mahoney?
A. Yes.
Q. We know that Operation Isotrope came to an end in January of 2023. Can you help us with how the operation came to an end, why did that come about? If it was providing additional resourcing, it was providing headspace to do important planning, why did it come to an end?
A. So, I mean, from an operational point of view, it got to the point where Border Force had — sorry, the Home Office had decided on a new operating model, the small boats operational command, and in that, had — I, amongst other senior officials, had done a lot of planning around how we might have a different deployment model to support that. So, for instance, previously, as I said earlier, most of the resource required landside was deployed in from multi-functional teams. We reversed that resourcing model. So that there was a standing resource available to the small boats operational command, for instance. So it was — I think it was felt at that point that the capability developments that were required had been delivered. The uplift in resourcing had been delivered and therefore, the requirement for military primacy had ended.
Q. Thank you very much. I want to turn now to a new topic, if I can. I want to ask you a little bit about relationships with the French and through that, I want to ask you a little bit about something called Operation Sommen, if I can.
A. Yes.
Q. Aside from working with UK agencies like the Coastguard like, RNLI, all kinds of other agencies that we have been talking about over the past few hours, it is right that the Home Office, and in particular CCTC, built a relationship with the French authorities?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right? If we can pull up your statement, please at page 10, paragraph 28 {INQ010134/10}. We can see there that: “… the majority of migrant vessels departing from France, [you say], in order it make effective interventions upstream, we needed to establish a good working relationship with our counterparts there.” And you tell us further down, in paragraph 29, about the signing of the Sandhurst Treaty and the creation of something called the CCIC.
A. Yes.
Q. I am not going to attempt to pronounce it in the native language, but the CCIC was effectively, a co-ordination centre between the British and the French authorities focused on the work that was occurring in the Channel, is that right?
A. It was initially focused on co-ordination of work across the juxtaposed ports of Calais and Coquelles, but we then, additionally, moved some people with responsibility for co-ordinating information and intelligence around the small boats as well, yes.
Q. Were there CCTC staff members working in the CCIC? How did it function, in practice?
A. There were — so, there were Border Force officers in there already who we — who we used as liaison officers for CCTC. And more lately, there have been CCTC liaison officers in there. But at the point of these events that we are looking at, there were Border Force officers in there who worked on our behalf on small boats as well as other issues.
Q. Can we turn to page 18, please, paragraph 48, {INQ010134/18}, I want to understand where the CCIC was providing sort of intelligence and situational awareness or whether it was actually undertaking liaison for operational purposes. We can see there, you say, right at the bottom: “CCTC did not have direct operational contact with the French authorities, but we did receive information via CCIC.” Was that operational information? Was that a relationship focused on what was occurring in the Channel, or was it about intelligence and information sharing?
A. It was both, from my recollection. So there was a two-way exchange of information and intelligence through the CCIC.
Q. And in your experience, how effective was that process? How constructive, what was the relationship like?
A. At an operational level, that exchange of information and intelligence continued throughout this period. How effective it was, I think changed over time. I think it’s much more effective today than it was at the time of this incident.
Q. You say there that CCTC itself didn’t have direct operational contact with the French. What does that mean?
A. So we had a strategic relationship with the French, as I describe in my statement. So I had a relationship with the Prefet, who was my opposite number there. At an operational level — so my gold commanders who ran Operation Altair, for instance, didn’t have an interlocutor in France and very few levels of operational command had any interlocutor in France, but there was this contact, at a very, very junior level in CCIC.
Q. Understood. Can we turn to page 12, please, {INQ010134/12}. In fact, can we go to 11, please, start with paragraph 33 {INQ010134/11}. You are talking there about the relationship with the French Deputy Prime Minister’s office?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say you had regular but infrequent meetings with SG Mer.
A. Yes.
Q. That is the department within the Deputy Prime Minister’s office which deals with the Channel, effectively. Other matters, but for these purposes, with the Channel; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You say: “At an operational level, a similarly regular but infrequent dialogue existed between [Border Force Maritime Command] and the Prefet [for] la Manche …”
A. Yes.
Q. What do you mean by “regular but infrequent”?
A. So, probably in the two and a half years that I was director of the Clandestine Channel Threat Command, I might have had three meetings with SG Mer.
Q. I want to understand how that fit with the communications in practice, on a nightly basis, about operational decisions in the Channel. So we have heard evidence from some Border Force officers, for example, that they were receiving, every night, trackers from Gris-Nez, containing information about boats crossing the Channel. How did that level of operational communications fit with the strategic high-level, infrequent meetings that was taking place through the CCTC?
A. I am not sure there was a corollary between the two. I think it was absolutely necessary for the French to exchange information around SOLAS operations. The relationship with the French at other levels, at this particular time, was very difficult. By the time I had left, it was very positive and particularly in terms of my relationship with the Prefet who oversaw the landside aspects of the operation and at a sort of national level in Paris. But at this particular point in time, it was very difficult.
Q. If we go on to paragraph 34 {INQ010134/12} you say, the second line: “… in 2020/21 the relationship was strained at a national level as a result of the UK’s exit from the European Union, disputes over fishing rights, the AUKUS submarine deal and Operation Sommen (also known as maritime turnaround tactics).” Is it right that you were the strategic lead for Op Sommen?
A. Yes.
Q. And in your capacity and experience through that role, what do you mean when you say it was a cause for strain in the relationship between the UK and France?
A. So, just before I was appointed, there was — there was an agreement with the French, known as the Cherbourg agreement and I think sometimes it was referred to as Op Bowthorpe, Operation Bowthorpe, and that was an arrangement whereby the French had agreed and worked up an operational protocol such that if we rescued migrants close to French waters, we could, on a trial basis, move them to Dunkirk and disembark them at Dunkirk. And that was seen as being a useful potential deterrent for migrants crossing the Channel. There were a number of obvious issues with that, but that was in place before I was appointed. Around the same time as I was appointed, a new Interior Minister in France was appointed and he withdrew support for the Cherbourg agreement and a requirement from ministers to develop an alternative to the Cherbourg agreement was received and we set about developing that. And that was to mirror a set of tactics that were used by the Australians in Operation Sovereign Borders, but in the Channel. Because the French had had withdrawn their support for the Cherbourg agreement. They saw this as — they — they didn’t accept that this was an appropriate course of action to take, particularly because they thought it went counter to their obligations and our obligations around safety of life at sea. And therefore, when they became aware that we were developing it, because we — I informed them we were as part of the sort of open operational dialogue that we were trying to have with them, they objected to it very strongly and it affected our already quite strained relationship with them further.
Q. You say there in the next sentence: “[The] national concerns affected regional relationships despite the efforts of colleagues across the Home Office and me personally.” What was the practical effect of the relationships being adversely affected by this?
A. The dialogue that we were having with our interlocutors was much less frequent and in fact, shortly before this incident, I recall having had a meeting with the Prefet in the Nord de France region, which is the first meeting I had with her for three months. There was a period of time prior to that where the French officials were told they could not communicate with us at all. Not directly as a result Operation Sommen, I should say. I think the trigger point for that was the AUKUS submarine deal, but, you know, there was a general atmosphere following EU exit, very frosty relationships with France. And to an extent, these relationships bled through into the operational relationships which also were strained. But I hasten to add, the relationship today is exceptionally good, both at a maritime level and on the landside and by the time I left in December 2022, I had a very, very healthy, open and constructive relationship with my French opposite number.
Q. I understand fully and I am focusing in on 2021 in particular.
A. Of course.
Q. Could we actually turn to the statement of Mr Whitton, please, which is {INQ010137/1}, page 18 {INQ010137/18}. Looking at paragraph 44 there, Mr Whitton is addressing relations with the French and interactions with the French there. Right at the bottom of that paragraph, he says: “We were looking at arranging secure communications between our vessels and those of the French but the deployment of Op Sommen unfortunately had an adverse effect on the relationship.” Is it right that the implementation of secured communication between French and UK vessels was derailed or undermined by Op Sommen as Mr Whitton says there?
A. I don’t know, I’m afraid. It’s not something that I was aware of at the time or since.
Q. Understood. Did Op Sommen cause strain with the relationships between the Home Office and any other agencies, so, for example, the MCA, DfT, RNLI?
A. No. We had a very — as I said earlier, we had a very constructive relationship and I personally had a very constructive relationship with the Coastguard. We developed the Standard Operating Procedures around Operation Sommen very closely with them; that’s not to say that they were in support of them but they recognised that this was a Government policy that needed to be implemented, it was a direction from the Home Secretary and indeed the Prime Minister to deliver on it and we had a very open and constructive relationship, which allowed us to plan or for them to plan around the deployment of Operation Sommen in a way that did not have an adverse impact on safety of life at sea.
Q. So at the time when you were in your role taking the strategic lead on this project, you weren’t aware of strained relationships or difficulties in the relationships with UK stakeholders caused by the implementation or planning for Op Sommen?
A. I don’t recall that, no.
Q. Okay. The Inquiry has received frankly an enormous amount of disclosure related to Op Sommen from various partner agencies showing the development of policies over time, extensive planning, numerous meetings, training, discussions with other stakeholders. Is it fair to say that planning for Op Sommen occupied a very considerable amount of time and resource within the Home Office in 2021?
A. It did and, as I said, this was a priority that was directed by the Home Secretary and indeed the Prime Minister, so it was important that we dedicated the requisite amount of time to it.
Q. Are you able to help us with what percentage of your time was spent on Op Sommen?
A. I — I don’t recall. I mean, I delegated most of the work to one of the directors in my team who oversaw the development of the policy and legal advice and tactics. I — I would struggle to put a percentage on it. I think it’s fair to say it took a lot of many people’s time.
Q. Would you accept that it drew focus from planning to meet the increased demand for search and rescue in the Channel?
A. I don’t think so. I think we were able to plan for both at the same time.
Q. I want to ask you now about recommendations looking to the future. Before we do that, I want to understand what introspection and lesson learning the Home Office has already done. This morning, Mr Whitton was asked about the aftermath of Incident Charlie and in particular the reasons why the Home Office did not undertake a internal review or lesson learning processes. I think he indicated this morning that question was better directed to you, Mr O’Mahoney.
A. Yes.
Q. Are you able to assist us with why that was not done?
A. So I — I recall that there was a debrief or lessons learnt process that the Coastguard undertook and we fed into that process. We also conducted more or less constant review of our operational deployments and planning. We conducted — when I say “we” I think in Government conducted a number of table-top exercises to look at various issues including mass casualty incidents. But I think it’s also fair to say, as you have heard from a number of people who have given evidence, we simply didn’t know at the time exactly what had happened and many of the operational commanders and operational officers within the Home Office and Border Force didn’t really have much understanding of what had happened until we were engaged by the Maritime Accident Investigation branch. So certainly there were lessons learnt exercises happening, including with the Coastguard which we participated in, but it wasn’t apparent to us at that time that there was a necessity to do it specifically for the Home Office.
Q. Is that a concern, that the Home Office couldn’t recognise its involvement in a mass casualty event?
A. Well, in so much as there was a lessons learnt exercise conducted by the Coastguard and we took part in that. There wasn’t — from what we knew at the time we didn’t — there was nothing in that that made us think we needed an independent Home Office-led lessons learnt exercise that looked at what we might have done differently, but we were conducting constant reviews of our capability and deployments and the campaign plan as a whole.
Q. And what about once, as you say, the MAIB exercise began, the MAIB investigation. At that stage, why did the Home Office not conduct a review or a lesson learning exercise?
A. Well, I think — I can’t remember the exact timing of when we received the MAIB report, but I certainly remember in the later stages of its production the recommendations that were being made by the report primarily around having a plan B for aerial surveillance, we had reached the point where we did have that plan B for instance. So when I looked a the MAIB report, I didn’t think immediately: Okay, we need to go back and look at this and see how we deliver on the recommendations because it was our view at that point that we already had.
Q. Understood. We have spoken quite a lot this afternoon about the changes implemented by the Home Office, both in the period leading up to November 2021 and of course thereafter. Is there anything you would like to add to our understanding of those changes of how the situation progressed to what you have said today or to what is in your statement?
A. I don’t think there is anything in addition to what I would say than what I said earlier in that the capability that we have in place today is very comprehensive and provides a high level of assurance and you can see that demonstrated in the operational outcomes in that there have been no uncontrolled beach landings for some two plus years.
Q. My final question: is there anything that you would like to share with the Inquiry in terms of changes or improvements to feed into recommendations for the future?
A. Nothing additional to what I have said already.
MS WOODS: Thank you very much, Mr O’Mahoney. Those are all my questions.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, Mr O’Mahoney, thank you very much for your statement and also for the evidence you have given this afternoon.
A. Sir, if I may just make one more point, if I may.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Absolutely.
A. The — my teams in the Home Office and Border Force Maritime dedicated their professional lives to saving lives at sea in the Channel and I am sure that there are many hundreds, if not thousands of migrants alive today who might not otherwise have been, and so the events of November 2021 came as a huge blow to all of us professionally and personally. But I recognise that is as nothing compared to the huge and devastating impact those events had on the families of those who died and the trauma experienced by those who survived. So I would like to offer my personal condolences to the families and to restate the Home Office’s commitment to you, sir, in delivering your terms of reference because I think that is the best way that we can honour the memories of those who died.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, thank you very much for that. I am sure those remarks are appreciated. So thanks very much, Mr O’Mahoney. We will resume on Monday, yes. Well, thank you very much. (4.23 pm) (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00, on Monday, 24 March 2025)
I N D E X
MR STEPHEN JOHN WHITTON OBE (affirmed) ……………1
Questions by MR PHILLIPS ……………………1
MR DANIEL O’MAHONEY (affirmed) …………………129
Questions by MS WOODS …………………….129