Thursday, 6 March 2025 (10.00 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, good morning, everyone. Good morning, Mr Norton. Thanks very much for your statement. In a moment, Genevieve Woods will ask you some questions, but first of all, could you read the affirmation, please.
CHRISTOPHER NORTON (affirmed)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Thanks very much. Ms Woods.
Questions by MS WOODS
MS WOODS: Thank you, Chair. Good morning, Mr Norton.
A. Good morning, Ms Woods.
Q. Could you give your full name please for the Inquiry?
A. Christopher James Richard Norton.
Q. Thank you. You have made a witness statement which was provided to the Inquiry and dated, I think, 27 November of last year; is that right?
A. I’m sure it was.
Q. Thank you, Mr Norton. It’s right that you’re here to give evidence on behalf of a company called 2Excel Aviation Limited; is that right?
A. It is.
Q. Can you tell us what your role is within 2Excel?
A. I’m one of the founders of 2Excel, I’m a main board director, and I’m the accountable manager, which means that I’m responsible for the management system through which we deliver our services.
Q. If you’re a founder, you must have been there from the very outset. How long have you been at 2Excel?
A. 20 years now.
Q. 20 years. Can I ask to turn to your statement, which is {INQ10335/3} and page 3 of that statement. Thank you very much. If we’re looking to paragraph 8, I understand that 2Excel was contracted to provide services to the MCA; is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. And we can see in your statement, paragraph 8, that contract was awarded on 19 March 2019 and began eight months later on 19 November 2019; is that right?
A. It was, yeah.
Q. And at the bottom of that paragraph we can see that the service required was: “… multi-faceted and included Search and Rescue … maritime patrol and counter-pollution tasking on an ‘availability service’ basis.” Is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. Can you explain for us —
A. Excuse me, Ms Woods.
Q. Of course.
A. Should I be seeing something on the screen?
Q. Ah, are they not appearing on the screen before you?
A. No.
Q. We appear to be having some technical difficulties. If you could just pause for a minute. (Pause). Thank you very much. We’re in paragraph 8 at the very top of the page there. We can see the start date for the contract eight months later, 19 November 2019. And then we’re just on the very last sentence here.
A. Thank you.
Q. “The ASv service required was multi-faceted and included Search and Rescue … maritime patrol and counter-pollution tasking on an ‘availability service’ basis.”
A. That’s right.
Q. Could you help us with what an “availability service basis” is?
A. The — the idea of an availability service is to provide a capability, which, in this case, is aircraft with — equipped with sensors, crewed by suitably qualified and experienced personnel to provide a contract-air service, and that would be for an amount of flying within — within a readiness, reactionary readiness schedule for a period of time. So, in this particular case, it was a 365 day, 24-hour service for five years, but to provide 1,044, I think it was, hours per year within that 365 day, 24-hour service.
Q. Have I understood, with a certain amount of lead time, depending on the time of day, 2Excel was required to essentially make assets — aerial assets available hours a day, all year around?
A. Correct. So in the daytime, it was a 45-minute notice period for a King Air, a 60-minute notice period for a Panther, and those were — the initial ASv contract was just for King Airs, but that was later amended to provide Panthers as an additional service later on. The — and at night, it was a 60-minute readiness timescale for the King Air and 120-minute readiness timescale for the Panthers.
Q. Mr Norton, you’ve mentioned I think the names of a number of different types of aircraft. Could I ask that we go to {INQ010335/11} of your statement and to paragraph 43, so right down the bottom.
A. Yeah.
Q. We can see there: “In November 2021, 2Excel had three aircraft types in place …” I think you’ve just mentioned King Air, which is the first one there. So we have two King Air aircraft in November 2021; is that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. And they could fly for approximately five hours —
A. Yeah.
Q. — is that what it means when it says “endurance” there?
A. That’s right.
Q. Then below, we can see there were also three Panthers. I think you also mentioned Panthers?
A. Yeah.
Q. And one Navajo; is that right?
A. Yeah. So the — the contract we had was to provide two King Airs and two Panthers, but we had additional aircraft within our fleet which meant that we could provide a more resilient service and so be able to — to hit the key performance indicators to provide the level of availability that we needed.
Q. Understood. I want to understand, if I can, the different types of tasking that those planes could be sent to as part of this MCA contract. In your statement you say the first type is called an SAR, a search and rescue tasking, and you say it’s where you’re airborne in response to a known rescue requirement with a rescue call sign. Can you tell us what that means? In lay terms —
A. Sure.
Q. — what is an SAR tasking?
A. Okay. The two types of tasking were defined as reactive tasking and proactive tasking. Reactive tasking is a response to a known situation and proactive is effectively patrolling. Patrolling may turn into something that becomes more reactive, but — but search and rescue as a specific is a response to be a direct threat, like a — sorry, a direct hazard, which is like a ship sinking or — or migrants being found in the water.
Q. There’s a second category described in your statement, a reactive SOLAS tasking. Is that safety of life sea, SOLAS?
A. Safety of life at sea, correct.
Q. And how is reactive SOLAS tasking different from a Search and Rescue tasking that you’ve told us about?
A. So it’s really down to the specificity of the situation at the time. So if a ship goes down and you know where the ship is, you can go straight — you can be launched, you know, from — from the ground. And in the case of you don’t know where it is and you might have to — to find it, then — then — or you — or you launch because you think it might happen, because you’re responding to a known situation where something might happen, that would be SOLAS.
Q. And specifically, there is a difference between a reactive and a proactive SOLAS tasking?
A. There is.
Q. How is a proactive SOLAS tasking different from a reactive SOLAS tasking versus a Search and Rescue tasking?
A. So it’s a — it’s a continuum, almost, of — of risk, effectively. So a search and rescue is to a known — that, you know, such and such a ship has sunk here. Proactive SOLAS is we think there’s a likelihood that there could be ships sinking here. And reactive — sorry, that’s reactive SOLAS. And proactive SOLAS would be the conditions might be right for such and such a thing to happen, we’d like to you get airborne so that you’re ready and go and look to — to see the — see the potential threats coming.
Q. Understood. Thank you very much. The Inquiry understands that when you were providing these services for the MCA, you were primarily working on something called Operation EOS. Could you tell the Inquiry what your understanding was of Operation EOS?
A. So Operation EOS is a proactive, planned patrolling, looking into an area because there’s a known set of threats or a known set of potential hazards. So “EOS”, as we call it, E-O-S, is a response to the high likelihood that you might be required, but it’s not in response to an actual sinking.
Q. Does that mean it’s proactive SOLAS tasking? Does it fall into that category?
A. It does.
Q. Okay. The Inquiry is also aware of a separate operation which 2Excel occasionally was tasked to work on called Op Altair. Could you tell us what that was, your understanding of what that was at the time?
A. So Op Altair usually precedes Op EOS, and effectively it’s to go and look into the start of the threat area and potentially see people getting into boats on the beach in order to be able to pass that information through the command and control system to, in this particular case, the French authorities so that they could hopefully stop the people getting into the boats. And if they get into the boats, you start watching them as they start to migrate across the Channel in order to be able to, if somebody goes into a — into a hazard area, to transition from Op Altair into Op EOS. So it’s often a precursor to Op EOS, but you can be — you can go to look for specific threats or you can go to warn people of potential threats.
Q. In practical terms, if you’re the pilot sitting in the plane, what’s the difference if you’re tasked to do an Op EOS tasking versus an Altair tasking? Is it just who you’re reporting to, or …?
A. You report to the same commander control in both cases, it’s just where your report might go. So in Op Altair, you would look further in towards the coast, so you’re looking into French airspace, into French sea space, ultimately all the way to the French beaches, but you’re looking from UK airspace and UK waters. And once there is a potential threat and you’re watching people come across the sea as they enter into the UK spaces, then that transitions into Op EOS, where you’re saying the boat’s going to land here, you know, make sure that the UK forces are ready to receive.
Q. Is it fair to say it is more about where you’re looking than what you’re looking for or what you’re doing in the plane itself?
A. What you’re doing is the same, the senses you’re using is the same, where you’re looking is slightly different, and the purpose of your report is slightly different.
Q. Thank you. Can we pull up a document at {INQ005198/1}. This is the Op EOS tasking policy and we believe this is the version which applied in November 2021. Can we go to page 3{INQ005198} of that document, please. We can see in the middle there’s a section called “Criteria”. At the top, in “Overview”, it tells us about the services provided by 2Excel to the MCA. Then under “Criteria”, it sets out when those services are provided. So it says: “These flights, which are proactive in their nature, can only be requested when the following criteria are met.” And there’s two criteria there. Just looking at the top one for the minute, the first criteria is when an: “Operation Deveran weather assessment [is] received by the [Coastguard] Liaison Officers and states that migrant crossings during a defined period of time (that is no greater than 12 hours) are deemed as a realistic possibility (or greater) to occur.” Does that mean that your taskings for 2Excel were to some extent determined in advance by the assessed likelihood of migrant crossings on a given day?
A. It does.
Q. And I think it says, correct me if I’m wrong, that where the assessment was that there was a realistic possibility of crossings, that 2Excel was in those circumstances to provide proactive surveillance patrols; is that right?
A. We have — our understanding at 2Excel is there are sort of three conditions, red, amber and green, and during red days, or red time periods, there is a high likelihood of a crossing, and we are required to be airborne, able to be, at very short notice, effectively, to — to react to a hazard. On an amber day, we would forward deploy, okay? So — so that is a less likelihood of a crossing, then we would forward deploy so we could still react quickly, but we may sit on the ground. And on a green day, we wouldn’t necessarily forward deploy, we may sit at our normal — our normal base, because there is a less likelihood of crossing.
Q. Understood. I think we can take that document down. Thank you very much. On a day where crossings were amber or red, so we’re talking about likely or high likelihood of crossings, did 2Excel still receive and review a tasking from the MCA or from the Home Office, or was the default position that you were preparing and assuming to provide services on those days?
A. So the — there are — there is a sort of cascade of information. Weekly, there is a meeting, and that meeting says this is what’s likely to happen over the — over the week, and we would use that information to make sure that we had the correct level of availability and we were planning to forward deploy if we needed to be, or we were planning to be airborne if we needed to be. That — that’s sort of done on a weekly basis. But our tasking is specific. So the tasking comes on a tasking form, and the tasking form requests that we get airborne for a particular time, or we forward deploy for a particular time, and it tells us what task we are likely to receive. So that may be proactive SOLAS, it may be reactive SOLAS, it may be maritime pollution patrols. So there are — there are many things. But it’s actually the tasking, it’s not whether it’s red or it’s amber or it’s green, it’s the tasking that tells us what we are — what we are required to do. We then either accept that, if we can, or we qualify our acceptance, or if we can’t deliver it, then we would reject the — the tasking. So it’s the tasking itself that is specific, not the conditions. It’s not our choice, we just prepare for the ability to respond to the tasking. And those tasks will generally come, you know, a day or so in advance. So on the night in question, we had pre-planned tasking to be ready, and then that was upgraded and upgraded as — as the events unfolded.
Q. So was 2Excel able to see the RAG rating, the red, amber green rating for a period in advance through that weekly meeting?
A. Through the weekly meeting, yes.
Q. And when taskings were received, is it right that they came through something called the ARCC, which is the Aeronautical Rescue Control Centre?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And that’s part of the MCA Operations Centre?
A. Yeah. So our tasking — all tasking would come through the ARCC.
Q. So turning then to planning for the specific night of to 24 November, if we can, could I ask that {INQ006332/1} is brought up on the screen, please. This is the RAG rating for 23 to 24 November. We can see in the box down in the corner — it’s quite small writing, hopefully you’re able to see — the first row is for November, but that second row is for the 23rd through to 6 o’clock UTC, and we can see it’s been assessed as amber, as likely for crossings. And then below it, moving into the 24th, as red, highly likely that crossings would occur. Is this something that you received in advance of that night?
A. This — I believe this is a document that is used in that weekly briefing. It’s — it may be sent to us, but it’s — it was definitely known by us, because we attend that briefing. So we would know those — those colour codes, but as I say, our tasking is — comes on tasking forms.
Q. Can I take you then to that tasking form. So it’s {INQ000148/1}, please. So just looking at that front page for the minute, we can see that this is a document dated 22 November 2021, and it is an Op EOS tasking, MCA 719 is the reference. And we can see, in that little box down the bottom, that the timing, “On-scene time” is 0300 through to 0800 on the day?
A. Yeah.
Q. Turning then to page 2 {INQ000148}, we can see the particular tasking that was given on this form.
A. Yeah.
Q. So we can see a map with different zoned areas and below it, it says: “Aircraft is to patrol areas A through D and respond to taskings from Dover Coastguard.” Below that are some objectives. But if we turn to the following page {INQ000148/3}, about halfway down the page, we can see a section called “Consequence of non-delivery”, and it says: “Non delivery of this patrol could.” And there are three risks listed there. The first is: “Reduce the chance of … vessels being identified earlier within their transit …” The second is: “… impact on [Search and Rescue] response times, decreasing the chance of early interdictions and potentially increasing risk to the migrants.” And the third is, it could: “Be detrimental to the building and analysis of the Maritime Domain Awareness Picture.” If this tasking weren’t completed. Were those things that 2Excel had in mind and was aware of when determining whether or not to accept a tasking?
A. To be — we would — if we were tasked, we would always go on the task, if we could go on the task. The consequence of non-delivery of this patrol, so — so in this particular case, A through D is UK airspace, UK water space, it’s a patrol and therefore it’s non-specific, but the idea, on a day like this, which was an amber, going red, day, is we need to be airborne. So the — we wouldn’t reject a task. We’re not assessing the risk of non-delivery per se, we would accept the task if we could accept the task. The detail of the tasking is, “Go and do X, Y and Z” and the consequence of not delivering is stated here, that was a sort of normal statement. And, to be honest, it was normal that we would be airborne, because we knew it was a red day, we knew it was an amber day, we knew what our job was, which is to be prepared from an airborne position to, in the case of Op EOS, understand what was going on in UK waters and UK airspace from 3 o’clock in the morning until 8 o’clock in the morning, and so our whole planning was to accept this task.
Q. Looking at that third risk in that little box there —
A. Yeah.
Q. — “the building and analysis of the Maritime Domain Awareness Picture” could be adversely impacted if 2Excel didn’t fly on a given night.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you tell us what that means?
A. So the — the sensors that exist on the aircraft and the picture that we could help to build by the other people who were connected to us was enhanced by the sensors on the aircraft. We would cover that particular time with two or three flights, so — and therefore two or three different aircraft, which are equipped with slightly different sensors, but all of those sensors are helping to build the picture for the users of the data, which, in this case, goes through — back through the various communications channels to the ARCC and to all the government departments that get fed that picture.
Q. Does that mean there’s an adverse impact on awareness of what is happening in the Channel in the area that it was tasked to if that task is not completed?
A. It would.
Q. Could I ask now that we turn to a document at {INQ001195/1}, please, and to page 4 {INQ001195/4}. This is a chain of emails showing that tasking being sent across to 2Excel. So right down the bottom, we can see, 22 November, 1.04 pm, and there’s an email sent from the ARCC through to 2Excel Ops, and it says here are the tasking requests and that’s the document we’ve just looked at. We can see the response above it, at 4.16, sent from 2Excel Ops to the MCA, and we can see the tasking sheets were completed and returned. But then it says: “Please note that due to only having 1 aircraft overnight on 23rd/early hours [of the] 24th, we will not be able to cover the whole tasking period for Op Eos.” Pausing there, can you tell us why only one aircraft was available at that point?
A. So we actually had four aircraft available, but that wasn’t until the next day. We had three aircraft available, and this looks to be looking at one of the two Navajos — one of the two Panthers, I’m sorry. So, at the stage that this email was written, which was on the 22nd, then one of the aeroplanes was in servicing, so we had one Panther and two King Airs. It looks to me like that email is referring to the Panther line, and we were going to deliver the five-hour window using two — two aircraft. So I think it may have been slightly lazy language from the operations controller, but on the night, we had two King Airs and two Navajos available. The day before, we had two King Airs and one Navajo available. The Navajo was got serviceable before the 23rd such that we had two — well, we had a primary and a back up aircraft for both the King Air lines and the Navajo lines.
Q. If what you’re saying now is that there were in fact three aircraft available at this point, the day before, and in fact more the next day, why does this email say, “We only have one aircraft available overnight” for the 23rd to the 24th?
A. I don’t know, actually.
Q. Are you saying that this isn’t an accurate statement of the position at the time?
A. The — there may have only been — I can’t explain that one aircraft, because the plan on the 23rd was that there would be two aircraft, each with a spare, throughout the whole of the VUL, throughout the whole of the — from the 23rd at 11.30 at night through until the next morning, we would use five sorties with two aircraft to fulfil the tasking.
Q. Can we turn then to page 3 of {INQ001195} of the same document. At the bottom, we can see Coastguard reverting, 16.23, to ask: “What times would you be looking at covering so I can look at what gap I need to cover?” And above it, 16.24, so I think just one minute afterwards, saying: “We’re going to look again at the plan, can we revert shortly please.” Moving to page 2 of {INQ001195}, we can see that at 5.17, so at the top page {INQ001195/1}, we have a further email from 2Excel at 5.14 that evening {INQ001195/2}: “We’re currently working to get enough crew to be able to provide full coverage, unfortunately we’ve been hit with a crew catching covid so we’re just waiting to hear back from one crew member to find out where our options lie.” So you’ve told us about the availability of aircraft and said it wasn’t right when they said there was only one aircraft available, in fact there were more. Is it right that there was a problem with obtaining sufficient crew to cover this tasking?
A. There was a problem, and the problem was solved. The COVID — the crew member that was on the roster was struck by COVID and therefore we needed to find a replacement crew from within our fleet, and that was — that was found and rostered in.
Q. And at what stage was that problem resolved?
A. Certainly by sort of lunchtime on the 23rd.
Q. Okay. Can we turn to page 1 {INQ001195}, please, we can see the response from the Coastguard, 5.16, still on the 22nd: “Thanks for the update.” And then at the end: “I’ll wait until you give me the final outcome.” Now, the Inquiry hasn’t seen any further emails on this topic or in response to this. Is it right that there was no response to this message saying, “I’m waiting until you give me the final outcome”?
A. One of the — the learnings for us, for 2Excel, is that we weren’t recording enough of the data in a — in a good enough way to be able to fill the blanks in later. A lot of communications were happening verbally on the telephone, not always backed up by email. That was a normal method of communication, and we’ve — we’ve struggled to fill in the blanks as to why some of this information was, you know — well, was presaging effectively an inability to provide, when actually we solved all the operational problems by the day and we were able to provide. I think — and that was — that was a lesson that we learnt and we’ve put in place various mechanisms to make sure that we record all of those decisions going forward. But at the time, we didn’t have a very good record, which is why I’m struggling to answer your — to answer your questions, because a telephone call may or may not have, you know, recorded the various communications between the parties. What I do know is that there was a — an intent, a will and an activity, an operational activity, to provide the service for the amber going red day such that we were able to fulfil the tasking and that — that tasking was — was all — sorry, the provision was all there with a sensible plan by the afternoon of the 23rd.
Q. On the same day, in fact at the same time, there was a planning meeting with the Coastguard. Can I take you to document {INQ000206/1}. We can see this is a migrant red days meeting. That’s the name given to those planning meetings. We can see that there, right down, bottom, second from the bottom, is an attendee from 2Excel?
A. Yeah.
Q. And we can see this was taking place at 4 o’clock on the 22nd, so at the same time as the emails were being sent?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it right, that’s not you in that meeting, that was your head of surveillance?
A. That’s right.
Q. Can we go to the bottom of page 2{INQ000206}, please. So there is a comment, right at the end, by someone called “NB”, who I understand is from the Coastguard, and it says: “… 23rd — Both drones due up 0530 to 1330. CG22 is on stand by overnight for [Search and Rescue].” Which aircraft is CG22? Is that the King Air?
A. I’d have to — I’d have to check, but it was — yeah, I’d have to — I’d have to — just have to check the data.
Q. That’s fine. If we turn over to the next page {INQ000206/3}, we can see then a comment made on the 24th: “… One AR3 drone up on Deveron, AR5 on rest day …” I think those are the Home Office drones: “… and Op Eos … has been requested to 2XL from — 0800 as has the amber day.” Does that mean that, at this stage, the plan from 2Excel was for this aircraft CG22 to be on standby overnight on 23 to 24 November?
A. The timing of this is on the 22nd, in the afternoon? So the — at that stage — at that stage, we were planned to be on Op EOS, so — and I believe that the request for Op Altair, which extended our tasking, came in a bit later than that — than this meeting. But this meeting is the weekly meeting, as far as I’m aware, and the weekly meeting is: this is the threats, this is the picture. Our head of surveillance was operationally trying to manage his assets to be able to provide for, in this particular case, the tasking. Five hours from to 0800 would be just beyond the limit for any one single aircraft, and so in his head, he was planning two aircraft, so using the King Air and the Navajo, they would have different call signs, and the plan was to overlap them such that they could relieve in place.
Q. There’s no comments in this document by your head of surveillance, by the representative from 2Excel at this meeting. Is it right then that that plan that was in his mind wasn’t shared with this meeting, as far as we can tell?
A. To be honest, the meeting is a tasking meeting.
Q. Okay.
A. And he was sort of going, “Right, okay, I know what the intent is”. It’s a tasking meeting that isn’t a specific tasking meeting to him, it’s a more general meeting where it’s, this is — this is — we’re marshalling all our assets. He’s at the meeting to be able to listen to the overall intent and play his part in the plan, but this is not a tasking meeting for him, it’s a provision of capability meeting, if you see what I mean, and the tasks fall out of those tasking forms that you — that you showed earlier.
Q. It’s right to say this was a planning meeting, wasn’t it?
A. Yeah.
Q. But 2Excel’s plan wasn’t shared with the other attendees of the meeting at that stage?
A. This — this is where they effectively are starting to form their plan. They’re getting given their jobs, but not necessarily in specific tasks. It — there’s nothing specific that came out of that meeting, as, “You are to do this”, it was the tasks that followed that meeting that said, “You are to do this”.
Q. Can we turn to a document at {INQ006340/1}, please. This is another email chain. We can see down the bottom of that page, the email at 16.16 which we’ve already seen. This is the response to that tasking, returning the sheets and saying: “… due to only having 1 aircraft … we will not be able to cover the whole … period …”
A. Yeah.
Q. If we go up to the email at the top, we can see that this is an email from, about two minutes later —
A. Yeah.
Q. — 16.18, and it’s from a person at 2Excel — it’s redacted there — to Ops, a number of other people at 2Excel and to the Special Missions Duty Exec. Looking at the content, it says: “I’m currently in a small boats meeting with the stakeholders — there’s significant risk in this period and we should try and cover as much as we can. I’ll stick a quick catchup meeting in for 1645.” So looking at this, it seems that the person who was in that red days meeting has, during that meeting, seen the email sent by 2Excel saying, “We’re not going to be able to cover the tasking period, we only have one aircraft”, but that’s not raised in the meeting. So they’ve seen the email below, “We can’t cover the tasking period”, they’re physically in that planning meeting with other stakeholders, why didn’t they say, “There might be some problems with covering the tasking period”?
A. I can’t answer for that individual, but my — my understanding is that he’s going, “We’ve really — we really need to move our assets around, people, planes, whatever, accelerate the engineering, whatever, but we need to be able to fill this hole”, and this is two days in advance, or 18 — 36 hours in advance, there or thereabouts. So he’s — he’s still got time to solve the problem. I don’t know what he said in the meeting, he hasn’t written anything in the meeting, but he — he’s definitely taken the point that this is a red or an amber-red day and we need to make sure that we provide for our job, which is to be airborne or forward deployed during that period.
Q. Given the recognised significant risk on that day, or overnight, wouldn’t it have been helpful to other stakeholders to say, “We may have some problems covering this”, to enable them to have an opportunity to find alternatives, or to turn to a plan B?
A. I think — I think his position would be that they have said, “We may have problems fixing this”. So if — if you’re right about that, we’ve only got one aircraft, that is saying it, it’s saying it through the operational response mechanism, as opposed to in the meeting. I don’t — if — were those minutes of the meeting that you showed earlier?
Q. Yes.
A. And he didn’t say anything?
Q. There’s no entry from the representative from 2Excel in the meeting. The only section that touches on 2Excel is the one that we looked at earlier.
A. Okay. So having spoken to him, he’s — he — he said, really, we go to that meeting to listen, not to talk, but we go — you’re absolutely right, it’s like he — he would have been — he would be articulating risk. His people are articulating risk, because they’re saying, “We have only got one aircraft, we’ve got a COVID member — sorry, a member of staff who’s gone down with COVID”, the — the job that he took out of that meeting was, “We need to make sure that we can provide” — this is on the 22nd, the risk is coming the following, so he’s got sort of 24 to 36 hours to fix it and that — and by 4.45, he’s going to try and do that. So it’s how can we — how can we fix this problem. And that is a normal operational thing. It’s like, right, the — you need to — you need to throw everything at this in order to be able to provide the service.
Q. And in fairness to you, we can see, looking at the email on the screen, that in fact there is someone from the MCA who is cc’d into that email.
A. Thank you.
Q. Can I ask to turn to page 4 {INQ003895}, please. This is an email on the following day. I can’t quite see the very top, it’s on the next page, but it’s November at 11.17. This an email from ARCC to 2Excel Ops: “I have received a request for Op ALTAIR for tonight … only if it remains an AMBER Day tomorrow, if it isn’t this request is withdrawn. “Are you able to support? Op EOS with SOLAS intent takes property.” And, at 12.41, we can see an email accepting that tasking {INQ003895/3}. So despite the concerns and the difficulties about being able to cover the tasking the previous day, 2Excel then went on to accept another tasking on the 23rd; is that right?
A. Accepted both taskings. So both the Op EOS tasking, which was the — the original one, and a subsequent Op Altair tasking, by lunchtime on the 23rd, yeah.
Q. And we can see a slight request in this email to change the time a little —
A. That’s right.
Q. — so that it’s on task for 30 minutes past midnight, so minutes after the start of Altair. Can we go to {INQ006337/1}, please. That is the tasking form for this Altair request. So this is reference number 722, dated 23 November, and we can see this one’s coming through from the Home Office rather than from the MCA. Is that because it’s Altair instead of EOS?
A. Yeah.
Q. Understood. And we can see the timing of that. It’s for November from 0001 through to 0500 on the 24th. And, of course, we know from that email the request was to change the timing slightly. It’s right that that overlaps with the Op EOS tasking that had already been accepted by 2Excel?
A. I think, actually, they were accepted at the same time. I think the previous email, the 12.41, was we accept both taskings, but — but what — can we start the Op Altair tasking 30 mins later.
Q. Apologies, I think that was my question not sufficiently clear. The timing of the taskings themselves overlap. So we can see this one is midnight to 5 o’clock, and we could see the other one was, I think, 3 through til 8; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. So in terms of timing, they were essentially at the same time on the 24th?
A. Yeah.
Q. Or at least there was a period of overlap?
A. Yeah.
Q. If we turn to page 2 of {INQ006337}, we can see the tasking itself. We can see the same diagram: “Aircraft is to patrol areas E through H …” And then, underneath, we can see the objectives set out. In fact, there was a third tasking request also accepted on that day, wasn’t there, Mr Norton? I’ll take you to that, that’s {INQ001188/1}. So this one is MCA 717 and this appears to be a further Op EOS tasking; is that right? This is coming through from ARCC?
A. Yeah.
Q. And we can see that’s for 8.30 until 4 pm on November. So it follows on in time from the previous Op EOS tasking that was accepted from 3 am until 8 am?
A. Yeah.
Q. If it was a struggle to cover the initial tasking, if there were concerns on the 22nd about whether you’d have enough aircraft or enough crew, why accept two further additional taskings the following day?
A. Because by the 23rd, we’d solved all of those potential or actual operational constraints, such that by lunchtime on the 23rd, we had generated or regenerated, actually at lunchtime on the 23rd, it was two King Airs and one Navajo — one Panther, I’m sorry, which happened to be a Navajo, and later on that day, we managed to get the Panther back up such that we had, by the time of the start of the tasking, two King Airs, a Panther and a Navajo to provide two lines of tasking. With those two lines of tasking, we could flip flop between the King Airs and the Navajos, okay, such that you could go airborne with one, airborne with another, relieve in place; land the first one, fill up with petrol, get airborne again, relief in place; land the second one, fill up with petrol, get airborne again, relief in place; land the first one, fill up with petrol, and keep flip flopping. That sounds easy if you’re all going from one place. The issue was that there was weather to manage, there were different crews that were going to get into the air — into the aircraft, and we were having to land at different bases. Nevertheless, there was a plan that, broadly, we could see, by lunchtime on the — lunchtime on the 23rd, that we could deliver from half past midnight through — through the — the VUL until the next day, in order to be able to cover the whole time for all the tasks. And when I say all the tasks, it’s because there was a clear prioritisation that Op EOS would take priority over Op Altair. So if there was a conflict by the — for the one aeroplane about whether you’re doing Op Altair or doing Op EOS, EOS would take priority, SOLAS would take priority, saving lives at sea would take priority. So we would provide the picture to the Home Office if we could, but if — if we needed to, we would go for saving lives at sea, and we could cover the whole VUL broadly we could cover the whole vol with those two lines of tasking throughout the night, weather permitting.
Q. You’ve just told us quite a complex plan for stopping and changing between planes. I think it might assist if I take you to where that’s set out in your statement. So could we go to {INQ010335}, bottom half of page 22. So under where it says, “To cover the overnight window”, it says “five sorties”, is that five flights essentially?
A. Five flights, yes.
Q. Quite a complex arrangement set out in those bullet points there. So, am I right, the intention was to use two planes to cover those taskings, one was a — originally a G-UMMI, is that a Navajo?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then that changed to become a Panther?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then to use a King Air plane as well; is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. Are you able to say whether that’s the CG22 plane that was mentioned in the red days planning meeting?
A. I think it was, yeah. I’d be doing it from memory, but somewhere in there it’s written down.
Q. Can you tell us why the change from the Navajo to the Panther?
A. The — the Panther came up late, but it’s a slightly better aircraft, so it is better equipped in the cockpit with — the — the equipment in the cockpit is better, it has a slightly longer endurance because it carries more petrol and it has a bigger engine, so it has got slightly more endurance, so five hours not four, and it it’s got slightly better mission fit, in that it’s not a hand-held radio, it’s an aircraft radio for a particular frequency band.
Q. So the plan then was to start with the Panther rather than the Navajo?
A. Yeah.
Q. And to use that to cover the Op Altair tasking from half past midnight; is that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. In fact, I think later in your statement you explain that it was planned to take off at about 11.30 in the evening, in anticipation of that tasking?
A. Correct.
Q. 2Excel has provided to the Inquiry flight packages for four of the five flights planned to cover this period, but not for that first flight, that first Panther flight.
A. Okay.
Q. I wonder if you can help us, was a package put together, was it made for that first flight?
A. I expect it would have been, yeah.
Q. Are you able to help us with why that’s not been shared with the Inquiry?
A. I don’t — I don’t know.
Q. Okay. So looking at this array of bullet points here, we can see the plan was the Panther flies first, from about 11.30 to meet the Op Altair tasking. Then it’s relieved by the King Air plane. Then the Panther lands at Southend, then it departs again to relieve the King Air. Then the King Air lands at Southend to refuel, then it relieves the Panther, and the Panther would land back at East Midlands airport; is that right?
A. That’s right. It may help, I think it’s figure 19 —
Q. Yes, it’s on, I think, the next page at 24 {INQ010335}, if that assists. There’s a diagram showing the overlap between the different flights.
A. That’s right.
Q. Looking at this figure, is it right that, at any given time, there was only one plane that was covering the tasking?
A. Correct.
Q. I want to ask how that was possible in a situation where 2Excel had two taskings at once and you’ve told us that saving of life takes priority over Altair, but the Altair tasking was at E to H in the Channel, whereas the EOS tasking was at A to D, so they were in two different places at the same time? How could one plane cover both different locations?
A. The — so this — this depends on which plane, okay? So the King Air has a radar and the range of the radar looks out, it can — it can see a much larger volume of airspace — sorry, sea space than a non-radar equipped fixed wing asset, where the primary sensor is an electro-optic turret, electro-optic infrared turret, and so you’re searching either with your naked eye or with your sensor, but looking — in the case of sensor, you’re scanning by looking through a telescope. Where — if you fly the aeroplane up and down the middle of the Channel, you can look either side of you, so you can scan and the radar will cue you to an issue or other sensors may cue you to an issue, or the tasker could cue you to an issue, so, you know, “Go and look over there”. Our job was to fly in UK airspace for Op EOS and focus on UK airspace, but before boats which are travelling from France to the UK get to UK sea space, they will be in French sea space and it is possible to look into French sea space from UK airspace. So it’s really we’re prioritising Op Altair because that’s what we’ve been asked to do. If, at any point, somebody says there’s actually somebody in trouble you can go looking elsewhere, and the aeroplane is quite fast and the sensors give you additional range as long as you can see. In the case of radar, you can’t see through cloud — sorry, you can see through cloud. In the case of an electro-optic infrared turret, you can’t see through cloud. So actually, whilst you’re there, you only really — if it’s — if it’s foggy or it’s cloudy or you can’t get underneath the cloud, there is a limited capability of the Panthers and there’s a much greater capability in the King Air. And —
Q. Can I pause you there, Mr Norton. I think you said in the answer you’ve just given me that you were prioritisation Op Altair unless and until there was someone who needed rescue; is that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. But the email tasking you to Op Altair said Op EOS with SOLAS intent takes priority, so in effect you should be prioritising Op EOS over Op Altair; isn’t that right?
A. The Op EOS tasking time was 3 o’clock, the Op Altair tasking time was 0030, is what we — what we accepted, but at any time Altair can be trumped by Op EOS. It’s trumped, according to the situation you see at the time. You’re looking to Altair, but — but SOLAS would always take priority over building the maritime picture. And that was agreed in the tasking, so that — the email that you referred to earlier said suffice to say Op EOS will always take — take priority. So — so we know that, so you look and you try and build the picture until there’s an issue, and that — that — for the first two and a half hours, so from 0030 to o’clock, the priority given to us was Altair, and then from 3 o’clock the priority would be EOS. But up until that time, whilst you’re doing Altair, if there’s any EOS tasking, which can be given to you by Dover Coastguard, then you would prioritise, that would — that would trump the Altair.
Q. And in the period where both taskings were overlapping, which I think is from 3 until 5 in the morning, is it right that the pilot would not have been doing Altair, they would have been doing an EOS tasking because that takes priority, it’s SOLAS, it’s a proactive SOLAS tasking, so it takes priority over Altair?
A. You’d — you’d — I’d have to go back to the tasking, but I think the tasking in — from 3 o’clock in the morning is — is — the priority is looking A to D, and that trumps looking in E to H.
Q. Understood. Mr Norton, I’m about to move to the night itself, to the 23rd to the 24th.
A. Okay.
Q. Is this a convenient moment for you to take a break, or would you like to keep going?
A. I’m fine.
Q. Could I ask that {INQ008827/1} is brought up, please. This is the transcript of a call on 23 November at 8.01 in the evening, and it’s a call between Mr Lugg and Mr Golden, who is the operations controller at the ARCC. Could we turn to the next page, please, {INQ008827/2}. So we can see Mr Golden is asking about coverage, asking 2Excel. Essentially he says: “… I’ll come back to you in a minute [want] to confirm with you what you think you are flying tonight, over the next … 12 to 24 hours?” In the middle of the page. He asks about that overlap in timings and he’s asking about what 2Excel’s plan is for the night. Turning to page 4 of{INQ008827}, if we can, we can see Mr Golden, at the ARCC, asking at the top: “The gap — physically, there will be no aircraft for the Dover Straits from 2Excel between … About 4, 5.30, 6.30?” So he’s asking what you think the gap is being to be. Mr Lugg replies: “No. We should have it pretty covered. “From 00.30, we’ll be covering each aircraft’s gap with another aircraft.” So that seems to be a reference to the plan you’ve told us about, where you have the Panther and the King Air going one by one; is that right?
A. Yes. Can you remind me what the timing of this telephone call is, please?
Q. This is 8.01 in the evening on the 23rd.
A. Yeah.
Q. Is it right that at that stage, 2Excel was still expecting to complete the delivery plan that you’ve told us about and to go ahead and cover the taskings?
A. 2Excel was planning to provide that tasking subject to weather. So the — the plan was to be available and to be airborne as long as the weather said it was fit, and the five aircraft plan, with aircraft getting up and getting down, was I believe what they were discussing. So it was an explanation from Ops: this is our plan to cover the whole time during — during the — during the night to subsequently.
Q. At this stage in the evening, was 2Excel aware that there was risk from the weather, that fog and other factors might mean that the tasking couldn’t be completed?
A. It was certainly aware that there was a poor — that weather was poor, yes.
Q. Here, Mr Lugg isn’t say, “We’ll complete this subject to weather”, as you’re telling me now, he says: “No, we should have it pretty covered. “From 00.30, we’ll be covering each aircraft’s gap with another aircraft.”
A. Yeah.
Q. Why isn’t he saying, “There’s a risk we might not be flying tonight”?
A. I think those conversations — so at that stage, we wouldn’t want to cancel, we would want to be able to provide the — provide the assets. The weather was getting worse, but — and the weather forecasts were getting worse, so we knew there was risk. My understanding is that that risk would be articulated, but the provision of assets, people, planes, airfields, was — was a plan, and the plan was to be able to get airborne if you possibly could.
Q. You say that that risk would be articulated. Can you tell us now whether 2Excel was saying to the MCA, to the Home Office, “We might not be able to cover this tasking depending on the weather”?
A. I can’t — unless it says it in that statement, which I don’t think it does, I can’t point to that at o’clock in the evening. I can point to it as time went on later in the evening.
Q. Let’s turn then to later in the evening. If we could go to {INQ000224/1}, please. This is an entry in the ARCC log for that evening, and if we go to page 2 of 10:56:33 25 {INQ000224} we’re looking at 23:53:50, which is down the bottom half of the page. We can see there: “CG25: Assigned to Incident … “ARCC Message.” 10:56:48 4 At 23:53:50. And it says: “2Excel Ops [to] ARCC. “Can’t complete this tasking. “Southend out of limits att for Panther AC. “Will reassess later for King Air.” Now, that doesn’t say, “Can’t complete this tasking because of the weather”, it says, “Southend out of limits att for Panther AC.” Can you tell us what the problem was at that stage that meant that this tasking couldn’t be completed at this time?
A. Because Southend’s weather was out of limits for the Panther aircraft.
Q. So it’s a problem with the weather at Southend; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. We’re looking at the time here, we can see this is 22:53. The take-off for the first flight was planned for I think 11.30?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is it right that that first flight did not happen, the Panther flight?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Can I ask you to go to 7824, please {INQ007824/1}. This is a further transcript of a call, again between Mr Lugg and Dominic Golden at the ARCC, and this time we have dipped over into 24 November and we’re looking at a call at 2.04 in the morning. If we turn to the next page {INQ007824/2} we can see again: “Hi Jacob, it’s Dom down the ARCC. “Hi, you all right?” And Dominic Golden says: “… where are we going with any Eos flying in the early hours of the morning? Is yours still playing the — is the diversions ashore? That is the problem.” And Mr Lugg says, as you’ve just told us: “Yeah. And it’s the weather in the tasking area.” So he goes on to say, further down: “The weather is not great in the tasking area.” And we can see this is a call in which Mr Lugg explains to Mr Golden at the ARCC why 2Excel hadn’t flown that night. In that bottom paragraph, Mr Golden says that there are “upwards of at least 11 vessels … on their way across”, says that the “Heli brief is showing awful weather visibility over land …”. And then if we go over to the top of the next page {INQ007824/1-2}: “… Dover Coastguard … can still see the lights …” Of France in the distance. And he goes on to say that they’ve “got no recognised maritime picture out there”. We can see that, second paragraph: “So we are now going down a decision matrix here of what we want to do. We’ve got no recognised maritime picture out there. Clearly, we’ve got yourselves as the normal de facto solution. But if you are unable to go …” He wants to understand what the thought process is. So I want to understand, at what stage did 2Excel determine that the weather that night would prevent them from completing the taskings?
A. So, at 23:50 — sorry, 22:50, the email you just showed, the decision had been made not to fly the Navajo because it couldn’t go.
Q. Is that the Navajo or is that the Panther, the first flight?
A. The Navajo and — and/or the Panther. So it was the Navajo until the Panther came up, but we can’t actually pinpoint exactly what minute that happened, we just know it happened in that evening. So the transfer from the Navajo to the Panther was that — that evening, but the Panther couldn’t go either. So the Panther couldn’t go at 11.30, so the first wave of the plan couldn’t go. At this stage — and that was the — the cancellation because of Southend out of limits. That’s part of the story, that’s — you know, there’s more to that — that — that story. The — the King Air was still there, still hoping to be able to go if the weather permitted it, but it couldn’t get airborne either, not actually because the weather in the area, but because of the diversions which meant that it couldn’t — it couldn’t go to Southend and know that it was going to be able to get in, so it couldn’t get airborne because it couldn’t necessarily land at south end. If it couldn’t land at Southend, it had one diversion to be able to go to, which was Brize Norton, but the whether was so bad around the whole country we needed two diversions to be able to go to and we couldn’t find a second diversion. So —
Q. Is this right, Mr Norton. The problem with the first flight was the weather at Southend?
A. And — and the diversions.
Q. And then the problem with the King Air was really the diversions rather than the weather; is that right? A. It was the same problem for both —
Q. Right, it was a combination —
A. — the problem was — was the consistent problem. It wasn’t — it wasn’t — the weather at Southend was really bad. Southend was the place we were planning to go and land. Even if you — even if you might — you might be lucky and you might get in to Southend, but if you couldn’t get in, you needed to have somewhere to go. Because the weather was so bad around the country, the weather meant we — the rules that we obey meant we had to have two diversions, and we could find one in Royal Air Force Brize Norton, but we were not able to find another, or we were not able to secure another. We could find another, it was called Manchester, but they wouldn’t accept us as a diversion. So we were then unable to get airborne because we didn’t have a legal place to land, or enough legal places to land. That was the reason we couldn’t go. This — this discussion, which is more discussions about, you know, what could we do if we were there, sort of thing, there’s lots of pre — presuppositions, because the pilot is looking at the weather for his whole mission, but the constraint was we didn’t have the diversions to be able to get airborne.
Q. Understood. I think let’s look at what Mr Lugg says. And where it says “2Excel pilot” there, that’s Mr Lugg.
A. I don’t think it is, actually.
Q. Oh, forgive me, no, that’s the pilot and Mr Golden. That’s my error, apologies.
A. Yes.
Q. So the pilot says here: “Our issue, we’re looking at the weather here and all the forecasts are showing the fog that is over France at the moment, is going to be creeping north over the next couple of hours.” Dominic Golden says: “Yeah.” And he says: “… it’s all layered cloud, so we would be safe to fly, but I think there’s going to be a layer of cloud beneath us, IR camera won’t be able to see through as soon as it hits …” So, is it right, it was safe to conduct the flight?
A. It was safe to fly.
Q. Safe to fly. What’s the difference?
A. You couldn’t find a place to land.
Q. I see. And in terms of what the pilot could see using equipment and using their eyes, I suppose, the IR camera wasn’t able to penetrate through fog?
A. No.
Q. What about other equipment on board?
A. The radar would be able to see through the cloud.
Q. So the plane, if safe to land, could have flown and used radar to look at the Channel below?
A. The King Air could. The King Air could.
Q. But not the Panther?
A. Because it doesn’t have a radar.
Q. Because it doesn’t have a radar. Understood. Could we turn to page 4 of {INQ007824} of this document, please. So we can see here the conversation continues, and right down the bottom, we have a comment from the pilot saying: “9 o’clock is starts to break again, and then we’ll definitely be able to see. My current train of thought is if I get airborne, I’m going to be wasting four or five hours of flying because Doncaster has … got a NOTAM with the runway closing tonight.” Can you tell us what a NOTAM is?
A. NOTAM stands for Notice to Airmen, and it’s a warning of some constraint which air crew need to be aware of because it would affect their flying.
Q. And who is it issued by?
A. The NOTAM is — is issued — so the person who knows what the constraint is going to be sends it to — to — they issue it, or they write it, and then it’s put on a system such that everybody can see it.
Q. And how is it seen by 2Excel? How is it communicated? Is it through a central software system?
A. Yeah, yes, effectively it’s a software system whereby you check the NOTAMs, and there is a place to go to to check NOTAMs; they’re all published and you read them. So it’s a — you pull the data, but the data is pushed by the person who knows what the constraint is. That could be an airfield, it could be an air crew, it could be the military, it could be civilian, it could be anyone.
Q. And is that something that 2Excel needs to proactively monitor, that system, or are you getting notifications and alerts?
A. If — if the person who’s — who understands what the constraint is going to be knows that it’s going to affect people, they might buck the system, if you like, and warn you of it, but you have to pull the data. So you go somewhere and you check the NOTAMs.
Q. Could we turn over to the next page, please, {INQ007824/5}. We can see Dominic Golden responding: “Yeah, of course it is. Yeah … I suppose down south … as I said, the weather over land is what Southend, they’re getting worse … they’re all shutting down, aren’t they?” And he says: “… I’m happy with that. I just wanted to gauge opinion.” Then we have some comments from the pilot, again explaining the reasons why the tasking couldn’t be completed: “My other concerns as well are available airfields for diversions.” Which you’ve mentioned to us. And Dominic Golden says: “Yeah … that’s only going to get worse.” And the 2Excel pilot says: “Getting worse and going out of limits … Manchester is the only one that is legally within limits but it is classed as a diversion …” And then there are some words that can’t be heard on the transcript. That reflects what you were telling us, doesn’t it, about the restrictions on airfields being actually the real reason why 2Excel couldn’t complete the flight that night?
A. Yeah.
Q. Can we go to page 7 of {INQ007824}, please. Dominic Golden, in that second entry, makes a comment, essentially, about the planning and the arrangements for the night. He says: “… I think there’s an element here of, I think people were thinking, dangerously to put it … we’ve not got lax but we’ve dropped back into the assumption that we’re always going to get aircraft, and they’re always going to give us the recognised maritime picture … you know, life’s a good one. And surprise surprise … the plan doesn’t always work. So what’s our plan B?” He asks. And here, we don’t actually have an answer there to that question, “What’s the plan B”? I wanted to ask you, Mr Norton, was there a plan B?
A. I think we should be careful about conflating what the subject of that — that is. So plan B, it’s — I believe, the way I read that, that that’s a rhetorical question, because 2Excel is not going to be able to get airborne and provide the — the recognised maritime picture. So, “What’s our plan B” is not, “What can 2Excel do about it”, it’s, “What’s my plan B”. I believe that’s a rhetorical question.
Q. Understood. But I want to know from you, did 2Excel have its own plan B, a back up for a situation where it couldn’t fly like this?
A. If we can’t fly, we can’t provide the picture. As — as I said at the — at the front of this, we’re part of a system where we provide a capability and there are other people who can provide similar or supplementary capabilities to help provide the recognised maritime picture. In this particular case, we had two different aircraft types. We had a plan to forward deploy in order to avoid the NOTAM, so our plan was to go to Southend so that we could continue to fly and we would be forward deployed. From — our plan was then to land back at East Midlands when it — when it became fit, and that would allow us to swap the crews over and continue to provide the assets for — for the amber day or the red day. The — so our plan was a good plan, the best plan we could have, effectively, in the conditions. But what stopped us flying was the inability to be able to know that we would be able to land, and that was down to the lack of alternate airfields were we unable to get back into Southend, which was forecast to be in and out of limits, but out of limits or below limits such that we needed to have a diversion. So our plan was already: use two different aircraft types to relieve in place over the whole VUL, landing away in order to not be affected by Doncaster’s closure and use alternates which mean we could do it and be able to put the aeroplanes in right place to change the crews over when the crews ran out of hours as well, with a spare aircraft for both lines. So, if you like, we put in place all of the things we could, but if we couldn’t get airborne, we can’t provide a picture, and that — that — that was the problem. And I think the rhetorical question is, “What’s our plan B”, was a question, an internal question, which is, “I don’t know, what’s my plan B”, and that could be other providers, but it would have to be other providers because 2Excel had tried everything that we could to be able to get airborne.
Q. Thank you. I do want to ask you a little bit more about the NOTAM, if I can.
A. Okay.
Q. Can we go back to your statement which is {INQ0010335/1} and page 19, please. We’re looking at paragraph 86. Mr Norton, you’ve very helpfully excerpted a section from the NOTAM here, we can see it in that box. We can see the reference code and we can see the timing on November. It says “Doncaster Sheffield”, and it says: “Closed due loading/unloading of dangerous air cargo for up to date information contact the airport duty manager.” Is that the NOTAM you were talking about —
A. Yes.
Q. — when you were referring to —
A. Yeah.
Q. — Notice to Airmen coming in to 2Excel? Could we go, please, to {INQ0006338/1}, which is the record showing the different NOTAMs on the night. That might be a native file that needs to be brought up on screen, if we just pause for a second. We can see there, Mr Norton, is that a spreadsheet showing the different NOTAMs that came in in that period? So we can see it runs from 8 November through to 30 November 2021. If you look at the highlighted rows there, we can see coming in 23:36 on November 2021, we can see NOTAM, “[Runway] 02/20 closed due loading/unloading of dangerous air cargo.” Is that that NOTAM coming in?
A. That’s correct.
Q. If we then go down below an entry to the one that in column C is labelled “1825”, it again says: “[Runway] 02/20 closed due loading/unloading of dangerous air cargo …” Then it says NOTAM cancelled, and that’s timed at 23:41. Does that mean that the NOTAM above it was in fact cancelled that night at 23:41?
A. It’s quite confusing, and I think what that refers to is the 04:30 NOTAM. So what they did was they changed the times. So there was a NOTAM saying 4.30 to 8.30, which was cancelled, and a NOTAM that was then moved, the times came forward by one hour by 3.30 to 7.30, which is what happened. And subsequently, at about 6.30, they actually cancelled the NOTAM because they’d finished the work. So the NOTAM itself, which referred to 4.30 to 8.30, was cancelled, but there was another one in place that said now 3.30 to 7.30.
Q. So it’s this right, the first highlighted entry is the change in timings? That is its own NOTAM identifying to others that the timing of the runway opening has changed?
A. That’s — that’s my understanding, yeah.
Q. At 4.30 on 24 November?
A. Yeah.
Q. Then below that we can see a separate entry at 23:36, which is the runway closed all together; is that right? That’s the second highlighted entry?
A. Yeah.
Q. So 1825 below that, highlighted now on the screen, is the cancellation of the first highlighted entry, not the cancellation of the closure of the runway?
A. Correct. That’s what I understand.
Q. And looking then to the entry below that at 6.43 in the morning on 24 November, is that the cancellation of the actual NOTAM itself?
A. Yes.
Q. So the runway remained closed throughout the night of November up until 6.43; is that right?
A. That is our understanding, yeah. So the NOTAM closures, you have to cancel the NOTAM, but effectively they brought the times forward by one hour, so they closed the airfield at 3.30, not 4.30, and that’s what — and therefore they cancelled the NOTAM that said 4.30 in order to be able to have the extant NOTAM which said 3.30 to 7.30, and then they closed that one, they cancelled that NOTAM at 6.43, so then the airfield’s opening again.
Q. Okay. And when the airfield’s opened again at 6.43, did that mean that the position had changed and 2Excel was now able to fly and complete the tasking?
A. So from a weather perspective, 2Excel became able to fly at 4.54 in the morning. So the weather got — improved, and at 4.54 in the morning the weather was fit, but unfortunately the aeroplanes were all locked into a closed airfield. And at 6.30 we could have gone flying — sorry, 6.43, the NOTAM was closed. There would have been a reaction time for us to — you know, we weren’t expecting it to be closed then, and by that stage, we’d had the discussion with the ARCC saying we can’t fly, so the next tasking we have is 717, I think it was, the tasking that started at 8 o’clock in the morning.
Q. So at 6 in the morning, 6.43, that entry that’s highlighted now —
A. Yeah.
Q. — that was the earliest time on the night that 2Excel could have stood up its aircraft and become available to fly with of course some lead time —
A. Yeah.
Q. — to be able to take off; is that right?
A. Yeah, when the NOTAM was cancelled.
Q. And at that stage the weather was fit for flying?
A. As far as I can tell, the — the weather forecasts became fit at 4.54. That’s the first forecast that’s — that you could have got airborne at.
Q. And at that stage there was an hour or so left of the Op EOS tasking. Did you consider flying to work on that tasking for an hour, or at that stage, what was the decision made?
A. So I don’t — I don’t — the — the NOTAM was cancelled, but we didn’t know that was coming. So we were still planning for 7.30 NOTAM being cancelled. People were still there, people were still at work, but they were coming to the end of their flight time limitation, so effectively you were now looking at crew changeovers into the next crews, and so once the — once the aeroplane is effectively — the tasking has effectively been — we can’t get airborne for 3 o’clock, then we’re now looking at the next sortie which was planned for there or thereabouts, 7.30/8 o’clock in the morning.
Q. Understood. And that’s the tasking we looked at earlier, the Op EOS tasking that followed on I think from 8.30 formally in the morning?
A. Yeah.
Q. In your statement you talk about other airports available as diversions during the night?
A. Yeah.
Q. Can I understand, if another airport had been available as a diversion, could 2Excel have flown, or would you still have had the problem of the aircraft being shut in an airfield?
A. After 3.30, when the airfield was closed, you couldn’t get airborne.
Q. Right.
A. Even though the weather was fit. Had we got airborne before 3.30 because the weather was fit, we could have flown — sorry, the weather was fit at the diversions, then we would have been able to fly.
Q. So the aircraft could have physically left prior to 3.30 had there been a diversion available?
A. Correct.
Q. Once we hit 3.30 and the NOTAM was issued and the runway closed, there was no way for the planes to get out; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. In your statement you talk about alternative aerodromes. I don’t think we need to go to the specific section, but you list a number of them as being weather unfit, Gatwick, Stansted, Heathrow, for example. How do you determine whether an airfield is weather unfit on a given night?
A. In simple terms, it depends on the visibility at that airfield and the cloud base compared to the number of pilots and the automatics and the approach aids that are available between the aircraft and the — and the airfield, in simple terms.
Q. Is that something that’s assessed on an ongoing basis?
A. Yeah.
Q. It’s kept under review —
A. Yeah.
Q. — through the night by persons at 2Excel?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. In your statement you talk about East Midlands as a potential alternative and you say it wasn’t an airport that had limitations on category 1 ILS landing and it was potentially available for that reason. Can you help us with why East Midlands couldn’t have been used as the diversion on the 23rd/24th? A. So, at the time when — so on the 23rd and the morning of the 24th —
Q. Yes.
A. — it was out of limits because the aids at the airfield and the aircraft trying to come in and the limitations of the regulations meant that the minimum height that the aeroplane could get down to and the minimum visibility that it — the pilot was allowed to use, were — that you were allowed to use with the sensors — with the aids at the airfield, was above the limits of the weather. So that the weather was worse than the minimum height and the minimum visibility you could go to.
Q. So, again, it was a problem with the weather at East Midlands?
A. Yeah.
Q. Not anything else to do with its acceptance of different categories of flights?
A. No.
Q. It was purely to do with the suitability of the weather at that location?
A. So — so there are — there are particular aids, that’s approach aids, at an airfield. They have limits, so that may be the type of aid may have a type of — a height minimum that you’re not allowed below or a range that you’re not allowed to get close — visibility you’re not allowed to have, and in the case of East Midlands, until the next morning, the weather was not fit to be used.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Ms Woods, I’m going to have to give the transcript writers a break at some stage.
MS WOODS: Of course.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: How much longer do you have?
MS WOODS: Sir, I think I have five more minutes.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: In that case, we’ll —
MS WOODS: If it won’t impose too much on the transcript writers, then I think I can wrap up before a break.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Okay, good.
MS WOODS: Thank you very much. Mr Norton, you told us earlier about difficulties at Manchester and its willingness to accept certain categories of flight. Can you tell us what the problem was on that evening?
A. So the — the weather was fit at Manchester, so we could have used Manchester as a legal diversion, and we requested that, but that request was rejected, and the reason that we were given is because of staffing limitations due to the post-COVID impact.
Q. So it was because of the post-COVID staffing available at Manchester itself?
A. Yeah, so it was the Manchester staffing.
Q. In certain circumstances, airfields are required to accept flights if they fall into a certain category. Are airfields required to accept Category B flights? Perhaps I can frame that in a different way. When asked about potential changes for the future to assist in facilitating aerial support for search and rescue in the Channel, 2Excel said to the Inquiry team that currently airfields are not compelled to accept diversion requests from SAR aircraft, search and rescue aircraft, on Category B taskings; is that right, Mr Norton?
A. Yeah.
Q. Was that an issue on the night? Was that part of the issue to do with Manchester?
A. So we could not compel them to accept us.
Q. Are there circumstances in which you can compel an airfield to accept a flight?
A. If you have a — a Mayday, so an emergency, or particular categories of tasking, you may be able to compel them, but at the time we would — we were unable to compel them.
Q. But ordinary search and rescue taskings, so an Op EOS proactive surveillance search and rescue tasking was not in the category of flights which were — airfields were compelled to accept; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Is that still the case now?
A. I don’t believe that the categorisation of the flights has changed. That — that is a tasking, as opposed to something that we would — we would be able to say. The — but what we have done in — to cover this eventuality — and, again, as a learning from — from this event — is put in place with all of the major airfields an agreed acceptance for our — for us to be able to use them as a diversion. So all the major airfields that will be open at night, you know, Heathrow, Gatwick, etc, then we’ve put in place a pre-prepared, you know, if we — if we ask you to be a diversion, we don’t need very much from you, but we do need to be able to come and use you to land.
Q. And that wasn’t something that was in place —
A. No.
Q. — prior to 23 November 2021?
A. No, it wasn’t.
Q. Can I ask when that came in, roughly speaking?
A. To be honest, it’s been successive airfields, we’ve had to negotiate with each airfield. Heathrow only accepted that a few weeks ago.
Q. And if 2Excel had been able to compel Manchester to accept it as a diversion airfield on the night of the 23rd to the 24th, could 2Excel have flown that night and used its radar over the Channel?
A. The King Air could have flown that night had we been able to have two diversions, and the Navajo could have flown that night, but it wouldn’t have had a radar.
MS WOODS: Understood. Thank you very much, Mr Norton. Those are all my questions for you. Thank you, Chair.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: I think we might like to know the full list, though, of the airports where you have made those successful negotiations. Not now —
A. Okay.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: — but at some point subsequently. I think that would be quite helpful. So, Mr Norton, thank you very much indeed for both the statement and also the evidence you’ve given this morning. Extremely helpful, and you’re now free to go. But we’ll have a ten-minute diversion — ten-minute break, and I have to, because the usher always wants a specific time, so we’ll say .25 to 12. Thank you. (The witness withdrew) (11.25 am) (A short break) (11.37 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, good morning, Mr Hamilton. In a short moment, Rekka Hollos is going to ask you some questions, but first of all, could you read the affirmation?
GRAHAM HAMILTON (affirmed)
Questions by MS HOLLOS
MS HOLLOS: Good morning, Mr Hamilton. Could you give the Inquiry your full name, please.
A. Graham Douglas Hamilton.
Q. Thank you. Now, Mr Hamilton, you are currently the director of UK search and rescue for Bristow Helicopters Limited, a company I think you describe as a UK-based civil helicopter operator; is that right?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. You’ve made a witness statement to this Inquiry which was signed on 3 December 2024 and runs to 25 pages?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, although you’re currently the director, I think you in fact joined Bristow back in June 2015 as the safety and compliance manager for search and rescue. You were then promoted to deputy director of search and rescue in 2019, and finally director in 2022; is that right?
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. Could you briefly just explain for us your responsibilities as the director of search and rescue?
A. So my role is mainly accountable to the Civil Aviation Authority to ensure that the regulatory standards for the aviation activities that we undertake are met, and that’s from engineering, flight operations, training, through to our ground operations, our fuel requirements, our cadetships, to ensure that we meet the civil flight regulations, but also the emergency CAP 999 regulations, which allow us to operate search and rescue aircraft outside the normal aviation airspace.
Q. And you are also I think responsible for Bristow’s contracts with the government, including the search and rescue contract with the Coastguard?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Thank you. In terms of the services provided by Bristow, in your witness statement you explain to us that there are two types of services provided to the Coastguard: helicopter search and rescue and dedicated patrols to enhance situational awareness. Can you just take us through the differences between those two types of services, please?
A. Yes, the — the latter came towards 2021, when we were asked to provide an overwatch system, but our primary role from 2015 to 2021 was search and rescue activities, which can be broken down into search and then rescue. The overwatch facilities that we then provide are where we had aircraft that would fly along beaches to give a presence, give the Coastguard situational awareness. Or other emergency service, police, for example, if they wanted to understand if there was flood protection breaches, we would take them up in the aircraft and allow them to radio back to their bases. Then latterly, from 2022, we introduced the uncrewed air system.
Q. Now, in terms of the search and rescue aspect of the services that you provide, you’ve outlined in your statement, and if we could bring it up, please, it’s {INQ010336/5} and paragraph 3.6. You’ve identified for us four categories of taskings: rescue or recovery; search; pre-arranged transfer; and support. Are these all delivered under the search and rescue contract or are they also part of the overwatch services that you’ve described?
A. No, these are all search and rescue activities under the contract.
Q. And earlier, when you said you can divide search and rescue into search and rescue is that because of the two types of categories of tasking that you can have, as you’ve set out here?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. We can take that down please. Thank you. I’d like to come, please, on to the process by which Bristow aircraft are tasked by the Coastguard, and you’ve set out the process for us at paragraph 3.9 of your statement {INQ010336/6}. In summary, a call comes in from the Joint Rescue Co-Ordination Centre to the relevant Bristow base, that telephone line is manned 24/7, the JRCC passes information about the tasking to the Bristow crew, who can then either accept or decline the tasking. Is that an accurate summary?
A. That’s an accurate summary, yes.
Q. Thank you. When the call comes in to the relevant Bristow base from the JRCC, is any record made by Bristow of the instructions given in relation to the tasking?
A. When the tasking’s accepted, yes, the information is transferred to the pilot’s log. But then information will be updated as the aircraft goes on task. So the — the initial information will be very scarce, it would have location information, the type of rescue they’re expecting or search activity to be conducted and typically the crew will then ask for more information, weather conditions at the site, et cetera. And then once they’ve accepted a task, they will then man the aircraft and more information will be transferred to the aircraft. That will all be recorded on the pilot’s log.
Q. What happens if a tasking is refused? Is any record made of the reason for the refusal of the tasking?
A. Yes, there is, yes.
Q. And where is that recorded?
A. That’s recorded in our electronic system called iSAR.
Q. And who records that information in iSAR, the JRCC or Bristow?
A. Bristow.
Q. Now, we’ve discussed the possibility for taskings to be either accepted or refused, and in your statement you give us two examples of reasons why a tasking might be refused: if it’s better suited to another base, or if the crew have just returned from another task. On what other grounds might a tasking be refused?
A. It could be weather, it could be out of range for the aircraft. Sometimes it won’t be refused, it will be delayed while — say, it’s a shipping vessel. It may be at the extreme range of the aircraft. By giving it another 30 minutes or an hour, so the ship will have moved closer and we’ll be able to reach it, and the — conduct a search — or a rescue operation for longer on site.
Q. You’ve mentioned “out of range”. What do you mean by that?
A. So the aircraft have a range of 240 nautical miles. If a vessel was at 240 nautical miles, we would have very little time to be on task, as we would say. To be sitting above the ship, five minutes, that would be very difficult, to rescue somebody or pull somebody from the deck, so sometimes we’ll wait for the ship to get close so we can spend longer, half an hour, for example, in the hover, to allow medics to go down, treat the casualty and bring them back up to the aircraft.
Q. You’ve also mentioned the possibility of taskings being delayed. What intervals of time can you delay a tasking up to before you decide: actually, this isn’t feasible we need to refuse?
A. That would be an ongoing conversation with JRCC.
Q. I’d like to, please, come on to the types of assets that are available for tasking for search and rescue by Bristow. You explain at paragraph 2.3 of your statement {INQ010336/3} that Bristow operates two types of search and rescue helicopter: the Sikorsky S-92 and the Leonardo AW189. Are both of those types of helicopters designed to operate in challenging, adverse weather conditions at sea, whether day or nighttime?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any practical difference between their capabilities?
A. Just their size.
Q. And does their size affect passenger load?
A. Yes, the number of passengers you could carry.
Q. And does their size also affect their endurance?
A. The S92 has a longer endurance; it can go out to 240 nautical miles and stay on station for 30 minutes, but to do that, it has to — it’s required to have internal fuel tanks, which takes up space, so you’re — you’re balancing one off against another.
Q. Is one or the other type preferred for the conduct of search and rescue in the Dover Strait?
A. The 189 would be the preferred; smaller, more agile. However, the 92 is just as capable of operating there.
Q. In terms of the technology available on board, you’ve helpfully set out this in paragraph 6.9 of your statement. If we could please bring up {INQ010336/16}.
A. Yeah, I see it.
Q. So you’ve listed here for us a range of technology available on board both assets. If we could go over the page, please, {INQ010336/17}, what I’d like to come on to is your identification of the equipment or technology that’s best suited or of most assistance for conducting search and rescue where what you are looking for are persons in the water.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. If we could go over the page, please {INQ010336/18}, and zoom in on paragraph 6.10.2. So you’ve identified here for us four types of equipment that I’d like to go through with you. The first of those is “Night Vision”. Briefly, can you just explain for us how night vision operates?
A. Yes, so the Night Vision system is what you see the military helicopter fly with. It’s focal tubes that go in front of pilot’s eyes, focused at infinity. Each pilot sets them up for their own eyesight before they go flying. They are still limited in that you need ambient light, so you need moonlight or — or —
Q. Moonlight?
A. Moonlight, yeah, or other lighting from ships/vessels to give you some reflective for them to enhance that lighting, and it increases your — your visible — what you can see at night, so it gives you better enhanced visuals at nighttime, not during the daytime.
Q. You’ve mentioned one restriction on their effectiveness, which is the need for some level of ambient lighting?
A. Yeah.
Q. What other elements might affect how effectively they can be used to detect persons in the water?
A. Mist, fog. Same as your normal eyesight.
Q. What about the sea state?
A. Sea state — the sea state, no different to your — your normal eyes, a target can disappear with the waves, so it’s very little different between night vision and — and your normal eyesight in the day.
Q. Does that same analysis apply for the size of the target that you’re looking for? No different whether you’re looking through night vision or with your normal eyes?
A. Slightly harder with night vision; you have to really focus in on the target to see a shape. But once you see the shape, you can normally build the picture very quickly. It’s very granular green picture, it’s not — it’s not like sitting in this room.
Q. It’s not perhaps the cinematic experience —
A. No.
Q. — we’re familiar with from TV?
A. No.
Q. The next item of equipment that you’ve identified for us is “FLIR”, which I think is forward-looking infrared?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Can you just explain how that works for us? A. So it’s a forward-looking infrared camera fitted to the nose of the aircraft that’s trying to pick out infrared radiation bands. You can use it during the day, but at night it’s much more effective. It’s also got normal camera vision on there. So, typically, what the crews will do is use the infrared function to pick out heat signatures in the water, especially if you’re looking for people in the water, you’re trying to look for that decaying heat signature, and then as they get — once they’ve identified it, they’ll switch to the normal TV camera to see, to try and pick it out, to pick the target out a bit bigger.
Q. Is it right that, essentially, the way it works is by looking for the differences in heat output between —
A. Yes, it’s the emissions.
Q. It’s the emissions?
A. Yeah.
Q. How does the length of time that a person is in the water affect the act of the forward-looking infrared to detect their presence?
A. So your main body will not show up, because your body will be under the water, so it will be your head or any exposed part. If you’ve got a life jacket on your chest, it will be coming out of the water. But as — the long you’re in the water, your heat signature decays naturally, because the water’s cooling you.
Q. And if your heat signature decays and becomes closer to the temperature of the water, does that reduce the ability of the forward-looking infrared to detect?
A. Yes. And wave height as well. You can disappear behind a wave and it won’t see you, so …
Q. The third piece of equipment is search lights and —
A. Yes, so the search lights, they — they help us. Previously, we talked about the ambient light it requires. They can flood the area with light levels that enhance the goggles. Typically, they’re very helpful for — we can control them, so we can send them in different directions. If we’re looking, typically, for people with life jackets on, of course, they’ve got reflective tape and that sometimes gets caught when the search light flashes across them; where, if you’ve not got that, the search light — you’re still looking into blackness and just trying to pick out something.
Q. And is the effectiveness of the search light affected by weather conditions such as fog?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there any other factors that would affect their ability to assist?
A. With the search light?
Q. Yes. At nighttime.
A. No, it’s primarily weather would be the big factor. They’re very powerful lights. They’ve got almost half a mile beam range.
Q. And finally coming on to radar. How effective is radar at detecting people rather than vessels?
A. It’s got very low probability of detecting a person. You’d probably detect something around the person first, typically a vessel or an aircraft, which is what we typically look for.
Q. And how effective is radar at detecting small boats rather than large shipping vessels?
A. It’s not very effective. They’re made of rubber, so they don’t give a good reflection, radar reflective signature.
Q. Is the efficiency of the radar affected by weather conditions?
A. It can be, yes.
Q. In what circumstances?
A. It can be affected by just the atmospheric, so moisture. Not so much fog and mist, but heavy rains can sometimes affect the screening on the front of the aircraft, which affects the reflecting that’s coming into the radar screen.
Q. Thank you. In terms of conducting search and rescue at night, there are a number of other items of equipment that you’ve flagged at paragraph 6.10.3 {INQ010336/18}?
A. Yes.
Q. Any of those that you would wish to point out for us, in terms of how it might assist at nighttime, over and above those we’ve discussed?
A. They — if we’re talking about the Automatic Flight Control System, this relieves the pilots of the pressure of trying to fly at low level. It will keep the aircraft at a set altitude and height, so they can then focus on allowing an extra set of eyes to look out the windows rather than having to concentrate on flying the aircraft constantly. So they can just monitor the aircraft around there. The other systems are there to — to help the pilot, of warnings that he’s about to find an oil platform, or a ship is about to come into range that they need to avoid. The AIS Transponder, again, just identifies shipping that’s got a transponder on, and it just shows up on their mappings so they get better situational awareness. And the Mission Management System allows them to programme in search patterns, so the aircraft will carry them out automatically with the flight control system, relieving the pilot of the pressure.
Q. Thank you. I’d like to come, please, on to the endurance of the Bristow assets, and I think you’ve already discussed their range in terms of nautical miles. In your statement you describe their endurance as three hours with a 30-minute reserve?
A. Yes.
Q. What are the factors that are capable of affecting their endurance?
A. The weight of the aircraft, so the number of people you put in the aircraft, the amount of equipment you carry in the aircraft. The outside air temperature can affect it, the air density can affect it, so the performance of the engines. These are all factors that the crew are aware of and they’ll calculate that into their fuel burn rates for the mission.
Q. How would you compare the endurance of a helicopter to a fixed-wing asset for conducting searches over a prolonged period of time?
A. It’s — a fixed-wing asset, theoretically, can stay up longer. But at the end of the day, we’ve got human beings on our aircraft and four hours in a rotating object is quite enduring on them.
Q. I’d like to come, please, then on to the increase in small boat crossings —
A. Mm-hm.
Q. — and the impact on Bristow’s work. Could we please bring up the diagram from your witness statement, which is at {INQ010336/8}, and if we could just zoom in on that graph. Thank you. You’ve set out here for us the taskings received by Bristow in the Channel up to 23 November 2021, and save for a slight decrease in 2019, there is a general upwards trend up to 187 taskings in the first 11 months of 2021?
A. Yeah.
Q. What did you put the increase in taskings down to?
A. We knew this was linked to the small boats, but the resilience within the system wasn’t being stretched, because we are — we do use the aircraft as a system, so each base will support the other base, they’re not individual — not individual air stations, but they require Lee-on-Solent to cover Lydd, Lydd to cover Humberside, Humberside to cover Lydd, etc. So we weren’t stretched; this was not causing us any problems with our tasking rates. What it was causing problems with was that we were using crews at nighttime, so we were having to bring a second base on state in the morning to cover off the Channel area.
Q. And did you experience any difficulties in identifying additional crews that could be brought in in the mornings?
A. We can’t bring in additional crews because of the regulations, so we bring — we bring another base down. So we used to bring Humberside down to Lydd, or Lee-on-Solent across to Lydd to cover that area of the Channel, if we — if we were required to.
Q. Did the type of taskings that were issued to Bristow during this time by the MCA change in nature at all?
A. No, they were search.
Q. Did you find that you were conducting a greater proportion of search taskings as opposed to, for example, the rescues, the pre-arranged transfers that you’d outlined for us earlier?
A. No, in Lydd’s case, generally it’s search and rescue; they don’t tend to do the transfers.
Q. And is Lydd the closest Bristow base to cover the Dover Strait?
A. Yes, it is, yes.
Q. Can we please take a look at the map of Bristow’s taskings that you’ve outlined for us. It’s page 12 of this same document {INQ010336/12}, and zoom in at that map. Thank you very much. This is a map of the taskings received by Bristow in in the Dover Strait. I presume that each of the little orange circles denotes a tasking?
A. It’s a location of a task, yes.
Q. It’s the location of a task. Thank you. Is this map broadly representative of the geographical spread of taskings in the years leading up to 2021 as well?
A. No, so the — the top right-hand corner has got more activity than we had seen before.
Q. What do you put that down to? A. The small boats. That’s all the small boats areas. The main part of the Channel, from Eastbourne to Folkestone, was very similar to what we saw in previous years.
Q. And so when you’re saying “the top right-hand corner” —
A. So —
Q. — are we looking roughly —
A. — so Dover —
Q. — between Folkestone —
A. — Dover —
Q. — and Ramsgate?
A. Yeah, Folkestone to Ramsgate, yes.
Q. Thank you. We can take that down. Thank you. I’d like to come, please, on to Operation Ceasar, which you describe as an operational awareness programme that led to the introduction of dedicated Channel aviation assets?
A. Yes.
Q. What were the types of aviation assets that were introduced as a result of Operation Ceasar?
A. So I — I was only responsible for delivery, so I was given the contract change notices in my evidence pack; I don’t know what the build-up to that was. So I delivered S-100 Camcopter helicopters, four of, and DA62s, which are Diamond Aircraft 62 aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, two of.
Q. How did those additional assets help with the situational awareness over the Channel?
A. So we were able to use those assets, and we still do, to do the search patterns, to provide the Coastguard with visual — visuals of the small boats that are crossing, is the have — is the small boat underway, do they have life jackets on, how many people are on there, where — what its location is in relation to the other assets that are out there, Border Force, etc.
Q. So in effect you had more assets who were able to conduct these overwatch patrols?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in terms of timing, I think earlier in your evidence to me you made reference to the overwatch patrols commencing in 2021?
A. Yes, that’s right.
Q. Is that separate to Operation Ceasar, which we understand was implemented in the March of 2022?
A. That’s correct. It was the build-up to that.
Q. So help us with the overwatch patrols then. Were they brought in pursuant to the same search and rescue contract that we’ve been discussing?
A. Yes, they were just — it wasn’t even an amendment, we were just tasked with more overwatch. We were asked to move aircraft from different locations so that we had more continuous cover. Especially if Lydd, for example, had been used through the night, we would bring Humberside down to cover Lydd. It didn’t necessarily mean the aircraft weren’t flying, it was just available to be called on to the silver watch.
Q. And you said 2021 is when these overwatch patrols began. Do you know when in 2021?
A. No, I couldn’t tell you.
Q. Now, separately then we have Operation Caesar, which is March 2022, and the additional aviation assets we’ve discussed?
A. Yeah.
Q. Does that mean that the additional assets were available to be deployed from March of 2022?
A. From 1 April, yes.
Q. 1 April.
A. Yeah — oh, in fact, sorry, no, it was 1 March it was signed, so, yes, they were. There was reduced numbers. We only had two Camcopters. We had a DA62 that we borrowed — that we used from another subcontractor in Belgium while we brought our own assets up to full strength.
Q. Now, the DA62 is a fixed-wing aircraft; is that right?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Was that still nonetheless operated by Bristow?
A. Yes. Yeah.
Q. And you’ve mentioned that initially there were reduced numbers. When did the full complement of assets under Operation Caesar become available?
A. So that would be the July of ’22.
Q. I think you’ve said in your evidence that you weren’t involved in the lead-up to Operation Caesar, you just received the contract change notice. If I were to take you to Bristow’s proposal to the MCA in relation to Operation Caesar, is that something that you would be able to speak to?
A. If it’s about DA62s and S-100s, yes. If it’s about B62s, no.
Q. Less about the assets and more about the proposal itself. If we could bring up {INQ008119/1}. Now, this is a presentation entitled: “English Channel – Enhanced Situational Awareness. “Bristow Proposal. “Version: 4.0 Final.” Dated 26 November 2021. Is this a document that you are familiar with?
A. Only through the evidence packs.
Q. Were you involved in its preparation at all?
A. No.
Q. You may not be able to answer this but let me try. If we could go to page 3 of that document, please, “Requirement Assumption Overview”. Are you able to say whether or not this sets out the assumptions to which Bristow was working to in relation to the proposal?
A. Yes, these were. as we know they are the assumptions. That’s what we were briefed, yes.
Q. That’s what you were briefed?
A. Yes.
Q. Can I just ask you please about the second bullet point and whether or not you’re able to assist with that: “HMCG lack situational awareness due to paucity of air assets and conflicting priority tasking.” Were you aware of any conflicting priority tasking insofar as the tasking of Bristow assets by the Coastguard was concerned?
A. Not of Bristow assets, no.
Q. All right, thank you. If we could take that down, please. Coming, please, on to training exercises. At paragraph 4.4 of your witness statement {INQ010336/11}, you describe attending a table top exercise on November 2021, which simulated the capsizing of small boats and you set out the lessons learned as a result. Did Bristow participate in any other tabletop exercises or live exercises in relation to small boat search and rescue?
A. I’m not aware if we did, no.
Q. Would you find it helpful to do so?
A. Yes, and I know we did, we were involved in deployment of life raft trials, etc. And we normally are, the MCA are normally very good at bringing us into the tabletops, so … But again, the previous director may have attended though; it was not myself.
Q. Thank you. Coming, please, on to then the operation of the search and rescue flights and in particular training. I understand from your witness statement that Bristow crew members and pilots have to undertake training and pass assessments in a number of different competency areas before they can conduct search and rescue operations; is that right?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Do those competencies include search and rescue techniques as set out in the Bristow Flight Operations Manual?
A. Yes.
Q. And do they also include search patterns and search parameters?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, there’s guidance on conducting search patterns and search parameters in the IAMSAR manual. Is that a portion of the manual that you would expect your pilots and crew members to be familiar with?
A. Yes, I would, yes.
Q. In order to check that the crew members and pilots remain familiar with their competencies, there’s an annual competence check as well, isn’t there?
A. That’s correct, yeah. As a whole crew, that is. The pilots get checked every six months in the simulator where we can put them through different training tests/environments.
Q. And is it every single competency that is checked on an annual basis?
A. Through the year, yes.
Q. Through the year. Now, staying with the topic of search patterns. Who determines the type of search pattern that a pilot would follow on a search and rescue operation? Is it the pilot or is it what we’ve come to know as the controlling authority?
A. The controlling authority.
Q. And is that in all cases or can there be exceptions?
A. There can be exceptions, but it’s very rare. Generally, it’s when the aircraft is on scene, they’ll report back that the weather conditions don’t allow them to do the search pattern and then they would change the search pattern.
Q. If the search pattern is set by the controlling authority, can a Bristow pilot question those instructions or make alternative recommendations if they don’t feel that the pattern is the most appropriate or the most effective?
A. They can, and they have those conversations before they launch, yes.
Q. Where they have those conversations, who does the final decision rest with?
A. The controller.
Q. Are Bristow pilots expected to be able to provide advice on appropriate search patterns and track spacing to the controlling authority?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. And are they expected to be able to select an appropriate search pattern and track spacing if that decision hasn’t already been made by the controlling authority?
A. Yes, they would be.
Q. And where the search pattern and the track spacing has been selected, that’s what gets input into the mission information system that you helped us with earlier?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Final topic from me, please, which are the taskings on the night of 24 November.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. You’ve explained to the Inquiry that Bristow assets were involved in four operations on the night of the 23rd to 24th November and using the tasking types we’ve discussed at the beginning, these were all search operations?
A. That’s correct, yes. But any search can become a rescue. Any flight can become a rescue. So the aircraft is capable of switching roles in flight.
Q. Did any of those four search operations become rescue operations over that duration?
A. No, they were all search, and they reported back positions of vessels to the controlling authority.
Q. Thank you. You’ve summarised those different taskings for us at paragraph 7.2 of your statement {INQ010336/19}, but just briefly, search and rescue 233/21, this was the tasking of rescue 163 captained by Christopher Trubshaw and from whom the Inquiry will hear later today?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Search and rescue 224/21, this was a search for illegal immigration activity in migrant search area Charlie?
A. That was rescue 175, wasn’t it?
Q. Yes. What is “migrant search area”?
A. That’s in the Coastguard’s instructions, they’ve got areas Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta. It’s specific coordinate areas that the crews know to go and search in. It allows to us control the different assets. So you can put asset — different air assets, different surface assets into different parts of boxes, basically, boxes of airspace.
Q. Now, you wouldn’t have been in the room at the time when Mr Norton gave his evidence, but we saw a map of the Dover Strait broken into areas A, B, C, D, on the UK side of the median line, and E, F, G, H, on the French side of the median line. Is that what the migrant search areas are?
A. Yes, as far as I understand, yes.
Q. Thank you. The third mission was search and rescue 234/21, a tasking to multiple persons in the water who had become separated from a small inflatable boat and who were located in the vicinity of French vessels?
A. Yes, that’s right.
Q. And then search and rescue 235/21, which was a return to the same general search area as the third mission —
A. Yeah.
Q. — to conduct any further searches?
A. That’s correct, yeah.
MS HOLLOS: Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr Hamilton. Those are all my questions.
A. Okay, thank you.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, thank you very much indeed, Mr Hamilton. Your evidence has been extremely useful, so thank you very much. We haven’t got Captain Trubshaw yet? No, so, what, that’s 2 o’clock? Okay. Right, well, we’ll pause until 2 o’clock. So thanks very much. (12.10 pm) (The short adjournment) (1.14 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, well, good afternoon, everyone, and good afternoon in particular, Mr Trubshaw. In a moment, Ms Onabanjo is going to ask you some questions, but first of all, could you read the affirmation.
A. Yes, sir.
CHRISTOPHER TRUBSHAW (affirmed)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Thank you.
Questions by MS ONABANJO
MS ONABANJO: Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, Mr Trubshaw.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. Would you start by giving the Inquiry your full name, please?
A. Christopher Trubshaw.
Q. You have made a witness statement for the Inquiry, which you signed on 22 November last year, which runs to pages; is that right?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. Turning then to your role, you’re employed by Bristow Helicopters Limited, which I will call “Bristow” in the course of your evidence, as a search and rescue pilot; is that right?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. And you have been employed with Bristow in this capacity since 2015?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And prior to that, you had significant experience as a helicopter pilot. I note from your statement that you qualified in 1989 whilst in the Royal Navy?
A. Correct.
Q. And you then left around 1996 and you subsequently flew for the police as a civilian pilot?
A. Correct.
Q. And you rejoined the Navy in 2001, where you stayed until you joined Bristow in 2015?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were the Captain of the search and rescue helicopter with the call sign R163 on the night of the incident that the Inquiry is investigating; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. You mention in your statement that when you joined Bristow, you completed an initial operational training; that’s correct, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you also undertake recurring training with competency assessments every six months?
A. That is a legal requirement under the terms of my licence that I hold, yes.
Q. Thank you. The director of search and rescue at Bristow has, this morning, given evidence to the Inquiry and he confirmed that the training competencies include search and rescue techniques contained in Bristow’s manual; is that right?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. And those training competencies also include search patterns and parameters?
A. Yes.
Q. And those search patterns and parameters are set out in the IAMSAR manual?
A. That is the descriptor for it, yes.
Q. And Mr Hamilton also confirmed that as a search and rescue pilot, he would expect you to be familiar with the portion of the manual dealing with search patterns and parameters?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you undertake any specific training in relation to searching for small boats and persons in water prior to November 2001?
A. I wouldn’t say “specific”. The training that we are given, undertake and continue to do, covers a whole lot of potential scenarios, different objects and the ways that we are employed using the standard techniques to try and find where they are.
Q. So is it your evidence that your general training in relation to search and rescue would enable you to competently carry out search and rescue of people in water, for example small boats in water?
A. Yes.
Q. I would now like to ask you about the helicopter itself and the crew.
A. Yes.
Q. You set out helpfully in your statement the capabilities and the equipment on board the helicopter. The Inquiry has heard from Mr Hamilton, this morning, on — on that very topic, so I propose to treat it very briefly with you.
A. Yes.
Q. What Mr Hamilton said this morning was that, in particular, equipment that would be useful searching for people in water would be the night vision goggles, forward looking infrared cameras, search lights and radar; is that right?
A. Specifically for looking for people —
Q. For people in water or for small boats in water as well, although he — he did acknowledge in the course of his evidence, and I will come to that, that those equipment have limitations?
A. Yes. So, sorry, reflecting to the first part of your question.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, those equipments are fitted and made available to us as aids to location. They do have limitations, as I suspect you’ll come to, and they are not necessarily, in standalone, a panacea for finding anything, especially in the water, as it goes.
Q. Could you explain what you mean by that, that they’re not standalone?
A. Yes, so if you’re — say you’re looking using night vision devices, night vision goggles, they are not necessarily the only thing that will pick up contacts. So they are all used in conjunction with each other and they are all different to the operation, and combined give you the best chance of locating something given the conditions that they’re operated in.
Q. And would there be a particular combination of those aids that would be most useful in identifying/locating small boats or persons in water?
A. They are all useful, and together, along with the operators’ competency and training and operation, that stands you in the best chance of finding what you’re looking for.
Q. Thank you. In terms of the limitation of equipment, Mr Hamilton’s evidence was, in relation to night vision goggles, for example, that they require ambient lighting and they could also be affected by fog; is that right?
A. Yes, it is a possible popular misconception that night vision goggles turn night into day. They do not. They require a degree of lighting, ambient lighting, as you say, in order for them to function. So without that initial trigger, the ambient light, they have reduced capability.
Q. And would it be the case that in circumstances where it is dark, search lights would mitigate — would be the mitigator?
A. Search lights help. They are not necessarily the solution, they help.
Q. I take from your answer that what you’re saying is that they are limited in the extent to which they mitigate a lack of natural lighting or other source of lighting. Could you explain further what you mean?
A. So I think —
Q. So I take it from your answer, you say “they help –”
A. Search lights?
Q. Search lights.
A. Yes.
Q. What is the limitation? What is the limitation of the extent to which they help?
A. A focused search light is obviously a beam of light, not something like the sun or the moon, where you have a larger pool of light creating that ambient light. A fixed point of light, a light on a ship, for example, will show up, giving that — that background, if you like, with night vision goggles, if you were looking directly at it.
Q. Thank you. In terms of the forward-looking infrared camera, which I understand is referred to as FLIR, is that —
A. FLIR, yes.
Q. — is that right? Yes. I understand this relies on a contrast between infrared signatures?
A. Yes.
Q. And so if persons had been in the water for a long time, this decreases the chance of locating them with the FLIR?
A. Yes, as does the size of the target as well. And I refer to things as “target”. Basically, that is the target we are looking for and nothing else.
Q. Understood. And in terms of the search lights, Mr Hamilton’s evidence was that they are affected by fog; is that right?
A. Fog defracts light, disperses light, and that will have an effect, yes.
Q. And then finally, radar. His evidence was that they have a low probability of detecting small boats and people in water?
A. Yes.
Q. And why is that?
A. Without wishing to get into radar theory, basically, the way it operates is a beam of energy is sent out and is reflected by certain objects and then received back from the transceiver. If it’s a small object, it has what’s called a small radar cross-section, a person in the water has a tiny radar cross-section and if any at all, because we, as humans, do not reflect that energy.
Q. Understood. Are there any other challenges associated with searching for small boats or persons in the water or searching at night that you think it would be important for the Inquiry to know?
A. Visibility is a big factor, and at night, you are obviously physically restricted in terms of the eyes adjusting to light to be able to pick out stuff on the water, unless there is an external light source, and so your ability to distinguish objects in the water is vastly reduced at night. Night vision devices help, because they will enhance reflected light, etc, as I’ve explained. The FLIR will help, given the fact that it is a camera operating within light that we don’t necessarily see as human beings, but the limitation, again, is, at night, you can’t directly see out the window unless there is an ambient light source, ie the moon.
Q. Thank you. Turning now to the crew of the R163. You explain in your witness statement that is usually crewed by four people, so there is the captain, the co-pilot, the winch operator and the winch paramedic, and you explain that the winch operator and paramedic are both competent to operate the search equipment. You also explain that, when effecting a rescue, one pilot is flying and the other is monitoring. What I’d like to know is, when effecting a search, what are the two pilots doing in the helicopter?
A. The captain of the aircraft usually sits in the right-hand seat and he has overall responsibility for the running and coordination of the operations within the aircraft and within the search and rescue operation. The pilot in the left-hand seat will normally be “hands on flying”. He’s known as the pilot flying for purposes of distinction. The pilot who is not actually controlling the aircraft is then known as the pilot monitoring. He’s monitoring the actions of the other pilot, he’s monitoring the actions and the requests coming in to the aircraft, although doesn’t necessarily respond to each piece of information, ie is not solely talking on the radios, and therefore he has responsibility for the safe and effective operation of that aircraft. The two pilots at the front can swap the handling duties, and it is good to do so at times, because it provides a different level of stimulation and a different level of input into the running of that mission, and it relieves fatigue of doing the same thing all the time. So that is basically what the pilots do. The captain of the aircraft, though, retains that overall responsibility for the input of information, the processing of information, and to an extent the outward transmission of information, although he can’t obviously tell any other person on the radio exactly what to say at what time.
Q. In terms of the search equipment —
A. Yes.
Q. — to what extent do the pilots get involved in operating the equipment or using the equipment. So, for example, you say there are four night vision goggles on the helicopter, to what extent would you use that on — on a flight?
A. We would fly with the enhancement of the NVGs and they would be down within our eye level at all times. They help us with the safety of the aircraft, as far as we can see, they do help with the visual look-out, because that is the best way of finding something is to actually see it. Then the operators in the back are tasked with the safe and efficient operation of the — the FLIR, etc, in the back, and they look at the — monitor it on the screen. The pilot can select a repeat of that screen on our multi-function displays in the front of the aircraft, and certainly if something is being investigated, then we would put that display up in the front so that we can see what they’re seeing in the back at the same time. And that’s the delineation of responsibility that is formally handed over whenever the pilots change control so that nobody’s in doubt as to who’s actually — excuse me — who is actually flying the aircraft.
Q. Thank you. I’d now like to ask you a couple of questions about the general operation of search and rescue flights. Firstly, Mr Hamilton confirmed, this morning, that if you are tasked to conduct a search and the search planning hasn’t been done for you, then you would be — you would be expected to be able to decide the search parameters, so decide the patterns and decide the track spacing and the sweep width; is that correct?
A. The expectation is that we are passed a plan with the parameters so that it fits in with the overall coordinator’s idea of what’s going on. For search patterns, ones that are dedicated, then we would expect to be given a start point, the leg length, direction of travel, direction of the first turn, etc, because this is — affects the area that you actually cover during the search. So therefore, if we decide to do something solely, it might not fit in with the overall coordinator’s plan of what to do. So therefore we would be given those parameters, we would programme it into the aircraft and get the aircraft to fly it under those parameters. (a), it’s more accurate, and (b), it gives us a chance to look out and carry on with the visual aspect of looking for whatever it is we’re searching for.
Q. I understand that, but if you — in a case where you are not provided with the parameters or the search patterns, what would you do?
A. Ask for them to be given. It sounds a little blunt, I’m sorry, but, again, we are there to carry out the requirements of the overall mission. Therefore, if we randomly choose something that doesn’t necessarily fit in with what is required, then that would be counter-productive. IAMSAR does say that if you approach a datum position initially, with very other little information, then the use of an expanding square search or the sector search, which looks a bit like a clover leaf, is the best option, because it covers a wide area to do. We are trained in the use of or the selection of sweep width, but actually the best one determining — determining the best one is not down to us in the aircraft to do it.
Q. I understand that, but would you be able to, would you have the information and would you have what you required to enable you determine the parameters if they weren’t provided to you?
A. Through knowledge of what you are looking for, we could decide a parameter. Whether or not it is the correct or the most — sorry, the most desired parameter, we cannot calculate that within the aircraft.
Q. Thank you. Next, I’d like to ask you about Mayday relays. You mention those in your statement, and perhaps we can turn to your statement. If I could have {INQ009651/1}, please. And if you could go to paragraph 4.1.4 of the statement {INQ009651/9}. In the second sentence, you say: “When we are tasked directly for an incident, we would not normally be advised that a mayday relay was being broadcast.” Who would you expect to advise you that a Mayday relay was being broadcast?
A. That would come as part of the tasking. I refer to it there, that we were not necessarily aware of Mayday relay, because that is to alert other participants within an area that an incident is going on. We are tasked directly to that incident, so would not be part of that Mayday relay.
Q. Would you —
A. So a Mayday relay is the means by telling everybody else that somebody has made a distress call.
Q. Yes, I understand.
A. So, to us, to be told necessarily there is a Mayday relay going on, is not required because we are tasked specifically to — with that incident.
Q. Thank you —
A. And —
Q. — I understand that.
A. Sorry.
Q. Thank you. I would now like to ask you about the typical tasking of a search and rescue helicopter by the Coastguard. Mr Hamilton explained, in his evidence this morning, that the usual process is that the ARCC would make a request by ringing the base at Lydd and they would provide you with initial details of the tasking. Could you tell us what information the ARCC would typically give you?
A. They would say roughly what the tasking is. There is language used like “wet job”, “dry job”, a search task. So initially a wet job would indicate it’s over the water, for example. Then they would give a brief synopsis of what is involved, where it is, any amplifying information that they have, and then who’s going to be coordinating the incident that you’re responding to. There is a chance within that initial call to ask further questions and for us to get as much information as possible within that. So that would be the initial tasking: what, where, when, requirements.
Q. And it would not be part of the ARCC’s role to provide you with any details of search planning; is that right?
A. The ARCC would not normally pass the search plan, because that is passed to the Rescue Coordination Centre, whoever is controlling it within your area. They may have information that we would be tasked to conduct an area search of something, or given initial coordinates, your task — your search plan will be passed, and then we would expect that — to receive it en route. There is an opportunity to further question, and if further details are available, then it’s best given on the ground so that we then have a chance to programme the aircraft en route, otherwise it’s reactive.
Q. Thank you. You’ve already said that the MRCC provide the search plan and that the reason why you would not normally decide search parameters is that it has to be — the search parameters have to be determined as part of the overall mission. In relation to small boats, wouldn’t the overall mission be similar?
A. No, it can vary. It can vary, and what we have seen over the years is these things have progressed from — inverted commas — “patrolling”, ie locating possible contacts within a certain area, to definite areas, which are slightly smaller in surface area, to go and look for things. So the tasking can be wide and varied and responding to whatever is happening. There have been times when boats have been located and we go and provide what’s called “overwatch”, ie making sure, from the air, we can see what’s going on and relay anything if people are missing or something is not quite right, or we can be tasked to go and recover people from the Border Force boats, for example, if they are listed as unwell. So the — the parameters can change each time as to what we’re being asked to do.
Q. So parameters can change depending on whether you’re being asked, for example, to search for something specific —
A. Sorry, can you say that bit again, sorry?
Q. So what you’ve said is that the parameters can change depending on whether, for example, you are being asked to do something specific, or you are being asked to provide overwatch, or you’re being asked to patrol?
A. Yes. “Patrolling” is the term that I would call it when you are asked to fly up and down to see what you can find. Searching is when you are looking for something specific within a certain area. And then assisting would be somebody’s fallen ill, can you go and assist by either the paramedic — winch paramedic providing their professional opinion or moving the — inverted commas — “casualty” to the next level of medical treatment. So there are several different factors within that.
Q. So within — within patrols, for example, would the overall mission be similar in relation to small boats? So within that sub-category of type of task?
A. Yes. So you’re given a line between two points potentially, saying we are aware of boats coming across — this is what has happened before — can you fly along there and see what you can find.
Q. Thank you. Can I now take you — can I ask you some questions now about the tasking of the R163 on the night of November 2021. If I could call up your statement again, it’s {INQ009651/1}, and if we can go to {INQ009651/8} and paragraph 4.1.3. Before I ask you a question about that, how well do you recall the events of the night?
A. I would say some is patchy, it was a while ago.
Q. And I imagine you undertake a lot of search and rescue flights over the course of the year and you’ve undertaken many since then?
A. Quite a few, yes.
Q. At paragraph 4.1.3, you say: “On the night of the Incident, our initial tasking was quite vague.”
A. Yes, the initial phone call, if you can imagine being in your bed at some form of sleep to be woken up by a phone call and passed information when your circadian rhythm is at its lowest, it takes a while, a finite amount of time to actually take in that information that maybe needs to be — repeat itself. In the — in this instance, the initial conversation was an opportunity to see the feasibility of actually achieving a task. I won’t say this particular task, but a task, as there were other factors to take into consideration. So the vagueness of it was, “Can you get up, can you have a look and see so that we can discuss the feasibility of achieving a task”.
Q. Ah, so your reference to the initial tasking is a reference to the first conversation you had in relation to that tasking?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. If I could take you now to documents relating to your conversation with the Aviation Tactical Commander on the night, Mr Golden. If I may call up, please, {INQ007825/1}, and as you can see, this is a call on November 2021 at 2.17, between you and Mr Golden. If I could turn to {INQ007825/2}, please. We see here that Mr Golden says what you’ve just described. He says: “Allow yourself to gather area thoughts and request a call back. The request is going to be for you and you alone to have a discussion with me about weather and suitability for conducting … a two hour sweep along the boundary [line] in … an hour’s time. So if you want to adjust yourself, you don’t need to get the rest of the crew up …” And so he was saying: this is what I am proposing to discuss with you, can you get yourself together and we have a discussion about it?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you ask: “A two hour sweep of what boundary, along the channel you mean?” And then he confirms: “… along the channel.”
A. Yes.
Q. So is this — it is this conversation that you’re referring to when you say —
A. Yes.
Q. But at this stage, you hadn’t been tasked, he hadn’t given you the tasking, he was just indicating that he would task the helicopter?
A. Yes. The information that is portrayed on the screens with regards to weather, visibility, etc, they have information within the ARCC, but that discussion was to look at the feasibility of actually what we could achieve and what useful part we would be able to play given the weather information that he had, and he was asking me to go and have a look and make an assessment. The reason I was asked to get up and not get the rest of the crew was to maintain that level of rest for them, to allow them the best opportunity that, as and when they were woken up, they would be of a fresh state before going. If they’d been gotten up earlier and nothing happened, then, again, sleep patterns are interrupted etc. So what he was trying to do was look after the welfare of the crew and look at the actual effectiveness and the possibility of achieving a — what I would term a patrol task. I would also say that “patrol task” is not actually written down in any of our literature, but that’s effectively what it is.
Q. Thank you. If I could now call up {INQ010697/1}, and you’ll see from that first page that this is a call a few minutes later at 02:23 between you and Mr Golden. And if we could turn to the next page, please, {INQ010697/2}. Halfway down the page, you say: “I haven’t stuck my head out the window … and had a look. It can always be a sort of false negative, false positive … I think we can do it.”
A. Yes, that’s slightly relaxed language. I would say I did literally have a look out the window, but I also consulted the Met information that we have. Again, at o’clock in the morning or 2.30 in the morning, you’re still — your body is still recovering from rest, so in terms of configuring exact language, it’s slightly difficult. However, what I was referring to there was, yes, literally, looking out the window, but if you look out the window at night, all you can see is dark, so we look into the lume of the lights on the airfield, for example, to see if there is moisture in the air and that would potentially affect something we need to do. There is also Lydd Power Station, which is visible from the airfield, which is a good barometer of measuring distance, and a water tower halfway between the two, which, again, gives you an indication of what you are faced with before going. And therefore, what I was looking at was not a reason not to go, but was just getting all the information: can we do it and feasibly provide something meaningful to an operation.
Q. I understand. And in that section of text, you ask: “Whereabouts are you expecting us to patrol?”
A. Yes.
Q. So — yes. And then, if we turn over to the next page {INQ010697/3}, he, Mr Golden, talks about the fact that a fixed wing couldn’t fly because of the issues with weather and their inability to get alternate. And then, at the bottom of that, he says: “Now, as usual, that catalogue of phone calls is beginning to trickle in of the, you know, the classic, I’m lost, I’m sinking, my mother’s wheelchair is falling over the site, et cetera.” Stopping there for a moment. What do you think he meant at the time by that?
A. He was starting to get information in. Over the years, we have seen a pattern of calls from certain areas that might exaggerate the condition of that object. I think he was trying to use levity there — you would have to ask him exactly what he was meaning by that one — in order to get the message across, and again overcome the circadian difficulties in getting going. I think it was not meant to be disrespectful. It is a means of introduction into what was being passed.
Q. I understand. How did you come to understand that there was a pattern of exaggeration on calls?
A. We’ve been involved in migrant crossings for ten years now. Patterns changed initially from boats being driven by a third party to deliver people crossing the Channel and then returning back to whence they came — where that is exactly, I have no idea — to then the pattern of what is widely reported now with the amount of migrants crossing. The calls have been reported in initial tasking in the past that they have reported potential deficiencies within the boat and the need for assistance. When we have located some of these — and this is personal experience as well as in general — we have found that what has been reported is not necessarily what has been going on in the first place. So we have seen that increase and it’s almost as if it’s been scripted. However, that has not affected our reaction to what we are given, and every incident is treated with the correct amount of severity and need, so every time we get that information, it is an opening means of conversation and not exactly what is going on on scene.
Q. Thank you. So that I’m clear, you said at the outset that you’ve been involved in search and rescue for ten years.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you mean to date? So, as at the date of this call, it wouldn’t have been ten years? No, sorry, in terms of Bristow’s experience of search and rescue?
A. We have been involved in search and rescue missions across the Channel area since inception, ie since standing up at Lydd, so the experience has accumulated over that period of time.
Q. Thank you. In terms of your understanding of that section of the call that I’ve just taken you to, so that I’m clear, you didn’t understand Mr Golden to be saying at that point that there were in fact people in the water or vessels in distress, your understanding was that he was conveying that there were some distress calls coming in, but these were exaggerated calls?
A. No, I don’t believe that actually distress was mentioned at that point, so I was not aware of a specific reference to an incident at that point.
Q. Thank you. So moving down then, further down the page in terms of what Mr Golden tells you, he says: “… a solution to generate a maritime picture …” In terms of what he was looking for: “… that we might be able to understand the problem better would be to get you out if you were prepared to go, hence this discussion and fly.” He says: “Dover …” And I assume that’s MRCC Dover: “… can work on a better plan, but I’m thinking about something like the 190 radial down from Dover right through to about 150 radial from Dover up and down the boundary line … So it’s effectively … as they cross the line.” And by “they”, he means the small boats crossing; is that right? So I’m looking now six lines down in the bottom text.
A. Yes, I can’t remember whether he would be mentioning the median line, ie the sort of halfway point across the Channel, or the line as described by an ARCC. He’s mentioning the general area there, I believe, so that I can make an assessment as to the feasibility and the effectiveness of a search within that given the weather reported at the time.
Q. So what do you understand him to mean when he said “the boundary line”?
A. There is what is called the “median line” between — roughly divides the Channel in half, and I would — at the moment, I can’t remember whether I made a decision that’s what he meant or whether it was going to be a specific tasking line from point A to point B and see what is around in that area.
Q. Thank you. If we could go to {INQ010697/4}, please. Halfway down the page, where it says: “The final thing I’ll say of course …” Can you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He says: “The final thing I’ll say of course is, I have no idea with the moisture in the air, whether we are going to be dealing with a useful search with …” And I take it that means FLIR, the forward-looking infrared —
A. F-L-I-R, yes, not the flower.
Q. — the FLIR: “… or are … going to be, quite frankly, just try to look out the windows to see where you’re going as the visibility gets worse. “Would you rather be doing this now or trying to do it at six, seven o’clock in the morning when I think looking at the weather tools to hand, the visibility is going to be worse. So this is a discussion rather than a tasking. I value your input.” And then you then go on to talk about the search equipment: “The issue obviously is with the conditions. If we’ve got horizontal visibility and can look through the [Night Vision Goggles], that would be okay from a safety aspect. The performance of the equipment in this sort of weather is not brilliant …” Can we turn over the to next page please {INQ010697/5}: “… obviously, because you need to have that horizontal visibility for Fleur to work. It won’t look through fog and cloud.” So you were discussing there the limitations of the equipment in terms of carrying out an effective —
A. To be effective and produce meaningful results, yes. There’s also a safety aspect, as I mentioned there, we need to be able to see where we’re going so as to avoid collision with objects.
Q. And then, in the next section, you say: “In terms of sort of getting in and out … and [the] safety of the aircraft, obviously if we are looking at radial contacts and trying reduce that, we wouldn’t pick up a rubber dinghy anyway.” What did you mean by that?
A. The “getting in and out” would be taking off and getting back to Lydd or somewhere suitable once we reached fuel endurance. In terms of the radar performance and tracking a small rubber dinghy, as I mentioned before about radar cross-section and radar reflection from materials, it wouldn’t necessarily pick up a rubber dinghy on the radar.
Q. Thank you. You then go on to discuss weather and feasibility, and then you say you will consider the situation and call him back. So if I could take you to the next call. It’s {INQ007389/1}, and this is a call again between you and Mr Golden at — and this time at 2.41. If we could go to the next page, please, {INQ007389/1}. And the second time you speak, so the big block of text —
A. Yes.
Q. — a third of the way down through the page, you say you’ve spoken to the person, who I take it to be your co-pilot, you’ve got him up and you’ve had a discussion and you confirm that you can do the tasking?
A. Yes.
Q. And then six lines down, you say: “Obviously, we will try and stand off any vessel if we find any.” What did you mean by that?
A. Two things. Obviously, collision avoidance, as I’ve mentioned, if we couldn’t necessarily see with visual aids, so with the naked eye, we would be required to maintain a distance away from a contact, because we don’t know what it is and therefore there is a risk of potential collision. The second thing is, if we find something, the idea is not to fly directly over the top of it, unless requested for further information, so as not to alarm or disturb any persons on board. So we would stand off, observe, report back and see what the next course of action was. Obviously, if there had been anybody in distress that we had located, then we would come up with a course of action and recommendations to carry that out.
Q. Thank you.
A. But the stand off — sorry, if I may.
Q. Yes.
A. The stand off is to get as much information and assess the situation. There’s no point in charging in if it’s not required.
Q. Thank you. In the next sentence, you say: “Then it’s what you do with that information if we do find the staff.” And then, the following sentence, you say: “Obviously, we’ll have to be sort of playing chicken, radar-wise, with vessels, and it might be that we find nothing.” What did you mean by that?
A. If the visibility was poor, as I’ve just iterated, we would need to maintain a distance from a radar contact, and therefore, if we are maintaining that distance, that limits our field of view, our ability to have a broad area knowledge of what is going on, and then it’s based on the grounds of safety. And obviously, if you can’t see it, you can’t do anything about it.
Q. And so the reference to “playing chicken” in that context is?
A. Again, it’s flippant language of early in the morning.
Q. I understand, yes.
A. It means that we would not be able to close definite radar contacts unless it was on a dedicated radar approach to them, and that takes up a lot of time, to be able to do that. So playing radar chicken means that we were having to be cautious.
Q. Thank you. You then say you’ll get the crew up and you will be airborne by 3.30. But in terms of what you’d agreed with Mr Golden, you then say, at the bottom of the page — at the top of {INQ007389/3}, if I could take — if that could be taken to the top of page 3: “So we’ll have an agreement with yourselves an hour-and-and-half on that patrol line, see if we can find stuff, which is basically the south-westerly traffic separation zone sort of area, isn’t it?”
A. Yes.
Q. And so what did you understand? What was the agreement, as far as you understood?
A. The agreement was to go and fly a line that was going to be defined. Initially, he was saying the rough area on those radials, which are bearings from a known point, and we will fly along that bit and see what can be located to try and help with their recognised maritime picture.
Q. So, from the calls with Mr Golden that I have taken you through, your understanding of what he’d asked you to do was to patrol the boundary line, you weren’t being asked to search for a particular vessel, it was to obtain a recognised maritime picture; is that right?
A. As far as I can remember, it was non-specific to a certain contact.
Q. And you weren’t told that there were people in the water, for example, you weren’t told that — about particular distress calls, it was just to patrol the boundary line?
A. Again, as far as I can remember, it was just that, yes.
Q. And as far as you can recall, even though you said the initial call with Mr Golden was vague, you understood the subsequent instructions he gave you in terms of what to do?
A. Yes.
Q. I’d like to go through one further aspect of this transcript with you, and if I could go to the bottom of this page 3, please. Mr Golden says there: “The only other question I have, of course, the nervousness in my back pocket will be of course we say 90 minutes, but of course once you get up, if this begins to change, you can then see more and more demands being put on you. So my nervousness will be that once you’re up once, this is it now, you’re up for the rest of your shift or until you claim the fatigue card … coming back, rotors running and coming back out again et cetera et cetera. So I would, in the back of your mind, have that as a distinct possibility.” Do you understand what he was saying there?
A. Yes. So the initial bit was, we anticipate building a picture as best you can within that hour and a half, be alert to the possibility that obviously if things change, then the nature of the tasking will change. To — to that end, be prepared, in terms of fuel state, in terms of briefing the crew, in terms of preparing yourselves mentally, this may extend as things develop, and that’s what he’s saying there.
Q. And his reference to the “fatigue card”, what do you think he meant there?
A. Again, the language is slightly, if I may use the word, slang. We understood each other, that he knows, being tasked at that time in the morning, the effort it takes to produce meaningful results, searching in the dark in reduced visibility in — under pressure to find these things is fatiguing, so be aware. He was reinforcing our ability to say, right, this is tiring, (a) we need a break or something, or something further may happen that we are unable to continue due to fatigue. And would I also stress at this point that fatigue is different to tiredness. Tiredness is as it says. Fatigue can be a culmination or combination of many factors reducing — resulting in the reduced performance of an individual.
Q. I understand, thank you. I’d now like to turn to the search instructions you were provided by MRCC Dover.
A. Yes.
Q. Following your call with Mr Golden, you contacted MRCC Dover and is that because Mr Golden had said to you Dover would define the parameters?
A. No, the reason for contacting Dover was to try and get as much information before lifting so that we could prepare the aircraft ready for that task. That relieves capacity then to deal with potential poor weather and the requirements of dealing with that.
Q. If I can have {INQ007601/1} on the screen, please. This is the first call with MRCC Dover and it’s at 2.49, and it’s a few minutes after you spoke to Mr Golden. If we could go to {INQ007601/2}. And, as you said, you said to him: “We’re going to get airborne fairly soon … I reckon around 3.30 … and do this patrolling for … potential boats.” Then you ask: “Are you starting to get distress calls in about it now?” And Mr Downs says: “Yes. Yes, we are.” But he doesn’t provide you with any further information about what calls might be coming in; is that right?
A. As far as I can remember, yes.
Q. And so you then say you would like instructions, and he said he will speak to the SMC. If we could then have {INQ008823/1}, please. This is a call between you and the SMC, Mr Gibson, at 2.50, so a minute after. Could we turn to {INQ008823/2}, please, and a third of the way down, you say: “A request, please, is just can we be clear on what you want us to do and if you want to give me something to work on now that we can amend as we go?” And so you were asking for instructions to take off, and that could be amended whilst airborne?
A. Yes, exactly that.
Q. He then says, about halfway down the page: “Yeah. So, I mean, at the minute, from what I’ve got from the French. Their reports — obviously, there are numerous, but I don’t believe they were all on the water. I think they’re just multiple reports that have been ringing regularly.” What was your understanding of what he was saying there?
A. I think, if I just step back, what I was hoping for was, “You are tasked to do this, at this point, with these parameters”. So amplifying it a bit further down, I believe he was saying that there were reports of multiple boats coming across the Channel, and I can’t remember the exact detail of that part other than what is written in the transcript here. So the idea of calling him was to try and get clarity before we took off as to exactly what they want us to do in the form of, “You are tasked to a boat”, or, “You are tasked to carry out a search of a certain type starting in this position here”. Now, I should imagine, at that point, he didn’t have that detail, but the more we can get it before we get airborne, the better prepared we are and the less time we — in inverted commas — spend “just flying” waiting for the instructions to come through.
Q. That’s right. And you can see from the bottom of the page there, that he gave you a provisional search area, so he said: “… sort of Mike Papa Charlie buoy up towards the Sandettie light vessel and then back towards the edge of the south-west lane. That sort of area there. Seems to be the high intensity crossing area at the minute.” If we can go to the next page {INQ008823/3}, please. Then he talks about the Flamant being on scene, which is the French boat, and he refers also to the Valiant, which is the Border Force vessel —
A. Yes.
Q. — proceeding. And then he — and then he gives you coordinates for the Sandettie Lightvessel; is that right?
A. He didn’t actually give me coordinates, no. He says that is the reference point.
Q. No, sorry, he gave you the reference point for the Sandettie Lightvessel, yes.
A. Yes.
Q. In his evidence yesterday, Mr Gibson told the Inquiry that he wasn’t — and as you’ve indicated this afternoon — asking you to search for a specific incident per se, what he was seeking to do was to gather an aerial picture of what was going on, and so he says he set what he calls a rectangular box and the task was to identify small boats or dinghies in the area that he set. Would you agree with that characterisation of what he — the instructions he gave you?
A. I would agree that the initial instruction there is — is fairly wide in its construct. I can’t say whether it was a definite, “These are the edges of the box”, with latitude and longitude references to fly within, which for an effective search is really what you’re after.
Q. Yes, and what he said, yesterday, was that there was a distinction between a search and a patrol, and he explained that a search would be undertaken when you’re looking for something specific, you know, and, you know you’re looking for where it went, you know its estimated drift and size, whereas a patrol is effectively intelligence surveillance and a reconnaissance flight and so you’re not — the details provided are not as specific. Would you agree with that?
A. Yes, intelligence surveillance and recording or reporting.
Q. And you understood the instructions that Mr Gibson was giving you in terms of the patrol area?
A. I would imagine so, in terms of, “Right, that is the rough area where they want us to go, this will be refined once we’re out there”. Because, again, unless you have defined parameters, you can carry out something within an area and then something else comes in and you’re searching exactly the same area again, but with different parameters.
Q. Thank you. If I could take you back to your statement, please. So if we could have {INQ009651/1} on the screen, and if we could go to paragraph 4.1.3 on {INQ009651/8}. So we’ve seen this before, and you referenced the initial tasking being vague, we’ve talked about that and you’ve clarified what you meant by that. And then you said: “We received reports of a distress call from people in the water saying they were in a boat and it was sinking although they did not know where they were.” Having now gone through the calls that I’ve taken you through, would you agree that, at the time, you did not receive that information about people being in the water and it sinking?
A. Maybe not succinctly at that point, no.
Q. Did you receive it at all?
A. I can’t honestly remember, but my focus at that point was the safe operation and getting airborne along those initial parameters that we were given, up towards the Sandettie Light and along that line, looking for a number of boats that were coming across. So I don’t know if I can honestly say I was specifically told that there were people in the water, because that does change things.
Q. Yes, and there’s nothing in the transcripts that I’ve taken you to that indicates that you were told that.
A. I don’t believe so, no.
Q. And Mr Gibson in fact accepts in his evidence to the Inquiry yesterday, that you weren’t told that.
A. It is fairly vague, initially, yes. So given that specific detail, I don’t think we were, no.
Q. And at that point, you weren’t told about Incident Charlie, which is the incident that the Inquiry is investigating?
A. No.
Q. So nothing at all about a particular boat or a particular set of small boats?
A. No. The idea was to go and see what we could see.
Q. If I can — after that, that set of calls then, you then went to prepare the helicopter, and you explain in your statement that there was some delay in getting the helicopter airborne because of an electrical fault.
A. Yes.
Q. You’ve set that out in your statement and I don’t propose to take you to it. The mission report, you understand what I mean, the mission report produced by Bristow after the tasked flight, records the flight taking off at 3.45 and records that you were on task at around 4.02; would that be correct?
A. Yes.
Q. In terms of the search conducted then, if I could take you to paragraph 4.3.7 of your statement, so that’s {INQ009651/13}.
A. Yes.
Q. You say there that: “In this instance we were told to conduct an expanding square search, using the parameters provided by Dover MRCC which I have referred to above.” If I could take you, please, to a call that you had with the SMC whilst you were airborne, and that’s {INQ008825/1}, and this is a call at 3.52 between yourself and the SMC. If we could go to the next page, please, {INQ008825/2}. It’s quite a short call. It’s a radio transmission, my apologies, and it says, from the SMC: “Further information. Valiant’s on scene of one craft. “She has reported one other craft sighted in the vicinity. So, I believe that a search around the Sandettie light vessel as an expanding square, or parallel track as you see fit to search for potential other craft in the area.” Based on this exchange, would you agree that Mr Gibson was giving you the choice of the most appropriate search pattern to use between the expanding square search pattern and the parallel track?
A. Can I first say that might not have actually been me on the radio answering that, as the radio duties are shared amongst the crew, but the information would have been passed. The selection of the expanding square search is best used when you’re given a datum point and you wish to literally expand out from that point to cover a wide area of possibilities. The parallel track search means that you cover an area parallel to a potential known track of a vessel or a — as I’ve said before, a target, and therefore that will cover the best area known to that specific target. The selection of an expanding square search in this instance meant that we could cover a large area properly and thoroughly around that initial datum that was passed.
Q. So do you accept that you chose the expanding square search pattern?
A. I think it was probably agreed that that would be the best course of action.
Q. And agreed between whom?
A. Within the crew. Within the experience that is — that is available to do it. As I’ve said, the captain of the aircraft is responsible for the actions going on and the responsibility of the aircraft. It would be a fool to ignore the advice and professional input from the rest of the crew when selecting these things when there are multiple other tasks going on at the same time.
Q. Thank you. Can I have your — Inquiry {INQ009651/1} on the screen again, please. So at paragraph 4.3.7 {INQ009651/13} you say that — so you’ve accepted that you chose the expanding square search and you’ve explained why that search pattern was appropriate. But in the next sentence, you say: “If we had not been given a specific search pattern, the best way to search an area quickly is generally to do a clover leaf search … pattern.” So you’re suggesting there that a clover leaf search pattern might have been appropriate?
A. It is another recognised appropriate search pattern, yes. But in this instance, where we were given two options and one of them being the expanding square search, which is also an appropriate search pattern, that is what was chosen to do, and the — the parameters for that would then have been passed to us.
Q. In terms of the appropriateness of the sector search, could I take you to the IAMSAR manual?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is at {INQ010511/1}. If I could take you to page {INQ010511/8}, please, and section 5.5.1. If you could highlight the first four lines of that, please. So that says: “Sector searches are most effective when the position of the search object is accurately known and the search area is small. Examples of this situation include a crew member seeing another crew member fall overboard from a ship or a reported distress from a craft which provides a very accurate position. Sector searches are used to search a circular area centred on a datum point, as shown in figure … [below].”
A. Yes.
Q. Would you still say that the sector search was an appropriate type of search in the circumstances?
A. Other than the —
Q. In the circumstances, given that you were searching around the Sandettie Lightvessel, would you say that a clover — a sector search would have been appropriate in those circumstances?
A. That’s very hard to say. Yes, it is — it is a recognised and appropriate search pattern, but in this instance, it was better to use the expanding square search to cover the area more extensively. So this is an initial look, but where it was — this is on the night of the incident, this is where we believe things are happening, can you cover this area, then the expanding square search was more appropriate at that point.
Q. Yes. And it would have been more appropriate because the position of the search object was not accurately known. So the examples given in the IAMSAR manual, a crew member seeing someone else falling overboard —
A. Yes.
Q. — or a ship reported in distress from — with a very accurate location —
A. Yes.
Q. — that didn’t apply in this case; is that right?
A. Not as appropriately as the expanding square search. It mentions there small search area, we’re talking three to five miles out on each leg and then you turn and back in. So these legs, even at a reduced air speed so you can look out and see, do not take a long time. The expanding square search is a more thorough investigation of that area and expanding out so that you can do it, but it takes a bit longer.
Q. And in the circumstances, why would you say the expanding square search was preferable to the parallel?
A. Because we knew that the — as you’ve pointed out, the Valiant was within an area and had seen boats, so that seemed an appropriate place to start, to spread out from that point to see if there were others in that vicinity.
Q. Thank you. If I could have {INQ006370/1}, please. And would you confirm that that’s the expanding square search undertaken, as far as you can recall?
A. As far as I can recall, yes.
Q. This is an image taken from the iSAR?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And the call with — and the radio transmission with Neal Gibson at 3.52, would you accept that he did not set — give you further parameters, so for example track spacing?
A. I can’t answer that. I would have thought he would have done. We wouldn’t necessarily undertake stuff without that parameter set. But if it hadn’t been sent, then we would have adopted a sensible track spacing, which is the bit for us within the aircraft, to enable us to search effectively with the visibility we had and the effectiveness of the devices.
Q. How would you have determined the track spacing? How would you have determined what track spacing was appropriate?
A. So the — if I may, sweep width is determined upon the probability of detecting an object, a certain type of object, and it’s computed based on the object you’re looking for. The idea of track spacing is that you turn and then on to a different track so that the sweep widths overlap. This gives you the best probability of detecting something within that search area. So if you’re looking for a person in the water, then the sweep width you’d want to be is about — and, again, these are off the top of my head and I’m happy to be corrected by the manual, but it’s between sort of 800 metres to half a mile, something like that. So therefore your track spacing, to enable that to overlap, would be something like 0.7 to 0.8 of a mile so that the distance between the two legs that an aircraft flies, the actual visible difference overlaps and gives you the best probability of detection, which you want to be 1 in an ideal situation. And there are other factors that come into play, ie sea state, visibility, time of day, etc. So in determining for us in the aircraft what would be the best track spacing, we would need to say it would be about that which gives us a lot of legs to cover but enables us to cover each part of the ocean or the sea, sorry, as we go over to the best of our ability.
Q. And would you refer to any guidance or any documents when making that determination of what the appropriate track spacing would be?
A. At that point in the morning, no.
Q. And so it would be —
A. So we would be — sorry, if I may.
Q. Yes.
A. We would look to direction as to how big a track spacing should be and that is normally passed to us. In this instance, as you’re saying, would we just make it up? No, it is based on experience, and what we’re actually looking for and the conditions of the day.
Q. And you used a track spacing of 0.7 nautical miles, didn’t you?
A. I can’t remember, I’m afraid.
Q. If I could take you — if I could take you to the MCA’s internal review. So if I could have document {INQ004344/1}, page 80, please {INQ004344/80}, and paragraph 5.2.6, it says: “R163 decided to complete an expanding square search with a track spacing of 0.7nm” Do you have any reason to believe that that’s inaccurate?
A. Not inaccurate. 0.7 is the minimum that the equipment to the helicopter can take, and that is based on the physics and geometry of flying, that you cannot fly a — an expanding square search any closer than that, the helicopter would just be turning on its own axis, basically.
Q. Can I take you to Bristow’s flight manual, so the concurrently flight manual? It’s at {INQ005343/1}, and if I could take you to {INQ005343/17}, please. At the bottom there, section 1.1.7, that gives guidelines for the FLIR camera searches when it’s searching overwater patterns, and my understanding from the mission report is that the FLIR was used on this search flight. If we could turn to the next page, please, {INQ005343/18}, there is table 1-2 there, which says: “FLIR Camera Search Guidelines for Thermal Searching Overwater.” Could you explain what the table sets out?
A. It gives guidelines for the operator to set the — the best chance of finding an object.
Q. And —
A. And — and these are based on the operator’s experience, so — of which, mine is very limited, because I don’t normally operate the FLIR, so I take advice from the technical crew in the back as to what — what to do.
Q. Ah, so you mean the operators of the FLIR, the crew members who operate the FLIR?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it correct that the suggested track spacing for man overboard, dinghy and life rafts, and vessels less than 25 feet, is 0.5?
A. That’s what the manual says, yes.
Q. And so when you say that the helicopter wouldn’t be able to fly less than 0.7, would you accept, based on this, that that can’t be correct?
A. Again, I would have to reference the technical manual for the aircraft, not the technical manual for the search, to confirm that figure has to go down. But you want to achieve as close as possible to that to enable you to cover across, as the — as the manual says. I’m not answering that particularly clearly, I’m afraid, but — but there is — the actual geometry and physics of flying it might not necessarily, in that first part, be — be accomplished. If you imagine flying a first leg on a direction of, say, quarter of a mile, and then turning right for another quarter of a mile, which is the first start of the expanding square search, and then you expand the third leg, which goes to half a mile. Actually getting an aircraft to turn that tightly in wind, across wind, etc, etc, is not achievable at all times, so this is a guide as to what you should be trying to achieve. However, within that first two legs, you are in a very small area, so you are covering, utilising the equipment as best as you can, and visual, so you are saturating that area and sanitising it as you go round.
Q. I understand that, but is it likely that Bristow’s manual will specify a track spacing that its helicopters were incapable of meeting?
A. I would say unlikely, and have to refer, as I say, to the actual aircraft operating manual and cross-reference it with this table, which I’ve not been able to do.
MS ONABANJO: Thank you. Sir, I’m conscious that the stenographers require a break. I don’t propose to be more than about minutes.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: About?
MS ONABANJO: About 15 minutes, so I don’t know whether you~…
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: I think that might be all right. Yes, it is.yes.
MS ONABANJO: If I could take you back to the May report, please, it’s {INQ010445/78}. It’s the second — if you could zoom in, please, on the second paragraph and there we find a summary of the MAIB’s findings — this is the Maritime Accident Investigation Board and the investigation they conducted the investigations into the event the Inquiry is investigating, and they say: “R163’s expanding square search was conducted in the appropriate area and was demonstrably effective in detecting small boats as it found three migrant boats.” And then it refers to the fact that it didn’t detect people in the water. It says, if I go down five lines: “… the occupants of the swamped migrant both Charlie were not detected until many hours later when the victims were found by a French fishing vessel. This may have been because the search pattern’s track spacing of 0.7 aligned with the IAMSAR recommendations for searching for boats, not people in water, and the likelihood of the victims being detected by the helicopter was therefore much reduced.” And then if we skip down, it says, the next sentence: “Effective detection of people in the water required a lower track spacing than that required to detect small boats and the IAMSAR manual recommendation given the visibility on the night was for a sweep width of 0.0nm.” Would you agree with that?
A. I cannot comment on whether we were tasked initially, at that point, to look at people in the water.
Q. No.
A. So therefore the track spacing at 0.7 nautical miles was both a physical and a predicted calculation. The — the sweep width of 0 nautical miles means you have to fly over the same piece of ocean all the time in order to find it, so — or be in the hover and looking right down on — onto something. So that’s what IAMSAR does, so you have to apply a little bit of logic and knowledge to this, to say, in order for us to cover an area and search an area, we have to do a recognised search pattern, and carry on and do as we did and fly the expanding square search. The IAMSAR recommendations are that, and conditions can vary from each job to each job. So at that point, I would suggest that we were doing the best we could, based on the direction we’d been given and the conditions we were faced with on the day. And the fact that you can look out and probably see a little bit further than the sweep width is — is suggesting — would mean that we were giving as best coverage as possible. As I said before, you’re looking for a coverage of 1. It’s not always possible to achieve that coverage of 1 in order to find somebody, in probability terms.
Q. If you had been given the information that there were people in the water, how would that have altered the decisions you made in relation to search parameters?
A. That’s a very good question and I’m not sure I can give a complete answer, because it is always done on a dynamic basis as to what you’re faced with at the time. If there had been a report of, “People in the water, roughly this point”, then we would have gone and searched that point, initially, on top of the datum, and then with whatever search pattern is given to us or predicted. We can suggest search patterns, but as I said before, it is down to the controller of the incident to — to actually give the specific instructions. Now, if we saw somebody in the water, or something in distress, then obviously we can respond to that and go to that position and make an assessment of what the next best course of action is. I stand by the — the actions that we took in conducting that expanding square search such that it had provided us the greatest probability on the night of detecting something and covering an area to minimise the probability that that object was outside of where we were looking.
Q. In his evidence yesterday, Mr Gibson suggested that the appropriate track spacing, for example, for searching for multiple people, so for example 40 people, might be higher than that for searching for one person.
A. That is true.
Q. And why is this?
A. Because they are a larger target.
Q. And —
A. So you might see one person out of that group of 40, but there are 40 more chances of seeing one person.
Q. He also suggested that the clothing worn by the target would be relevant —
A. Sorry, could you say …?
Q. The clothing worn by the target —
A. Oh, yes.
Q. — would be relevant in determining the appropriate track spacing. So he suggested, for example, that the detection range dramatically increases for someone wearing a bright orange life jacket, for example.
A. And protective clothing, yes.
Q. Thank you. How would your knowledge of the fact that a vessel was in distress — how would that have affected your response on the night?
A. In terms of what aspect, please?
Q. In terms of — in terms of your decisions you made in terms of the search pattern, the search parameters, would that —
A. Oh, I see.
Q. — have impacted your —
A. Actually on the scene?
Q. On the scene, yes.
A. I think if we’d been given a specific position to go to, then we would have started and saturated the area either by just standing off a little bit to allow the equipment to look, because obviously if you’re right over the top of it, you’re not giving the best horizon to look at to see. And then we would have performed some sort of search pattern around that position, and as we’ve discussed, the clover leaf position — the sector search is a good one to do, because it searches an area quickly. But, again, if we had no detailed position of it, then the expanding square search is also a good one and would probably have been used. What I will say is at that no stage within that search pattern can you not stop and make a manual manoeuvre to investigate something. So that’s the whole idea of it is, if you spot something outside of necessarily the track you are flying, then you go and investigate it. If it turns out to be nothing, the aircraft equipment, we can then ask it to take us back to that position where we stopped and carry on, and it is the most effective way of sanitising an area effectively and accurately so that you can say, “We have searched this area”.
Q. Thank you. The Inquiry understands that the Coastguard considers all small boats to be in distress because of the nature of them. Did you take the same view, take the same approach?
A. Yes. We treat each report of somebody who is in difficulty exactly the same and there’s no deference put between any different one. If it is noted when we get there that they are not in distress, then we report that back and then carry on with the next part of the search that we are directed to do. The advantage of being in the air is you get a greater look-down capability and you can see more of what’s going on than you can directly in — on a horizontal line of sight, and we could see boats outside of the search pattern and reported those as such, as has been documented. And in other cases, we’ve been able to report vessels and investigate those vessels using the FLIR, admittedly in better weather conditions, and report that the state of the vessel itself and the people on board seemed to be less than potentially anything in distress.
Q. I’ve already mentioned that in your search you identified three vessels. Just to confirm, none of them were Charlie, which is the vessel that the Inquiry is concerned with?
A. As far as I understand.
Q. Yes. Did you encounter any challenges in carrying out the searches that night?
A. Well, as we’ve discussed before in — in this deposition, the visibility is — is a big factor. Obviously it’s dark. The — the moisture in the air does have an effect on the FLIR in terms of its performance, and it will still work, but it is harder to interpret the — the picture that you get to a point where it becomes saturated and won’t work. It won’t look through cloud, and I’m sure the Inquiry has been told that. And the fact of an uncertain area to search, so you have to start somewhere. So those are the difficulties which I think you’re alluding to within the — within the question. And no two searches are the same. Obviously the mechanisms are, but the conditions and the objects, etc, are always different.
Q. If I take you to {INQ010445/27} of the document that we are currently on, the MAIB report, so if we could go down, please. So, in the third paragraph, it says that: “… R163 relayed the position of a third migrant boat …” And then, in the third line, it says: “… however, the helicopter had since lost sight of the boat due to a fault with its infrared camera.” Do you recall that being an issue on the night?
A. Not specifically that piece. There are a number of things that that could relate to in terms of the — the camera is — is obviously stabilised and refers to references using a gimbal system. If you’re constantly manoeuvring that, it is possible to confuse that gimbal system, and so the best way is you give it a reset, there are a number of electronic things that could go wrong, as seemed to go wrong with computers, and again, a reset, whether it’s just a period of stability on a single bearing or whatever it may be, and that allows it all to reset and the sensors to realign and it can do — then be reused. In terms of this paragraph, I’m not sure exactly what the fault was on the night, I’m afraid.
Q. Thank you. And I note that you came off the tasking at 6.30 in the morning —
A. Yes.
Q. — were you asked to carry out a further tasking that morning?
A. At that point, when we had to go back for fuel, we were asked to conduct a further visual search as light was coming up along the coast, and you’ll see from the trace that there seems to be a dog leg within that where we investigated another contact and we flew closer to the coast on a non-specified search pattern before returning to Lydd for fuel.
MS ONABANJO: I have no further questions. Thank you.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, thank you very much, Mr Trubshaw, both for your statement and also your evidence this afternoon. It’s been very helpful, so thank you. Ms Le Fevre, I understand we’re back on Tuesday — Monday.
MS LE FEVRE: Monday, yes, my Lord.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: 10 o’clock?
MS LE FEVRE: 10 o’clock.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: So 10 o’clock on Monday. So thanks very much to everyone and we’ll see you on Monday. (2.45 pm) (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Monday, March 2025)
INDEX
CHRISTOPHER NORTON ……………………………..1 (affirmed)
Questions by MS WOODS ……………………….1
GRAHAM HAMILTON ……………………………….65 (affirmed)
Questions by MS HOLLOS ……………………..65
CHRISTOPHER TRUBSHAW …………………………..92 (affirmed)
Questions by MS ONABANJO ……………………92