Monday, 10 March 2025 (9.58 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Well, good morning, everyone, good morning, Commander Toy. In a couple of minutes, Mr Rory Phillips, counsel to the Inquiry, will ask you some questions. Just before that, can I say that we are going to break every hour, I think, just for 10 minutes. So 11 o’clock we will have 10 minutes and then at noon. But could you please read the affirmation.
MR KEVIN TOY (affirmed)
A. Yes.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. Thank you very much. Mr Phillips.
Questions by MR PHILLIPS
MR PHILLIPS: Commander Toy, you have made a witness statement for the inquiry which I think you signed on 12 November last year; is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct, sir.
Q. Can we start with a few questions about your role and background. We know that in November 21, you were employed by the Home Office as a Commander within Border Force.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. How long had you been in the role of Commander before then?
A. I was first appointed Commander in 2013, I believe.
Q. I think it may have been earlier than that?
A. Sorry.
Q. Shall we just look at your statement? It’s not a memory test.
A. Thank you.
Q. So 010 — it will come up on the screen — 136 and it is paragraph 5 right at the end {INQ/10136/2}. “I was first appointed as Commander of a BF vessel on 27 August 2008 …” So you had more experience than you have remembered.
A. Yes, I apologise, I got the date wrong. Sorry.
Q. Just in terms of your professional background, you spent some time, I think, in the merchant navy and then worked for the Customs from 1984, is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And so you have spent nearly 40 years, before your retirement in February 23, in law enforcement?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And that included, I think, some time not in the UK and UK waters, but in the Mediterranean, is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct, sir.
Q. What were you doing there?
A. In the Mediterranean we were working under the guidance of Frontex, doing migrant rescues in the Mediterranean.
Q. So that was search and rescue experience?
A. Search and rescue, yes.
Q. And can you remember when that was?
A. If I could refer to the statement, that might —
Q. It’s not in your statement.
A. Oh.
Q. I think it may be in your — the interview you gave to the MAIB. Do you remember giving an interview to the MAIB in, I think, April 22?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. If we can turn that up, please, it is 008 — sorry, 330 {INQ/8330/1} and you will see on page 3 {INQ/8330/3} it is a series of questions and answers, on page 3. Do you see the large box beginning: “Pretty awful really …” It deals with your experience in the Med and do you see above that: “I’d been out in the Med doing migrant operations in the Mediterranean …” Can you remember when that was? It doesn’t matter.
A. I believe it was for about two years between about 2013 and 15, possibly.
Q. Yes. But in terms of its relevance to what we are thinking about today, did that also involve rescuing people on board small boats, this time in the Mediterranean?
A. Yes, that’s correct, sir.
Q. Thank you. Now, just a few questions, if I may, about what the role of Commander of a vessel within Border Force entailed. You tell us in your statement and again, please, perhaps we could have this up, so that Commander Toy can see it. It’s {INQ/10136/2} and paragraph 6. You tell us there that the role of a commander was being: “… to command a cutter responsible for border protection against the smuggling of goods or illegal immigration.” And you say later in your statement at the next paragraph that you had a team of law enforcement officers under your command; do you see the top of paragraph 7 {INQ/10136/3} there?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. So your job was concerned, primarily, with border protection to combat smuggling, smuggling of goods and indeed, of course, illegal immigration, is that correct?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And you describe — if we go back to 6, please, the previous page {INQ/10136/2}, how part of your role involved, for example, taking a law enforcement team to a vessel, so that they could board it and search it.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And sometimes you were involved in surveillance.
A. Yes.
Q. And at other times, you insisted other law enforcement officials — you list them there: Police, Department for Transport, etc, with law enforcement operations at sea; is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. So that the main purpose of your role, when you were appointed to it and thereafter, was law enforcement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as you say at the bottom of this paragraph, it’s still on the screen, search and rescue operations were not historically part of the Border Force remit.
A. That’s correct.
Q. But, of course, like any mariner, you would respond to vessels needing assistance as necessary.
A. That’s correct.
Q. And that was, of course, founded in the — what you refer to there, the basic obligation of any vessel at sea under maritime law.
A. Yes, sir, that’s correct.
Q. So going back then to the time when you took up your first command, which you tell us was of HMC Sentinel, that’s in 2008, at that stage I assume you were simply concerned with law enforcement?
A. Yes, our main focus was law enforcement.
Q. Yes. And that began to change, as you explain in your statement, it’s the last sentence of the paragraph we have on the screen, when the number of small boats coming across the Channel dramatically increased and we got into Operation DEVERAN.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as you say from that point on, search and rescue became central to the job you did every day?
A. Only when deployed to Operation DEVERAN.
Q. Yes. Well, we have heard a good deal about Operation DEVERAN, but would you like to explain to us, please, your own understanding of what it did and how it brought about this change in your role?
A. So my understanding was we could be tasked to the area for Dover Straights, as part of Operation DEVERAN, you knew that you were more than likely required to carry out search and rescue as a priority.
Q. And what we have seen in the various charts that the Inquiry has obtained of the increase in numbers over the years, is that by the time we got to 2021, and actually specifically November 21, this was a very, very regular occurrence, every shift; is that fair?
A. Yes, when the weather permitted the crossings.
Q. Yes. Now going back to your role as Commander, did you always work on a cutter in that role?
A. I spent a period of time in the MCC, for about two years, I believe.
Q. But did you ever, for example, command any of the other seaborne assets, like the CPVs?
A. No.
Q. No, and were you always assigned to a specific cutter or could you be moved between the different vessels?
A. No, we — we were generally given a cutter for a period of time, 12 months, but we could be moved to other vessels.
Q. Yes, and during that period of Operation DEVERAN, and let’s say from 2018, were you always working in the Channel?
A. No.
Q. Where else did you work?
A. In the Southwest approaches.
Q. Right, anywhere else round the UK?
A. Yes, possibly the North Sea.
Q. Okay, but was most of your work for Operation DEVERAN done in the Channel?
A. I would say all of the work for Operation DEVERAN was in the Channel.
Q. And that was a proportion of your work?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you put a number, or figure on it? Was it most of it?
A. I think that’s a difficult one, to — to answer because I didn’t record, what — what I was doing on a regular basis. You knew when you were in Operation DEVERAN because you were — you were tasked to that. Otherwise if you were not in the English Channel area — well, sorry, the Dover Straights area, then you would be — you would know you wouldn’t be involved in that. However, you could be called in at short notice.
Q. Yes. So can we agree this: if it was Operation DEVERAN, you would be in the Channel?
A. Dover Straights, yes.
Q. Yes, Dover Straights.
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So now please a few questions about training and qualifications. You have been in the job, as you have explained, for nearly 40 years. So I imagine you have had a whole load of training over the years. But can we just focus in on the period leading up to November 21. Specifically, first of all, what qualifications were required for your role, the role of Commander, in November 2021?
A. I was required to have a master’s certificate for Government vessels.
Q. Was there anything else that was required to undertake that role?
A. You would have your certificate, STCW, that’s basic training in firefighting, sea survival, medical care and helm, of course, which is a leadership course.
Q. Well, that’s something you mention at paragraph 41 of your statement, so could we have that up please. The statement, {INQ/10136/15}, thank you. The top of the page. There you refer to the STCW and you also talk — do you see, at the beginning of the paragraph, about MCA certification?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What was that?
A. That would be my certification, my qualification, as a master for Government vessels.
Q. I understand. And was that something you obtained and then that was it, or did you have to refresh it, how did it work?
A. You — I obtained that in 2000, sorry, 1997.
Q. Yes.
A. And that would be refreshed every five years.
Q. Right. Thank you. And you have already told me that you had law enforcement responsibilities, security, etc. Did you have specific training for that?
A. For law enforcement?
Q. Yes.
A. There was specific training. However, I predated that specific training in the role that I did from 1984. So I was — it was accepted that I had that qualification before the formal training came in.
Q. Right. So during that — the rest of your time then, the nearly 40 years, you didn’t have any further specific law enforcement training?
A. I don’t remember any —
Q. Okay.
A. — that I can talk about.
Q. Now, we have talked about your qualification as Commander, and we pinned it down to 2008, if you remember. And you tell us, in your statement, if we could turn back, please, to {INQ/10136/2} paragraph 5, page 2, do you see at the end of the paragraph there, two lines up, you say you completed the command course in 1997. We talked about the MCA course, the other acronym which I have now forgotten and here we are on the command course. Was that something that needed to be refreshed?
A. So I apologise that is the MCA qualification.
Q. It’s the same thing?
A. It’s the same thing, yes.
Q. And you said you had to refresh it every five years.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Great, thank you very much. Now going back, sorry, now we have cleared that up, to paragraph 41 {INQ/10136/15}, and the MCA course you describe there, you explain something of what it included. You say: “[It] includes our SAR obligations under maritime law.” Just to be clear on that, the course then deals with the law on what is sometimes called SOLAS, yes, rather than the practical methods of search and rescue; is that fair?
A. Yes, I think that’s fair to say. In part of the business and law course, they would — they would include your responsibilities as a master of any vessel in search and rescue obligations.
Q. Yes. And then the STCW, that’s the acronym, course, that you talk about there, does that include any training on search and rescue?
A. No other than first aid.
Q. Right. Yes. Yes, you say there about medical incidents and personal survival, fire prevention, firefighting, okay — and medical care. Thank you. Now, in paragraph 43, just reading on, please, on the screen at the bottom of this page, do you see there, you talk about the standing operating procedures covering Operation DEVERAN. Can you remember whether they specifically covered search and rescue?
A. I believe they did. I believe they — they covered how we would go about responding to a potential event in the Channel.
Q. Right, we will come back to them so we can take a look then. And were you specifically trained in the operation and practice on those SOPs for Operation DEVERAN?
A. I would say there was no formal training. Possibly in-house training with — with the crew.
Q. Yes. Well, you, you talk about that in your statement and again we will come back to that, Commander Toy, because you refer, for example, to training on the job.
A. (Nods).
Q. And it looks to me, reading your statement, as though that was a really important aspect of the Operation DEVERAN work?
A. Yes, I would — I would agree with that.
Q. Because the conditions were so particular and again, we will come back to that.
A. Yes, they were very dynamic and it took a good team to deliver the outcomes.
Q. Yes. Now, just going back to the discussion we had about the way your career developed and the change that came about with Operation DEVERAN, can I just ask you whether you remember this: before you started work on Operation DEVERAN, so let’s say 2018, 2019, before then, do you remember whether you had had any specialised search and rescue training?
A. No specialised training.
Q. No. And in terms of your search and rescue work in Operation DEVERAN itself, did you have training in conducting searches at sea?
A. Sorry, if you could clarify that, searches in relation to SAR?
Q. Yes.
A. No. No specific training on that. The health and safety team might come down and carry out a man overboard exercise. We might have a — a safety drill on board where we would discuss — tabletop discuss search — searches at sea.
Q. And is that the sort of thing you are talking about there in paragraph 42, if you look on the screen?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Yes, exactly.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have any training in the context of Operation DEVERAN for — on the issue of recovering people from the water?
A. No.
Q. No. Now, in paragraph 40 of your statement, if we turn back a page, please, on the screen, thank you, {INQ/10136/14} you talk about the particular challenges — and you and I have just touched on this — in the context of small boats. But can I — as I said, we will come back and look at this in more detail. But to be clear, did you have any specific training in SAR in the context of small boats in the Channel?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. Now in terms of training generally, you tell us in paragraph 60, page 22 of the statement again if we could have that on the screen, please, {INQ/10136/22} that you and your crew were fully compliant with all the training requirements on the day of the incident, 24 November, is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct. Training requirements would be training to be crew on board HMC Valiant.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. So not these other things we have been talking about?
A. No, just to be on board the boat.
Q. Exactly, thank you. Could I now ask you, and this is the final set of questions about training, etc, about exercises or practical training exercises that you may have undertaken as part of your role. And if we can go back, please, to 42, that was the paragraph of the statement we looked at before, {INQ/10136/15}, do you see the — where you refer to the safety team coming down, etc, and there you say, at the top of the paragraph, you would complete a drills matrix, including emergency drills, two or three times a year. Was that something that you organised as Commander or was that a Border Force programme?
A. So it would be a programme in the safety and environmental management system. It would be a set matrix, where you would carry out a fire drill, and a man over — sorry, an abandoned ship drill every patrol, every 15 days and then you would have one or two add-on drills; for example, helicopter operations or a medical first aid incident that would be added on within that patrol.
Q. Would they take place when the vessel was stationary, in other words in port in Dover?
A. No, they could be at sea or they could be in port.
Q. Right.
A. Or at anchor.
Q. Presumably, you needed a relatively quiet moment for that?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Which was not, I think, your general experience of Operation DEVERAN, not many quiet moments?
A. No, that’s right. We would choose our time, if — if the weather was poor, then we could — we could carry out our drills matrix —
Q. Yes.
A. — amongst other things.
Q. Then at the end of the sentence and again, we have looked at this, you talk about performing scenarios under controlled circumstances with the safety teams. Can you help us a bit with the detail of that? What are you referring to there?
A. So every — every year, you would tend to get the — the health and safety team would come down in a quiet moment usually out of Operation DEVERAN, and it would be four — maybe three, four days of focused activity around safety training, where the health and safety team would run scenarios and assess the crew on their performance and provide feedback as necessary.
Q. Yes. And in terms of other agencies, before the incident, November 21, did you do any training or exercises with, for example, coastguard or the RNLI?
A. We would do some training with the coastguard, specifically the helicopter on an opportune basis. If there was a quiet moment, maybe out of Operation DEVERAN, and the coastguard helicopter was looking to do winching operations with us, of course we would facilitate that.
Q. But not with the RNLI?
A. I don’t recall any training with the RNLI.
Q. No. Now, the Inquiry has received some written evidence about some training exercises, or table-top exercises, which took place in 2021 concerning small boats and mass casualty incidents. Did you take part in them?
A. I can only remember taking part in one train — a meeting, shall we say, where we were discussing the turn round tactics that were being proposed —
Q. Yes.
A. — and the suitability of the small boats and whether they were suitable for turning back or not and whether they were considered to be in distress or not.
Q. Yes. But nothing else? Nothing concerned with mass casualty incidents?
A. No.
Q. No. Right, the next topic is the crew of the Valiant on the day in question, or the night in question. But, first, looking at it a bit more generally, can you describe for us the normal, if I can use that word, the normal crew of the Valiant in November 21? How many people did you have on board, for example?
A. Sorry, do you want me to explain the normal crew —
Q. Please.
A. — or in November 21?
Q. Start with normal and then we can go to November 21.
A. Certainly. So the minimum crew we could put to sea would be eight persons, but you wouldn’t be able to — that was mainly for positioning and the likes, or going to refit or something like that. But for operational, the — the ideal number would be 12.
Q. Right. And I think it’s right, this is 59 of your statement, if we could have that up, please, page 21 {INQ/10136/21}, you had 11 people in the crew.
A. We had 11 maritime crew, plus one criminal and financial investigation officer on board.
Q. Yes. And thinking first about the crew, we will come back to the CFI, you say, in paragraph 7 {INQ/10136/3} of your statement, you describe the — your crew there as: “… a team of law enforcement officers … who were also trained mariners.” Do you see, that’s the first sentence? And is that a fair description? They were primarily in the business of law enforcement, but they were also trained mariners?
A. Yes, sir, I think that’s fair.
Q. Yes. Now, going back then to the CFI and again, back please to paragraph 59 {INQ/10136/21}, you explain what the acronym stands for, an officer from criminal and financial investigations and you explain his role which was to: “… capture evidence and facilitation on board the migrant boats, whether photographic or video evidence.” So they were — that individual was entirely concerned with law enforcement and with the sort of, evidential or forensic side; is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And they weren’t there to play any role in search and rescue?
A. No.
Q. As a matter of interest, do you know to whom that CFI officer reported?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. Now, going back — and I’m sorry to jump around — to paragraph 7 of your statement {INQ/10136/3}, again, it will appear magically on the screen. Excellent. You say that the composition of the team would — you see the fourth line: “… reflect the size and complexity of the vessel, and the missions assigned to [it].” As I understand it, you, at this time, November 21, were working a 15-day patrol, is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And during that time, you and the crew are were living on the cutter?
A. Yes.
Q. And was it your role as Commander to assign their own individual roles on the vessel?
A. Yes, and no. I mean, they — most of the roles are — are predetermined. So clearly, someone who had a navigational skill wouldn’t be an engineer and an engineer wouldn’t be a navigator.
Q. But was it within your authority, for example, to say to your superiors, to Border Force: well, I need more of this or I need another one of those to do a particular role within the crew? Or did you just take what you got?
A. That’s a very difficult question to answer because at the time we had the Covid going on as well. So we were trying to keep the crews in their bubbles, if you like, to provide, you know, the security not only to the officers, but to keep the business going as well.
Q. So there wasn’t much scope, really, for picking and choosing?
A. No, not really.
Q. And as far as you can remember, the crew you had with you on the night of the incident, 24 November 21, was that one you had worked with for a good deal of time before, or were they new?
A. I think there were two officers who weren’t — maybe two, maybe three, officers who weren’t regular on my team, but certainly had the same experience as those that were there.
Q. Yes, in paragraph 49 of your statement, if we could have that up please, you talk there about {INQ/10136/18} the concerns you had then, ie at the time in question, about resource availability given how busy it was and we have talked about that a little already. And you say: “I believe I raised those concerns in my debrief.” So those were the reports you prepared after your — your shifts, I think, in the case of debriefs, is that right? So you do one every time?
A. So to clarify, the debriefs would be the emails that I would send in after I had been involved in a small boat incident.
Q. Yes.
A. So each — each afternoon/evening, I would send in a debrief and there, I may or may not say that: it’s been extremely busy, we are running out of — we feel very limited in the amount of vessels we have got and the effect it’s having on the crew.
Q. You were feeling overstretched?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Yes. And, and we haven’t seen the debriefs, I don’t think, but obviously when you made this statement, you thought that you had raised those points in the debriefs at the time?
A. I believe so.
Q. Yes, and that would be before the night in question on 24 November?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. Yes. And presumably, what you were asking for is more people, first of all?
A. I — I don’t think more people on the — on the vessel. But more people on other assets.
Q. Yes. So that there could be more of a rotation between the vessels?
A. Yes, more — more rotation, but also when you are faced with a — an ever-increasing report of incidents, it would be nice to have more vessels to respond to those incidents.
Q. Yes, so it’s not just people, it is also vessels. You needed more assets?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you need more cutters, did you need more vessels of another kind, what were you recommending?
A. To be fair, anything would have helped.
Q. Yes.
A. But I think we realised that the cutters weren’t designed to — to carry out the role they were being asked to do.
Q. Yes.
A. So I know we were looking at other assets that could be used.
Q. So we will come back to that, you won’t be surprised to hear. But were you looking then for a different type of vessel, ie one better designed for search and rescue?
A. I think Border Force, as a whole, were. I was just raising the concerns that it was getting ever busier and we needed more assets to respond.
Q. Did you and the crew feel overwhelmed, at times?
A. I can’t speak for the crew, but I certainly did.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And do you think that that was reflected in your performance or the crew’s performance?
A. No, I don’t think — we did — we did what we could to the best of our ability.
Q. But it must have been extraordinarily stressful to operate under those conditions?
A. I think it was, yes. I think I did feel under stress yes.
Q. And that must have taken its toll?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now I am going to ask you some questions about the vessel itself, if I may. First of all, for us non-mariners, can you give a brief description of the HMC Valiant?
A. Yes, certainly, sir. She’s a 42-metre patrol vessel, I believe designed for law enforcement work, self-contained to a certain extent. She carried an inflatable RHIB which was stern launched, which we would primarily use for interdicting vessels that we wanted to either board and search.
Q. Can we turn to paragraph 15, please, of your witness statement. {INQ/10136/5} and there, just picking up, Commander Toy, the first thing to flag up is the point you make in the second sentence, that you weren’t dedicated to Valiant, you could be assigned to any one of the cutters. But the thing I wanted to ask you about is the safe capacity, or the maximum number of people you could embark and you give the figure there of 100; is that right?
A. That’s the figure that was produced by the maritime safety team.
Q. Yes, and so it’s very clear, that is 100 people in addition to the crew?
A. Yes, in addition to the crew.
Q. So, on the night in question, for example, it would have been 112 total. You could have had 100 people plus the people you have said on the boat, 11 crew, plus the CFI?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Thank you very much. But the question, I suppose that arises, is what happens in these very busy shifts when you get at or near your maximum capacity, the 100. And can I ask you, please, to look at 35 of your statement {INQ/10136/12} because this deals with the realities and now we are six lines down. Do you see a sentence — have you got it there: “should the total number …” can you see that?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. “… exceed the maximum safe capacity … we would still do what we could, while still being mindful to protect the safety of the crew and those already rescued …” What does that actually mean?
A. What that means is that if we were assigned to another event and we were at capacity, we could stand by that vessel while another asset arrived, or indeed, we could put in the water some life rafts that we had that would help save lives.
Q. And was —
A. And stand by.
Q. Sorry.
A. Sorry.
Q. Did you ever find yourself having to do either of those?
A. On one occasion I can remember and I don’t believe if I was at capacity or not, I can’t remember the detail, but we were certainly near it and there was an event where the lifeboat was on the way and I remember standing by until the lifeboat arrived.
Q. Yes. And in terms of the decision-making in that situation, that would be your call, would it?
A. Yes.
Q. As Commander?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Now both of those options you have described involve either standing by, as you say, by the boat or using life rafts. Would you ever embark, onto the Valiant, more than 100 people?
A. I think I — I would, if I had to. Because at the end of the day, the priority is saving lives. However, I had other options available to me.
Q. Yes.
A. Life rafts and our own RHIB.
Q. Yes.
A. And we had a man overboard boat. At the end of the day, if people were in risk of dying in the — drowning, then we could use whatever we had —
Q. Yes.
A. — to effect a rescue while something else turned up. But at the end of the day, if I had to go over that 100 limit to save lives, of course I would.
Q. And do you remember ever having to do that, taking on more than 100 people?
A. No.
Q. No. Okay. In terms of, then, of what was on board the vessel, the Valiant, in terms of search and rescue facilities or equipment, you had radar, of course?
A. Yes.
Q. You had night vision thermal imaging?
A. Yes.
Q. You had a large spotlight?
A. Yes.
Q. You had a VHF radio?
A. Yes.
Q. I think that was — was that — was it by radio that you tended to communicate with Border Force, for example? Can’t you remember?
A. With, with radio and telephone.
Q. Yes.
A. To the MCC.
Q. Telephone to the MCC, that’s mobile, yes?
A. Yes, it is a mobile phone.
Q. So mobile to the coastguard but — but radio to Border Force, is that right? That’s the impression I have.
A. So, just to let me explain.
Q. Yes.
A. We could choose to either telephone or use an Airwave radio to the MCC and I don’t know when it happened, but at some point, the coastguard were given an Airwave, so that we could communicate with them with Airwave or VHF or telephone.
Q. And what about communicating with Border Force personnel?
A. So the MCC is Border Force personnel. However, the Tug Haven would be Border Force personnel, so we would use Airwave with those and other Border Force personnel, being other Border Force assets, we would have the choice of Airwave and VHF.
Q. Yes, thank you. And you had SatSea, so satellite email?
A. Yes.
Q. And of course, you mentioned the RHIB and the man overboard boat.
A. Yep.
Q. Was there anything else in — on board which was relevant? If you look at 20 {INQ/10136/7}, for example, you mention life jackets, flotation devices, life rings. All of those also on board; yes?
A. Yes, they are also on board the Valiant.
Q. Anything else that I have missed off the list?
A. The only other thing we could consider would be to throw anything that floated.
Q. Yes.
A. A fender.
Q. Yes.
A. Or anything like that, that would someone could hang on to —
Q. Yes.
A. — to effect a rescue.
Q. And it looks, if you look at the next paragraph, if we can bring the 21 up, please. Yes, it looks as though you had put in a request for a flotation device or something like that, but it sounds as though you didn’t get one of those by the time you retired, is that right?
A. Yes. I would like to explain that. My understanding is that — excuse me — some of the other teams within Border Force, I was told, might have had some sort of hand-thrown device that would inflate and I thought this would be extremely useful to have in our RHIB, which we could make use of. I did put in — I can’t remember how I put the request in, whether it was in the debrief or by actually trying to obtain them through our provisions section. But when I left, we didn’t have them.
Q. Right. Now going back to the boat itself, in paragraph 15 {INQ/10136/5}, if we could bring that up, please, you describe it, in the third line, as: “… a fast patrol beat or ‘cutter’ designed to do traditional customs work …” And this is the point that you have already mentioned, it wasn’t specifically designed for search and rescue, was it?
A. No.
Q. The Inquiry has received a statement from, I think, the man who was probably your boss, Stephen Whitton, who was the head of the Border Force maritime command, who says in his statement: “Cutters are not designed or equipped to take large number of passengers.” (As read) Would you agree with that?
A. Yes, I would.
Q. Yes. And is it right that people who had been rescued often had to be held outside, as it were, not under cover, while travelling back to port?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And he also said in his statement that vessels were not designed or equipped as dedicated rescue vessels or to carry out mass rescues. Again, do you think that’s fair?
A. Yes, I think — I think that’s fair.
Q. And presumably, that was something that was obvious to you, as the Commander, from early on in your time doing work under Operation DEVERAN?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And how, in practice, did that affect your ability to deal with search and rescue?
A. I think the — the answer to that is it was extremely challenging to embark people we had rescued onto the vessel. And we developed a system where we would put a boarding ladder down and bring our RHIB alongside with a group of people and where they were capable of climbing up that ladder, we would help them up. The crew would help them on board and that seemed to be the most efficient way, in my opinion, of doing it. If someone was unable to climb that ladder, then we had the option of recovering them through the — the stern launch slipway mechanism. However, that in itself was fraught because sea conditions and you could only bring up a limited number of people. So you had to be mindful the weight restrictions involved with that.
Q. So if you — if you were in a search and rescue operation where somebody couldn’t make their way up the ladder, you were into this intrinsically more difficult and troublesome process that you have just described?
A. Yes. I think it was quite a slick operation because we did it many times. However, it — it would affect how you were rescuing people because you had to be mindful that — if you had three people that couldn’t climb, you had to think how you are going to do that.
Q. Yes. Now, some questions, please, about where you fitted into the hierarchy within Border Force. You have explained and we have discussed the fact that you were in charge, as the Commander, of a crew of law enforcement officers who were also mariners. And you tell us in your statement, and this is paragraph 8 {INQ/10136/3} that you reported directly to a senior officer at the MCC, an assistant director. I am going to show you a chart now. It’s {INQ/10688/1}. And if you could blow up the lower half, please. Sorry, it is a little — yes. Do you see — good. Do you see your name there: “Cutter Crews (Commander Kevin Toy)”?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And above you is somebody called the Head of Operations and Planning. Is that the assistant director you have mentioned?
A. Yes, sir; that would be correct.
Q. Great. And can I just ask you about the Head of Operations and Planning. While you were deployed, was that individual tasking you, or directing you?
A. So my understanding was that he would, in effect, be more focused on the law enforcement side of things.
Q. Right.
A. So that if we were in DEVERAN, that would probably be handed over to the Head of Operational Support, I suspect.
Q. I see. So he was more on the sort of search and rescue side, you think?
A. No, he was more the — sorry, the Head of Operations and Planning?
Q. Yes.
A. Was more on the law enforcement side.
Q. Yes, and the other person, more on search and rescue, do you think?
A. Possibly.
Q. Possibly. Okay. So when you, for example, did your debriefs at the end of each search and rescue operation, would the Head of Operations and Planning be somebody to whom you would report?
A. No, those, those debriefs would go to the MCC.
Q. Right.
A. However, he would be able to see them.
Q. Yes, okay. Now, keeping the chart up there, please, tomorrow we are going to hear evidence from a higher officer and then later in the week, from an immigration officer and you can see their names on the screen there. Were they roughly at the same level of seniority as you?
A. No. I would be — looking at the chart, I would be at the same level of seniority as the Senior Executive Officer.
Q. I understand. So the chart’s right, at least on this?
A. Yes.
Q. Good, but I think it is right on the night in question, that your tasking, ie the deployment to Incident Charlie, came from — I am just going to say one of these two, either Karen Whitehouse or Tom Willows and would that be normal?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you, great. Now, can I ask you, please, some questions about responsibility between the coastguard and Border Force for taskings under Operation DEVERAN at the time of the incident. When you were deployed, who held responsibility in relation to your tasking?
A. So when deployed?
Q. Yes.
A. The coastguard.
Q. Yes. But imagine a situation, for example, when you were being deployed for something which had nothing to do with search and rescue, ie law enforcement, would it then be right that responsibility or tasking would all come from Border Force?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. But if you were deployed for search and rescue, as you were on the night, then, as you say, it would be coastguard in charge?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would take your taskings from them as — as the shift proceeded?
A. If — if we were alongside, then the phonecall would come via the MCC.
Q. Yes.
A. But my understanding is that the coastguard would contact the MCC to request an asset.
Q. Request an asset. And therefore, once you were launched, you expected to get your instructions from coastguard?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.
A. Or, or via the MCC.
Q. Yes. But as it were, coastguard was running the operation?
A. Correct.
Q. Yes, and I think you explain in paragraph 29 {INQ/10136/9} of your statement that — exactly what you have just said. And I think it is also right, isn’t it, that while you were out, in other words you had begun your deployment, you could receive further tasking from coastguard to go off and look for another boat, for example?
A. Yes, that’s correct, sir.
Q. And that’s, indeed, what happened on the night in question?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, that’s the tasking. In terms of your reporting, while you were out during the shift, who did you report to?
A. So, I would report to the coastguard if I discovered a small boat, or if I located a small boat that — that — as I was tasked to. I may report to the MCC for welfare checks or to obtain a Mike number —
Q. Yes.
A. — to link the small boat I was dealing with to the MCC Border Force records.
Q. Yes. But would it be fair to say that your primary reporting when you were out was to coastguard?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, in terms of the shifts that you worked — we have again, touched on this briefly. You say in your statement at para 9 {INQ/10136/3} that they were 15-day shifts and you have confirmed to me that you and the crew would be on board, living there during that period. Between deployments, how long did you get to rest?
A. That depended on the events that we had been involved in.
Q. Yes.
A. And the need to restock equipment, take on stores, and other ancillary roles that required the boat to run.
Q. Yes. But was there, in effect, a minimum time that you had to be back in port before the next deployment?
A. I think the minimum time was around rest for the crew.
Q. Yes. Subject to that, and during the 15 days, you could be, as it were, stood up at any time to be deployed?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes, and was that done by phone to you from the MCC?
A. Yes, generally.
Q. Yes. And you explain in your statement — this is paragraph 26, if we could have that up, please {INQ/10136/9} — that when you received a tasking like that, you had to deploy within 30 minutes, is that right?
A. Yes, that is the accepted notice to deploy for a — a cutter.
Q. Yes, so all the crew on board and underway in 30 minutes?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Did you ever receive a direct tasking or deployment from coastguard while you were in port?
A. I don’t believe I did.
Q. No. Thank you. Now, when you were called and deployed, or tasked — this is paragraph 25, at the bottom of the previous page, please {INQ/10136/8} what information would you expect to receive?
A. Well, I would hope to receive a position — a time, a position, a description of what I was tasked to and anything else that may — may assist; if they had a speed or a direction, it would be helpful.
Q. So, first of all, presumably: this is the purpose of your tasking, search and rescue. Co-ordinates?
A. Yes.
Q. Description, as you say?
A. If available.
Q. Yes. Would you ever expect to be told something about the urgency of the task?
A. You might get additional information such as: they are taking water.
Q. Yes.
A. However, all — all my — all small boat incidents were considered to be requiring rescue in any case.
Q. Yes, they are considered as in distress, weren’t they?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. But can you remember examples where the call came in from MCC and the urgency of the task was stressed to you?
A. I can’t recall if this one they said that there was — they were taking water or not. I — I …
Q. We will come to that.
A. Yes.
Q. But other than this one?
A. I don’t — I don’t remember.
Q. No. What about the information you might be given to identify the boat? What would you expect to be told? Colour? Dimension?
A. It depends on each event.
Q. Yes, of course.
A. They are all different. Clearly, the more information we get at the time is going to help us.
Q. Yes.
A. A lot of these taskings are during the hours of darkness.
Q. Yes.
A. So it’s very difficult to —
Q. Yes.
A. — get that information.
Q. Yes. Did you ever find yourself wanting more information and asking for it?
A. I think I may have asked for courses and speeds, on occasional ones, but I can’t specifically say —
Q. No.
A. — that I did.
Q. And you say in your statement — and now this is 29 {INQ/10136/9} — that once you deployed and departed the port you would let MCC know and give them an estimated time of arrival at the co-ordinates?
A. Yes or — or an estimated time at a fixed point, so that they could work it from there.
Q. Yes.
A. Because it’s — you never know how you are going to make your way to that position because of the traffic in the Channel.
Q. Yes, indeed. But from that point on, as you have said, most of your communications, I think, would be with coastguard?
A. Generally.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And again, just to go back over something you said. In terms of your communications when you were deployed with Border Force, what would prompt you to get in touch with the MCC?
A. I think if — just to confirm the number of people on board. For example, on that night, I remember — I remember telling them that we had the CFI embarked, so that they knew that there was 12 people on board and not 11 as per the sip rep. The other occasions, maybe for a welfare check if I hadn’t spoken to anyone for a while or indeed, to obtain the Mike number and advise them of the number of people that we had indeed embarked.
Q. Yes. Any other sort of points which might make you think: I need to speak to MCC about this?
A. Not that I can bring to mind at the moment.
Q. No. Sir, would that be a convenient moment?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, yes. Thank you. So let’s keep it to 10 minutes. So let that’s 8 minutes past. All right. Thank you. (10.58 am) (A short break) (11.08 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Mr Phillips.
MR PHILLIPS: The next topic, Commander Toy, is recording and managing information because the inquiry is interested in the ways in which you obtained information and in the way in which you recorded it. Can we look, please, at paragraph 9 of your statement {INQ010136/3}, and it is the second sentence there on page 3. You say that during any deployment, you would record details in your daybook, including instructions received, communications with other parties, developments of note and issues encountered. Can we look, please, at your daybook, and that is {INQ002051/1}. There it is, your name, and that shows how long you were using this daybook, which looks like nearly two years, and presumably that meant that the daybook covered multiple deployments.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Yes. So if we turn over, please, to page 3 of this version {INQ002051/3}, we will see your — the relevant date, 24 November ’21, and obviously we will come back to that later in your evidence. But they are all relatively short entries, aren’t they? Is that fair?
A. Yes, they are more bullet points of information I was given at the time.
Q. Yes, yes. So they are more of a summary, aren’t they, rather than the full detail of any information you received?
A. Yes, I — I would say they are the salient points that — that —
Q. Yes.
A. — I could refer to.
Q. If you were given detail beyond that we see in these entries, where would that be recorded?
A. This would be the only record I would make.
Q. So in other words if somebody had telephoned you at 1.30, for example, and in addition to those — that information about the location of a small boat, they’ve given you the sort of things we discussed earlier, the description or who might have been in the boat or those sort of details, you may have been given them, but they weren’t recorded in your entry, which was in this very summary form.
A. No, that’s — that’s what I recorded because that was my priority, to get going to that position.
Q. Exactly. So anything else would remain in your head.
A. Yes.
Q. And on the job, as it were, in the deployment, would you share that information with other members of the crew, even if it wasn’t written down?
A. I would possibly if I was given information as to the description. For example, I notice at 2.30: “Small [boat] 40 [people on board].”
Q. Yes.
A. I would tell the — the navigator and the lookout that we are looking for a boat with about 40 people in it.
Q. Because this is important information for the operation, isn’t it? You are going to somewhere. There may be 40 people you need to embark, for example.
A. Yes.
Q. And if it was 12 as opposed to 40, that would make a big difference.
A. It could do.
Q. Now, in terms of other recordkeeping, the inquiry’s received extensive evidence about what have been called trackers for the coastguard, amongst others, and they are internal documents which were used to monitor the progress or status of the small boats and the search and rescue operations. Now, can you just confirm: you had no involvement in updating trackers, managing trackers.
A. That’s correct, sir. I had no input into that at all.
Q. Yes. And you didn’t have access to any of the trackers while you were on the cutter.
A. So technically I would have had access, because they would possibly have been e-mailed to me.
Q. Yes.
A. However, I was so busy dealing with the navigational side of the boat, the — the tactics involved and keeping an eye on the vessel and the crew that I didn’t actually look at those emails.
Q. No. The emails you have talked about, would they have been from MCC?
A. I believe so.
Q. Yes. So if there were trackers there, they would be Border Force trackers.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. But as far as you knew as you were, as you say, doing your job on the vessel, information that you reported back may well have been entered by Border Force, by coastguard on to their own trackers.
A. May well have been, yes.
Q. Yes. And equally, presumably, and again as far as you know, you may have been given information during your deployment which came from the trackers.
A. I don’t know where that information came from.
Q. No. Thank you. The information or the email you mentioned, which I think you said came from MCC, from Border Force, that had a tracker with it called the live update, which came in every hour. Do you remember that?
A. I — at the time, I wouldn’t have seen them.
Q. No. As it were, you had the opportunity, but you had many other things to do on board the vessel; is that fair?
A. They may — they may have been sent to me —
Q. Yes.
A. — but my focus was on navigating the boat to the incident I was attached to.
Q. So we can take from that, can’t we, that whatever information they contained, you weren’t using it or relying on it to do your job?
A. No.
Q. And presumably, if you felt you needed to look at it, you would have done that.
A. Yes.
Q. So next, a few questions, please, about locating and identifying small boats in the Channel, and this is really to take us back to a conversation we had right at the beginning. There are — I think it’s obvious, isn’t it — particular challenges in search and rescue operations involving small boats in the Channel in the Dover Strait?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. In paragraph 40, you set out some of them for us. That’s {INQ01036/14}. Thank you very much. But I would like, if I may — so you have got that there — to put some broader points to you and see whether you agree that these all affect search and rescue operations in the Channel. First of all, the obvious point, the vessels are usually small, which can make them difficult to locate.
A. Very difficult, sir.
Q. Quite often, they are dark in colour, which can make them difficult to see in the water.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Crossings, as you have already said, often take place at night when visibility is obviously limited.
A. Yes, it’s the darkness that is the — is the issue.
Q. Yes. And it can be cold, so thermal imaging is more difficult.
A. I am not a professional in thermal imaging, so I can’t answer that.
Q. No, okay. The boats are often overcrowded, which means that they have a low profile in the water.
A. Yes, whether they are overloaded or not, they still have a low profile.
Q. Yes, and that makes them harder to spot.
A. Correct.
Q. And they don’t ordinarily have AIS or any other radio communications.
A. No, not that I have experienced.
Q. They don’t ordinarily have identifying information, names, flags, etc.
A. No.
Q. They don’t often have GPS on board; is that fair?
A. I have never heard of them having GPS on board.
Q. No. They may have limited English or French or any other language that members of the crew speak.
A. Possibly.
Q. Yes. And presumably, those were all points, the points I have made, to you which you were well aware of and were within your direct experience in November ’21 when you were deployed on the 24th.
A. Yes.
Q. So then the question is how those challenges were managed, those very specific challenges, and can we look first at the question of locating boats? Imagine a situation, a hypothetical situation. A call comes in to you about a small boat crossing the Channel. You are tasked to respond. How do you determine where your cutter should go?
A. So for — to help us decide whether we’re going to go, we would be looking at the longitude of the — of the vessel. And if you knew it was to the west of Dover, you’d head to the west, clearly, and if it was to the east, you’d head towards the east. That would give you an idea which way you needed to go when you left Dover, if you were in Dover to start with.
Q. Yes. So if you don’t have anything in terms of specific co-ordinates, you at least have to choose a general area in the way that you have described.
A. Yes. The other option, it might be that it’s been reported by a cross-Channel ferry. So you could look on the AIS to see where that ferry was and that would give you an idea of where to head for.
Q. Yes. Now, imagine a situation where you are given co-ordinates. Do you make your way to them or do you think about the likely course of the boat during the time it’s going to take you to get there?
A. I think you would — you would aim to go towards those co-ordinates, however bearing in mind the route it may take —
Q. Yes.
A. — may or may not take.
Q. Yes, because presumably you’ve built up a certain amount of experience about how — whether their small boat was underway or whether it was stopped, how they were likely to move through the water.
A. Yes. You know, you generally know that they are going to head towards the South Downs, shall we say, Dover and that area, so you have an idea that they are heading there. But also, you’d be mindful of the — the impact that the wind and the tide may have on them if they were to stop.
Q. So you can factor all of that in as you’re making your way towards the co-ordinates.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if you get to the last known co-ordinates, the last co-ordinates that you have, and there’s nothing there, how do you then search for the boat?
A. So the first thing I would do is to report to the coastguard that we’re in that vicinity. It is very difficult to go to the exact co-ordinates. “We’re in the vicinity. There’s nothing here.” And you could make a suggestion, for example, “I am going to head towards the Sandettie Lightvessel”, and then the coastguard would know what you are intending to do and they could consider if that — they consider that to be the right action or not.
Q. So you can have a discussion about it.
A. In my experience, it’s better to do something than nothing.
Q. Yes.
A. So while they are deciding what they want you to do, you can be doing something at least to try and —
Q. You get on with it.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Now, we know in this case that between the distress calls from the boat and the Valiant reaching the last known location of Charlie, there was about a period of about two hours. And it’s obvious, isn’t it, but please confirm, that a boat can move a considerable distance in two hours?
A. Yes. Sorry, I’ve got a sore throat. The vessel could either move on its own power or if it broken down, it would drift with the wind and tide.
Q. Yes, but if it was still underway, if it was still under its own engine power, even a small boat could make a fair old —
A. It could.
Q. — amount of progress over two hours.
A. Yes, yes.
Q. So on the average deployment like this, would you make sure to ask for any updated co-ordinates as you were making your way to try and deal with the impact of the delay?
A. I think you would hope to get updated co-ordinates.
Q. But you wouldn’t proactively look for them or seek them?
A. Not necessarily, because you would be very focused on getting to where you wanted to go to.
Q. Yes. Now, if you had — again, in this hypothetical case, if you had been given any contact information for the people on the boat themselves, telephone numbers or whatever, would you ever make direct contact yourself?
A. No.
Q. No. Was that as a matter of policy or just because you never received details like that?
A. I don’t believe I ever received details like that. However, if I did, I wouldn’t want to confuse the issue because clearly the coastguard are in control of the situation.
Q. Yes. So you would expect the coastguard to be in contact with them, if anybody was.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Did you ever use live location functions or other mobile phone technology to look for or find a boat, a small boat?
A. Sorry, I don’t understand what “live location functions” are.
Q. I am very sorry that you asked me that question because I don’t think I do either, really. But what about mobile phone technology? Did you ever use that?
A. Certainly not.
Q. No. Thank you. A little more, please, about searching. When you are — you have arrived at the location or where the co-ordinates, the last known co-ordinates are, there is nothing there, so you have to search, as we were discussing earlier. How do you do that? Are you using binoculars? How does it work? Does everybody go on the side of the boat? Do certain people take up positions on the side of the boat? How does it work?
A. What we would do is we would have — excuse me — the number of people in the wheelhouse. You would have a navigator who would be focusing on the radar hopefully trying to find something on that, though that’s very unlikely.
Q. Yes.
A. A lookout, who would be — have his night vision set —
Q. Yes.
A. — so he’d be used to the ambient light. You would have an engineer. If available, he could help, and myself, we’d be looking on high alert as we’re in the area.
Q. Do you use — I think you mentioned a searchlight on the boat. Would you deploy the lights in your searches?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And are you listening as well?
A. We’d have — yes, we’d have the wheelhouse doors open, but unfortunately, the engines are more than likely to override any —
Q. Yes, hard to hear over.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Coming back to radar, I think I am right in believing that you used the radar, to the extent you could, to search for the small boats.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, there were — there are two radar screens, isn’t that right, on the vessel?
A. Two radar units.
Q. Two radar units. One, if I can put it this way — I am sure it’s not the right expression. One is normal with bright colours and the other is much, much darker for night vision. Is that fair?
A. No, I think they’d be adjusted to the — to the user —
Q. Right.
A. — for example, as the layout of the cutter would be such that the navigator would tend to sit or stand on the starboard side.
Q. Yes.
A. And he would use that radar to do his navigation and searching with — and I would have access to the one on the portside —
Q. I see.
A. — for an overview, if I needed it.
Q. Okay. So it would be — principally, the navigator would be looking, but you would have access to it as well. You were literally standing there and able to look at the other screen if you wanted to.
A. Yes.
Q. And presumably, that’s something you would be doing very regularly indeed.
A. Yes, to be — I would tend to leave the navigator —
Q. Right.
A. — to doing the searching and I would have the overview, standing back and looking at all the other factors, risk of collision —
Q. Yes.
A. — that sort of thing as well.
Q. We will look together in a moment at some examples of how the radar looked, but can you help with this general question? How difficult is it to see a small boat on a radar screen?
A. Extremely difficult.
Q. Yes. Can you explain why?
A. Excuse me. All the factors that we have already spoken about; the fact that they’re — they don’t have a radar reflector.
Q. Yes.
A. They are low in the water. Sea conditions may have an impact on that. The fact that they are small in any case.
Q. Yes.
A. If they are stopped, there’s no — no wash that we might even pick up.
Q. And turning away from radar, of course, the other thing we haven’t yet touched on in terms of the challenges in small boat search and rescue is that all of this is taking place in what you describe in your statement as the busiest shipping lane in the world —
A. That’s correct.
Q. — with very high levels of traffic.
A. Yes.
Q. I would like to illustrate that, please, to show you an extract from the AIS on the night. This is {INQ001385/1}. We will just play it for a short while and see — at least I hope it is. Maybe it is the native. There it is.
A. Okay.
Q. Can we start, please. So here from 2 o’clock, as you see, and can you describe for us what we are looking at?
A. Yes, okay. So this is a picture of the Dover Straits and the red line that goes — red or orange line that goes up the middle would be called the median line, so it would go close to the MPC buoy and down to the Bouee Colbart Nord. So that would be the median line. So to the top of that, to the north, if you like, it would be the UK search and rescue zone and to the — to the bottom of that to the south would be the French rescue zone. If you look at all the vessels to the north of that line, they are heading at what a mariner would describe as the south-westbound lane of the traffic separation scheme and the ones to the bottom of that would be heading in the north-eastbound lane of the traffic separation scheme and —
Q. On the French side in particular, as we are looking at it now, we can see just how closely packed the vessels are —
A. Yes, yes.
Q. — because it shows that — the brighter line shows the vessel and then — with the name and then the stream, as it were, is their direction.
A. Yes. Well, the stream behind, if we call it, is the trail and if you notice some of them have got green lines sticking out from them, that is their — their intended track, if you like —
Q. Yes.
A. — where they will be at a certain time.
Q. And, again, just while we are looking here, we can see in the middle of the screen —
A. Excuse me.
Q. — it is in red at the bottom, the sandbank, the Sandettie Lightvessel.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see “Sandettie LV”?
A. Yes.
Q. And this, I assume, is what you are dealing with in order to pick your way from Dover on the left-hand side across towards the sandbank to go about this particular deployment on 24 November.
A. Yes, that’s correct. Just to — if I may explain, sir.
Q. Yes, please.
A. The first issue you have is leaving Dover and dealing with the cross-Channel ferries that are leaving and entering Dover, so you need to — to clear that. And then I think you can see the Valiant moving along now.
Q. Yes, can you see you have started out now, 2.44?
A. Yes. So the next thing is — is the ships that are coming down in the south-westbound lane.
Q. Yes.
A. Now, clearly I want to get to the Sandettie Lightvessel —
Q. Yes.
A. — and I need to wait for these people — well, not wait, but I need to adjust — adjust my course or my track so that I can fall behind them, because what I don’t want to do is cross in front of those people and cause a navigational issue or a collision —
Q. Right.
A. — with that traffic. So you can see us — see my vessel now heading up slightly more to the north so that we can tuck in behind them.
Q. Yes.
A. So it’s not a matter of going directly from Dover to the Sandettie Lightvessel. We have to take whatever track is possible in, taking into account the traffic as well.
Q. Great. Thank you. Can we have that taken off the screen, please? Thank you very much. We agreed a little while ago how difficult it was to see small boats with radar, and obviously you had training and the relevant people and the crew had training on the use of radar. You have explained that. But was there any specific training directed to this challenge, the challenge of using radar to detect small boats?
A. The only thing that I can remember would be a traditional challenge of finding small boats that may be running commodity across the Channel before we started into the SAR type of thing.
Q. This was in the smuggling —
A. In the smuggler zone.
Q. Yes.
A. The only difference with them, they — they would be possibly larger boats going faster, therefore more wash, so they would be a little easier to find. However, they were still very difficult to locate.
Q. Yes. But presumably that’s right, isn’t it; that they would generally have been a bit bigger and with fewer people on them, all of the things we talked about before, but still difficult?
A. Oh, very difficult.
Q. Yes. Then, if I may, the question about distinguishing between numbers of small boats, because, as we know, you were not just dealing with one small boat on night in question, but a number of them, and presumably that was a regular occurrence. You were aware that there were a number of small boats trying to make their way across.
A. Yes, in my — my experience was that if you’re called out for one, invariably there are going to be more and possibly ones that have not been reported. So there was always that risk that there would be an unidentified small boat —
Q. Yes.
A. — en route.
Q. So when you were tasked to respond to one boat, you might encounter another, which is exactly what happened on the night.
A. More than likely.
Q. Yes. Now, that raises the question how could you tell whether the boat you found was the one you had been tasked to find?
A. I couldn’t.
Q. No.
A. No, I couldn’t.
Q. And we have talked about this before, but I think you said you would be — you would expect on being tasked to be told — well, you would hope to be told its colour, perhaps its size maybe.
A. (Nods).
Q. Would you often be told the number of people on board?
A. You would get an estimate.
Q. Yes.
A. However, I can recall one incident where I was told there were 12 people on board and there turned out to be in the region of 50.
Q. So did that make you take what you were told about things like that with a bit of a pinch of salt?
A. I wouldn’t say a pinch of salt. What I would say is you wouldn’t be surprised if the numbers were inaccurate or you didn’t have a colour, for example.
Q. Yes, but presumably in those situations, if you had a location, whether specific or general, you just made your way and then found what you did.
A. Correct.
Q. Yes. Do you remember being told in these tasking calls about, for example, whether there were women or — and children on board?
A. I can — I can recall on some occasions being told.
Q. Yes.
A. How that information was obtained, I don’t know.
Q. No. But can you remember occasions where you were told, for example, that the boat or the people in the boat had been making calls to the emergency services?
A. Yes. Well, only once — well, it’s a difficult question to answer, that. I think possibly I would be advised that they had been making calls, but I wouldn’t know the detail of the call.
Q. No, and that isn’t something you would necessarily make a note of in your daybook.
A. Not necessarily, no.
Q. No. And what about the boat itself and, for example, whether it was underway or stopped? Is that information you would expect to be given?
A. If available.
Q. Yes. And what about more important information such as whether it was taking on water or swamped or submerged? Would you expect to receive information like that?
A. You could do. However, most of the vessels that we encountered had taken on water to some extent.
Q. Yes. Well, we will come back to that. In terms of the information you were given when you were tasked, it sounds as though you got used to proceeding with pretty much the bare minimum. In other words, sometimes you got some information about the occupants, but the thing you were really interested in was there was a small boat and the last known co-ordinates were X; is that fair?
A. Yes, I think that’s the primary information that you would want.
Q. Yes. And, again, can you ever remember asking for more; in other words, asking MCC or whoever was tasking you, “Well, I need a bit more help with this one”?
A. I probably did. I probably asked if a course and speed was available.
Q. So go back to the hypothetical situation. You have been deployed. You find a small boat. What steps — you have talked about this already, but just to be clear, what steps could you take, did you take, to ascertain which incident the boat was linked to?
A. I didn’t. I just reported I had a small boat in this position. It’s either stopped or making way. I am going to engage it, make sure it’s reported to the coastguard, and then the next thing would be to get the M number and to tell them how many people there were on board and what the breakdown would be.
Q. Yes. So in terms of linking boats to incidents, that was somebody else’s job.
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Coastguard’s.
A. Yes.
Q. And were you ever asked by coastguard to ask questions of people on board the boats to help them to do that task?
A. Yes, I believe I was.
Q. I think there was an example in this case.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And when you are doing that, is language a barrier to communication with people on board the boats?
A. Well, to a certain extent, yes. However, for whatever reason, it — some people would go into this rescue mode where they’d shut down and just they rescue their — go quiet or they just wouldn’t want to answer the questions, or some did.
Q. Yes. But, I mean, I imagine there were many cases when you found people who were traumatised, who were cold, anxious. Presumably that makes the sort of communication we have been talking about rather difficult.
A. I guess it does.
Q. Yes. And how would you deal with that? What steps would you take to mitigate that problem?
A. You — verbal — verbal and using sign — signing, if you like, for a telephone. “Have you made a telephone call?”
Q. Yes.
A. But that would be my deck team. I wouldn’t be doing that.
Q. No. But in terms of your understanding of the position as their commander, can we have 39 on the screen, please, of the statement, 101 — sorry {INQ010136/14}. It is the last sentence there, isn’t it? Do you see you say there that: “Every interaction which I saw between my officers and the migrants was one in which the migrants were treated with nothing but respect, dignity and kindness.” And I imagine that that was the message from the top, from you.
A. Oh, without doubt, yes.
Q. That they were required to behave professionally despite the very difficult conditions.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, at this point, I am going to come back, if I may, to the two sides of your role, to law enforcement as opposed to or alongside search and rescue, because when you are dealing with — you are engaging with the people on the boats, how do you balance those things? What is the priority at that point? Is it law enforcement or is it search and rescue?
A. The priority is search and rescue.
Q. So any work to do with investigations or evidence, etc, is secondary.
A. Yes.
Q. And in the case that we are talking about, 24 November, would that principally have been the role of the CFI?
A. That person was there to capture any photographic or video evidence —
Q. Right.
A. — not to engage with the people that were rescued directly.
Q. Right. But so far as you and the remainder of the crew with your law enforcement role was concerned, that was secondary to the search and rescue.
A. Oh, yes, without a doubt.
Q. Thank you. On the question of the identification of the small boats — and, again, we see examples of this on the night in your daybook — that presumably was information that you would communicate back to coastguard or, indeed, coastguard would ask you about as the deployment proceeded; is that correct?
A. Sorry, could you repeat?
Q. The information about the boat, the identification, the sort of things we discussed earlier, is that information that you would report back to coastguard?
A. Yes.
Q. And there were occasions no doubt where you were asked specific questions about it by coastguard.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Would you ever report that sort of information to MCC, to Border Force?
A. No, I don’t believe I would.
Q. Thank you. Can we now look please at the standard operating procedure for Operation DEVERAN, which we talked about early on and here we are back with it. It’s {INQ003920/1}, please. That’s the beginning of the document, but what I would like to do, please, is to turn on to page 14 {INQ003920/14}. I should say there is a great deal of detailed information about it, about the operation leading up to this point, but if we could go to 14, 12.32 I am looking at. There is a reference there to the use of a tally sheet to, I think, record the accurate breakdown — if we turn over the page, please {INQ003920/15} of the migrants embarked, women, children, etc. Were those sheets that you completed as a matter of course?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And was that your responsibility?
A. No, that — that would be the person in charge on deck.
Q. Okay, thank you. And presumably, therefore, one would have been completed for this deployment, the one we are concerned about, 24 November.
A. Yes, for the three events.
Q. Yes. And in terms of what happened to the tally sheets, how they were used, do you know: were they provided to MCC?
A. No, they were not. They were — they would go with the group of people from the small boat to the tug haven.
Q. Right, thank you. Were they provided or was the information on them provided to coastguard that you can recall?
A. So I would use that sheet to check the number that the deck team had told me about because clearly they’re dealing with multiple functions. So they would hand the sheet to me, I would check it and then I would report that to the coastguard or the MCC.
Q. So you would use the tally sheet as the basis of your report.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes, I see. Thank you. Can you just turn on to — yes, we have got it on the screen, protective searching. This talks about a standard procedure for searching of migrants {INQ003920/15}. And I think you tell us in paragraph — do you see there: “ALL migrants to undergo a Protective Search …” Etc, those provisions to 12.37, referring to weapons or other intelligence, etc. Thank you. If we could have that taken down, please. Could we now look at paragraph 37 of your statement {INQ010136/13}, because there you confirm that you do not recall ever finding a knife or other weapon on a migrant.
A. No, none was ever reported to me.
Q. So whatever those searches yielded, they didn’t yield knives or other weapons.
A. Not in my experience.
Q. Thank you. Now, turning to the background to the deployment on 24 November, I want to ask you some questions, please, about the information you were given by Border Force or others before you were deployed. And we know, first of all, that Border Force produced a RAG, R-A-G, rating assessing weather conditions and the likelihood of crossings. Was that actually something that you as commander produced yourself or did that come to you?
A. In the early stages, the commander of the cutter in Op DEVERAN was required to produce that. However, it then developed to the Met Office doing it outwith the operation.
Q. So it was one less task for you anyway.
A. Well, not only that, it was — it was more subjective.
Q. Yes. And you say — and this is now 57 of the statement, please, page 20 {INQ010136/20}, the first two sentences — that you would have seen the weather forecast produced by the Met Office. So obviously by this stage, November ’21, you were on the second system, as it were, and they were producing it.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you. And you also refer there to seeing the Joint Maritime Security Centre situational and operational awareness briefs. But the conclusion you have there at the end of the paragraph, if we could turn over the page, please {INQ010136/21}, do you see the very last sentence, Commander Toy —
A. Mm-hm.
Q. — that nothing you were told in this information suggested that the day was going to be out of the ordinary?
A. No, not to what we were used to —
Q. Yes.
A. — on an amber day or whatever rating it was.
Q. So far as the numbers of small boat crossings are concerned, we have, as I said to you earlier, seen the figures for the whole of ’21 and before and it was obvious, wasn’t it, by this point in November, 24 November, that November ’21 was a very busy month?
A. I suppose so, yes.
Q. Do you not remember that?
A. It was busy, yes.
Q. I mean, you have described the conditions to us and I think they were the conditions that pertained in November ’21, weren’t they?
A. Yes, I agree with that.
Q. Yes. You have mentioned earlier the nature of the day, green, amber, red, etc, signifying the likelihood of crossings. We know that this one, the 24th, was actually a red day, but did that have any impact on the nature of your preparation?
A. No, we — we expected to be called. We were primary, so I reported that I’ll remain in Dover ready to respond. We had already had the CFI down, so they were — they knew where to come, and we were ready to respond.
Q. Yes. So you didn’t do anything differently. It’s just the forecast was telling you it was more likely on a red day that you would have crossings than on green or amber.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in terms of assets available, we know that Border Force had a range of assets available for search and rescue responses in November ’21 and that there were others provided by independent contractors, 2Excel, Bristow, etc. So could I ask you please to look at {INQ000566/1}. This is an email on the day before at 5.12 in the afternoon on 23 November. Do you see? And it sets out the assets available that night. Now, would you receive an email like this before deployment?
A. Yes, I would have seen this —
Q. Yes.
A. — or a similar form.
Q. Yes. So you would expect, in this way, to know what other assets, other than the Valiant, were available for deployment on the particular night.
A. Yes, that’s correct. I’d just like to point out that’s an amber day planning.
Q. Yes, the 23rd was amber, I think it’s right, and the 24th was red.
A. Okay.
Q. Yes. Can I ask this about the information you were given before deploying? Were you told before you deployed which other assets were being deployed alongside you?
A. No.
Q. Did you need to be aware of that?
A. Are you — are you talking about aerial assets?
Q. Could be any assets, but yes, let’s take aerial.
A. No, I — it would have been beneficial to know if there was an aircraft, but I didn’t.
Q. Yes. Well, we will talk about air cover in a moment, because you deal with that in your statements, as you remember. But presumably, sticking with air, if there was going to be top cover, if there was going to be an aerial asset, you would want to know that.
A. I assumed there was.
Q. Yes, and it turned out there wasn’t.
A. Correct.
Q. Yes. But equally, if you were made aware that there wasn’t air cover, if you had been made aware of that before you started, would you have expressed concern about it, wanted something to be done about it?
A. It’s — at — when I went to get some rest, there was air — there was going to be air cover, and when I was deployed, I deployed.
Q. Yes.
A. So —
Q. So you were just focusing on your part of the job.
A. Correct, yes.
Q. And in your statement, you explain what happened about the air cover, and this is 58 {INQ010136/21} — if we could have the email down, thank you very much — that you weren’t aware and you don’t know whether you got an email confirming that there wasn’t going to be any cover, but you wouldn’t have seen it anyway because, as you say, you were resting.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And in terms of that, presumably what that means is that when the call to deploy comes through — in this case we know it was at 1.30 and you think you were probably asleep — you have to, at that point, get hold of the background information or all of the points we have been talking about, as it were, once you are awake and getting ready to deploy in 30 minutes.
A. Well, my focus was to get — get the vessel underway and going towards the co-ordinates I had been given.
Q. Okay. Now, in this same paragraph, you say, do you see, a little bit later on the question of air cover: “Either way, it would not have affected the deployment of [the] Valiant. We simply deployed if we were ordered to do so by the MCC.” And that’s very much what you have just said to me, but presumably the absence of a recognised maritime picture which came with the absence of air cover did actually have an impact on how you were able to do your job.
A. It had an impact on the overall maritime picture —
Q. Yes.
A. — but it didn’t affect how I was able to do my job.
Q. No, but it meant there was nobody else out there able to point you in the right direction —
A. That’s correct.
Q. — putting it simply.
A. Yes.
Q. So as you were deploying and making your way, and we know it took a fair old time to get there, there was nobody up there with an eye on the boat from the air giving you updated co-ordinates, for example.
A. Or other traffic, no.
Q. No, exactly. So it made it more difficult, this business of locating the boats, didn’t it?
A. Well, it didn’t help.
MR PHILLIPS: No. We will come back to that. Sir, would this be a good moment?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, right. So what’s that? 12.07. Thank you. (11.57 am) (A short break) (12.07 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Mr Phillips.
MR PHILLIPS: Commander Toy, I am about to ask you some questions about the deployment on the night. But before I do, can we stand back a bit and can I ask you some questions about your small boat rescue experience up to that point. It may be you can’t help us, but can you give an estimate, at least, of how many small boat rescues you had taken part in by the time you were tasked on the early hours of 24 November?
A. That’s very difficult to answer that.
Q. It is, I’m afraid.
A. Well, I would say over — over 50 maybe.
Q. Yes.
A. Possibly more. I — I don’t — I don’t know.
Q. And how many times — again, it’s very difficult I’m afraid, but do your best — had you been tasked to Operation DEVERAN? Because it’s not necessarily the same thing, is it?
A. No, I get that. Possibly eight times in two month periods, possibly.
Q. All right. That’s for the whole of the time that you were working on Operation DEVERAN, between then and November 21?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Thank you. So, turning to the night itself, can we start by looking at your daybook again, please. This is {INQ002051/3}. So the first entry there, we can see the tasking to deploy at 1.30 and there are co-ordinates given. It may be helpful if you can talk us through what you have written there.
A. Yes, I can talk you through that.
Q. Thank you.
A. So, obviously the date and the time: Call X MCC, deploy to event, latitude/longitude, call CFI, call crew, plot and prepare to deploy.
Q. Thank you. And in your — if we can take that down briefly, please — in your statement, paragraph 62 {INQ010136/22} you say, in the fourth line: “I was likely asleep …” We have talked about this before: “I was likely asleep when I received the call …” Do you see the sentence just above that though? You say: “I understand that call to have taken place with [Border Force] higher officer Karen Whitehouse.” I mean, do you actually remember that call now, the call at 1.30?
A. No, I don’t recall it now.
Q. No.
A. No.
Q. And can you be sure now that the call came in from Karen Whitehouse, for example?
A. I can only assume it came from the MCC.
Q. Yes. And then if we go back to your daybook, please, {INQ002051/3}, other than what’s written in the daybook, do you have any independent recollection of what you were told in that call?
A. No.
Q. No. So you don’t know whether you were told about the number of people on the boat, the status of the boat, anything like that?
A. No, I don’t — I don’t remember because you get so many calls that you can get confused as to which one it refers to.
Q. Yes. Can you remember, from what’s written down there, what you were told about your tasking?
A. No.
Q. So what do you think you were being deployed to do?
A. To go and locate a vessel in that position —
Q. Right.
A. — and report and take action as necessary.
Q. And it certainly looks, from what you have recorded, that you didn’t feel it right to record anything specifically about the urgency or anything else of the situation with this boat?
A. No, because my priority is to get — get underway and once we are clear and we were en route, we can then get the finite detail later on.
Q. Yes. I assume when — or maybe you realised when you were given the co-ordinates, that the boat was not yet in UK waters?
A. I don’t — I don’t remember.
Q. No. But would it have made any difference to your response anyway?
A. No.
Q. No. You were given the co-ordinates and your job, as you saw it, was to head in that direction?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Yes. Can we just have a quick look at your — at the transcript of your May interview and again, I don’t know if you remember, that was in April 22. This is {INQ008330/5}, and do you see at the bottom of the page there is a large block of text which is you speaking; you are “T”.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And about five or six lines down, you say — seven lines down: “So the initial position that I got at about let’s have a look 01.30 was it was in French waters sort of about I would say — haven’t got any scale on here. I would say about just under 5 miles south. No 4 miles south of the Sandettie Lightvessel. So in the French search and rescue zone.” So certainly, it looks as though much nearer to the event, only five months after, you had a clear sense that the co-ordinates put it still in French water?
A. Yes, probably the advantage I have with when I made that statement was that I had a — probably had a chart to refer to the position so that I could actually plot and see where it was. Whereas now, I — I don’t.
Q. No, exactly. But the point you make there, of course, in the next sentence is important. Can I just read it: “However, having been deployed to a few of these things quite rightly they asked us to go at 01.30 because by the time we get into location it’s likely that the vessel will in fact be in the UK search and rescue zone.” And that obviously reflected your experience?
A. Yes.
Q. Because, as we were discussing before, the boats are moving and the chances are — they are moving towards the UK, that’s the point, and therefore it’s likely that the vessel would have gone over the line by the time you get there?
A. Yes, sir. The sooner we can get moving, the sooner we can get to the position when we get there.
Q. Yes. But that — that goes to the point that we were discussing earlier, it doesn’t really make any difference, as far as you are concerned, whether it was in French waters or not. You were given the co-ordinates and you just had to get out and find it?
A. Yes.
Q. Expecting, as you said here, that if it was, it would be in English waters by the time you got there?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Yes. Thank you. Now, the question of response times for cutters including the Valiant and obviously, in particular on the night in question, as we have discussed, you get the call at 01.30 and you have half an hour, 30 minutes, to deploy and what do you then do? What are the steps you take once you have been given a tasking like this?
A. So, the first thing I do is to alert the crew.
Q. Yes.
A. Make sure they are all up and about, tell them we are going to proceed. I would then go into the wheelhouse, plot up the position, a lot of — because we knew we were likely to get called, a lot of the — the — sort of — not mundane, but the more business as usual preparations would have been made. It would simply be a matter of the crew, or the engineers really, starting the — warming the engines through, starting them up, doing their initial checks. No point leaving the berth if the steering’s not working, or the engines aren’t responding — excuse me. The rest of the crew would be making the decks more secure. There would be certain things that we would want to remove that could be weaponised, if you like. And those sort of things, it just takes time to — to get moving.
Q. Yes. Now if we could go back, please, to the daybook, thank you very much, we will see at 01.50 {INQ002051/3} it says — I think it says that the CFI was embarked. Can you just — no reflection on your handwriting, but can you just read the last sentence there, after “CFI”, what does it say?
A. “SME” —
Q. Yes.
A. — which is my shorthand for start main engines.
Q. Yes.
A. “Prep to sail, AIS on”.
Q. Right. So just talking about the CFI, therefore, embarking at 01.50, the rest of the crew and you were already on board the boat?
A. That’s correct.
Q. So did you have to wait for him?
A. Not really. By the time we were ready to — to go, he was there.
Q. Based on your experience, if he hadn’t — if you hadn’t had to wait for him, would you have left earlier?
A. Probably not.
Q. Probably not.
A. No, because we weren’t — we only just started the engines at ten to.
Q. Yes. Well, presumably, you started the engines once he got on board?
A. No, no, we didn’t wait for him. The engines would probably be — it just happens that I made a note and everything was in place.
Q. Okay, and what does it say at 2 o’clock?
A. “Slip and proceed”.
Q. So that was you underway?
A. That’s us letting go of the quay and getting crew member back on board and proceeding.
Q. So that’s literally half an hour from the tasking at 01.30?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. But at that stage, you actually hadn’t left Dover, had you?
A. No, no. No.
Q. No. And it looks as though you didn’t leave Dover until 02.22. “Clear Dover”, is that right? Is that what it says?
A. Yes, that is what it says. “Clear Dover, ETA MPC”, which is a buoy one hour.
Q. Yes. So by the time you clear the port, 52 minutes have elapsed since the tasking?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were estimating an hour further to the MPC buoy, is that right?
A. That’s what I have written there, yes.
Q. Now that wasn’t the — wasn’t the location you were given. Why were you doing your time estimate by relation to that?
A. It was just something that I recorded to. If anyone asked me what time I would get there, I could say: well, MPC about an hour and a little bit more.
Q. Yes, and therefore, more than that to get to the locations you have been — the co-ordinates you have been given?
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. Was it clear to you, do you remember, how much longer it would take to get from the MPC buoy to those co-ordinates?
A. No, because as I stated earlier — excuse me — it’s not a case of going from Dover to those co-ordinates and an ETA is what it is, an estimate.
Q. Yes.
A. So until I’ve got the full picture of the navigational situation, I don’t know what route is the best route to take and indeed, the safest route to take, to get to that position. So I am just trying to figure out timings in my — in my mind as to — should something else come in —
Q. Yes.
A. — how long would it take you to get here.
Q. But assume for the moment that the MPC buoy which you mention in that entry at 02.22 was reasonably close to the co-ordinates you had been given, what you are talking about there as you leave Dover is, in all, an hour and 50 minutes to get to the place you were aiming for. Now, imagine a situation with distress calls coming in from a small boat, people who say they are in need of urgent help, that’s a long time, isn’t it?
A. It is.
Q. Is it too long for a search and rescue operation?
A. I think the thing is I can only go as fast as I possibly can.
Q. Yes. Well, I totally understand that and you are doing what you can with the resources you have available. But based on your experience, that’s a very long time for people who are in distress on a small boat, isn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Now, can we move on, still in the daybook, to 02.30. And again, if you don’t mind, just — I think I know what it says, but can you just tell us?
A. So, 02.30 “From Dover coastguard, small 40 POB [persons on board], position”.
Q. Yes.
A. “Sandettie Lightvessel, bearing 244 by 1.8, taking water”.
Q. “Taking water”. Great, thank you. So it looks then as though you got that information from the Dover coastguard, as you say. And so by that time, 02.30, you knew that the boat was taking water. Did that change your assessment of the urgency, or your response to this incident?
A. No, because I — I needed to get — get there as soon as I could in any case.
Q. Yes, and so can I take it from that, that you were already going at what you describe in your statement as “best speed”?
A. Safe speed.
Q. Safe speed, thank you. But you know, even then, that you are about an hour away. Do you remember letting coastguard know, at that point, that it would take you an hour to get — roughly an hour to get to the co-ordinates?
A. I believe, at some point I did. But, I don’t see it referenced here.
Q. No, no. Okay.
A. In any case — sorry, in any case, they would have had an overview of me on the radar and the AIS.
Q. Yes, well they could see where you were, but there wasn’t any air cover, so they couldn’t see where the boat was, could they?
A. No, but they knew where the Sandettie Lightvessel is.
Q. Yes, but as we have agreed, the likelihood is that in the hour — or two hours, in fact, between those co-ordinates at 01.30, the boat would have moved?
A. It could well have done.
Q. And might have moved a fair old distance?
A. It could have done.
Q. Yes. Now, just on this question of taking water, which as you say is something that you think you were told by the Dover coastguard at 02.30, can we look, please, in your statement at paragraph 66, {INQ10136/23}. Thank you. Do you see the fourth line, you set out the entry we have just been looking at.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And there, you say: “‘Taking water’ is serious, but does not necessarily mean that a given vessel is sinking.” And you explain why: common for them to take on water, they were wholly unsuitable for the crossings and particularly, had a very shallow freeboard. It may have been a common occurrence, but it doesn’t necessarily mean it was safe, does it, in crafts like this?
A. No, that’s why all vessels are considered to be in distress.
Q. Exactly. Because if a vessel of this very rudimentary and, frankly unseaworthy, kind is starting to take on water, things might, quite suddenly, go very badly wrong?
A. Yes.
Q. And you must have had experience of that?
A. I have.
Q. Yes. And you also knew, of course, that when people enter the water in November, in the Channel, the effects of cold water on them can be very serious and very quick?
A. Yes, sir, I am aware of that.
Q. Yes, and therefore, presumably, that for a primary responder to a boat taking on water, a further response time from this point of over an hour might mean the difference between life and death for the people on board?
A. It could well do.
Q. Yes. Can we go back to the daybook, please. Thank you {INQ002051/3}. At 02.40 you asked for and were granted permission to contravene the traffic rules, if I can put it that way; is that what it says?
A. Yes. Excuse me. Permission to proceed contrary to Rule 10 of the International Collision Regulations.
Q. Right. I would like to show that on the video, please. Can we have {INQ001384/1}. Now, we can see the time going quickly on the left and that must be the time you were leaving Dover. We can see the little box, Valiant.
A. Yes.
Q. 02.25, you are well out. And we will just have to be a little bit patient, we are just going very quickly. So we will see, I think, at 02.40, as you say, you effectively crossing the line. So you have asked for permission and in you go.
A. So if I can give you some narratives.
Q. Please, please.
A. I might have asked for permission there with the hope that if I could cross sooner, I would. However, it then became apparent that these three vessels here —
Q. Exactly.
A. — the Fehn Companion, the Excelsus and the Sixtine were blocking my direct — you can see the MPC buoy to the south and then you can see, I have swung around now towards the Sandettie Lightvessel.
Q. Yes, the MPC buoy there, the bottom centre really of the —
A. Yes.
Q. — screen, as we are looking at it, yes. So if we just keep the video going so we can see where you end up at 03.27, which is the next key moment. (Pause) Now, we are — you are moving towards the Sandettie Lightvessel which we can see, the red one. (Pause) And there we are. If we can stop it there, please. Because you, again, tell us in your statement and you record in your daybook that that, at 03.27, is when you were, and I quote: “In vicinity of last known position ‘C’.” So Incident Charlie?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you very much. Could we take that down, please, and have up {INQ005568/1} which is a radar screen, I think — I hope and again, so that we all know what we are talking about, this is, in fact, from 03.27, the timing is an hour on, but — so French time, as it were — and can you help us to see, if you can make more sense of it than I can, where you are — the Valiant is? Is it in the purple square? I think it is.
A. No, the purple square is referring to — if you can zoom out again please, sorry. The purple square is the target — you see the Sandettie Lightvessel up in the top right-hand corner?
Q. Yes.
A. So that is the Sandettie Lightvessel. Where — the Valiant is the centre of the screen where you have got the sort of small arrow with — an arrow — or a line with two arrowheads on it.
Q. Yes, exactly.
A. So that’s the — that’s us, yes.
Q. Good, okay. Thank you. We can take that down, please. Anyway, the net result of all these timings is that from the tasking to reaching the area of the co-ordinates, it was about two hours.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And again, in your experience of search and rescue of this kind, for small boats, was that a usual arrival time from port to last known co-ordinates?
A. I think it’s very difficult to — to set that sort of time because there are many factors that need to be taken into consideration.
Q. Yes.
A. The main ones for me are the fact that small boats are not visible on radar, or by your eye, until a very short distance away. I was concerned that — my experience shows that if one boat’s out there, there’s going to be others out there. So I didn’t want to run anybody over. I didn’t want the wash of my boat to swamp any boats that we hadn’t located. I also had crew on board that would be doing various tasks to prepare for a rescue and if I had to do an emergency stop without announcing it, I could injure one of those. So there’s always factors that have to be taken into consideration. Traffic, again, I mean, I could have taken — if there wasn’t that traffic in the Southwest bank lane, I could have probably taken a — a more direct route, but unfortunately, I couldn’t.
Q. No. Well, all of those factors which you have fairly set out, explain why you went at the speed you did and how you had to make your way. We have seen that very graphically on the radar. But, the fact is that it took two hours from tasking to get to the co-ordinates you had been given. And given what I have told you, or posited, the suggestion that there was calls, urgent calls, people in distress, taking on water, that’s a very long time isn’t it?
A. It is.
Q. Yes. Can I ask you a separate question related. Do you — or did you, when you were doing this work, have in your mind an average time — I appreciate you may say you can’t do that — but an average time to get you to the median line?
A. Again, it’s very difficult.
Q. It all depends?
A. It depends on traffic, visibility. You know, if you are in thick fog, you won’t be going anywhere near that speed.
Q. What would you normally expect, can I ask you that?
A. It’s difficult to tell.
Q. Would there be a range, between X and Y?
A. No, not really. I — it’s very, very difficult to explain. Sea conditions. There’s so many factors, it’s just very difficult.
Q. Okay. Commander Toy, I want to ask you some questions now about the Mayday Relay and we talked, right at the outset, about your training on and understanding of your obligations as a mariner under SOLAS. So taking, again, a general question, a hypothetical, if you hear a Mayday Relay call while you are deployed, what do you have to do?
A. Respond.
Q. Which means?
A. Record it.
Q. Yes.
A. Respond to the co-ordinating authority to tell them that you are available.
Q. Yes.
A. And proceed, if — if you possibly can.
Q. Yes. And at this time, November 2021, how were such relays broadcast? Was it on VHF?
A. I believe it was.
Q. Yes. And if a broadcast — a Mayday was broadcast in that way, would it have been audible on the Valiant?
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. You say possibly?
A. Yes, I — I could have been involved in other communications —
Q. Yes.
A. — so I might have missed it.
Q. You might have missed it, but would somebody have picked it up?
A. Possibly.
Q. Because otherwise the system doesn’t really work, does it? If you have obligations to respond, but it’s, as it were, a matter of chance whether you hear it, the system’s not working, is it?
A. No.
Q. So was that a problem on this occasion, do you think?
A. I don’t think it was because we were already tasked to —
Q. Yes.
A. — an event.
Q. But as far as you knew at 01.30, you weren’t responding to a Mayday?
A. Well, every tasking we had was from a vessel, a small boat and it was acted as in distress.
Q. Yes, but — as you have pointed out, quite right, but we know that there was, in fact, a Mayday issued for this incident, don’t we?
A. Mmm.
Q. Had you, by November 21, when this — when you were deployed on the 24th, had you come across before a Mayday call being issued for a small boat?
A. No.
Q. No. So it was very unusual in your experience?
A. I had never experienced it.
Q. It was unique?
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. Yes. So if you didn’t hear the Mayday when you were on the Valiant, presumably you would expect whoever did, whichever member of the crew did hear it, to tell you, because you would have to respond accordingly?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, when you receive a Mayday like this, are you under an obligation to respond to the issuing authority?
A. Yes.
Q. To say whether or not you are on your way, or you are able to help?
A. Mmm.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And I am right, aren’t I, in thinking that any vessel in the Channel that night that heard the Mayday Relay should have responded to it?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Yes, thank you. In responding to a Mayday Relay, is it possible to ask for further information from the co-ordinating authority?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. Yes. Have you done that yourself?
A. Well, I believe I did on this instance when I clarified — I heard something.
Q. Yes.
A. I heard a position, but I can’t remember hearing the words “Mayday Relay”.
Q. Okay.
A. So it may be that I was on a telephone or something and I heard something and I — I contacted the coastguard to confirm that I was responding to that.
Q. Right.
A. So in my mind, I was responding to that event.
Q. Okay. So what I think you are saying is that you don’t think you heard it but you got the information by chasing it up, as it were, or following up?
A. Yes.
Q. With the coastguard?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. Let’s have a look at the daybook, if we may, please. And that’s {INQ002051/3}. There it is. Again, we are on page 3 again. We can see the entry which you read out for us at 02.30 from Dover Coastguard, the small boat, 40 passengers on board and then the co-ordinates, as you said.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And then the words at the end which are taking —
A. “Taking water”.
Q. “Taking water”. That was, in substance, the Mayday message that night, wasn’t it?
A. I believe so.
Q. Yes. And you can see in the next entry you refer to your tasking as “Mayday”?
A. Yes.
Q. “Advise proceeding” I think — again, tell me if I am getting the handwriting wrong — “Advise proceeding to Mayday at 02.30”?
A. Yes.
Q. So you are referring there, aren’t you, to the Mayday which you have recorded at 02.30?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.
A. Just to clarify that.
Q. Yes, sorry.
A. I — I made a — I made contact — I can’t remember whether it was telephone or on the radio — because I was concerned that there were two incidents ongoing here and I wanted to clarify that the original tasking I had was indeed the one that they were talking to that I recorded at 02.30 and they clarified that with me.
Q. That it was the same incident?
A. Yes.
Q. In other words, that the one you had been deployed to at 01.30?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you very much. Okay. I mean, there is, I think, a little uncertainty about this in your recollection. If we can go back to your statement, at 67 {INQ010136/23}, just to remind you of what you said there. At the bottom of the page, you see: “My daybook entry references that I was ‘proceeding to mayday’, however I do not recall receiving a mayday in relation to my tasking, nor a PAN-PAN [the other type of signal]. I may simply have used the terminology …” Etc. Now it sounds as though what you are saying to us today is rather different; that you followed this up and that what you were told at 02.30 — 02.34, I’m sorry, was confirmation of the contents of the Mayday which you referred in the daybook at 02.30?
A. Yes. Sorry, I — I am not trying to confuse anyone. What I am trying to say is I didn’t hear the words “Mayday”.
Q. No, I understand.
A. So I clarified that the one I was going to was in fact a Mayday.
Q. But the net result, from what you are saying, it didn’t make any difference because you got the information and you knew what the Mayday had said?
A. Yes, sir. The important thing to me was I wasn’t getting confused that there were two events going on.
Q. Yes.
A. I wanted to clarify that the event I was originally tasked to was, in fact, the one they were talking about.
Q. Yes. Now, in the statement, at the top of the second page there {INQ010136/24}, you see the sentence begins: “I may simply have used the terminology ‘mayday’ because I was informed that the vessel to which I was tasked was taking water.” That’s not very likely, is it, because you have already told us that taking water was quite a normal thing. You were specifically told this was a Mayday, weren’t you?
A. I don’t recall receiving the Mayday.
Q. No, okay. But you wrote it down in the daybook.
A. Because that’s the nautical terminology for that type of event.
Q. Okay. So at 02.34 you wrote in the daybook, if you remember: “Advise proceeding to Mayday at 02.30”?
A. Yes.
Q. If you remember, it was then that you recorded the information which we know was, in fact, in the Mayday call.
A. Sorry, say that again, sorry, please.
Q. Let’s have a look at your notebook — or daybook.
A. Yes.
Q. 02.34, you say: “Advise proceeding to Mayday at 02.30”. If you look above, there you have the Mayday content — what was actually set out in the Mayday.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So it looks as though, one way or another, you knew what was being said in the Mayday Relay call?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And we can just — if you want confirmation of that, let’s have a look, please, at {INQ007660/2}. There it is: “Small craft with 40 persons on board …” Then the position, which you wrote down: “Taking water” and then these words “requiring immediate assistance.” Do you think you will have been told that as well on the night?
A. Most probably.
Q. Yes. I mean, the fact you didn’t write it down, as we have discovered, doesn’t mean you weren’t told it?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Yes. Thank you. Going back to your daybook, please. The reference to “taking water” there at 02.30, do you think that was the first time you were told that this boat was taking on water?
A. I don’t — I don’t remember.
Q. No, thank you. Now, can we look at the transcript of a call, please, between the Valiant and the coastguard and this is at {INQ007613/2}, the second page, please, Valiant and — well the Valiant is at the top. Do you think this will have been you, making this — or receiving this —
A. Yes, that would be me.
Q. Thank you very much. And the time is 02.32. That was on the first page. Sorry, I should have showed that to you. So you are speaking from the Valiant to Stuart Downs of the coastguard and you are asked what incident you are attending and do you see the second paragraph of Stuart Downs: “… it’s understood you’re attending the Mayday relay.” And you say: “Yes, if you’re happy with that, we’ll proceed to the Mayday one over.” And then a reference there to the Flamant, which was a French vessel, wasn’t it, being closer to the co-ordinates; yes?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And do you see, above that, in the second box of your speech, you say: “Yeah, we were deployed to one at 1.30 by our control unit and then we heard your one with the vessel taking water with the 40 on board.” And we know that’s what is said in the Mayday. So it looks, doesn’t it, as though by this point, 02.32, somebody had heard the Mayday about the vessel taking on water with 40 on board?
A. Well, like I have said, I heard there was a vessel taking water on board in that position and I wanted to confirm that it was the same event.
Q. Yes. So what did you mean by “your one”?
A. Well, that was the thing. I wasn’t sure if that was the 01.30 one, or —
Q. Or the 02.30 one?
A. No, the one I was deployed at 01.30.
Q. I see, yes.
A. I was trying to confirm that that was the same one as the 02.30 broadcast, if you like.
Q. Thank you. Yes, I understand. And again, just flicking back to the daybook, please {INQ002051/3}. There is the 02.30 and that’s where you get the information from the …
A. That’s correct.
Q. So it looks as though, in the call, you are referring to that call from coastguard?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you. Now, therefore, one way or another, you had all this information about this boat about an hour before you got to the co-ordinates. Again, just coming back to this question if I may. Given what you learnt an hour into your deployment about its situation, did you take any different further steps to get to the co-ordinates you had been given?
A. No, I believe I — I made the safest speed I could to get there.
Q. And did the — again, I think you may have covered this — but did the information you were given that Charlie, the boat, was taking on water change your assessment of the appropriate level of urgency?
A. No. I — I was on — on — I got to a position for event Charlie as soon as I possibly could.
Q. Yes. And did you, finally on this, did you pass on the information we see written down here to MCC, to Border Force, that you can recall?
A. I don’t think I did.
Q. No?
A. I don’t think I did.
Q. Thank you. Okay. Can we take the daybook down, please. A completely different topic, communications with the French, and this is paragraph 56 of your witness statement. If we could have that up, please, {INQ010136/20}. You talk there about your working relationship, first of all, with the French surface assets and how you would sometimes communicate with them via VHF and sometimes you would you say call them on a working channel and for example ask that they stay with a boat until you could take control of the situation. So as far as you were concerned in your experience, this was a perfectly sensible functioning working relationship?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Thank you. Did you or your crew ever communicate directly with the French authorities, not with the vessels but with the authorities?
A. No.
Q. No. And then you say right at the end: “… professional working relationship, and any conversation which I had with the French was recorded in my daybook.” So we know that there is no reference to a conversation with the French on this night. So can we take it then that, as far as you are concerned, there was no conversation between you on the Valiant and any French vessel that night?
A. No, I made no conversation with the French vessel on that evening.
Q. Thank you very much. Okay, the next topic is searching for Charlie, the boat, and the question of the available assets. As you have — we have discussed, when you got to the co-ordinates at 03.27, you couldn’t see the boat and we saw in the radar image how you got to the right point by 03.27. So at that stage, just to go back to the radar discussion we had earlier, would you have been the one looking at the port screen and your navigator looking at the starboard screen?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, going to your daybook, please, {INQ002051/3}, can I assume that the co-ordinates you reached at 03.27 were those you record at 02.30?
A. Yes, in the vicinity of it.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Because they were an hour more updated as it were, if I can put it that way, than the ones you had received originally at 01.30?
A. Yes.
Q. What’s — what difference to non-experts was there between the two sets of co-ordinates?
A. Oh, looking as a rough figure —
Q. Yes.
A. — it’s always difficult.
Q. It is.
A. A couple of nautical miles possibly.
Q. Yes.
A. But the — the thing I would be focusing on would be the range and the bearing from the Sandettie Lightvessel.
Q. Yes. So what I am really asking is when you got that message from Dover Coastguard at half past 2, did you then change your course to make for those co-ordinates, however small the difference?
A. So I would have changed my course at 02.30 to that range of bearing from the Sandettie Lightvessel, yes.
Q. Thank you very much. And did you, as far as you can recall at any point in the next hour, so between 02.30 and 03.27, seek updated co-ordinates?
A. No.
Q. No.
A. Because I had assumed I’d be given them if they had them.
Q. And this is despite the fact as we know that boats, if their engines are working, the small boats are obviously on the move, they are unlikely to be where the co-ordinates even an hour before had placed them. You didn’t seek updated co-ordinates in that final hour of your journey?
A. No. As I — as I have said if, if the coastguard had them I would trust them to give them to me.
Q. Yes. Were there ever circumstances during your search and rescue experience where you proactively sought updated co-ordinates?
A. Possibly that evening with the helicopter.
Q. Yes. So when you knew there was the helicopter available, you could check in and get a better take on the co-ordinates?
A. Yes, and they could vector us on to it.
Q. Yes. But obviously without an aerial cover, that wasn’t an option?
A. Correct.
Q. Yes. So the next question I want to turn to is, as it were, what you did when you got there. So in other words you have arrived at 03.27, in the vicinity of the last known position of the event and as you have explained the boat wasn’t there. We have talked about this in general terms before. But, how did you go about deciding how to plot your search for the vessel?
A. So the first thing I did was I reported to the coastguard.
Q. Yes, we can see that.
A. That there was no vessels in that vicinity.
Q. Yes.
A. Then I made the decision to head towards the Sandettie Lightvessel based on the fact that in my experience, small boats may head towards a fixed point if they can make way —
Q. Yes.
A. — and having worked out the tidal set, it also made sense to head that way because if the vessel had stopped at the last known position and drifted it was likely to have gone northeasterly.
Q. And is — presumably the factors that you have just mentioned are factors that you learnt to take into account really by experience with small boat search and rescue?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. So it wasn’t something you had specific training on. You just came to know that this was the best and most effective way of searching?
A. Yes, it would seem that way from experience.
Q. Thank you. And while the searching was going on, can you remember now what arrangements you made on the vessel, in other words, how many look outs there were, whether you were — who was using binoculars, etc?
A. So we would all be I say “we all” — there would be five people in the wheelhouse —
Q. Yes.
A. — including the CFI person.
Q. Yes.
A. The navigator would probably be using the radar but also using the binoculars. The lookout could use the binoculars. I would probably be using the spotlight, shining the spotlight ahead to get a look ahead. The engineer could possibly be looking on the night vision and the CFI officer could use binoculars as well.
Q. Yes, I mean in terms of looking at the radar, which you have just mentioned, as we know that’s of pretty limited use with small boats?
A. It is, but also you have still got to consider anti-collision work as well.
Q. Yes. So you are not just conducting your search. You are making sure that you are not getting as it were in somebody else’s way?
A. Yes, and there’s a certain amount of self-preservation as well going on.
Q. Indeed.
A. Yes.
Q. What about the weather, can you remember what the weather was like that night? Was it clear? Was it foggy?
A. I don’t recall it being foggy —
Q. No?
A. — at the Sandettie Lightvessel.
Q. Okay. But presumably it was dark?
A. Yes.
Q. Pretty cold?
A. Yes.
Q. Any other specific challenges that night that you can remember?
A. Not weather wise or anything like that.
Q. Yes. And in all of this discussion, we have been presuming that you have been looking for a boat and not for people in the water?
A. Well, you are doing both because you are concerned that there may be people in the water because there’s — there’s the high probability that there are other events or are other small boats out there. So you are always very cautious. Plus you are looking for things that might have been jettisoned which may indicate that there’s a vessel in the vicinity, life jackets, bags, whatever, anything to indicate that you are in the right location.
Q. Yes. So to summarise then, you are not just looking for a specific boat or a boat. You are looking for, as it were, other types of evidence that would indicate that it might be near?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Yes. But you hadn’t been told anything, certainly in your daybook that we have seen. To suggest that you were told to search for people in the water?
A. No.
Q. That’s right, isn’t it?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you. Had you — can you remember now, had you been told at any stage that the boat had been swamped?
A. I don’t believe I was.
Q. No. If you had been told that it had been swamped or that there were people in the water, would that have affected the way you went about your search?
A. Probably not because once you are in that vicinity, you are on high alert in any case.
Q. Yes.
A. As I said earlier, you are looking for any evidence that you might be in the right area.
MR PHILLIPS: Yes. Sir, would that be a convenient moment?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. Thanks very much. So we will come back at 2 o’clock, thank you very much. (12.58 pm) (The lunch break) (2.00 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Thank you, Mr Phillips.
MR PHILLIPS: Commander Toy we, before the break, were discussing what you were searching for when you got to the last co-ordinates position at 03.27. Can I just ask you about another aspect of this. At 11 minutes past 3 that morning, there was another call between Border Force and coastguard. You weren’t involved in it, so don’t worry about that, but during that call Border Force was informed that there were at least four boats known to be requiring rescue in this Sandettie area. As far as you can recall now, is that something that you were told that night?
A. Without reference to the —
Q. Shall we have a look at the daybook?
A. Yes, please.
Q. It’s not in your statement and the daybook is — there it is, as if by magic {INQ002051/3}.
A. Thank you.
Q. There is no entry for 03.11. As I say, it’s not suggested you were part of this call, but it’s nowhere recorded, take it from me. You can read your writing better than me, so you can check.
A. Okay, so at 03.20 “Call from Dover coastguard RQ 163” which I associated to be a helicopter, would be on task at 03.30.
Q. Yes.
A. Was then told: “Other migrant vessels in the area of Sandettie Lightvessel. Remain on Charlie”.
Q. So, there were other boats there?
A. I was told there were other vessels in the vicinity of the Sandettie Lightvessel.
Q. Not specifically four, but certainly not just the one?
A. Other migrant vessels.
Q. Exactly.
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you very much. Now, can I take you back to the topic of air cover, which we touched on earlier today. And again, we have covered the fact that you became aware that there was no aerial coverage, certainly when you started your deployment, that’s right, isn’t it?
A. I don’t recall being told at the time, but because I was getting no — I suppose I just worked it out from the fact that I was getting nothing about it.
Q. Shall we have a look at 58 of your statement, page 21. {INQ010136/21}: “I was not aware that there was no aircraft cover for that day. I don’t recall whether I received an email confirming that there would be no aircraft cover, but likely would not have seen it any case, as I was resting.” Then you made the point we discussed before, it wouldn’t have affected the deployment. And you also say, just before that, in your statement at 55, if we could have that, please, {INQ010136/19}, in relation to Bristow, that any contact with them would be via the coastguard. Do you see at the end of the page there, rather than you contacting them direct; is that correct?
A. Not exactly correct. I might — excuse me — once they were on — on task they would be known as RQ 163.
Q. Yes.
A. And I may or may not have spoken to them asking for a position update. But I certainly wouldn’t be tasking them or anything like that.
Q. No. Well, you see the next point, the next sentence, do you see: “… I might receive information or taskings directly from the helicopters, as described above, however I would not task [them], as that was not my role and I did not have the requisite authority.”
A. No, the — the only thing I may do is call up on channel zero to RQ 163: can I have an updated position.
Q. Yes.
A. But in my mind, that was speaking to the coastguard as well because it was on channel zero in any case.
Q. Yes. Now, in terms of what the absence or presence of air cover meant, in terms of searching and search and rescue, can we look, please, earlier in the statement. It is on the left-hand side of the screen, as we have it now, {INQ010136/19} third line, do you see? The sentence begins: “Where I was aware that an aircraft was operating as part of Operation Deveran, it was reassuring to know that …” Have you found the paragraph?
A. No, sorry, I have not.
Q. Sorry, 54.
A. Right, thank you. Yes, yes.
Q. Second sentence, do you see?
A. Yes.
Q. “… reassuring to know that it was providing top cover, as it is significantly easier to identify migrant boats from the air when compared to surface assets like HMC Valiant.” And that, presumably, is just based on, partly common sense, but also your experience?
A. I think it’s — yes, correct, both.
Q. Yes. And you make the same point earlier in your statement. If we could just look briefly at that; in paragraph 19, at the end of the paragraph on page {INQ010136/7}, at the top of the page there, you say: “The use of aerial assets is, in my opinion, by far the most effective means of locating such vessels, ie small boats, rather than with surface assets like the Valiant, and particularly at night when migrants were most likely to attempt a crossing.” So again, it seems common sense, but it’s much harder to locate a small boat if you don’t have the aerial cover helping you?
A. Yes, I would agree with that, sir.
Q. And indeed, in the evidence we heard last week from 2Excel themselves, the suggestion was that the absence of aerial cover can mean that there is, in effect, no recognised maritime picture, which obviously adversely affects your ability to locate a small boat?
A. Yes, I would agree with that.
Q. Yes. But, as it were, the good news, so far as this night is concerned, is you were told and we have just looked at the entry in your daybook, that from 03.30, R 163, the helicopter, would be on task. And it looks from the documents and your statement as though from then on, you were effectively working with the helicopter as the search proceeded, is that fair?
A. I think the wording of “on task”, my understanding is that’s possibly when they lift off.
Q. I see.
A. So I don’t think it’s when they are actually in the vicinity. However, I could be wrong on that.
Q. So it may — just so far as we are getting this clear then, it may well have been rather later than that that you started to get any useful input from a helicopter actually on the scene?
A. Yes, I — I believe that’s correct and if I could help —
Q. Please.
A. — help the Chair with that. Is on one of those video screens that we show — saw earlier, we actually — if you run it on, you can see the coastguard helicopter coming in from the west, or left of screen, if you like.
Q. Yes. It’s moving very, very much faster.
A. Yes, very rapidly, yes.
Q. Yes, yes.
A. So that would give you an indication of when that was available to help with the picture in the vicinity I was in.
Q. Thank you very much. Did you, at any point that you can remember now, consider asking for more help, for more assets to be deployed to look for these boats?
A. On that evening, probably not.
Q. No. Was it within your power to have asked for further assets to be deployed?
A. I suppose I could have asked. However, I trusted the — the overall overview of the coastguard to provide assets over the longer period.
Q. Yes. You say — and I should show you this, paragraph 54 of your statement {INQ010136/19}, towards the end, do you see, three lines up: “Nor did I have the overall picture to be able to make these strategic calls as to asset allocation, I was simply responding to the incidents with which I was tasked by coastguard, as noted above.”
A. Yes, I can see that.
Q. So it required somebody else with the overall picture to make decisions of that kind.
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So just to summarise then, before we look at the three small boats that you embarked that night, we have agreed, I think, that the conditions for searching were very challenging?
A. Yes.
Q. You found, in fact, four small boats in a relatively short period of time, one of which you allowed to carry on and the other which was stopped, as we will hear?
A. Sorry, if I could correct you there.
Q. Please.
A. I identified two small boats.
Q. Right.
A. One of which was stopped and was not making way in the water, which we controlled and the other one just carried on and I don’t know where that went.
Q. Yes, exactly. Okay. Well, we will come back to that.
A. Yes.
Q. And at no point during the deployment did you ask for more assets to be deployed?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. Right, we are looking at the small boats in turn now, please. And first, some general questions about decision-making when you are in this situation and you come across a small boat. If you have been tasked to a particular location, perhaps to rescue a boat that was compromised, that was taking on water, what do you do when you encounter another boat that isn’t in distress?
A. The — every boat that I come across, as far as I’m concerned, and I think the DEVERAN policy is that they need — they are in distress, they need rescuing.
Q. So if you have been summoned, as here, to a Mayday, with a boat said to be taking on water, but before you reach that boat taking on water, you come across another boat which isn’t taking on water, which is simply underway, do you stop for that other boat, the one that’s not taking on water and underway?
A. I think you — you would report it — well, I would report it to the coastguard.
Q. Yes.
A. And say: I am intending to go to that one.
Q. But what the Mayday boat?
A. Well, you don’t know that’s not the Mayday boat.
Q. Okay. And that’s an assessment, presumably, which you just have to make in the moment?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. There’s no guidance, there is no policy; you just have to use your judgment?
A. It’s dynamic, yes.
Q. Yes. Okay. Well, then, let’s turn to the first boat that you encountered and it’s page 26 and paragraph 72 of your statement, please, {INQ010136/26}. So here, you say: “At 03.35 … two vessels which I suspected to contain migrants were identified on the … night vision … One … was underway, however the other was stopped.” And if we look at the radar imagery, I think we can see this moment, at {INQ005632/1}, remembering that the time is an hour ahead, the time on the left. Again, can you interpret what we are looking at for us, please? Does it show this moment at 03.35?
A. Well, assuming that the timing is wrong in that, yes, I —
Q. It is an hour out, we know that, yes.
A. Yes, it doesn’t show any small boats.
Q. Right.
A. But it just shows the position of where Valiant was in relation to the Sandettie Lightvessel.
Q. And by way of description, can you tell us where the Valiant was?
A. Close by to the Sandettie Lightvessel.
Q. Yes.
A. Slightly to the northeast.
Q. Yes, the arrows, again, that you pointed out before.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Yes, okay. Then another screen, please, that’s {INQ005633/1}. Now, this is the one I described to you earlier as the darker screen. This is the second radar screen, or a snapshot from that, isn’t it? And what, please, can we see here? Can we see the small boats on this?
A. Possibly, that “03” —
Q. Yes.
A. — could be a radar trace of a small boat. But without looking at the range and — excuse me — I couldn’t tell you what that is.
Q. And just tell us again, why is the screen so much darker?
A. I don’t know.
Q. No. But it does make very, very difficult to see anything useful, doesn’t it, even if you are an expert?
A. It probably — could we zoom out a little bit, please?
Q. Yes, please.
A. Thank you.
Q. Thank you.
A. It was probably adjusted so that we could see out the window because this is right under the window, you see.
Q. Yes.
A. So we have adjusted it down so that you can actually see what’s on the — on the water in front of you.
Q. So it’s not interfering with your vision outside the boat?
A. Vision — that’s right, yes.
Q. Okay, and where on this screen do we see the Valiant?
A. So the Valiant would be the — the longer dotted line with the two arrows on the end, it will be towards the bottom left-hand corner, if you like, at the end of that dotted line.
Q. Right. Thank you.
A. And the — just to help you understand, the extended yellow line down to the bottom of the screen, that will be, probably, the Sandettie Lightvessel there.
Q. Right, yes. Okay, thank you. Can we take that down, please. Anyway, to go back to the narrative. At this stage, as you say in your statement, paragraph 72, if we can have that again, please, {INQ002051/3} you had found two small boats, one of which was making way and one of which was stopped. And you decided to approach first the one that had stopped?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And the one that was still underway just carried on?
A. Yes, it carried on its way.
Q. And is this right; you now don’t know what happened to that boat, the one that carried on?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Yes. You were attending to the one that was stopped and you explain that, and the decision you made, in this paragraph: “My rationale for providing assistance to the vessel that was not making way was that it was likely to be in greater danger than the vessel that was able to make way, such that it was less able to navigate out of the way of commercial vessels transiting the Dover Straits.”
A. That’s correct.
Q. So thinking back to my hypothetical example, you came across, here, two vessels and your judgment was that it was the stopped one that needed more urgent help?
A. Yes.
Q. And presumably, it was, from that point on, the focus of your immediate attention. And as you have said, the other boat went literally out of your attention and you are not able to say what happened thereafter?
A. Yes, it proceeded out of my sight.
Q. Excellent. Thank you. So you describe there you deployed your RHIB, and that was engaging with this stopped boat at 03.48. And I think it’s right, isn’t it, that you were given a — I think you call it a Mike reference earlier? An M —
A. An M number.
Q. Exactly.
A. Yes.
Q. For this boat, M957. Do you see the start of paragraph 73?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Now, could we look at your daybook for that time, please. Thank you {INQ/2051/3}. Do you see “03.55, M957”. That, I suspect, is you recording the number you were given?
A. That’s right.
Q. Thank you. Can we just have a look at the entry immediately above that, 03.48 and again, I’m sorry, can you just tell us what you have written there?
A. Yes, certainly. Excuse me: 03.48, position latitude/longitude, “engage with migrant vessel stopped in water.”
Q. I am glad I asked you. Thank you. Right. Now, I think it’s right that at the same time, 03.48, you had a call with the coastguard. And we can see this at {INQ007390/2} the second page please, you see the time there, “Valiant” and I think that would have been you —
A. Yes.
Q. — is that right? Yes. And the coastguard. And what the conversation there is you are telling the coastguard aren’t you, the second speech for you: “… engaged unlit migrant crafts stopped in the water …” I think you probably meant craft, singular?
A. Yes, I think, yes, yes.
Q. “Dover Coastguard. Roger … well received. How many persons on board …? Over?” You say: “… lots of them. Estimate in the region of 40.”
A. “Four-zero, four-zero”, yes.
Q. Yes, and the coastguard says to you: “Approximately four-zero persons on board. Believe this could be incident Charlie which you’ve been assigned to. Names on the board the vessel was a Moomin(?), a person I believe and the telephone number is …” Etc. So that was information given to you which I assume — and again, this goes back to the discussion we had earlier — that you were then going to use to try and help the coastguard to see whether this could be positively identified as Charlie?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you. So then you explain in your statement — and we have now moved on to paragraph 73, {INQ010136/26} how you started to embark the people on board that boat. At 04.07, do you see, that’s the very start of paragraph 73, “started to be embarked on to HMC Valiant”?
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. Thank you. And in fact, if we have got the daybook nearby, which I think we probably have, excellent, {INQ002051/3}, you can see what I think is the same thing. I think it is, being said at 04.07, what does that say?
A. “Commence embarking migrants”.
Q. Thank you very much.
A. Okay.
Q. Can I just, as it were, pause here. You are in the process of embarking this first boat. I want to understand if you can remember now what was in your mind at this stage. Did you think that this boat was Charlie?
A. No.
Q. Why was that?
A. Because I didn’t know the details to decide whether it was or not. All I knew was it was a vessel in that position and I was intending to rescue the migrants.
Q. Yes. But you then describe in your statement how you tried to get information, the sort of information we have seen you suggest discussing with Neal Gibson, to help him work out whether this was indeed the boat from which the calls had come, to which you had been sent with the Mayday, etc. And you see at 74, please, of the statement, page {INQ010136/27}: “… in response to a request from the coastguard I advised that the migrants embarked had not claimed to have called the United Kingdom authorities.”
A. Yes, that’s correct. I asked my — the person in charge on the deck team to see if anyone claimed to have made phone calls.
Q. Yes, so that was the first point, wasn’t it, which was inconsistent with this boat being Charlie?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And did you ask whether there was anyone on board the boat called Moomin, do you remember, the name you were given?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. You didn’t. Why not?
A. Because, I wanted the officers to concentrate on rescuing the people and if they hadn’t made phonecalls …
Q. Yes. Do you remember now whether that vessel, the one you embarked the people from, the first stopped vessel, do you remember whether that vessel was taking on water?
A. I don’t remember that.
Q. No, it’s not recorded in your statement or your daybook.
A. No.
Q. Does that suggest it wasn’t?
A. No, as I said earlier most — most migrant boats do take water.
Q. And at this stage, again, can you remember what other information did you have about the boat, about Charlie, which might have enabled you to work out whether this was it?
A. I think it was 40 people.
Q. Yes.
A. Taking water.
Q. Yes.
A. I think that was it.
Q. That was about it, wasn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And we know, in fact, there were 35, that’s right, isn’t it?
A. That’s the count we — we had, yes.
Q. Exactly. “20 males”, this is your statement again, do you see, “13 infants and 2 females”?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you. And having gathered the information you had described, did you report that to Border Force or the coastguard?
A. I believe, I reported it to them, first of all, based on the grounds that at 04.43, I got another tasking.
Q. Yes.
A. So, in my mind, that would follow on; that they wouldn’t give me another tasking until I completed that task. However, I do believe there was a 05.04. I was asked how many people had been embarked for Charlie. Now, at the time of making this statement, the transcript I was shown showed it to be — I think it was a female speaker and the later transcript I’ve seen, it says “Border Force”.
Q. Yes.
A. So I am not sure now if it was the coastguard or the Border Force that I actually reported that to. However, I would hope that MCC and the coastguard would be talking together to —
Q. Yes.
A. — to sort that out.
Q. But you had certain — we saw in the conversation with Neal Gibson, you had been given certain information about what they knew of Charlie and it seems pretty logical that you would want to report that back to them so they knew and could make that comparison?
A. Well, as I say, I believe I did.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, there was another call between the coastguard and the Valiant at 04.20, if we can just look at the transcript of that, please, and that is at {INQ007578/1}. You see, again, the time at the start, first page 04.21.
A. Yes.
Q. Here it is again. Probably you, again, do you think?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes, and Neal Gibson of the coastguard. And you are giving a description there of the boat you have disembarked, a black inflatable, you say.
A. Yes.
Q. And Neal Gibson says: “Roger. Then I believe this probably is incident Lima, which would match the description being a black RIB. Also from the French it was reported approximately 40 people on board.” And you say: “Yeah, that could be the same, one of the same, but clearly there’s a lot of reports, so we’ll deal with what we’ve got. Thank you.” Then Neal Gibson ends with: “We’ll work on this potentially being Lima and obviously carry on our search on for Charlie and the other vessels that have been reported in the area.” And so it’s obvious, isn’t it, that by this time, 04.20, the coastguard were telling you that they thought the boat you had embarked with the 35 people was {INQ010136/27} probably Lima?
A. It might well have been, but I don’t associate with the tracker. All I do is go to the vessel.
Q. That wasn’t your job.
A. No.
Q. Exactly, no.
A. Yes.
Q. But what he was telling you, insofar as they were concerned, is they thought it was probably Lima.
A. According to that, yes.
Q. That’s what it says, thank you. Okay, let’s turn on to the second boat, and it’s your statement at 75, please {INQ/10136/27}. And this was the other tasking you have just mentioned, 04.43?
A. Yes.
Q. You are given further co-ordinates and a description of another boat. And this time, this information came from R 163.
A. Okay, so the first tasking, I don’t recall — that came from coastguard, sorry, yes.
Q. Yes.
A. And then at 04.48.
Q. Do you see?
A. Yes, 163 provided description of vessel, yes.
Q. If we look back to your daybook {INQ002051/3}, there we are, do you see “04.48”, I think.
A. Yes.
Q. And what does that say?
A. “8 metre LOA”, length overall.
Q. Yes.
A. “With 30 people on board”.
Q. Yes.
A. That’s my signature. I don’t know why I put that there, but just —
Q. And then?
A. “From RQ 163”.
Q. Exactly, there it is, the information from the helicopter. And we have then another call, again involving you and the coastguard, I think, and this is at {INQ007469/1} about the second boat, do you see, “04.43” this time, slightly before. Next page please {INQ007469/2} and right at the bottom of the page, there is a discussion about the co-ordinates and the vessel: “[Light] grey in colour. 30 [people on board]. “Underway”. So this one is not stopped, this one is underway. And then right at the bottom, do you see, you ask: “Is Rescue 163 [the helicopter] still with this vessel?” And the coastguard person says: “Valiant Dover Coastguard. That’s a negative, rescue 163 searching for the boats. They described the vessel as not being in distress and not being in the immediate need of any assistance. So they’re continuing their search to look for other vessels, over.” So again, based on what you had been told before about Charlie, this doesn’t look consistent with that, does it?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. And while you were en route to that boat at the tasking, at 04.43, there was another call and this was at 05.04, again {INQ007627/1} please, and this seems to be — and I think this is the one you mentioned before.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Exactly.
A. Yes.
Q. It’s actually a call from MCC to you as we understand it and the first part of it comes here, next page, please {INQ007627/2}: “How many migrants did you embark for Charlie, please?” And your answer is at {INQ007627/2}. “Yeah, that was what three five, three five in total.”
A. In total.
Q. So this is a call, as I say, relatively short and in your statement at paragraph 76, if we look at that, {INQ010136/27} we see that you accepted it was you on, as it were, the other end of this call. Now, at this point, you didn’t actually know, did you, that the first boat you had found was Charlie?
A. No.
Q. No. And yet here, you, by saying: yeah that was three five — that was what three five, you seem to be agreeing with the MCC caller that the boat was Charlie: “How many migrants did you embark for Charlie, please?” Do you see?
A. I do see what you are saying.
Q. Yes.
A. However, as that was the only up — until that point M, the first one —
Q. 957?
A. 957 was the only set of — or people that I had rescued, I assumed, rightly or wrongly, that they were talking about the event that I had first attended.
Q. Yes, so you thought this was simply a reference to the first boat, the —
A. Yes, and as I said, it’s not my role to start adding M numbers to —
Q. No.
A. — coastguard letters because I don’t have all the information.
Q. But it didn’t occur to you then, to say: well, actually I don’t know if this is Charlie, the boat I was originally tasked to?
A. No because that’s the only one that I had embarked.
Q. Yes.
A. So I assumed —
Q. Yes.
A. — that they had done their working — you know, they worked out with the information they had and come to that conclusion.
Q. Yes, so you were answering a question which you thought was just about the first boat?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you.
A. Well, in fact, the only boat at that time that I had embarked.
Q. The only boat you had embarked. Exactly right, yes. But you can see the potential for confusion here because the person on the other end of the line from MCC might then have thought: Ah, Charlie, that boat, has been embarked with 35 people?
A. I can see that.
Q. Yes. Thank you. Now, after that call — and again, this is 77, we have got it on the screen — at 05.19, you made contact with the second boat, the one you had been tasked to at 04.43 —
A. Yes.
Q. — and you describe how you embarked people from that boat between 05.30, that’s the fourth line.
A. Sorry.
Q. Sorry. I’m flicking around.
A. Jumping around.
Q. Yes. Para 77.
A. Right, thank you.
Q. Do you see, 05.19 you made contact with — this is the second boat now.
A. Yes.
Q. You launched your boat.
A. Correct.
Q. Then you got the number, the second number, M 958.
A. That’s right.
Q. Do you see? And then it was a grey hulled inflatable with an engine; that’s the description?
A. Yes.
Q. And the start — the embarcation starts at 05.30.
A. Correct.
Q. And finishes at 05.57, do you see, a few lines down?
A. That’s right.
Q. And we know from the daybook and indeed, this part of your statement, that this boat had 31 males on it. Last sentence, do you see?
A. Yes.
Q. And you pass that information on to coastguard at 06.03.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, can you remember — and you may not be able to — but can you remember whether you had been told anything about the people on board Charlie, in other words whether it was men, women, children, etc?
A. I believe it was just an estimate of numbers.
Q. So, again, that wasn’t something you could use to determine for yourself whether that was the boat you had originally been sent for, the fact there were 31 men?
A. No.
Q. No. Well, then we have another call involving you and this is at 05.58 at {INQ007474/2}. And I think again, in your statement you have said that this was you speaking or — well, it looks as though it may have been you speaking?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Thank you. And you say: “Two of the people we’ve picked up speak reasonable English and they do not claim — do not claim to have made telephone calls to [the] UK …” So again, it looks as though this is you testing the information you have been given, they had been making calls, and saying to coastguard, I think, that these people, the people you have just picked up, were not saying they had been making calls to the UK authorities?
A. I think from memory, I was trying to find a boat that had made calls.
Q. Yes. Because that was one of the characteristics —
A. Exactly.
Q. — that you had been told about.
A. It’s the information I had.
Q. Exactly.
A. On this second one, I was telling them — you know, I was still saying: has anyone made a call to the authorities? However, I do believe there is another conversation —
Q. Yes, there is the next one.
A. — where they change their mind.
Q. It is the next one. If we look at that, {INQ007478/2}, at 06.05 a further call, again, I assume it’s you?
A. Yes.
Q. “We couldn’t get any names however one of them does claim that they did make a call. They saw someone make a call, over.” So this is — how can I put it — somewhat mixed information you are getting about this, at this point?
A. Yes. I think this is coming from the deck team they are saying: hang on, somebody now does recall seeing somebody make a call.
Q. Yes.
A. But what it doesn’t say is whether they called the UK authorities or not.
Q. Yes.
A. So …
Q. And did you — again, to go back to this point, do you remember asking if anybody on this boat, the second boat, was called Moomin —
A. No.
Q. — or something like that?
A. No.
Q. You don’t think you did?
A. I don’t think I did, no.
Q. I mean, in your MAIB interview — I am not going it take you back to it, but at one point you describe the difficulty sometimes in getting information and establishing what people on the small boats are saying. And it looks as though that may have been a problem at this stage?
A. Yes, as I said earlier today, when you — some people go into this sort of shut down mode when they are rescued. They close down and just want to go to sleep or whatever.
Q. Yes.
A. And some just don’t want to talk to you. I don’t know why.
Q. No, and all of that on top of potential language difficulties as well, presumably?
A. Yes, certainly, certainly.
Q. Yes, again, thinking about the second boat now, did you think that this boat was Charlie?
A. No.
Q. No. Why was that?
A. Again, I don’t associate the — the ones I am rescuing to a coastguard letter.
Q. No.
A. Because that’s folly, in my mind.
Q. Yes.
A. Because I haven’t got the information that they have.
Q. But did you think you had found the boat to which you had originally been tasked?
A. No, I have no way of knowing that.
Q. No. So then the third boat at 06.07, we have a yet further call, and this is {INQ007485/2} please, you and Stuart Downs: “Valiant, Dover Coastguard, the tasking next one is in the vicinity of Southwest Goodwin, over.”
A. Yes.
Q. So as you explain in your statement at paragraph 78, {INQ010136/28}, you were tasked, after embarking the second boat, to a third incident but that was in a different part of the Channel, near Southwest Goodwin?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Considerably to the west of where you were placed by the Sandettie Lightvessel?
A. Yes, the other side of the traffic separation zero.
Q. Yes, so you are leaving the Sandettie area?
A. I am.
Q. And that was the area, as we discussed earlier, where you had been told there were a number of small boats.
A. Yes.
Q. And you had only embarked two of them?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. And we now know, because of where the boat Charlie ended up, that you — that tasking took you in the opposite direction from where that boat eventually drifted?
A. Possibly.
Q. Yes. And in terms of your tasking at that point, away from Sandettie over to Southwest Goodwin, was that simply, as it were, an order that you obeyed? Did you question whether all of the boats that had been in the Sandettie region had been found by that point?
A. No.
Q. No. It was —
A. I was.
Q. — your job to follow the tasking?
A. Follow the tasking.
Q. Okay. We can see the tasking in your daybook {INQ002051/4} at 06.10.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see, again, if you could help “tasking”…
A. “Tasking head for Southwest Goodwin [buoy]”. “BY”, buoy.
Q. All right, thank you very much. But it was surely unlikely then that you would find at the Southwest Goodwin, one of the boats that you had been told about that were generally in the vicinity of the Sandettie Lightvessel? Very unlikely, isn’t it?
A. That’s a difficult one to answer, sir, because the vessel that was making way, that went out of sight of me, may well have been this boat.
Q. Yes.
A. I don’t know that.
Q. Yes. Now in your statement at 79 {INQ01036/28}, you say that en route to this tasking at 06.30, you found a vessel that was not underway and so, again, you launched your RHIB?
A. Sorry, I am trying to catch up.
Q. Sorry, 79. My fault.
A. It’s all right.
Q. Do you see “06.30”?
A. Yes.
Q. “I made contact”?
A. Yes.
Q. You launched your RHIB to engage with that boat and again, that got you another Mike number, 959, for that boat?
A. That is correct.
Q. And those people — the people from that boat, you say, two lines down, embarked at — they began to embark at 06.36?
A. Yes.
Q. Was this the boat, do you think, to which you were directed with the tasking at 06.07, the Southwest Goodwin?
A. I believe that to be the one.
Q. Right. Now, this one, as you say at the end of the paragraph, had 32 people, of whom 21 were male, four female and seven were children. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. We can see that in your daybook, this time on page {INQ/2051/4}, I think, 07.22.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that what it says?
A. “32 total, 21 male, four females, seven minors”.
Q. Yes, and again, I think this is obvious from everything you have said so far, but you didn’t know whether this vessel was the original one, Charlie, or not?
A. No.
Q. No, but it wasn’t taking on water, this one, was it?
A. No, I don’t believe it was.
Q. No. Now, in relation to this boat, based on the documents we have seen, you don’t seem to have asked the sort of identifying information questions that we talked about before, you know: have you made calls to the UK? Is anybody — you know, the sort of —
A. No, I don’t think we did, no.
Q. No there is no record of that.
A. No.
Q. So, as you explain, going back to 79, {INQ01036/28} of your statement, by the time this — these people had been — embarked on your boat, you had embarked three small boats and you had got to a total — do you see the fourth line of paragraph 80 there, at the bottom the page —
A. Yes.
Q. — of 98 people?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, just going back to the question of where this left you. You, as I understand what you have said this afternoon, you weren’t in a position to say, at this point, with the three boats embarked, whether Charlie, the original boat, had been found?
A. No.
Q. No. And it sounds as though that wasn’t actually something you were particularly focused on as you did your job that night?
A. No, I was focused on the three events that I — that I had on board. I had 98 people on board the boat and had to make sure they were safe.
Q. Right, and what you had learnt during the night suggested that the boats you had embarked were probably not Charlie. For example, there was the coastguard saying: we think the first one is probably Lima; the second one only had men, it didn’t have women and children; and the third one was in a completely different area and it wasn’t taking on water?
A. But again, that’s their decision, not my decision.
Q. Yes, absolutely.
A. I am — I am just picking up these people.
Q. But if you had been asked to assess it for yourself, none of those looked like Charlie, did they?
A. The only information I had on Char — on an event, Charlie, was of 40 people and they were taking water in a certain position.
Q. Yes, and you hadn’t found any boat —
A. I had found a boat with 30 —
Q. 35.
A. — 5 and it may or may not have been taking water. So I am not in a position to decide whether that links to Charlie or not.
Q. No.
A. I don’t have enough information.
Q. No. You weren’t the person making the decisions of that kind on the night?
A. No, no.
Q. And it wasn’t you who made the decision as to whether to carry on or stop, looking for any particular boat, you were just accepting taskings?
A. Correct. The only thing I would say is that Rescue 163 was in the vicinity for a period of time —
Q. Yes.
A. — searching the area.
Q. Yes.
A. So …
Q. But as you have explained to us, when you got a tasking as a result of R 163’s observations, you complied with it?
A. Of course.
Q. You got on with it. That was 04.43, I think?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So then you explain in your statement how you — the Valiant returned to Dover with 98 people and as we discussed this morning, that was near to full capacity. And you explain later in the statement, at 81, if we could have that up, please, {INQ01036/29} very much consistent with what you have just told me, the coastguard could, at any time, have objected to Valiant returning to Dover, but at no point did it do so?
A. No.
Q. Nor did it ever request the ship to attend a further event following the disembarkation of the 98 migrants rescued at Dover.
A. That’s correct.
Q. So the people who were responsible for the decisions didn’t ask you to go back out after you disembarked the 98?
A. No, no.
Q. Thank you. And as you say, at the end of that paragraph: “… ultimately it was for [coastguard] to coordinate and request that those assets respond should there be any further SAR events.”
A. Yes.
Q. Well, this is a hypothetical question, but bear with me. If you had known, as you came back to Dover that night, that there was another boat requiring rescue in the Sandettie area, what would you have done?
A. Sorry, that night or that morning?
Q. Well, the time we have got to now.
A. Oh right, okay. I — I would have — there were still boats out there. So there were many migrant boats coming across on that day.
Q. Yes, yes.
A. But you — there are other vessels out looking.
Q. Yes.
A. So, if they said: there is a boat missing and we need everyone to go and look for it, of course we would have gone.
Q. Yes.
A. But they didn’t.
Q. No. And presumably, the same applies earlier in the night when you were actually on the scene in Sandettie at about, let’s say 4 o’clock, 5 o’clock, something like that, if somebody had said: well, there’s actually another boat. We know you are getting quite full, but there is another boat that needs rescuing. What would you have done?
A. As I said before, we would have stayed if we could.
Q. Yes.
A. Obviously, if we have got people we have already rescued and they are starting to collapse, then they become the priority.
Q. Yes.
A. However, all things being equal, we would have stayed out there and if we found another one, we would either accommodate them, one way or another, with the life rafts and the RHIB, waiting for another asset to come along.
Q. Yes, as you explained to me this morning, you would have found a way —
A. Yes.
Q. — to make sure it happened?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Now, going back to the disembarkation of the people you did have, the 98. You explain how you — this is paragraph 80 again, you went back and it took something like two and a half to three hours to get all these people onto Tug Haven, I think. And as far as you were concerned — do you see, Valiant berthed in Ramsgate at 12.30, so the process is quite a long one — but once you had berthed again, that was the end of your involvement for that particular shift, if I can put it that way?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Thank you.
A. Well, having said that, we still had to do the debrief.
Q. Yes.
A. Restock on the stores we had used.
Q. Yes.
A. So …
Q. Get some rest?
A. Yes, exactly. Yes.
Q. Yes. And later in your statement, at paragraph 83, you give, on {INQ01036/29}, a graphic description of the sort of pressures and strains on you and your crew that this search and rescue work imposed. It is the sort of thing we discussed this morning which must, I think, have left the crew utterly exhausted by the end of each shift?
A. Not just the shift, but also after a 15-day period.
Q. Yes. And then finally, in paragraph 84 and following {INQ01036/30}, you describe the impact of learning of the deaths on that night. And then later — only later, learning that you and your crew had been involved, one way or another, in the incident. It looks as though the first time you were really aware of that is when you were contacted by the MAIB, is that right?
A. Yes. Well, when I read the draft report of their investigation, it was when I realised that: oh, we might have been —
Q. Yes.
A. — in that vicinity. But up until I read that draft, I didn’t link any of this to what we were doing. As far as I was concerned, we had gone out, found three boats, rescued 98 people, got them into the UK, and that was it.
Q. Yes. But if I may, when you made that discovery, how did it make you feel?
A. Quite upset, really.
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah, and I know for a fact that the afternoon — we were going out again that night and you had to sort of sit the crew down and say: look, there’s been multiple deaths in the Channel. It is terrible, but what you have got to remember guys is all the other people you have saved.
Q. Yes.
A. And more people you will need to save again.
Q. Well, thank you very much for answering my questions. Is there anything else that you would like to say to the Inquiry today?
A. No, sir.
MR PHILLIPS: Do you have any questions?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: No, I don’t, commander Toy, thank you very much indeed. Thank you for your statement, but especially for the evidence today. It’s been extremely helpful. So thank you very much indeed.
A. Not at all.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: So, Mr Phillips, I think tomorrow morning.
MR PHILLIPS: Yes, please.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: 10 o’clock.
MR PHILLIPS: Yes.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Okay. Right, well, thank you. (2.53 pm)
(The Inquiry adjourned until 10 o’clock, on Tuesday, 11 March 2025)
I N D E X
MR KEVIN TOY (affirmed) …………………………1
Questions by MR PHILLIPS ………………….1