Tuesday, 25 March 2025 (9.59 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, good morning everyone and good morning Mr Driver. In a moment Sarah Le Fevre will have some questions for you. But first of all, could you read the affirmation?
A. Certainly.
MR JAMES DRIVER (Affirmed)
Questions by MS LE FEVRE
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, thank you very much. Yes.
MS LE FEVRE: Mr Driver, your full name is James Driver?
A. Yes, correct.
MS LE FEVRE: Thank you. And you have provided a witness statement to the Inquiry, at the Inquiry’s request, running to 90 pages and dated 19 December of last year, 2024, yes?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. You made that statement in response to the Inquiry’s request for evidence from the Department of Transport.
A. Yes.
Q. And you have worked for that department since 2004, is that right?
A. 2017. I have been a civil servant since 2004, in the Department for Transport since 2017.
Q. Thank you. It is a statement that, you tell us in the body of it, which is based partly on your own direct knowledge and partly on information which has been made available to you —
A. Yes.
Q. — from within DfT records?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now personally, you are, is this right, the head of the maritime security division within DfT?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. And that’s the position you have held since 2017?
A. Yes, it is. That’s the first position I took up in the department when I joined in 2017.
Q. Thank you. In that capacity, is this right, the department determined that you were best placed to make this statement and answer the questions that the Inquiry may have of you?
A. Yes, I have been a senior civil servant working on a day-to-day basis with HMCG on small boats, since it became an issue in 2018 and therefore, I am the relevant person to be before you today.
Q. Thank you very much. Now, at the time of the events with which the Inquiry is primarily concerned, your lines of reporting, is this right, were these, you reported directly to the director of maritime?
A. Yes, at the time I did, yes.
Q. Thank you. And she, in turn, reported to the director general of aviation, maritime international and security group?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Who, in turn, reported directly to the permanent secretary?
A. Yes, that is all correct.
Q. Thank you. I am going to ask you a few questions now about where interest and responsibilities for the small boats issues lie and lay within Department for Transport.
A. Sure.
Q. So can I ask to be shown on screen, please, your witness statement, which is {INQ010337/20} and turn to page 20 and to paragraph 48, which starts right at the foot of that page. And this is the paragraph where you deal with the implementation or the drafting of policy and you tell us that: “… DfT does not lead on any small boats policies, it did not itself create any draft or implemented policy [initiative]. [It] does have a policy-making role in relation to maritime security, [but] the small boats issue is not generally considered to be a maritime security matter within the scope of DfT’s core area of responsibility.” You go on to say, in the final four lines of that paragraph {INQ010337/21}, that it is: “The Home Office [which] leads, and has always led, on overall policy relating to small boats, primarily as a risk to the UK’s borders, and is best placed to explain its policy initiatives in relation to small boats.” All right?
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. So that is the context for the DfT’s role and responsibilities, certainly in respect of policy-making in this field, is that right?
A. Well, so this describes in particular — goes to — from a maritime security perspective, there is no policy-making role or function vis-à-vis small boats. Of course, the department separately has a very important role in terms of sponsorship, support and challenge to the MCA and HMCG.
Q. Yes, thank you very much. All right. Well, you explain to us at various places in the witness statement what those responsibilities actually are as well as what they aren’t. If we look at paragraph 47, since we have it on screen, at page 20 of the witness statement {INQ010337/20}, you tell us that: “[The department’s] role was to contribute to the proposed policies of other government departments and cross-government initiatives, ensuring that there was no impact on the UK’s obligations to safeguard lives at sea, liaising with SAR experts within HMCG and UNCLOS leads in the FCDO as required.” Yes?
A. Yes, that’s right. So I am just considering if there is anything to add there. No, that goes to the point I was just making I think, yes.
Q. Thank you. I am going to take you to some other paragraphs in your witness statement where you expand on the areas of responsibility. Can we go to page 4 and paragraph 12, please, {INQ010337/4} and here, you tell us that: “[The department] does not itself operate any specific small boats governance structures … has participated in cross-government structures where relevant. DfT and the MCA’s departmental responsibilities for responding to small boats are limited to delivering the UK’s SAR responsibilities.” So that’s the point that you were making just a moment ago, is that right?
A. Absolutely right. The Government has two important concerns or policy focuses in relation to small boats. That is border security and illegal migration aspects led by Border Force and Home Office, as we were just looking at a moment ago, and then separately, ensuring safety of life at sea, ensuring that there is an adequate and effective search and rescue function to ensure that we are protecting and saving those lives of those people who are in a deeply vulnerable position as they are crossing in small boats. And that is the responsibility of Secretary for Transport, the Department for Transport and in turn, MCA and HMCG.
Q. Thank you. And that’s where you finish this paragraph by telling us that the relevant governance and leadership structures in DfT are primarily those which oversee the sponsorship of the MCA, including their discharge of SAR obligations?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Can we turn forwards a little in your witness statement to page 10 {INQ010337/10} and paragraph 25, that starts right at the foot of that page: “[The department] supports [His Majesty’s Coastguard] with its response to small boats in a number of ways.” And then over the page, {INQ010337/11} you elaborate on that through — you tell us, at paragraph 26, that the department undertakes departmental sponsorship and governance of the MCA and we will come and look in a little bit more detail at that in a moment. At paragraph 27, that the department oversees the overall performance of the MCA, through the MCA sponsorship board; yes?
A. Mm-hm yes.
Q. And you tell us more about the purpose of the MCA sponsorship board at paragraph 28. Its purpose is: “… to ensure there is sufficient oversight of the strategic direction of performance, risks and financial reporting; [that the] Governance arrangements for the MCA are upheld or amended where necessary; and [to ensure] that the recommendations of any successive independent reviews of the MCA are fully implemented.” And is that an accurate summary of the work of that board?
A. Yes, that is an accurate summary, yes.
Q. Thank you. Then finally, I would like to look with you at page 58 and paragraph 163, {INQ010337/58} where I think you are making the same point again, that the department’s primary responsibility in respect of small boats is as the MCA’s parent department; yes?
A. Yes.
Q. “[Our] role in any systems to review arrangements for responding to small boats is limited to the SAR response. [But] as the parent department for the MCA … had a role in ensuring appropriate systems were in place to deliver an adequate and effective SAR service to respond to all persons in distress in the UK SAR region.”
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. All right. So in summary as you have indicated two key areas of work; the contribution to cross-government initiative and policy on the one hand and then the delivery of the UK’s SAR responsibilities?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Thank you. All right. Now, against that background — we can perhaps take statement off the screen, please — is this right; there were two teams or divisions within the department which were involved with small boats-related issues: firstly, your own division, the maritime security division; yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And secondly, the MCA sponsorship team. Did that sit within the maritime operations division?
A. Yes, at the time, in 2021, the sponsorship team sat within maritime operations division, so that’s a sister division to my maritime security division and reported up to the maritime director at the time, Petra Wilkinson.
Q. Thank you. So the same chains of reporting upwards?
A. Indeed, yes, and we worked very can closely together.
Q. Thank you. I think it now sits within the maritime directorate, yes?
A. Yes. We have since, within the directorate general grouping, the Aviation Maritime Security Group, we have since undergone reorganisation in 2023, I think it was, and in particular, my maritime security division and maritime security operations function now reports into a transport security directorate.
Q. Yes.
A. And the maritime sponsorship team remains within the maritime directorate.
Q. Thank you. Is it right that the personnel of both the MCA’s sponsorship team and the maritime security division are civil servants?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And does it follow that the team within DfT with direct oversight of the performance of the MCA wasn’t your team?
A. Sorry, say that again.
Q. The team within DfT with direct oversight of the performance of the MCA wasn’t your team?
A. That’s correct, yes. The team that carries out the formal sponsorship and accountability roles was not my team; that was the MCA sponsorship team.
Q. Thank you.
A. But like — my team, like all other policy teams, maritime policy teams within department had a relationship with MCA where our policies intersected or where there was a need to support or interact with MCA. So, yes.
Q. Thank you. We will look in a moment in a little more detail at the structure of the MCA, but in respect of your maritime security team, perhaps we will have your witness statement back up on screen, please, {INQ010337/2} and at page 2, paragraph 6, please, you tell us here that the small boats issue isn’t considered a maritime security matter within DfT responsibilities, but it is your team who primarily engage on issues relating to small boats. And you go on to tell us on the following page at paragraph 9 {INQ010337/3} that the issue of small boats was a small part effectively of the work of your division. What did that actually mean, what was your work in this terrain?
A. Yes, I will expand a little now. I will just do a zoom down view. So whole of Government’s interest or — or in terms of maritime security can be described as ensuring that we uphold the laws, regulations, the norms to maintain a free and open and fair maritime division — maritime domain. And that means there are many Government departments and agencies that have maritime security responsibilities across Government. So the Foreign Office, for example, looking at overseas maritime security, that might be more kind of State active, threatening the maritime demain. Verses the Home Office who are responsible for crime in more domestic waters and any illegality in domestic waters. For Department for Transport, our responsibilities as the department for commercial maritime, our maritime security policy function follows from that. So we are the department responsible for regulations — international regulations relating to commercial maritime security. So we have a port, we ensure ports, British shipping, indeed, British maritime overseas interests are upholding any relevant international regulation, ensuring that we have a reasonable and appropriate inspection regime for that. We speak to the rest of the security community around Government to ensure that we are aware of threats, risks and that we can support the commercial maritime industry by providing them with security advice to mitigate those risks. So that might be ensuring that ports have the relevant security for the risks that they face, it might be countering piracy or supporting commercial shipping operators in how they counter piracy in east and west coast Africa. So that’s our kind of locus. It means we hold and are responsible for a number of security regulations relating to ports, domestic waters as well as international — as well as international shipping relating to maritime security. So our — our work in small boats came about when, in 2018, central Government first organised itself vis-à-vis small boats and started looking at the small boats issue particularly. And we were engaged by Home Office and Border Force, as were several other departments, as a department that possibly had enforcement — maritime security regulation that might be relevant to where Home Office and Border Force were leading, which was border security, illegal migration and how that could be countered within the maritime domain. So we were approached, maritime security division, I was approached in that way in the very, at the very first time that we started working on this in 2018. And similarly, HMCG were also approached by Home Office and Border Force in the same terms as — what might you be able to do and assist with in — in those terms.
Q. Thank you. That’s helpful.
A. I think that, hopefully that gives context as to why —
Q. Yes.
A. — my team had that locus initially and then continued to have that locus because it then meant that we were — I should add we were also the division with the best and regular contacts with Border Force, with Home Office, with people — and teams that were working on that small boats issue. So we had potential enforcement regulation, that’s what we were being asked about by Home Office and Border Force initially and certainly the contacts. And therefore, that’s why we were approached and that is why we then worked with HMCG initially and then continued to work with them from then on.
Q. Thank you. Thank you. All right. That is helpful. What I would like to ask you a little about now is the MCA and its structure. Can I have up on the screen, please, {INQ000955/1}. Now, this is the framework agreement. We can see at the head Department for Transport and the MCA headers and this is the framework agreement for the Marine and Coastguard Agency dated November 2017. That’s a document that was due, I think, to be reviewed in 2023 and the Inquiry has seen now a final draft for clearance dated 8 August 2024. But this is the version that was and, I think, remains effective —
A. Yes.
Q. — to date, is that right?
A. That, that is right. Yes, it is the extant framework document agreement at this moment in time, noting that there is one that’s very soon to be published.
Q. Thank you. If we move on then through this document to page 3 and paragraph 2, please, {INQ000955/3}, we can see that the MCA was established on 1 April of 1998. It is an executive agency within the department, that’s right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Thank you. And you confirm in your witness statement that it includes His Majesty’s Coastguard within its directorates?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. If we look and see at paragraph 4 on that same page that the agency provides the national 24-hour maritime search and rescue emergency response service operable throughout the UK at sea and internationally.
A. Yes.
Q. If we move on to page 4 and paragraph 9, please, {INQ000955/4}, the document tells us that the department for transport is the responsible department for the MCA, as you have already told us. And we then have set out, from paragraph 10, and following the various roles and responsibilities and primary contacts in respect of the MCA, starting with the Secretary of State, moving on through page 6, please, {INQ000955/6} through the identification of the agency sponsor, that’s the director of maritime within Department for Transport, paragraph 23 at the bottom; yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And then moving on to page 13, and paragraph 46 and following, {INQ000955/13}, the MCA sponsorship board and paragraph 46 tells us that the performance of the MCA will be overseen by the MCA sponsorship board. What is the sponsorship board, please?
A. So the MCA sponsorship board is the primary sponsorship accountability mechanism for — for the department and the MCA. As an executive agency, it meets on a quarterly basis. It is chaired by the Director General Aviation Maritime and Security, attended by relevant parts of the department, maritime director, finance lead, sponsorship team, secretariate provided by the sponsorship team. It is then, of course, attended by the equivalent relevant parts of the MCA and it takes and considers the performance of the MCA. So it looks at its key performance indicators, its risks, its financial health on a — its business plan, it is meeting its business plan and its objectives. It — and then any other key concerns and issues that may arise. So it is the key sponsorship and accountability forum that the department uses to ensure that the MCA is meeting its — its objectives and purpose and performing effectively and adequately.
Q. Thank you. If we move on a little within this document to page 19 and paragraphs 86-87, {INQ000955/19} there is reference here to MCA performance indicators and key performance indicators that you have just referred to. Those are to be agreed with department ministers and are to cover core functions, safety initiatives and organisational efficiencies. Are the KPIs for the MCA those which are published in their annual report and accounts?
A. Yes, I believe — I believe that’s right. I believe that the KPIs are within that document. I’m slightly hesitant, I am slightly —
Q. Let me help you. Can I have {INQ000957/1}, please.
A. Yes.
Q. That’s the MCA annual report and accounts for the year 2021-2022. And if we move on within this document to page 16 {INQ000957/16} we can see that the subject of KPIs are introduced here. And at page 18, {INQ000957/18}.
A. Yes.
Q. We can see at the foot of that page under the heading “Our services” we can see the search and rescue KPIs set out there.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, that is right. Yes, that is right. So key performance indicators, I should — for usefulness and context, I should say that’s a system used across — across Government and many will be familiar with the — with the concept. So all SCS headed functions tend to have key performance indicators. So I have a set in relation to maritime security that roll up to our directorate level and as we have come to, these are the MCA’s.
Q. Thank you very much. And just to contextualise the three that we are looking at on screen, if we scroll up a little just to see — a little further. So the — it is the “Future Technologies” section that we see immediately before the search and rescue KPIs.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And on the following page, page 19, {INQ000957/19} the KPIs move on to aviation and pollution response and other KPI indicators; yes?
A. Yes, I think this shows — covering the breadth of the MCA’s responsibilities and objectives.
Q. Yes, and this is just an extract, but can we go back to page 19, please. I am so sorry. I have given our technology support a poor reference. Can we go back, please, to {INQ000957/18}, page 18, please. Thank you. Just to look in a little more detail at what the KPIs were for that year, for the search and rescue limb of the MCA. We have, first of all, the indicator that: “The response to all Maritime and Aeronautical incidents in the distress phase [to] be reviewed by an operational supervisor within 30 minutes of the distress alert being received or a distress phase being declared by HM Coastguard.” Yes?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And the goal: “90% of all cases”.
A. (Nods).
Q. The second KPI was to: “… review 10% of incidents to which the national SAR network has responded to assess … compliance with Mission Conduct protocols and the effectiveness of outcomes.” That’s 10% of all indents, yes?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And then finally: “Other than because of the coronavirus pandemic, Coastguard Rescue Service … teams available for duty, not stood down or otherwise unavailable for tasking …” And that was to be met 98% of the time.
A. Yes.
Q. And those were the KPIs for MCA for search and rescue for that year, is that correct?
A. Yes, I believe so, yes.
Q. Thank you very much. Now, and with apologies to our technical support, I would like to go back to the framework document, and to page 20 of that document, please, so we are going back to {INQ00955/20}, paragraph 88. We can see here at — obligations on the MCA, to: “… operate management, information and accounting systems …” The second sentence: “The MCA [to] inform the Agency Sponsor of any changes that may impact on the achievement of its objectives.” Then finally, the final sentence of that paragraph: “… the MCA’s performance shall be formally reviewed by the MCA Sponsorship Board on a quarterly basis.” Do you know what form those formal reviews take?
A. I am trying to think. So I am — certainly at the time regularly in receipt of all sponsorship board papers, if not — only present at the sponsorship board when relevant in terms of policy area for me to discuss. So I am trying to think whether I — I do know and have seen exactly how that — you know, physically what that performance review.
Q. Thank you.
A. Looks like. I think I have on occasions seen the papers and tests and indicators that are used to consider and determine whether that performance — various different performances against key objectives are met. That is often quantitative for the MCA because there is lots of quantitative information and tests that can be applied. So for example, we have looked at some in relation to search and rescue where you can — you can quantify that and determine whether that means that an objective has been met. But, of course, all of those will be considered and discussed by the sponsorship board to get under the skin of what that — that information is — is telling and showing the group.
Q. Thank you. All right. I don’t think you have produced for us through your statement and the exercise of making a statement any formal review documentation, is that right?
A. Formal review?
Q. Emanating from the board in its capacity.
A. So I think things like the risk register and various different finance documents relate to review and achievement — objectives achievement. So I think that probably goes to it.
Q. I see. Well, that’s helpful and I will come back to the risk register a little later this morning. So thank you for that. Just to finish on this document, please, at paragraphs 89 and 90, the MCA provides the assurance information required by the assurance framework. In the most general and brief sense, what sort of information is that?
A. Sorry, say that again.
Q. The assurance information that’s referred to at paragraph 89, what is that information?
A. So the assurance framework goes to business plans, KPIs, key performance objectives.
Q. I see.
A. Financial reports, etc. And so providing the right level of assurance information relates to that. Finance — that might be the regular finance check-ins as well as financial reporting in something like the MCA sponsorship meeting.
Q. All right. That’s helpful, thank you. Then we can see — just the beginning of paragraph 91 on this same page, we can see set out in a series of bullet points at paragraph 91 various levels and types of liaison arrangements that take place —
A. Yes.
Q. — between the MCA and its sponsoring department, DfT, yes?
A. Yes. Yes, I think that is a good representation from very top of office through to working level contact. So that describes various different formal fora.
Q. Thank you.
A. Yes.
Q. And for example, you have referred us already to the MCA sponsorship board’s quarterly meetings and those are reflected in one of these bullet points, third from the bottom of the page.
A. Yes, yes.
Q. All right. Thank you very much. All right, we can take that off the screen now and I want to ask you a little bit about the — examples of aspects of the cross-Whitehall cross-governmental thinking that you have referred to as your team being involved in.
A. Yes.
Q. I think it’s right that in the summer of 2019, on 1 July of that year, you were invited to a cross-Whitehall meeting at the Cabinet Office to take place on 5 July and the purpose of which was to discuss the issue of migrants and small boats.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. It is a meeting which you thought and expected to be an important meeting?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. You understood that a topic that might fall for discussion in the course of that meeting was whether, at some point in the future, the MCA and the RNLI should be leading the response to that issue rather than Border Force; do you remember that?
A. Yes. I think that is an issue and conversation that has come up on several times throughout the period that I know the Inquiry has looked at and heard evidence on and I think that’s perhaps one of the first times that that discussion, I suspected, might come up.
Q. Thank you. You received a briefing pack and an agenda for that meeting and that included the briefing at {INQ008159/1}, if we could have that up on the screen. That’s a briefing. Do you remember this? It’s headed “Migrants Crossing the Channel in Small Boats”.
A. Yes, I — I do remember this. I think it’s also useful to remember the context here, 2019.
Q. Yes.
A. So numbers of crossings have gone up, but not the significant increases that we see in 2020 and ’21. So I think it’s — hence, the focus and the discussion here is on — more on the — more on the enforcement and operation practice rather than anything else at this point.
Q. Thank you. We can see in the section headed “Background” and the first bullet point, talking of the issue and the method of travelling to the United Kingdom, recognising that it carries significant risk to life; yes?
A. Yes.
Q. As you have just underlined to us.
A. Yes.
Q. “The number of events in 2019 is rising as conditions improve … we anticipate … it may continue to rise as we enter [the] summer. It is also highly likely that a fatality could occur. Note [and this in bold] that the DfT does not own this risk. The Home Secretary does.” What does ownership of risk mean in this context?
A. So that goes to departmental policy responsibilities and therefore accountability. So I think here — perhaps if I just re-read one moment, please. (Pause) So here, it is recognising the point that lots of witnesses have spoken on, the very — the very high-risk nature of those, those crossings in small boats and that despite all best efforts a fatality could occur. I think note that DfT does not own this risk relates to the border security —
Q. I see.
A. — illegal migration aspect, that’s how I am reading it now.
Q. Thank you.
A. And I think how I understood it at the time. Certainly how I understood it at the time and —
Q. Thank you.
A. — that relates to, as described in — as we have already come up against and described and discussed.
Q. Thank you. I think it’s right that the MCA, you would accept, had accountability for its decisions and its —
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. — operational response?
A. Absolutely. So, I — I think that’s why I just picked up on that. So I think it is important to note this does not go against that at all. We absolutely have recognised throughout that, of course, safety of life at sea and operating a — operating efficient and adequate search and rescue service is the responsibility of HMCG and therefore, the department.
Q. Thank you very much. That’s helpful. Can we move on to page 3 within this document, please, {INQ008159/3}, and the key points at the top of this page, still within this briefing note for the meeting of 5 July. Key points, then: “… a possibility that the Home Office, who currently have primacy on the issue, would like to lessen or cease their support they give at sea to enable Border Force to focus their assets on other pressing work.” Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And then, secondly: “The SOLAS responsibility attached to this issue could solely fall to the MCA, who have confirmed that they have sufficient capability to respond. The procedure is well established from interception of vessels at sea, through to arriving at designated points on UK soil where migrants are met and processed by Border Force.” And then a final point under the key points: “The Joint Maritime Operations Co-ordination centre … could play a significant role in co-ordinating Government … assets.”
A. Yes, so reading that section bullet, I think just for clarification, I think what would be more accurately — more accurate language there would be search and rescue operations could fall solely to MCA. I think that’s what the points are getting at.
Q. Yes.
A. As we have just spoken about, SOLAS responsibility always sits with MCA, HMCG.
Q. Thank you very much. If we scroll down a little, the briefing notes goes on to set out in some more detail the role of the JMOCC. The final bullet point under this heading: “With an MCA/SOLAS lead, there will be occasions when commercial vessels are tasked to respond because they are the best available asset. It would be better if this could be avoided when possible, therefore a greater role for [the] JMOCC, able to co-ordinate a greater number of response options, could be useful.” Is it — was it considered realistic or viable that the tasking of commercial vessels would form part of the MCA Coastguard response?
A. No, it wasn’t considered as a key plank or aspect of capability. I think this just goes to the fact that — and I think in 2019, when numbers are rising and we are — Government is understanding operations and how they can be best and most efficiently put together, I think that was going to the fact that commercial operators could be involved in any search and rescue operation if needed to. As they could be anywhere around the country at any point, they might be the best and most, most useful asset to be tasked by HMCG. It was not considered as a key plank or aspect of the search and rescue function at any — at any point and I think, of course, as we progressed through 2020 and 2021, we know that they were rarely if ever utilised. So I think that that sentence is in that level of context.
Q. All right. Thank you.
A. I could describe the Joint Maritime Operations Co-operation Centre and its role —
Q. I was about to ask you about that, so please do.
A. Yes, certainly. So, Joint Maritime Operations Co-ordination centre came about in 2017/2018, I think, and that — the function for the JMOCC, as it was known, was about co-ordination. It was the organisation which could take a view on and understand all Government maritime assets, maritime enforcement assets, assets that could potentially — or had an actual enforcement responsibility or could assist in enforcement. Noting that those assets are finite and that in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, it was most useful for Government departments and agencies to share assets and — on occasions. So their aim, their modus operandi, was to have a good overview of Border Force, marine management organisation, that polices fisheries, the devolved administrations that policed their own fisheries, police forces that have a projection at sea and to an extent, engage with the Royal Navy. So that they — so they had a good view of what assets were available, should there be a need for an agency to get some support in a particular part of UK waters. So that was the JMOCC’s modus operandi that then meant — you know, it’s called “joint” because there are a number of agencies —
Q. Yes.
A. — based all in one area, sharing that information, with a small core team. You have heard from the first director of JMOCC, Mr Dan O’Mahoney, and then I should say, it sat very next to the National Maritime Information Centre, the NMIC, which had a similar role, a number of agencies coming together in one place, sharing and co-ordinating, but that was in relation to maritime security information and intelligence.
Q. Yes. And I think it’s right that those two acronyms —
A. Yes.
Q. — have been subsequently merged into a single entity.
A. Yes.
Q. The JMSC, is that right?
A. Yes, indeed. Yes, so in 2019 I worked with — I worked with Dan in — to bring together JMOCC and NIMC into the JMSC. So Mr Dan O’Mahoney was the first director of the JMSC, which — two constituent parts were the JMOCC and the NMIC. And its relevance here in relation to small boats was, at the time, in 2019, as Home Office, Border Force were going out and engaging relevant Government departments and agencies to see how we can best organise Government’s whole small boats response most effectively, its relevance here was that at the time, the JMOCC was a potential relevant organisation. Although its modus operandi was in relation to maritime security, it certainly had relevant expertise in terms of knowledge of different assets owned by different organisations and how they could potentially be co-ordinated.
Q. Thank you. All right. We will take that off the screen and thank you for that explanation. I want to ask you now about some correspondence that you were involved in, in November of 2021. I think it’s right that on 12 November 2021, you asked for information as to the availability of assets, I think.
A. Yes.
Q. Particularly surface assets —
A. Yes.
Q. — but assets in relation to the SAR capability —
A. Yes.
Q. — of MCA Coastguard, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And we can see at the rest of the email chain at {INQ001055/1}, please. Thank you. So if we scroll down I think on to the next page, {INQ001055/2}, this is your request to Claire, Julie and Helen, all of whom I think hold various roles within Coastguard?
A. Yes, yes. Director Coastguard, Claire Hughes. Julie-Anne Wood, we have heard her title previously. And Helen McCaffery, the Deputy Coastguard, I think, at the time.
Q. Thank you. And so you are referring to a meeting that day: “… SAR resource not infinite … will be a problem if capacity is maintained at such a level.” And you are asking for a line on HMCG/RNLI capability for input into a CRIP?
A. Yes.
Q. CRIP?
A. Yes, shall I expand?
Q. Yes.
A. So, context here — it is 12 November, isn’t it, the email?
Q. Yes.
A. So the context here is that this was the day after Home Office had declared a critical incident in relation to Tug Haven. The record numbers that day had created that bottleneck on the landside there at Tug Haven in terms of processing those people who had come off small boats and making sure that they were safe and warm and processing them as they — into the asylum system managed by Border Force. So Cabinet Office had organised a significant urgent meeting in relation to that critical incident, where all parties — relevant parties were asked to attend, which included DfT and HMCG. Helen, I believe, attended alongside with me. I think it was an online meeting, if I remember rightly. And the effort and the focus of the discussion was how can — was Government working through how it can reduce that bottleneck, how it can process that landside issue better and more quickly. So focus on landside, focus on Border Force/Home Office operations. It was right that I introduced them and made the point about the search and rescue resource in case — and because of concern that any bottleneck landside could equal potentially a queuing of RNLI or Border Force cutters arriving at Tug Haven and, and moving off migrants onto — onto the landside. So I had concern that that might impact search and rescue operations. I inputted those points to that discussion. The CRIP that was being discussed is a common recognised information picture. It’s a set of slides really, which is input into things like COBRA meetings or any significant Government incident type meeting, which aims to establish the one version of the truth: what is the situation, what — what is being done and responded to and by whom about that situation? So responsible departments — joint CRIP owned by Cabinet Office responsible departments will feed in relevant lines to that so that all that information is coalesced in one place and that’s pushed out around, around Government. So it is — we were being asked about search and rescue capability for input into the CRIP because overall, the most important aspect of this discussion — despite the focus on the bottleneck, the most important aspect was the search and rescue operations were not impacted, given the — given the time we are talking about and the high level of pressure on those operations — on that capability and resource because of the very, very high numbers of crossings. In the event, I do not think a CRIP was produced by Cabinet Office.
Q. Thank you. Well, that answers that question.
A. Yes.
Q. If we scroll back to the first page of this email chain, {INQ001055/1} we can see, I think, that you were provided with the information that you had asked for.
A. Yes.
Q. Did this response provide you with reassurance about the sufficiency of SAR resource, despite that bottleneck that you have described?
A. So, yes, but not just — not by any means just this email exchange. My team worked very closely with Claire’s team throughout the period that small boats has been an issue and concern, so from 2018 onwards. So my team regularly spoke and liaised with Claire’s team, with Julie-Anne Wood, Helen McCaffery, as noted there, but with many others as well. So on a day-to-day basis, the team were speaking and communicating and notably by this point, November ’21, we had established weekly huddles between those two teams, attended by Claire and by me, so attended by senior civil servants with relevance in this area, to ensure that we both had a good level of understanding as to the pressures and concerns in relation to all small boats issues. Now that — the formalisation in July ’21, just putting something in a diary to say a regular time and point in the week. But actually that, a regular meeting of some kind or meetings per week had gone on for some time.
Q. Thank you.
A. I think from probably early 2020. And although — I should add, although the focus of those meetings to begin with were about engaging with Home Office development of tactics at sea and then later turnaround tactics, as numbers increased, they immediately took on considering pressures, capability pressures on search and rescue capability as well. So our initial focus of working together to ensure that HMCG and DfT were best representing HMCG and DfT responsibilities vis-à-vis working with Home Office and Border Force, but very much had that focus on — on search and rescue capability pressures. Because we were — we, DfT, were very aware and very engaged on the issue of concern at search and rescue capability —
Q. Yes, thank you.
A. — throughout that period. So these lines that were produced were just to get a good level of — assure that we were at this point in time, were we were absolutely clear with our description of what those pressures look like. And they then — that — we had already built an idea and lines like this, which is why I go to the previous email we saw, which was based on the information that we have spoken about beforehand.
Q. Thank you.
A. And then we built this down ready for — ready for the CRIP.
Q. Thank you. You tell us through your witness statement — and if you want to, we can look at it — but you tell us that it’s really at the tail end of 2021 that you first remember there being discussions about resource and capacity within Coastguard, is that right?
A. Formally?
Q. Yes.
A. — yes. So I think formally, my witness statement contains reference to various different formal submissions that were produced from autumn 2021 onwards in relation to assets and search and rescue capability. There is the 12 November submission and then the December submission.
Q. Well, let’s be clear about this. You do deal with that in your witness statement.
A. Yes.
Q. Again, if you want to, we can look at it, it is at paragraphs 129-131 at page 47. {INQ010337/47} and you have set out for us there, helpfully, the history of a pair of joint submissions, Department for Transport and His Majesty’s Coastguard. The first is dated 26 November 2021.
A. Yes.
Q. It refers to an imminent table-top exercise which is due to take place on 2 December 2021. That did take place and resulted in a recognition, I think this is right, that maritime assets were being stretched to the limit; yes?
A. So that’s the reference to the phrase that was used in that —
Q. Yes.
A. — in that exercise. Yes, it was.
Q. Thank you.
A. So if I may, just to finish on the kind of the progress of our concern and understanding on search and rescue capabilities. So formally, these submissions came up, but this is from — certainly from summer ’21 onwards and the understanding of the 2022 projections, the very large projections in 2022 —
Q. Yes.
A. — that the pace and focus picked up on our discussions, DfT and HMCG discussions, on pressures and capability of search and rescue, notwithstanding the 2021 numbers were increasing and were a problem and issue. So there are documentary evidence from I think early, so March ’21 when we are talking between HMCG and DfT where I am — where I make the point about our understanding and making sure that we are looking at and understanding capability vis-à-vis the increasing numbers. But what we are looking at here is the focus that had come about since summer, since those 2022 projections.
Q. Yes.
A. And how we were — how we built that over that period of time. And now we are coming to our series of formal submissions as we have at this point got a better understanding as to what we need to develop in terms of increased capability for 2022.
Q. Thank you. Can I ask you a very discrete question. That submission, dated 26 November 2021, was that informed by the events of the 23 to 24 November 2021 or is it happenstance that the submission goes in a couple of days afterwards?
A. It is happenstance.
Q. Thank you.
A. And I know it might sound callous, but it was happenstance. I think just that description — of that period of time we had been considering this and looking at this, shows that we had been thinking about that from a period of time. There is then the critical incident in Tug Haven and — as well, which is a motivating factor.
Q. Yes.
A. As well. Now, of course we were not ignorant of the — of the fact that this terrible tragic incident had happened a couple of days later and we did consider and look at and — and work out how to reference that within the submission. But actually, it’s separately — a few days separate that we put an advice note up to the minister on that incident itself.
Q. Thank you. You have told us through your statement of a further submission following the table-top exercise. This one dated 14 December of 2021. Can we have that on screen, please, it is {INQ000846/1}. We can see reference to that table-top exercise, reference to the fact that the rising levels of activities are placing a strain on both Border Force and Royal National Lifeboat Institution rescue boats. Recognition that should small boat activity continue to increase and include crossings on consecutive days similar to the high levels experienced to date, the availability of maritime SAR surface assets could be reduced, significantly increasing the loss of — or the risk of loss of life. The submission represents recommendations and next steps arising or resulting from the table-top exercise. And the recommendation comes at paragraph 2, in the form of five bullet points. Two requests for agreement and three requests formats to be noted; yes?
A. Yes.
Q. The two points where agreement is sought: firstly, that His Majesty’s Coastguard: “… should explore increasing additional maritime surface SAR assets in order to continue to meet the rising levels of activity and deliver our obligations to preserve the safety of life at sea.” Secondly, that the Coastguard: “… should explore developing enhanced situational awareness capabilities.” And then noting the Tug Haven bottleneck issue: “The importance [fourth bullet point] of welfare issues including the mental health of all staff and volunteers involved in the small boats response.” And then the consideration by Coastguard as to the development of an alternative SAR operating model. To the best of your knowledge and recollection, did you achieve the agreement that you sought through this submission?
A. Yes, we — we did from — from the ministers — ministers at the time, Junior Minister with responsibility for aviation maritime security, Robert Courts and then the Secretary of State. Yes, we did get agreement to go forward. And if I may, I think the first — the first submission flags to ministers we are thinking about — to be aware we are thinking about these issues and we are going to put forward some more advice to you.
Q. Yes.
A. There is the 2 December exercise which gives us more ability, more detail, more idea — I say “we”, HMCG — more clear idea as to what those first operational capability improvements can be, could be. Hence, at this point in this second submission, we are seeking the agreement on the things that have, at that point, been identified as improvements to capability ready for 2022 projected increases. Notably, the aerial assets and other technology improvements, but noting that there are all these other issues that we are progressing as well. And to loop back round to your direct question, yes, we did have agreement from ministers to carry on with that.
Q. Thank you. What you tell us through your witness statement is that the question of the acquisition of additional maritime surface SAR assets was overtaken, to a degree, by Operation Isotrope?
A. Yes. That is right. So by this — throughout — at this point, as we have seen, there is a — a very good deal of effort and focus at working to determine what capability improvements will make a difference to improve search and rescue capability ready for those 2022 projected increases. HMCG is, as you can see here, looking at what surface SAR assets might be needed in order to — to manage that. That is in consultation with Border Force and in discussion with Border Force. And there is — it goes to some discussion as to — as to how that’s best worked out between HMCG and Border Force.
Q. Thank you. In particular, can I ask you —
A. Yes, sorry.
Q. — was there thought at this stage about whether or not the MCA or Coastguard should own its own surface assets or consider their purchase?
A. Not at this very point, sorry, I think you were just getting to the point I was considering whether I needed to introduce. So not at this very point of this submission, but it very quickly becomes a discussion point and we have seen and the Inquiry has seen and looked at Home Office, Border Force, Mr Dan O’Mahoney’s submission of late December —
Q. Yes.
A. — on that issue. So it’s not, as I remember it, an issue as to whether HMCG should be owning those surface SAR assets. It’s just what does the SAR effort need in terms of additional maritime surface assets.
Q. Thank you.
A. HMCG, being highly knowledgeable, technical and engaging with Border Force on the issue.
Q. Thank you very much. In terms of the need enhanced situational capabilities, you have told us through your witness statement and the Inquiry has received evidence about this already, that Project CAESAR came into existence and fruition and did provide the additional situational awareness through the form of additional aerial assets, is that right?
A. Yes, that is right and I would note that that went through in incredible quick time. So noting the Inquiry has heard evidence of the importance of aviation assets.
Q. Yes.
A. And that was identified as a — as needing to be increased. And that — that — Project CAESAR went through and got agreement internally within DfT and then agreement from HMT in incredible quick time. So from there to February and then operationalised in March is — is very significant for a — the size and complexity of that project that we are — we are looking at here.
Q. Yes, thank you. Just so we are clear, that’s 2021 into 2022 —
A. Correct.
Q. — that you are talking about? Thank you. I would like to look with you at the MCA’s risk register —
A. Yes.
Q. — for this same period that you have referred to already in your evidence and referred to in your witness statement. {INQ000167/1}, please. It starts at page 1 with an entry from May 2020. And this is, is this right, a pretty standard form of risk assessment. It is a five-by-five risk matrix which looks at the likelihood and the impact of any particular eventual locates a score of 1 to 5 to each, multiplies the two together to produce a figure, rates it red, amber or green according to severity, and then looks at the mitigations that might be —
A. Yes, indeed. Indeed, we — standard. I have one in relation to maritime security, lots of — lots of divisions/directorates will operate similar. The different columns, I can’t see the column headings, but I think one is “If untreated”.
Q. Yes.
A. “If treated”, or “Current trajectory”, something like that, I forget.
Q. Thank you and: where can we end up — if we apply the mitigation, that we have identified —
A. Correct.
Q. — where do we end up on the score?
A. Yes.
Q. Can we look, please at page 24 of this register, {INQ000167/24} and this is an extract from that same register dated November 2021, so the timeframe that we are looking at —
A. Yes.
Q. — currently. And we have here a new risk identified, do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And the new risk is that: “HMCG may become overwhelmed due to unquantifiable levels of migrant channel crossing activity occurring during periods of good weather.” Unmitigated score of “5 x 4”, “20” in red. Target score “9 (3 x 3)” and the identified mitigations in the sixth column.
A. Yes.
Q. If they are put in place, will result in a score of “4 x 4”; 16, yes?
A. Yes. Yes. So small boats, the previous risk we — we see, which featured was relating to concerns around turnaround tactics, but this is a new risk that is inputted into the risk register from November ’21. So that comes, essentially as the — the description I have just given in terms of the experience of 2021 and the high level of pressure that search and rescue capability was coming under. But the understanding that the projections for 2022 were significantly bigger and therefore, capability needed to improve. So I think that is why the timing comes about and this risk is entered at this point in the risk register.
Q. Thank you. Did this entry — were you aware of it at the time?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Was it factored into, did it underpin in any way either of the submissions that you referred us to, the ministerial submissions?
A. They relate — relate to each other.
Q. Thank you.
A. So absolutely. I was speaking to HMCG team, director Coastguard, and my teams were speaking to each other in relation to the risk and the need at this time for a risk to be properly represented on the risk register. And that — and the work and the mitigations being taken forward that were summarised in the submissions. So I think at the time the risk is written down, there is some understanding as to what the capability improvements could and should be. But more work goes on to determine that, as represented and described in the bullets and the recommendations we saw in the submission just a moment ago.
Q. Thank you. All right. We can take that off the screen, please. I want to ask you very briefly about the timeframe for Operation Isotrope that you have referred to, already. That’s the period of maritime primacy that the Inquiry has already referred to —
A. Yes.
Q. — starting on 14 April 2022, running through to 31 January 2023. MoD effectively taking primacy over all aspects of Government’s operational response to small boats, illegal migration, but of course Coastguard retain the lead for search and rescue.
A. Yes.
Q. In that timeframe you have already referred us to some aspects of this. The independent review of Border Force took place and that — in July 2022 — did that recommend that Border Force and Royal Navy vessels weren’t appropriate for providing an ongoing SAR function? You touched on this in your witness statement.
A. Sorry. I was distracted just momentarily.
Q. Of course.
A. Can you give me the date and reference?
Q. Yes, July 2022, the independent review of the Border Force had recommended —
A. The Down(?) review, yes.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. In September and November 2022, the Home Office made repeat proposals that SOLAS assets should be procured and managed under DfT and Coastguard ownership and again, you touch on that in your witness statement. You received — or a paper was prepared, rather, for the MCA’s sponsorship board by the director of Coastguard in October 2022 which was not supportive of the need for Coastguard to acquire its own surface assets, do you remember that?
A. Yes, I remember it vaguely from the time, but also from the preparation here. Although, I can’t bring it to mind right at this moment.
Q. Thank you. Then shortly after Operation Isotrope came to an end, the department approved, in principle, a business case — the MCA’s business case, to procure its own surface SAR assets in the event of the withdrawal of Home Office operative boats; that’s February 2023, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.
A. Yes.
Q. We can look at that, please. That’s {INQ004304/1} and at page 1 we can see a document describing itself as the strategic outline business case, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. At page 5 of this document, {INQ004304/5}, we can see its purpose is set out — rather, at the “Background” is set out: “[Looking for] approval in principle to develop a requirement and commercial framework to procure surface rescue assets in the English Channel, in the event of a planned withdrawal of Home Office operated rescue boats.” Recognising, at the fifth paragraph under the background, the events both of 24 November 2021 and the 17 December 2022. That background is followed by a section headed “Strategic Consideration” which again, recognise the potential that Border Force might withdraw its assets. Can I look over the page, please, to page 6, {INQ004304/6}, and at the paragraph that starts on this page: “The HM Coastguard Search and Rescue in the Channel (SARiC) project …” Is that the project which this document relates to?
A. Yes, it is the acronym that we see on the front page of the document.
Q. It will: “… strategically offer a proportionate and appropriate service to conduct search and rescue in the channel that is focused on small boat migrant crossings. “This will fill the void left if Border Force withdraws its service …” And then the next paragraph: “Incorporating this function as a core role of MCA offers a unique opportunity to reposition and refine the search and rescue provision in the channel to provide tailored solutions driven by data and employ assets proportionately to reduce wastage and improve efficiency.” Is this the part of this paper where the benefits that might accrue from Coastguard owning and operating its own surface assets are identified?
A. I think it is. I should say this is an outline business case —
Q. Yes.
A. — that was produced. So again, I have, of course, looked at this paper in preparation for the Inquiry, but I can’t remember how much more detail goes on beyond this, in terms of — in terms of benefit, noting that it is an outline business case.
Q. Thank you. Well, perhaps I will ask you a more open question. What benefits are you able to identify that could accrue from Coastguard owning and operating its own surface SAR assets?
A. So I think the main point goes to it’s an opportunity to reposition, refine the search and rescue provision. So the search and rescue provision per se, independent of who owns it. I don’t think it makes a case that — that the fact that it’s owned by MCA is an improvement in itself.
Q. Yes.
A. So the points that you have picked up on, in terms of Isotrope and the various other papers and discussions about who should own and operate the surface asset capability, shows a development over time. So Isotrope, even in the submissions we were looking at earlier, Border Force and HMCG looked and determined that more surface assets were needed. It then became with Isotrope coming in, that MoD managed and operated those additional surface assets and everyone recognised the improvement and benefit that that provided. With Isotrope coming to an end, it naturally, across Government, became a discussion point as to those assets are important, they must continue. So that was the overall most important factor here is that with MoD who own the contract, ceasing to operate on small boats. That contract must be taken on by another organisation and then there is discussion about whether that is best and most appropriately taken on by Border Force or by Coastguard with, as I say, the most important thing being there is no interruption of that contract. There is no interruption of the availability of assets for search and rescue operations. We thought it appropriate and important that we prepared an outline business case, in case in discussion with Border Force, in discussion around Government it was decided and agreed that it should be HMCG/MCA rather than Border Force operating those. So we are getting ahead by developing this outline business case and we can see here, it is a draft; there are comments boxes, track changes —
Q. Thank you.
A. — on the document itself.
Q. Approved, in principle then, in February 2023 and as you say it is an outline business case, but what’s the status of that proposal and the approval currently?
A. It wasn’t taken forward at the time because it wasn’t needed to, ultimately. Border Force determined, in discussion with HMCG, that they were best placed to continue operating those assets noting the dual — you know, in effect, a dual importance and role for Border Force vis-à-vis small boats operations that there is a broader security and legal immigration concern and operation that they need to attend to as well. So that they are able to manage the search and rescue assets means that they also have an ability and control in that aspect as well.
Q. Thank you.
A. So it wasn’t — the outline business case wasn’t taken forward.
Q. It wasn’t taken forward. Are there any plans at the moment for that decision to be reconsidered?
A. So the — the contract operated by Border Force at the moment comes to an end at the end of this year. So there are already discussions ongoing between DfT, HMCG, Home Office and Border Force as to how that contract should be renewed.
Q. All right. Thank you.
A. With, again, the most important thing being those assets are needed for search and rescue capability, someone must operate.
Q. There has to be continuity?
A. Yes, yes.
MS LE FEVRE: Thank you. Chair, I have about another half an hour. I am happy to continue and finish my questions, or it is quarter past 11, so …
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, I am just wondering — are you happy to continue?
A. I am very happy to continue.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. Continue, yes.
MS LE FEVRE: Then I am going to ask you some questions about a different topic and that’s oversight of the MCA. You were asked, and you answered questions in your witness statement, about the process by which the work of the MCA is monitored, assessed, assurance provided. And you pick that up at page 57 of your witness statement {INQ010337/57} paragraph 163, if we can have that on screen. It starts right at the bottom of that page, “DfT oversight of the MCA” and then to paragraph 163 {INQ010337/58}.
A. Yes.
Q. “… DfT had a role in ensuring appropriate systems … in place to deliver … adequate and effective SAR service to respond …” And then paragraph 164: “DfT had formal and informal mechanisms in place to provide oversight and assurance of the MCA’s SAR systems; [those included] sponsorship governance structures and external audits.” And you tell us that those mechanisms were effective in ensuring that DfT had sufficient oversight of His Majesty’s Coastguard’s performance of its SAR function, as the aspect of the UK arrangements for responding to small boats the DfT had an interest in. And in particular, you tell us the MCA Sponsorship Board was kept informed the challenges faced by the MCA in relation to small boats. All right. So at 165, you move on to the review of the risk register and we have just looked at some extract of the risk register and in particular, the new entry in November of 2021: “… Sponsorship Board regularly [reviewing] the … risk register.” What does a regular review, in that context, mean? We know, as a board, it meant — met quarterly, but what did regular review of the risk register mean?
A. So it meant that there was a formal review at that quarterly board, but depending on actions, that actions would be followed up. If there were any further actions in relation to mitigating or looking closer at those risks or indeed, generally — I think it is important to say generally — the highest risks were attended to outside of the sponsorship board. So the sponsorship was concerned to be assured that the highest risks were being attended to appropriately. That’s where you get the column in the right saying: this is the activity that’s going on against those risks. And that was absolutely the case in relation to the small boats risk, represented by the contact that my group was — my team was having with HMCG. It — outside of the formal MCA sponsorship board as well, I think it’s important to recognise the senior level regular interaction between the MCA and the department as well, that acted as sponsorship, which was, at the time, twice a week discussions between director, maritime DfT and the chief executive MCA. The chief exec and the executive directors, regular meetings with the director general and then indeed, the meetings that the chief exec, and on occasion exec, had with minister for aviation maritime security as well or indeed, with the permanent secretary. So the Inquiry has received papers — evidence demonstrating when the chief exec raised issues — the small boats issue with the minister, for example, or when that was discussed with the director general. But certainly, on a twice weekly basis, director maritime and chief exec MCA discussed matters of concern. For us as a department, ensuring that we are properly holding the MCA to account meant that the risks that were high on the risk register were discussed and brought up and — and that we were assured they were being attended to appropriately.
Q. Thank you.
A. And that was the case.
Q. Just to push you a little further on this —
A. Yes.
Q. — because you told us this is this sponsorship board that’s particularly responsible for the oversight function and that part of its work was the regular review of the risk register and we have looked at that November 2021 entry in the risk register. You have given us examples, at the end of that paragraph, paragraph 165, of the sponsorship board having considered the issue of small boats and the three documents that you refer us to, at the very end of that paragraph, are respectively, notes of October 2022, August 2020, and 2019, I think. Sorry, 23 November 2021. 23 November 2020.
A. Yes.
Q. My question to you is: where is it that we see the sponsorship board considering the November 2021 entry?
A. So, the minutes — I think the minutes throughout don’t necessarily records all the discussion of each risk. But the highest risks, in my experience, from — on occasions where I attended the sponsorship board and similar meetings, the highest risks were discussed and gone through. I think there are examples where in the documents that say the sponsorship board looked at the small boats risk, but I appreciate it wasn’t in relation to that November ’21, I don’t think.
Q. It is the November 2021 entry which is a new and high red-rated risk.
A. Yes.
Q. Specifically arising because of the small boats issue. And the documents that you have confirmed that you have provided to us through the witness statement don’t touch on or incorporate reference to that entry in the risk register.
A. Yes. So I was not at that meeting, unfortunately, but from my experience, as I say from being at the sponsorship board and meetings similar, I would — I am assured that the sponsorship board that met after the entry of that risk, looked at that risk as a high risk, a new entry. Those are two reasons a risk would be looked at and considered by the board. I think it would be a limitation in the minute rather than anything else that that was not recorded. And I know from the experience and working with the chief exec, Brian Johnson, Maritime Director at the time and with Director Coastguard, Claire Hughes at the time, that this was an issue that was discussed at the highest level, at the highest appropriate sponsorship accountability, meetings like the sponsorship board.
Q. Thank you. You next refer us to, as part of the assurance work, deep dive meetings, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. You pick this up at paragraphs 166 and following.
A. Yes.
Q. I think it’s right that you identify a sole deep dive meeting at which the small boats issue was canvassed or discussed, yes?
A. In relation to sponsorship, the sole deep dive meeting, yes. Yes, noting — I think as you went to on those other papers that I think it’s August and December 2020 and then September and November ’22 that the sponsorship board took papers on — on small boats. But yes, I think this is the sole one describes a deep dive.
Q. Thank you. You move on to tell us about the MCA’s internal systems reviewing and reflecting on SAR arrangements. You pick that up at page 59 and paragraph 169 and following, {INQ010337/59} and of course, the Inquiry heard from Matthew Leat yesterday, a programme of ongoing self improvement, regular peer reviews of changes in process, internal reviews in relation to serious incidents with, if appropriate, elective peer review of those internal reviews. Is that what you are referring to when you talk of the MCA’s internal systems for reviewing and reflecting on its SAR arrangements?
A. Yes. Yes. There are — if I just pause and read for a moment.
Q. Of course.
A. (Pause) Yes, it is — it is an organisation where, in terms of search and rescue for HMCG training, exercising is very important, learning lessons is very important and they go about that and attend to that with a degree of seriousness. There are other accountability or checks in terms of reviewing and learning lessons in relation to the IIIC code that I describe —
Q. I will come to that.
A. — later, but I think, yes.
Q. Yes, but that’s — have I fairly summarised the internal systems that you are referring to in this paragraph?
A. Yes.
Q. You tell us that the DfT isn’t directly involved in those review or inspection systems, but you are aware of them.
A. Correct, there are lots of reviews and inspections into various different incidents that, you know, whole of the UK search and rescue, for example our search and rescue capability and responses is involved in and we generally don’t see all of them. But in relation to small boats and the 24 November ’21, that being a very, very important incident we, of course, were in close contact and close discussion with them on that.
Q. Thank you. You move on, at paragraph 170 still on screen, to the MCA board, {INQ010337/60}. That’s different to the sponsorship board, that’s right, isn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. And its functions, you explain, is the highest decision-making corporate management group in the MCA. You tell us, through your witness statement, that it occasionally receives high-level briefings, relevant to the small boats issue, is that right?
A. Yes. It has on occasions, yes. Yes.
Q. And is that another layer that you refer the Inquiry to in respect of assurance and supervision of the work of the MCA?
A. It is, absolutely. So, I mean, it is notable that the MCA’s executive agency — a key part of its — of accountability on its objectives and performance comes about through that structure of the MCA board and its non-executive directors and non-executive chair. That is a — you know, it’s not necessarily a normal setup, but it is a setup important to the MCA and by consequence, HMCG, in order to give another layer of accountability and check and balance.
Q. Thank you. And I think the example of a briefing that you have given the Inquiry appears at {INQ008042/1}, a monthly chief executive report dated 23 July 2020 and at paragraph 2, the issue of migrants crossing the Channel and the increase — the dramatic increase in their numbers is referred to. I think this is the only point in this report that picks up the particular issue, and the paragraph concludes: “The solution remains very unclear … it should be noted that, were the 3 Border Force cutters to focus only on interception outside SOLAS, there is not the lifeboat capacity to deal with the numbers of migrants crossing the channel.”
A. Yes, I think this is an example of a note pulled together, a chief executive report — the chief executive, as I understand it, will have spoken to this note, so may have elaborated. Noting the date, of July 2020 when the numbers are first increasing, 2020 when the numbers are first increasing. I think that is the context for the chief executive’s language here in — in this note.
Q. Thank you. You move on then — and back to your witness statement please, at paragraphs 174 and following, page 61 {INQ010337/61}, to tell us of the departmental review of the MCA, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And at paragraph 174, you tell us that: “[The department] conducts reviews of the MCA in line with Cabinet Office’s guidance [on] ‘Tailored Reviews: Guidance on Reviews … Public Bodies’ … In the period immediately prior to 23-24 November 2021, DfT was in the process of undertaking what it referred it as a light-touch departmental review of the MCA … sought to provide assurances that the organisation was well run with good governance and assurance, and strong leadership; and that [it] was carrying out its functions efficiently and effectively.” Yes?
A. Yes, yes that sometimes referred as tailored review, the departmental review —
Q. Thank you.
A. — was underway at that point.
Q. And paragraph 175 you produce the report. We will look at it in just a moment. But you finish that paragraph by saying that: “This review provided assurances to DfT that MCA was carrying out its wider operational duties effectively and efficiently, while also making recommendations for improvements.” And you say that that report was never actually finalised or published; yes?
A. That’s correct. So it was — that report was interrupted by, in 2020, Covid, unfortunately. The work was done and progressed through to a written report, the — the document that — provided to the Inquiry and recommendations were made. When HMCG and DfT sponsorship came back around to considering the recommendations of that report and discussion in 2021 about — the discussion in 2021 was about what has not — what has been implemented, what has not yet been implemented, but remains relevant. And given that a period of time had gone past, it was determined that it wouldn’t be relevant to publish the report because a number of recommendations had been implemented or had been overtaken by —
Q. I see.
A. — by events.
Q. So this report is of a type that would typically be published?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Can we look at it then, please, {INQ008152/1}. Thank you. This is the report you have produced, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. It’s got a date at the foot of it, November 2021.
A. Yes.
Q. It’s a departmental review. If we move on, please, to paragraph 1 on the next page, {INQ008152/4}, thank you, telling us the executive summary of the report. Can we go to paragraph 3, please. I am so sorry, in the centre of that page: “… Terms of Reference … approved … in 2018 … in relation to accountability and governance … the relationship with the Department only. It did not go as far as examining efficacy and efficiency.” Do you see that?
A. Yes. Yes, I do see that.
Q. So when, in your witness statement, you told us that the purpose of this review was to give assurance that, in fact, the MCA was operating efficiently and effectively, that’s exactly what this review didn’t look at, is that right?
A. It — yes, I hadn’t seen or — I hadn’t realised this sentence in itself. I think when you look at the report itself, when it looks at accountability and governance structures, it — and recommendations around how those accountability and governance structures can be improved, I think that must go to a point of — it’s making — you know, aiming to make things more efficient, but I appreciate that sentence there.
Q. Well, it’s the sentence and a sentiment that is reflected elsewhere in this review. In fact, the report appears to be going out of its way to say it’s not examining and isn’t a review of efficiency or effectiveness. Do you think your witness statement might require a degree of reflection on that particular point?
A. Can you just take me to the witness statement?
Q. Yes, of course. So we will go — let’s just stay — to your witness statement, or do you want to look elsewhere in the report?
A. To the witness statement. I just wanted to see how I had described it in my witness statement.
Q. Yes. Paragraph 175: “This review provided assurances to DfT that MCA was carrying out its wider operational duties effectively and efficiently …” Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And, at the end of paragraph 174: “… the MCA was carrying out its functions effectively and efficiently.” What I am asking about, Mr Driver, is the apparent disconnect between those sentences in your witness statement and what the report appears to be at pain to stress —
A. Yes.
Q. — that’s exactly what it wasn’t doing.
A. Yes, I appreciate that. I — I — I suppose I don’t quite see the — the exact aim of the statement within the report of: this does not look at efficiency and effectiveness, in that it was a departmental review that made improvements, suggestions as to how various different aspects of the relationship, accountability sponsorship could be improved. And to my mind, I think, that would also equal making it more effective and more efficient though.
Q. All right. Thank you. Well, let’s go back to {INQ008152/4}. If we can still stay on that first page. You see those two bullet points immediately beneath the bullet point we have just been looking at?
A. Yes.
Q. “It is important to note the following. “[That] the MCA will undergo a full review next year … which will consider governance, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency.” And that’s 2022. Did that review take place? It’s not produced in your witness statement.
A. No it — it didn’t take place. So this is a fuller Cabinet Office review. Let me just read the reference here. One moment. (Pause) Yes, so I believe this is a reference to Cabinet Office led, Cabinet Office timetabled review programme and that review did not take place. It is referring to it being planned for 2022. Am I reading that correctly to your understanding?
Q. That’s my understanding.
A. Yes. So whilst that did not go ahead, there certainly was a lot of activity from a sponsorship and accountability improvement point of view. So instead, the director general put together an internal departmental review, which I think occurred in the beginning of 2023. So — sorry, the — the point I opened with, I think, that that is a Cabinet Office agenda and timetabling of the review. It did not go forward by the Cabinet Office. So —
Q. That was just my question, was whether that actually happened or whether it didn’t happen. We haven’t seen it.
A. No.
Q. And you are telling us it didn’t happen?
A. Yes, it didn’t happen, so I appreciate instead there was subsequent activity when that didn’t go ahead. Notably, an internal review asked for by the director general —
Q. Thank you.
A. — in 2023.
Q. I would like to look with you at the recommendations table that resulted from this review. You have referred to it already. It starts at page 8 of the report, {INQ008152/8}. Table of recommendations. “Form and Function”: “… MCA functions [recommendation 1] are critical to government and in its current form as an Executive Agency of DfT (noting this review did not cover efficacy and efficiency) …” And referring again to those aspects being for review the following year. Can we turn on to recommendation 6, please. I think that is a couple of pages further on, please. Thank you, {INQ008152/9}. There’s a recommendation here that there should be alignment between its key performance indicators and its objectives in the annual business plan and we have looked at the KPIs for 2021 to 2022: “… so that it can measure, monitor and manage delivery. Differentiating between internal-facing management information and public-facing key performance indicators may help the organisation to drive performance in the areas that matter most. At the time of … review [this review], a considerable number of MCA KPIs were focused on business-as-usual activities or hygiene factors, thereby limiting the ability to provide a robust view for MCA outcomes and progress against Ministerial priorities.” Yes?
A. Yes, I think that — I mean, we looked at a published document of MCA’s KPIs and that is unusual. I don’t publish my KPIs and most don’t. So I think that that is — I’m not hugely familiar with this aspect of improvement, for reference, but I gather that it is making that point that public-facing KPIs don’t necessarily get into the nitty-gritty.
Q. Well, if it helps — and I am not going to push you much further on this — but it is at page 35 of this same review, {INQ008152/35} that the report authors set out the analysis that underpinned that finding and that recommendation.
A. Yes.
Q. You will see key findings, indicating a need for greater sponsor input to the agreement of objectives, greater collaboration between the MCA and its sponsor in mutually agreeing submissions to ministers: “MCA’s performance reporting could be more rigorous and provide a clearer view and reflection of the progress [the] MCA has delivered. “Due to the considerable number of KPIs and other measures, it is difficult to know which are high priority. Some are business-as-usual activities which do not merit KPI status.” So that’s the analysis of the report that underpins the recommendation, do you see that?
A. Yes. Yes, I do, yes.
Q. And you tell us, helpfully, through your witness statement that this review, report was noted and was discussed by the MCA board. You tell us in October 2021. Can we have {INQ008153/1}, please. Those should be the minutes of that meeting. And we can see, do you see starting at paragraph 3 reference to that tailored review?
A. Yes.
Q. Now just called the DfT review of the MCA. If we look over onto page 2 of this document, please, {INQ008153/2}, we can see — it’s referred to here as recommendation 8, so the last but one bullet point on that page. This is the response in relation to key performance indicators. So: “In response to [that recommendation], we can simply differentiate in the annual Business Plan between [KPIs] that are externally-facing or are relevant to the internal running of the Agency.” That appears to the Inquiry to be the whole of the response to the DfT’s departmental review and its concern about the KPIs and how they were being identified and followed up. Do you think this response is a good enough response to the department’s analysis?
A. Well, I can certainly see here that it is only a small description —
Q. Yes.
A. — and mention in a — a longer — a longer note. But I think it is indicating that there was an approach and certainly an acceptance of the recommendation, first of all. And that there was a considered approach as to how that recommendation should be met. I know though, separately, the sponsorship team within DfT and HMCG have worked generally on the point about — on this point about ensuring that there is a — a relevant — a more relevant level of key performance indicator, or way of understanding performance indicators separate to those that are published. I think it goes to the point that I was just getting at, that published KPIs don’t necessarily get all that you want — all what one wants from DfT’s point of view in terms of holding MCA to account, perhaps because of classification or other sensitivity. I don’t — that I — that, I don’t know, but there could be several reasons as it why what is described at high level in a published document might not be enough for a sponsorship relationship between a department and its executive agency.
Q. All right.
A. And I think that’s been a focus in the sponsorship team.
Q. Thank you. And then the sixth limb — we can take that off the screen, please. The sixth limb of assurance you refer to is the IMO triple C, C audit. Is that?
A. III C.
Q. III C, okay. And your witness statement picks this up at page 62 and paragraph 177 and following. {INQ010337/62}. Mr Leat told us yesterday about the III C code and said this is an audit that takes place every five years.
A. Yes.
Q. And undertaken by the IMO, is that right?
A. Yes. So it is the IMO’s instruments implementation code audit. So the IMO, International Maritime Organisation, a UN body. It owns lots of the international regulation in relation to — in relation to maritime. And the UK, being a signatory of various of those instruments, is inspected as is every country in a similar position by the IMO on a regular basis.
Q. Thank you. By “regular”, Mr Leat is right, is he, every five years?
A. Yes, yes. I think that is IMO’s standard approach —
Q. Cycle, thank you.
A. Yes.
Q. Are the audits typically published or not published?
A. I — I think not published, but I am not absolutely sure on that point. My apologies. Whilst I’ve seen the documentation, as you ask the question, I am not absolutely sure, sorry.
Q. Thank you. You tell us at paragraph 178 that the audit was carried out remotely between 14 and 28 October 2021. And finalised early in 2022, yes?
A. Yes, I think remotely is unusual. It was another hangover from — from Covid. So normally, there would be a team in the — the state subject to the assessment, so in this case the UK, but in this instance it was remote.
Q. Paragraph 180, you tell us that in your estimation, the audit process will include a review of the operational learning systems MCA have in place for SAR, including incident reviews, yes?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. What does the phrase “In my estimation” mean in this context?
A. This was my best language to describe the fact that I don’t know the detail of the III code audit, but it was my understanding — my understanding, my estimation, was that it would include that as an aspect: is this an organisation that carries out things like reviews on SAR — in its SAR function?
Q. Thank you.
A. Nothing more than that. My best — my best effort at appropriate language there.
Q. Best estimation. Not quite —
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: I am just wondering. I’m just worried about the shorthand writer.
MS LE FEVRE: Yes, Chair. I share the concern. I probably have about six or seven more questions for the witness, but I can happily break now, if that is better for the shorthand writer please.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Okay. Let’s just have a short break then. In other words, we will be back at noon. (11.53 am) (A short break) (12.00 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Ms Le Fevre.
MS LE FEVRE: Thank you. Mr Driver, I was about to ask you some questions about the III C code audit.
A. Yes.
Q. And that is {INQ008173/1}. Now, you have already told us, Mr Driver, this isn’t a scheme you are yourself personally closely familiar with, is that fair?
A. Sorry?
Q. You are not personally closely familiar with this audit scheme, is that right?
A. No, I am not. So the scheme is supported when MCA go through this process, the incident is — is closely involved in supporting them through that and contributes to that, but that is outwith my team and my experience.
Q. Thank you. Well, I will just look at a very few aspects then, with that observation in mind. Can we look at page 3 and paragraph 1.1, please. {INQ008173/3}. We can see there set out what the audit scheme is: “[An assessment of] the extent to which a Member State complies with its obligations set out in various IMO instruments to which it is a Party.” Paragraph 1.3 on the same page, as you have already told us, this was a remote audit taking place over a fortnight. Four auditors drawn from across the world. And at 1.8, please, just scrolling down, we can see that there are a range of bodies involved in the process. It’s not simply the MCA.
A. No.
Q. Or the department. It is the full spectrum of entities involved in compliance with those international obligations that are being looked at through this audit, is that right?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Thank you. At page 17 then, please, {INQ008173/17}, we can see at paragraphs 9.8 to 9.10, the observations and commentary in respect of search and rescue services. That tells us about the Coastguard Act, it tells us about the network of nine maritime rescue co-ordination centres and so on. That the Coastguard maintain continuous monitoring of its VHF and MF DSC frequencies. It tells us some aspects of the emergency telephone system, distress alerts, the co-ordination of maritime search and rescue units. Operated by charitable organisations and the aeronautical SRUs. And then it goes on to comment on the Gibraltar Port Authority and the Port Authority of the Cayman Islands. At page 22, please, {INQ008173/22} paragraphs 9.43 to 9.45, the auditors make some observations about the processes for evaluation and review. So far as Coastguard’s concerned, that’s the second two of those paragraphs, conducting regular standards performance reviews. Those sound like the reviews that you have referred us to separately. And an annual programme by an Independent Standards Team. Do you know anything about the Independent Standards Team?
A. Just give me the —
Q. 9.44, the end of the first sentence, the second line of that page — of that paragraph.
A. I think the Independent Standards Team are the team that I think Mr Leat described yesterday, yes —
Q. Thank you.
A. — so I’m familiar with them and indeed interacted with them on a regular basis.
Q. Thank you very much. And then the processes for external audit reviews, The UK Government Internal Audit Agency, what’s the GIAA, do you know?
A. So as, as described, the Government Internal Audit Agency which as a function its modus operandi is to go to Government departments and investigate and audit various different aspects of those Government departments.
Q. Do you know what — when the UK GIAA was last involved with Coastguard, with the MCA?
A. I do not know, no. I know that DfT, at departmental level, there were a number of audits per year in DfT as there will be in every Government department, but I don’t know when last that was HMCG.
Q. Thank you. And 9.45, reference to training and exercises conducted by Coastguard for SAR being subjected to operational learning reviews by separate teams or independent entities. And is your understanding of that paragraph that that refers again or reflects Mr Leat’s evidence to the Inquiry yesterday; internal work to self improve and peer review electively as appropriate?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. If we move on to the programme for this audit, it starts at page 39 of the document, just to introduce it, {INQ008173/39}. So this is Annex 1 and the audit programme broken down by session and by day and by participants. It’s at page 53 and the afternoon session on page 53, {INQ00817353} that we can see search and rescue services and radio communications looked at. That’s a session that lasted I think for an hour and a half, 15:30 to 5 o’clock in the afternoon and what we know about the methodology for auditing so video calls, documentary review, and a documentary and data review?
A. Yes.
Q. And just for the sake of completeness, turn back to page 51, please, {INQ008173/51}. And we can see there’s a morning session on that day, 11:00 to 12:00, looking at coastal state activity generally and then review of the policies for implementation and evaluation review and improvement. And in the afternoon, an hour’s session looking at the safety of navigation systems and training around that. That appears, to the Inquiry, to be the whole programme within this audit that touches on auditing of the search and rescue functions within MCA. You may not feel it possible to comment on that because you are not intimately familiar with the process. But this is, is this right, the only external auditing, or mandated auditing, to which His Majesty’s Coastguard through the MCA is and was subject?
A. I will have to say, I am not absolutely sure. MCA and HMCG will be best placed to answer that. I know it is a significant one —
Q. Thank you.
A. — and I am not sure that I know of any others.
Q. Then I will put my question that way: it is the only external audit to which you have referred us?
A. Yes. Separate to peer-to-peer review system, that was a feature of the 24 November incident, in that MCA, HMCG were subject — invited to peer review via US Coastguard. But that is a facility that exists and can be used in any aspect or incidents, that peer review system.
Q. Thank you. We can take that off the screen, please. For the sake of completeness and within your witness statement, you also refer us to the work of the MAIB and of course, an independent branch of the DfT and responsible for investigating marine accidents involving ships —
A. Mm-hm.
Q. — in UK territorial waters. That’s a responsive organisation, or reactive in the sense that it only investigates where there is an issue, an accident to investigate, is that right?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. So it’s not a proactive system of investigation?
A. No.
Q. No. And you then refer us, finally and for the sake of completeness in your witness statement, to a range of internal meetings, some of which you have referred us to already in your oral evidence, some of which are minuted and some of which are perhaps not minuted, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it fair to say that that is now the entire picture of assurance that you present to the Inquiry on behalf of the DfT, in respect of oversight of the MCA?
A. Yes, I think we have covered all the significant levels of assurance, yes, I think that is correct. I would separately add, which is not a mechanism itself, but the MCA is led by a senior civil servant chief executive that has — is accountable to up through the line management chain and to the Secretary of State for ensuring that they meet the objectives of the organisation and all aspects and facets of its business plan. So that line management function, which is common throughout the Civil Service, means there is a — there is a level there of accountability as well, that the function of delegating authority through to that chief executive heading up that organisation is common to — the function of delegating authority is common to how the Civil Service operates and is relevant in this instance in relation to accountability as well.
MS LE FEVRE: Thank you, Mr Driver. Chair, I have no further questions for Mr Driver.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: No. Well, thanks very much for your statement and evidence, Mr Driver. I think we might have to write to the department to fill in some of the gaps, but thank you very much.
A. May — sorry, Chair —
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: I shall write to you. (12.12 pm) (The Inquiry adjourned until 10 o’clock, on Wednesday, 26 March 2025)
I N D E X
MR JAMES DRIVER (Affirmed) ……………………..1
Questions by MS LE FEVRE ………………….1