Thursday, 13 March 2025 (10.00 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. Well, good morning, everyone, and good morning, Mr Willows. Could you just read the affirmation, please.
MR THOMAS GREGORY WILLOWS (affirmed)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. Well, thanks very much. So Ms Woods has some questions for you.
Questions by MS WOODS
MS WOODS: Good morning, Mr Willows.
A. Morning.
Q. Is it right you have provided a witness statement for this Inquiry dated 3 December 2024?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And I think that statement consists of about six pages; is that right?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Thank you very much. I want to start, if I can, by asking you about your role and in particular about your role in November 2021. Is it right, based on your statement, that you were working as an immigration officer?
A. That’s correct. I was based in the Maritime Command Centre, yes.
Q. On Tuesday, we heard your colleague Karen Whitehouse refer to you as something called an EO, I think an executive officer. Can you tell us what that is?
A. Yes. Well, within the Civil Service grading, it’s officer grade. Karen is my line manager, HO, higher officer. Yes, that’s my grade.
Q. So executive officer is your grade within the Civil Service, whereas immigration officer is the title of your role within BFMCC; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you very much. Could we turn to your statement at {INQ10214/5}, paragraph 13, please, page 5. We can see in the second half of that paragraph: “Since the creation of the Small Boats Operation Command … in December 2022, responsibility for assisting [HM Coastguard] with migrant rescue operations has transferred from BFMCC and my work therefore is no longer related to migrant rescues, where the capacity of the BFMC vessels was a relevant factor of which both I, and … colleagues, were aware.” Mr Willows, are you still working as an immigration officer?
A. I am still working within the Maritime Command Centre, yes.
Q. But is it right, based on this, that you are no longer working in relation to rescue of small boats in the Channel?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you very much. And it’s fair to say if the Small Boats Operation Command was created in December 2022, it’s been somewhere in the order of two to three years since you were working in that role; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you very much. Prior to your work for Border Force, is it right — or for BFMCC, is it right that you worked as a maritime enforcement officer?
A. That’s right, yes.
Q. I want to ask you a little bit about that, if I can. Is it right that that involves working on a cutter for Border Force?
A. That’s correct. I spent about 15 years working on the cutters.
Q. And we heard a little bit from Commander Toy on Monday about the kinds of work that a cutter might undertake; combating smuggling of goods, combating illegal immigration. Was that the kind of work which you took part in in that role?
A. Primarily smuggling operations.
Q. Smuggling operations.
A. The migrant activity hadn’t commenced whilst I was on the boats. I came off the boats in 2014 and migrant activity started in about 2018.
Q. So if we go to paragraph 2, page 1 of your statement — it is the same document {INQ010214/1} — we can see, paragraph 2: “During my time working on the cutters, I was never directly involved in migrant rescues operations …” And as you have just told us, that’s because that didn’t really start to become a part of your work until 2018; is that right?
A. It’s correct.
Q. We can take that down. Thank you. When you were working on cutters as a maritime enforcement officer, were you a member of the crew or were you undertaking sort of separate law enforcement role? You weren’t a CFI or anything like that, were you?
A. I was a member of the crew, so I was a member of the cutter crew and the boarding crew, so …
Q. And were you a qualified mariner?
A. Everybody working on a boat takes marine qualifications, depending what level they are, so I had certifications appropriate to my level on board the boat.
Q. Thank you very much. Turning back then to the role of immigration officer, can you tell us a little bit about the function of an immigration officer, please? What were your responsibilities?
A. Within the Maritime Command Centre?
Q. Yes.
A. Specifically to Operation Deveran or …
Q. I want to understand the role in general first, if I can.
A. Okay.
Q. Is it right that an immigration officer might have a range of different roles?
A. Our primary role in the Maritime Command Centre was looking after the fleet of Border Force assets, tasking and deploying them on a day-to-day basis, having to look after the welfare of the crew, and we’re the single point of contact for other Government agencies who might need assistance from — from Border Force.
Q. We heard from Karen Whitehouse on Tuesday that her role was national, not just focused on the Channel, but dealing with the Border Force fleet as a whole. Is that also true of your role?
A. Yes, that’s correct. The fleet work round the whole of the UK, so yes, it was a national role.
Q. And how much of your time was focused on the Channel as opposed to that national picture?
A. The proportion of the time increased over the years from when it first started. Events were few and far between and then, yes, it got to the stage where the majority of our time would have been taken up by Operation Deveran work.
Q. Was that true in November 2021?
A. Yes, certainly the majority of our work would have been on Op Deveran.
Q. You talk about “our work”. Are you talking about immigration officers or are you talking about yourself and the higher officer you worked with on that tasking?
A. My role specifically in the MCC.
Q. Thank you. In terms of the structure of your role, who did you answer to? Who was your line manager?
A. Karen Whitehouse is my HO at the time.
Q. Was it always Karen who was your line manager working on a shift or did you work with different higher officers?
A. I would have worked with different HOs at different times if Karen was on leave. Someone might have swapped shifts. So yes, but …
Q. Did you also have a more senior officer available to you during your shifts?
A. Yes, there was always an on-call SO who was available if things needed escalating.
Q. And if you needed to speak to them or contact them, was it Karen Whitehouse who would do that or were you able to contact them yourself?
A. Either one of us, as — as appropriate at the time.
Q. And how would you contact them, if you needed to?
A. By telephone. They weren’t on duty in the office, so we would phone them.
Q. What sort of circumstances might lead you to contact a more senior officer for assistance or support?
A. Specifically to Op Deveran?
Q. Yes. So November 2021, in the role you are undertaking ordinarily with Karen Whitehouse, in what circumstances might you call the senior officer who was potentially on-call for assistance or support?
A. If an incident needed escalating, if there was — either if one — if there had been a request for a Border Force asset to go into French territorial waters for any reason to assist in a rescue, then that would have to be certainly flagged to the SO, or if there had been a serious incident resulting in injuries or fatalities, then that would need to be escalated to the SO.
Q. If you needed advice or support on a decision whether to task an asset, for example, is that something that would go to the higher officer or would you contact the senior officer?
A. We would take that decision in the office between us.
Q. Yes. I want to understand how your role interacted with that of a higher officer. So you have told us, I think, that the higher officer was essentially your line manager, your direct report; is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. In evidence on Tuesday, Karen Whitehouse told us that there was very little difference between your role and that of the higher officer. Is that something you would agree with?
A. Primarily, yes. We both carried out the same functions. Karen or whoever the HO would be would ultimately have the line management responsibility, but essentially, day-to-day roles for the work that we were doing, especially for Op Deveran, our roles were pretty — pretty much the same.
Q. Understood. Can we go to your statement at paragraph 11, please, page 4 {INQ010214/4}. So halfway through that paragraph, you are talking about decisions to task an asset and right in the middle, it starts: “As it was, Karen was leading on managing the surface assets during that shift, I simply rang [Her Majesty’s Coastguard] to query the latest updates on the tracker.” Is that a fair description or were you working collaboratively, making decisions together in concert?
A. Yes, so generally, the way we worked as a pair, we would discuss and decide at the start of each shift how we were going to run the shift. One of us — on this particular shift, Karen would look after the case filing and electronic recording side of things, doing the live updates, and I was looking after the telephones and the radios. So we would decide that at the start of the shift, who was — who was going to do what for the duration of the shift, but we would — it was a small office. There is only two of us in there. Three desks, but there was only two ever — generally, there is only ever two people on duty. We are a small team. So we knew exactly what was going on between us the whole time. Any telephone call or radio transmission would be heard by both of us in the office. So yes, that is the way we — we ran it.
Q. Can you help me to understand those logistics? You are in a small room just yourself and Karen Whitehouse, is that right, or usually Karen Whitehouse, on a shift?
A. That’s right.
Q. Are you sharing a desk? Are you sitting close to each other? What is the arrangement?
A. Our desks are next to each other.
Q. Okay. And if there was a call or contact via the radio, could you hear the other person on a call? Could you hear the radio?
A. Certainly the radio. Of course, it is a — yes, it’s a handset, so the radio would be heard by both parties, and telephone call, yes, generally you could either hear it or the other person would just say what had been said when you came off the phone.
Q. Okay. Between yourself and the higher officer, who had final decision-making authority? Who was the one who actually made a decision about tasking an asset?
A. The HO.
Q. If you were taking a call as you have described and there was a request to task an asset, could you take that decision yourself without consulting the higher officer?
A. I would always consult the HO to make that. If the HO was there on duty, we would discuss it together and, yes, ultimately the HO would make the decision.
Q. Okay. You have talked a little bit about speaking on the phone, speaking on the radio. I want to understand how the different communications were happening in the office. So you have said you were talking to the higher officer physically in person when you were both in the office; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. When you were speaking to HM Coastguard, was that done by phone, by radio? How were you communicating with them?
A. Generally via telephone.
Q. Generally by telephone?
A. (Nods).
Q. And what about an asset? So before it was deployed, if you needed to call a cutter commander, for example, how was that done?
A. That was done by telephone to tell them that they were being tasked. That would be a telephone call.
Q. Once an asset had been deployed, so the cutter is out in the Channel, it’s left the port of Dover, was that the same? Were you still talking to them by phone or how did you communicate with an asset?
A. Both means — both means available, either telephone or airwaves radio. Obviously they had VHF on board, but we don’t have that in the office because you haven’t got the range. So the coastguard could talk to them on VHF radio, but we could talk to the vessels either by telephone or by airwaves radio.
Q. You have mentioned VHF radio. Did you say you haven’t got sufficient range to listen to VHF radio in the office; is that right?
A. That’s correct. VHF has a range of approximately 30/40 miles line of sight, so yes, we wouldn’t be able to speak to vessels that far away, no.
Q. It’s right you were based at Portsmouth, weren’t you?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. In what sort of circumstances might you speak to an asset once it had been deployed? So after the initial tasking, as I say, en route in the Channel, in what circumstances might you be contacting, say, the Valiant?
A. Sometimes it would be a welfare check, depending how long they had been at sea; if we needed to — if we needed an update from them for any reason. But most of the communication, once the asset was at sea, would be through the coastguard, the coastguard talking to the cutter. We would speak to them — once they had intercepted a migrant event, we would pass the — our reference number, the M number, Mike number. We would pass that to the cutter, so we would contact them to pass that number. But most communication with the asset, once it was tasked, was by the coastguard.
Q. What about the number of people embarked on the cutter? Was that something you would communicate directly with the cutter about?
A. Yes, the cutter would — ultimately, they would notify both us and the coastguard of the numbers that they had picked up, but yes, we would speak to them once the — once the event was concluded. Obviously it was a very busy time on board the vessels when they were involved in embarking the migrants, but yes, once they had concluded the events, we would speak to them and obtain the numbers from them.
Q. You have told us a little bit about the different communications you would be having in the course of your shift. How were you recording or writing down or using the information you were obtaining on those calls?
A. As I said earlier, the way Karen and I worked was we would decide at the start of each shift who was — well, we would have one person looking after the recording on the case register and the live event updates. One of us would be doing that for the shift and the other person would be looking after the radio and the telephone calls. A lot of the details which we were recording on our live events updates, our hourly reports, a lot of the details on that were taken direct from the coastguard tracker. So it was a case of trying to confirm details from — from the coastguard tracker to our hourly report. Any additional details which might be obtained on a telephone call or radio transmission would have been recorded directly into the electronic reports.
Q. Understood. So an important part of your role, depending on the division of work between the two of you, was inputting that information into logs and trackers and making records of what you had been told on calls; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Can I ask you a little bit about your training for this role? I’m afraid there is not much in your statement about that, so I want to ask you first quite a general question. What are the qualifications that are required to work as an immigration officer?
A. Specifically within the MCC?
Q. In general, to start with. We will get more specific in a minute, but if you can just tell me, to become an immigration officer, to take on the role that you had at that time, what qualifications do you need? What training?
A. Well, I mean, immigration officers — you know, you have got frontline immigration officers who are dealing — who are working at ports and airports, or you have got ourselves who are — who are not frontline-based. We are in the Maritime Command Centre, which is a support — support role. So it’s a — so it’s in the roles and different training ultimately. My — personally, my background was I was a trained Customs Officer who had worked on the fleet and then came off and worked within the Maritime Command Centre subsequently.
Q. Is there any basic training which all immigration officers receive or is it all specialised to the particular tasking you have within that role?
A. Yes, it’s specialised to the role you are doing. Frontline officers would be trained to a different capacity to support officers.
Q. Understood. Moving then to your specific role working on Operation Deveran and responding to boats within the Channel, what training were you given to undertake that role?
A. It was — it was a work area that developed, you know, from when migrant events started. So I wouldn’t say there was any specific training for Op Deveran itself. We all had general maritime background experience, but the running of events, the recording of information was something which was just on the job training, I guess. Once — once the events started, yes, we just — we learnt as we went along.
Q. And in relation to small boats in the Channel, were you given any training about particular facets or challenges or aspects of that response work which were different to other general maritime work? So, for example, we know there are particular challenges associated with small boats to do with the nature of the boat, the difficulty locating or identifying the boats, the ways in which they move or travel. Had you had any training on that sort of content for this role?
A. We all received briefings. There was weekly briefing reports from — from CTC and whoever were running Op Deveran from Dover. So there were weekly briefing reports which highlighted the current trends and associated risks with ongoing events, so we updated ourselves through those briefings from our own managers. So yes, that’s how we basically kept up to date with regards ongoing threats.
Q. Did you have any specific training in incident response or risk assessment to help respond to small boats in distress?
A. If there was — if small boats were in distress, that was something which would be — well, it would be down to the coastguard who would be dealing with the incident at the time, you know, realtime. That would be a — be within the coastguard remit to deal with any ongoing distress scenarios.
Q. You were being asked to make decisions about the tasking of assets in response to small boats which were quite often in distress. I think we have heard evidence that all small boats were treated as being in distress. Is that something you agree with?
A. Yes, the grading of each — every small boat event as it was reported and, you know, when it was entered into the coastguard tracker, the status would change when it was in French waters. As soon as they all entered UK waters, they were then classified as distressed because of the nature of the boats and the situation. Yes, they weren’t necessarily in distress, but they were classified as — as distress.
Q. Can you help me to understand that distinction? They were classified as distress, but not necessarily in distress. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, it was the view that was taken that because of the type of boats, the quality of the boats, they weren’t obviously trained mariners on board, they were poorly equipped boats. Obviously, Operation Deveran as a whole, the primary role was SOLAS. It was all about safety of life. So hence, yes, all the vessels were classified from the UK side as distress once they entered UK waters.
Q. You have told us they often weren’t genuinely in distress. Does that mean even where they were classified formally as being in distress, you weren’t always treating them as though they were in a state of distress or emergency?
A. Yes — yes, it’s difficult to answer that. Obviously some of them would — yes, there was — generally they would still be underway. They would still be making way through the water, but the reason they were classified as distress on the coastguard tracker and on ours was because of the nature of the boats and that they were totally unsuitable boats and the, yes, primary requirement was to locate and pick up the boats.
Q. So coming back to my original question then, did you have training for risk assessment or incident response for boats are that were categorised as being in distress, as you put it?
A. Not specifically, not to my knowledge.
Q. Did you take part in any drills or practical exercises with the cutters or with other assets?
A. Table top-type exercises, you mean?
Q. For example, yes.
A. Not personally, no.
Q. Did you ever do training with other stakeholders or agencies who had involvement in Op Deveran? So, for example, HM Coastguard, perhaps the RNLI as a voluntary organisation assisting.
A. Not personally, no.
Q. No, okay. I want to ask you now a little bit about the working arrangements for the night of the 23rd into the 24 November 2021, if I can.
A. Yes.
Q. Before I do that, I just want to clarify what it is that you remember about that night. So can we turn to your statement, paragraph 5, page 2, please {INQ010214/2}. So you say in your statement: “I cannot recall the night of 23 November into 24 November 2021 because it was a ‘business as usual’ night. Whilst I now know of the tragic events which unfolded whilst I was on shift, I did not know at the time. I cannot recall exactly what work I did that evening and I have not located any notes or emails from that shift.” Can I ask you now, Mr Willows: do you have an independent recollection now of that night?
A. Having heard and seen the various transcripts of telephone calls and radio transmissions that were made that evening, I obviously know that I was on duty and I was in the — in the MCC that night, but it’s three and a half years ago, so I don’t have any specific recollection of the specific shift itself.
Q. Is it fair to say then that you are reliant on the documentary material to tell us about what happened on that night?
A. That’s correct.
Q. You don’t have any sort of independent memory of that specific night beyond what the documents and the transcripts tell you?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you. Is it right that you were never interviewed by the MAIB as part of their investigation in this incident?
A. That’s correct.
Q. So is it right that the first time essentially you have been asked about what happened that night is as part of this Inquiry?
A. That’s right.
Q. Thank you. Turning then, as best you can, given that, to the working arrangements which were in place that night. So if we turn to paragraph 3 of your statement, which is on page 1 {INQ010214/1}, you say right at the bottom of the page: “I cannot remember whether I was working remotely or working in the BFMCC but I know that my colleague Karen Whitehouse, a BF higher officer, was working in the BFMCC that night.” Is that still your evidence now? You can’t remember yourself whether you were there in person or whether you were working remotely?
A. If it wasn’t for the transcripts, etc, I wouldn’t have — I wouldn’t be able to recall where I was three and a half years ago. Having looked at the rosters from that time period, for example, the night before, which had been assessed as a green night, I was working from home. We just had the one in the office, but for that night, because it’s an amber assessed night, the two of us were in the office.
Q. Is that something you remember or is that something you have logically deduced must have been the case from the RAG rating for that night, the red-amber-green rating?
A. A combination. That and one of the transcripts, which shows that the night before, we had a telephone conversation when I was working from home and Karen was in the office.
Q. Okay. Can I take you to the second statement of Karen Whitehouse, {INQ10698/2}, paragraph 4, page 2, please. She says at the very bottom of that paragraph: “The expectation of Border Force Maritime Command … was that BFMCC personnel would be physically based at the BFMCC on ‘red days’ or ‘amber days’, however, we were able to work some shifts remotely on ‘green days’, when the demands of Op Deveran would allow us to do so.” Do you agree that that was the working arrangement for remote work at the time?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Now, we have heard evidence that the evening of the 23rd was amber and overnight in the 24th, it became a red day. Is that the basis on which you say you were likely to have been in person at the office that day?
A. Based on the RAG system, did you say?
Q. Yes, in that the rule seems to have been you should be physically based at BFMCC on red days or amber days, as it says at paragraph 4 there.
A. Yes. Yes, that’s correct. We were both in the office on the 23rd because it was amber. I think if I — the following day, the 24th, Karen was on leave, so it was just me on the red night working on my own, so — but that was the agreement. If it was red or amber and there was two of us on duty, we would both be in the office.
Q. I think, in fact, it became a red night during your shift that evening overnight. Is that something you remember?
A. I don’t recall, only from the — from that day’s planning document which reflected that.
Q. Understood. I think you mentioned earlier when you were talking about your understanding of whether you were in the office or out that you had seen rosters for the day; is that right?
A. Yes, yes, yes. We have — we obviously have a team roster.
Q. I don’t think that’s something the Inquiry has had disclosed to it. Is that a document you looked at in preparation for today’s evidence?
A. Only when I was trying to clarify whether I was on duty or not, so —
Q. Understood.
A. — yes, I saw it then.
Q. Can I take you to the first statement of Karen Whitehouse, which talks a little bit about communications that night. Paragraph 43, page 19, please, {INQ010135/19}. So Ms Whitehouse says: “If I needed to communicate with Mr Willows then I would have done so by mobile telephone.” I think that might be higher up in paragraph 43. I think, in fact, paragraph 43 begins on the previous page, if we go right to the bottom of the previous page. Thank you very much {INQ010135/18}: “If I needed to communicate with Mr Willows … I would have done so by mobile telephone.” Going across on to the next page. Now, at that stage, I believe when she wrote that, looking at the rest of that paragraph, she was under the impression that you were working remotely that night. If you were in the office together, is it right you would have been speaking to one another rather than speaking by phone?
A. Yes, that’s correct, yes. We sat next to each other, so yes.
Q. She goes on to say {INQ010135/19}: “I cannot recall contacting him that night and have not located any emails between us. Given that we would have agreed who was doing which tasks, there would not have been a need to speak unless either of us had a query.” Was that the normal arrangement when you were working remotely; that you wouldn’t expect to speak to one another in the course of the night?
A. If it was a green night — so I think there was some initial confusion when Karen made her first statement as to whether we were both in the office or not, so I think she subsequently updated that. So if it was a green night and one of us was working at home, then we would have a conversation at the start of the shift, see what was going on, decide who was going to — what the person working at home was going to be doing. But yes, if we needed to speak, then obviously it would be done by telephone.
Q. But is it right that when you were working remotely on a green night, you wouldn’t normally expect to speak to one another unless there was a query? It wouldn’t be unusual not to speak to one another in the shift.
A. Yes, that’s correct, yes.
Q. Can I ask you about the division of responsibilities between the two of you. So I think you mentioned earlier that you might choose to divide the work between one person doing essentially the calls and the other doing the recording and the information management. Is that a fair description?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a standard arrangement or was it something that was different night by night or morning by morning, depending which shift you were assigned to?
A. Certainly for us, the way we worked, we always had a conversation at the start of the shift, so we would probably alternate it. So, you know, the first shift, Karen was looking after the recording, case register, etc. Then the next time we were on shift together, we would probably swap round. So yes, that was the standard arrangement.
Q. Can we turn to paragraph 35 of this statement, please, same document, page 15 {INQ010135/15}. She says right at the very bottom: “Although I cannot recall …” Then going over on to the next page {INQ010135/16}: “… I would expect that my colleague working remotely and I agreed at the beginning of the shift that he would do the ‘business as usual’ work including emails, reports etc. and I would focus on Op Deveran and looking after the assets.” Does that sound right to you in terms of the allocation of work on the night of the 23rd to the 24th?
A. I think that’s — well, no, because that refers to working remotely. We were both in the office, so that’s — no, that’s not correct, no.
Q. I think in her evidence on Tuesday, the position was a little bit different. Rather than you doing business as usual, emails and reports and her looking after Op Deveran and the assets, I understood her evidence to be that you were taking responsibility for the calls while she was taking responsibility for the information management side, inputting into the trackers.
A. Yes, that’s correct. We were both focused on Op Deveran on that night. It was an amber night. We knew it would be busy night. So yes, that’s the way it was split.
Q. Is that something you actually remember now or is that something you are basing on her evidence?
A. I certainly don’t recall the conversation at the start of the shift, but that’s based on the transcripts, and it’s clear from that how we were running the shift.
Q. Understood. So it’s based on having seen the transcripts and you taking a number of calls on the night; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. How long were your shifts in November 2021?
A. Generally nine/nine and a half hour shifts with a handover factored in.
Q. Okay. Can I take you to paragraph 44 of this same document, page 19, I believe {INQ010135/19}. It says: “The shift involved working through without an official break – the break is taken at the end of the shift because of the nature of the work. Comfort breaks are possible by diverting the phones to the mobile and taking the airwave handset too. There are opportunities to have a snack without leaving any comms unattended.” Now, I think her position in oral evidence on Tuesday was a little different to that again, but I want to understand what your experience was. Do you remember working through without official breaks?
A. Generally that’s what we — that’s what we did. We would eat our meals at the desk. The bit about diverting phones, etc, to the official mobile, that would be if you were solo working. If there was just one person in the office, if you obviously needed to go to the toilet, take a five/ten-minute break, comfort break, then you had the option of diverting the phones, etc, and taking a radio. Obviously when there was two of you in the office, then there was no requirement to do that. But yes, certainly we generally worked through our shift.
Q. Did you often find yourself working solo in that period?
A. Fairly frequently. We were — there was only — the MCC is a small team. We were basically five teams of two people. So you only need one person to be on leave or on a training course and you are solo working, so it wasn’t uncommon.
Q. And it may seem obvious, but if you were solo working on a given night, were you then responsible for both calls and communicating with stakeholders and assets and the information management responsibilities, the live updates and the trackers?
A. Yes, that would be the case.
Q. Whereas normally that would be a two-person task.
A. Correct.
Q. I want to turn now and ask a little bit about that information sharing role, if I can; how information was recorded within your office and how it was shared with others. Within the Home Office, we know that you had a Border Force tracker which had a title called “live updates”, and we have spoken a little bit about that already.
A. Mm.
Q. There was also something called an Op Deveran case register.
A. (Nods).
Q. I don’t think we need to go to that document itself. It’s quite a large spreadsheet.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. We have heard from Karen Whitehouse on Tuesday that it was different to the Border Force tracker because it was only filled in once an M number or a Mike number was assigned to an incident. Could you talk us through that? At what stage was the case register coming in? How was it different to the Border Force tracker?
A. So the tracker or the live events update was basically a mirror of the coastguard tracker, so it would reflect every single event that was open, but because, yes, on some days, they would go round the alphabet two or three times, we would only actually put an event on to our official case register once a migrant vessel had been picked up, and at that point was when the Mike number was issued, so only then, from our point of view, did it become an official record, so to speak. So that’s when we created — obviously it was given the Mike number and that’s when we entered it on to our case register.
Q. So at the start, you were looking at HM Coastguard’s tracker to obtain information; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Was that information then used to inform the Border Force tracker, the live updates; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And then where was the information for the case register taken from?
A. Essentially from the tracker, whether it was the coastguard tracker or from our live events update. It would be a combination of the two reports which then fed into our case register.
Q. So were you taking information from both the Border Force tracker and HM Coastguard’s tracker to feed into the case register once an incident had an M or Mike number assigned?
A. That’s correct.
Q. I want to ask you a little bit about HM Coastguard’s tracker, if I can. You have already told us it was the first point of information on anything. It’s where you would first see information about incidents; is that right?
A. Yes, the — well, either the coastguard tracker or the French Gris-Nez tracker. We received copies of that as well, so sometimes we would get indication on there that there was activity in French waters before it was, yes, on the coastguard tracker. So yes, that’s the first we got the heads-up, so to speak, from either Gris-Nez or from the coastguard tracker.
Q. And were you getting the Gris-Nez tracker from the coastguard or from a different source?
A. We received it direct from Gris-Nez.
Q. Direct from Gris-Nez. Did you then share it with HM Coastguard or were they also receiving it directly from Gris-Nez?
A. They received it themselves direct from Gris-Nez.
Q. I want to ask you a little bit about how you interacted with the tracker of HM Coastguard. Could we turn to {INQ010631/1}, please. This is an email from the 20 November 2021. We can see text pasted into the bottom of the email from both yourself and Karen Whitehouse and a person whose name has been redacted. You say at 6.02: “Morning … Me and Karen on earlies here.” Is it right that that was an instance where you were working a morning shift as opposed to an overnight shift?
A. Yes, 06.12, that would be an early shift, yes.
Q. If we look further down towards the bottom, we can see you making a number of requests for the tracker. So you say. “Can we have another [HM Coastguard] tracker please …” Moving down: “Thanks.” “Is there another tracker please …” And again: “Thanks for tracker.” Why were you asking for the tracker at that stage? Did you have access to it yourself on the 20th?
A. Not on the 20th — well, obviously not if I was asking for it. I believe we only literally were given access to it the day or two before the night of the incident. So at that stage on the 20th, we would not have had access to the coastguard tracker, no.
Q. And at that stage, how did you obtain the tracker? We can see requests being made to someone within Border Force. Did they have access to the coastguard tracker?
A. I think that would be — that email is going to — sorry, who’s that conversation with again? It’s —
Q. So it’s a person within the Border Force —
A. Sorry, yes, sorry. So that was with the CGLO. That was our — that was the Border Force liaison officer based at, you know, the JCR in Dover. So — so they had access to the coastguard tracker, but we didn’t in the MCC.
Q. And they were not based in your office. They were based in a separate office in Dover.
A. They were in the JCR at Dover.
Q. They were in the JCR.
A. Yes, yes.
Q. So any time you needed to see a tracker at this stage —
A. Yes.
Q. — you had to make a request for an updated version; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Can I ask that we turn to {INQ010633/1}, please. We have a similar email, but this time from 22 November in the evening, 11.24 pm. Once again, we have got yourself and Karen Whitehouse speaking there. It looks like this is the shift the night before 23 to 24 November; is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct. So that evening, I believe I was working from home.
Q. So if you go about halfway down the page, we can see Karen Whitehouse says: “Debriefs- just read the last comments from [redacted name] about MCC/CGLO confusion. Wonder what he’s referring to?” Do you have any recollection what this is about at all?
A. No, no idea.
Q. Is it fair to say CGLO is HM Coastguard’s liaison officer that we were just speaking about?
A. Well, the Border Force liaison officer working with the coastguard.
Q. Understood. You say: “Not really sure…… i do wonder if there are too many people involved sometimes though.” Do you know what you meant by that? Are you able to tell us now?
A. No, no recollection what that conversation was — was based on, no.
Q. Carrying down a few entries, Karen Whitehouse says, 23.19: “I wonder if now we have access to the [coastguard] tracker if we need a CGLO?” So by this stage, we can see you do have access to the coastguard tracker; is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. So certainly by the 22nd, the shift before, you had access to the tracker. It seems likely you gained access sometimes — sometime between the morning of the 20th and the evening then of the 22nd.
A. Yes.
Q. Can we turn to another document, please, {INQ010640/1}, starting at page 3, if we can, please {INQ010640/3}. This is an email chain within Border Force Maritime Command and we can see there an email on 19 November at 1.57. It starts: “Dear all, “In the light of the last few manic Deveran shifts…. Just wanted to make a suggestion on the new live updates and the case register in general, as there are some variances in how we are operating as teams. I think it’s important that we produce consistent output, so we probably need a bit of a tune up in some areas.” Can I ask: the live update system that you have been telling us about, was it new at that stage?
A. I don’t recall when it came into — into use.
Q. Okay. Could we go then to page 1, please of this document, {INQ010640/1}. We can see at the top this is a chain forwarded to you by Karen Whitehouse on 21 November, 6.06 in the morning: “Tom “FYI.” And below we can see an email from Border Force Command on 20 November. It says, several lines down: “Hopefully by close of play tomorrow all MCC staff will be granted permission to the MCGA share point which will allow live continuous access to the [coastguard] Tracker. “This will prevent chasing and allow us to update as we go rather than being bombarded with multiple events sporadically. “This should ease pressure on our hourly update, but again we can only report what we know or are told.” And it says this is being done as a trial: “We should trial run this and if there are still concerns we can revisit this.” Looking at that, having seen these documents that give some context, are you able to tell us now: do you have any recollection yourself of when you got access to the coastguard tracker?
A. Yes, as we established, it looks like it was some time between the 20th and the 23rd. So whether it’s the 21st or the 22nd, I don’t know for definite which day it was, but yes, one of those two days, a day or so before the night — the night in question.
Q. So it was a new system, effectively, on 23/24 November?
A. Yes, for us to have direct access to it, yes.
Q. And do you remember now, so using your recollection, whether you were given full access to the coastguard tracker or read-only access? So what I am asking is: do you remember whether you had the ability to make any changes to that document?
A. My recollection is initially, we only had read-only access. I don’t know when we were given full — full access, but certainly initially, with it being a new system, it was read-only.
Q. Can I take you to a document {INQ007058/1}, please. We need to wait a second to bring it up on the computer. There we are. This is a register of changes made to HM Coastguard’s tracker on the night of 23 to 24 November 2021. We can see the different columns. We can see “Change Date” and “Change Author”. And there is just one entry from you that night, which is line 17, item number 17. In fact, I think, yes, it’s row 18, and we can see on the 24th at 2.23 in the morning, thomas.willows@homeoffice. Looking at this, do you accept that you had change access on the night, the ability to amend the tracker itself?
A. As I said, my — my recollection is we had read-only access initially. Whether that’s when we would have logged on to the tracker — I don’t know if that’s the only entry from me, because by that time at night, we certainly weren’t issuing any M numbers. So there’s no reason that I would have been editing that document, so — so I can’t answer, but I thought we had read-only access, so …
Q. Are you saying that from 2.23 in the morning onwards, you weren’t issuing any further M numbers, for instance?
A. No, no, I am saying stage, there hadn’t been any M numbers issued —
Q. Understood.
A. — because Valiant hadn’t picked up any events by that stage, I believe.
Q. Is it right that your shift would have started around 7.30/8 o’clock that night?
A. About 8.30/8.45, yes.
Q. Can it be right that for the first six hours of your shift, a little more, you hadn’t logged on to look at the coastguard tracker?
A. If there had been no activity — Karen had — Karen had logged on earlier in the shift, and we generally only accessed it once we needed to, once there was ongoing events. Obviously, Valiant was tasked, was it, 1.30 in the morning, I believe, so it was only round about then when we became involved in events. So it was round about then when we really required access to the tracker. I wouldn’t necessarily have accessed it if there wasn’t any events going on.
Q. How would you know whether there are events going on if you weren’t logged in to check the tracker before that stage?
A. Well, the coastguard would contact us as and when they needed an asset for tasking, and also we would have seen any emails from Gris-Nez once they started coming in. We would have started getting indication that there was activity going on.
Q. So you weren’t checking the tracker from HM Coastguard until you had a notification from them, like a phone call, or something on the Gris-Nez tracker to indicate that you should then go and check?
A. Possibly. As I say, this was a brand new document — a brand new system that we had access to. So yes, I am not — I can’t say how we were accessing it and how we were running the coastguard tracker that early on, whether we would have — as it went on, as time went on, I am sure we would have started logging in straight away, but if there was no activity going on, there would have been no — no necessity for us to have been logged into it at that stage.
Q. Do you now remember whether or when you logged in that night —
A. No, I do not.
Q. — or whether or when you might have checked the tracker that night?
A. No, I don’t know.
Q. You have told us about a range of different trackers. We have talked about Border Force tracker, the case register, the HM Coastguard tracker, the Gris-Nez tracker. I think there is also a thing called a ViSION log which the HM Coastguard were using to record information. Was that something you were aware of?
A. We didn’t have access to that, no.
Q. Were you aware that it was being used? Did you know about it?
A. I have heard of it, but it’s a coastguard system which we wouldn’t have access to, so no.
Q. Did you find that working across multiple different trackers, copy/pasting information between them, that that could create confusion or inconsistencies?
A. I don’t believe that was the case. I think we — we knew the importance of our reporting, obviously how accurate it had to be. So certainly from our — from our point of view, yes, we all took the reporting seriously and it was a — it was a primary part of our role.
MS WOODS: Understood. Sir, would that be a convenient moment to break?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes.
MS WOODS: Thank you very much.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: So 10 minutes. (10.54 am) (A short break) (11.05 am)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Ms Woods.
MS WOODS: Thank you very much, chair. Mr Willows, before the break, we were discussing the different methods of recording information as part of your role. Another method of recording information was the daybook. Can we turn please to your statement, {INQ010214/2} at paragraph 4. That’s page 2, I believe. Thank you very much. We received as part of the Inquiry daybooks from Karen Whitehouse, which we have gone to in evidence, and from Commander Toy, but we don’t have a daybook from you. Looking at this paragraph, you say: “It is an individual officer’s decision as to what information they record in their daybook. I have checked my daybook and I have not made any notes during my shift on 23/24 November 2021. This is not unusual for me; I tend to record information directly onto Home Office systems, if relevant. Using my daybook is rare, given the ever-increasing move to electronic records. Where I did use my daybook, it was typically to record specific incidents which were relevant for law enforcement purposes, rather than ‘business as usual’ matters such as migrant crossings.” Looking at this, does that mean that you didn’t use your daybook at all on the shift from 23 to 24 November 2021?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And, in fact, if we go further down the paragraph, you say that you didn’t use your daybook at all between, I think, 1 August 2021 and 28 April 2022; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. I think you say in the middle of the paragraph there it was typically used for law enforcement purposes rather than small boats; is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. Was that your understanding at the time?
A. Yes.
Q. And you understood that it was a matter for your discretion whether or not you used the daybook at all?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Could we turn, please, to {INQ010666/1}, please. This is the Operation Deveran standard operating procedures which were in place at the relevant time. Mr Willows, is this a document you were familiar with in your role?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this essentially the role which governs the way you do your job for Operation Deveran matters?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Thank you very much. Could we turn to page 6 {INQ010666/6}, please. We can see a section in the middle of the page titled “Recording of decisions” and it says: “Decisions made in relation to this operation must be recorded in appropriate documents as soon as is reasonably practicable (Day book, Ships log and/or pocketbook). This should include the supporting rationale for the decision made.” It’s fair to say you weren’t on a cutter, so you weren’t filling in a ships log; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And did you have a pocket book?
A. No, just a daybook.
Q. Just a daybook, okay. Could we go to page 7, please {INQ010666/7}. We can see at the top there: “MCC officers …” Were you an MCC officer at the time?
A. Yes.
Q. “MCC officers must record their decisions and actions taken in day books.” And it goes on: “MCC officers are responsible for providing timely, accurate and updates to partner agencies and departments, and compile case files and a register.” Could we turn one more to page 14, please {INQ010666/14}. There is a heading titled “Day book entries”. It says: “SOLAS 1974 …” I think that’s safety of life at sea; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. “… and Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 (Record/Retain/Reveal) require all actions and decision making to be recorded. Day book entries must be in chronological order, factual, and accurate, with awareness that these may be used in evidence.” So this is referring not only to CPIA, to the law enforcement element, but also to SOLAS, to search and rescue, safety of life at sea; is that right?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. You accept you weren’t compliant with this requirement to be recording your decisions and your rationale in the daybook at the relevant time?
A. The way we — the way things were run in the office, all entries were put directly on to the electronic updates and case register. So I personally didn’t run a daybook, but all information or details that I took were put directly on to the electronic records that were kept. So they were all, yes, completed timely and accurately, but the electronic version as opposed to into a daybook.
Q. You didn’t have an electronic daybook. You are talking about the trackers, aren’t you?
A. Yes, the live update tracker and the case register.
Q. But you have told us that this is the document which governed the way you did your job at the time and you have told us this is a document you were familiar with. This document says you must be recording in your daybook, doesn’t it?
A. The work around Op Deveran was evolving the whole time. When it started, incidents were few and far between, back in — back in 2018 when it all started, but by this stage, 2021, as you are aware, there were multiple events, crossings per shift and the amount of reporting and recording became quite substantial. So it just — our work evolved in the office and certainly me personally — I think most people within the team, we were recording directly on to the electronic records to save duplicating all the information.
Q. We can see that this document requires you to record your decision-making and your rationale for that decision-making in the daybook. Are you telling us that you were recording your decision-making and your rationale for your decision-making in the Border Force tracker, the live update spreadsheet?
A. Well, if there was an HO on duty, then it was the HO that was taking the decisions, making the decisions.
Q. You have already told us a lot of decisions were collaborative. You were discussing, you were working together and taking decisions about asset allocation. Where were you recording your decision-making and the rationale for that?
A. I was recording the pertinent facts directly on to the electronic live updates case register.
Q. Just to be clear, I am not asking about the facts. Just for the moment, I am asking about your decisions and the reasons for making the decisions you made. Where was that?
A. Well, I didn’t have anything in the daybook.
Q. Okay. We can take this down. I want to ask you now a little bit about the actual night of the 23rd to 24th, and I appreciate you have told us you are reliant on the written records and you don’t have an independent recollection, but I want to take you to some of those records, if I can, to see what you do remember and what you can assist us with.
A. Yes.
Q. Could we start by looking at the statement of Karen Whitehouse, the second one, 10698, at paragraph 6. It is page 3, I believe {INQ010698/3}. At the very bottom of that paragraph, Ms Whitehouse says: “I now believe that all telephone calls made by BFMCC to HMCG, or received by BFMCC from HMCG, on the night of 23/24 November 2021 were made or received by Mr Willows.” Do you agree with that? Were all phone calls made or received by you?
A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge, yes.
Q. Okay. Again, is that based on what you have seen of some of the transcripts or is that your memory that you were receiving all the calls?
A. I can’t specifically recall the night itself, so it’s going — going from transcripts.
Q. If we could turn to paragraph 12, page 4, please {INQ010698/4}. In this paragraph, Ms Whitehouse is talking about calls made to or received from Commander Toy, so communications with the Valiant. She says: “Given that I believe that Mr Willows was working alongside me at the BFMCC, I consider that it is currently impossible for me to confirm whether Mr Willows or I made those calls.” Are you able to say now which of the two of you it was who communicated with the Valiant on the night?
A. Not for definite. There’s transcripts which clearly have me involved in communications. Maybe Karen did make a phone call, but I believe I made the majority of any calls during that shift, but we might well have overlapped or Karen might well have made some herself.
Q. Understood. Could we turn to Ms Whitehouse’s first statement, 10135, paragraph 49, please {INQ010135/21}. It starts: “The first entry in my daybook for [that date] is timed at 01:12.” So 1.12 in the morning: “It is a set of coordinates which I believe came from [HM Coastguard] by telephone. I was given the coordinates [and then sets out the coordinates]. Next to that entry I wrote 23:52Z which I think meant that the coordinates given for the migrant boat were received by [HM Coastguard] at 23:52.” Do you now have any memory of participating in any call before 1.12 or at 1.12?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Okay. Turning then to the next call, it’s at 7648, please, {INQ007648/1}. We can see that this is a call which took place around 1.20 on the morning of 24 November 2021. You can see there that there are two speakers there. They have been identified in the transcript as yourself and Stuart Downs. Can I ask: do you remember making this call?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. Are you able to confirm whether the speaker on this call was yourself, was you?
A. I have heard one audio recording of it. I don’t know if it’s this call. I have heard an audio recording from a telephone call which was myself. I don’t know if it is this call or not.
Q. Perhaps it would assist if we go to the next page, please {INQ007648/2}. Are you able to say whether the entries marked as “Tom Willows” here are in fact you on that call?
A. Yes, I presume so, yes.
Q. Thank you very much. Looking at the transcript, it begins with some information about the boat called Migrant 1 before turning to the subject of Charlie. So we can see about two-thirds of the way down the page, we turn to Charlie. Stuart Downs says: “Not on the list and more of an issue is migrant 7 which I can give you a position for that.” And you say: “Okay.” We understand that Migrant 7 is the boat we have been calling Charlie. Is that also your understanding?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. And HM Coastguard gives a position for Charlie, which he says is from about 10 minutes earlier, as best I can tell. And if we go over the page, {INQ007648/3}, we can see: “That’s now, or about 10 minutes ago. And that’s supposedly from the — according to the French at that, when they told us about it, was … 6 nautical miles from UK waters. I would imagine it’s in UK waters by now.” And he confirms that there is no French asset with that boat. We can see he gives some information about Migrant 7 or Charlie. You say: “… any further details?” So you are asking for more information about this boat, and he says: “There’s 30 people on board, 14 have got life jackets and supposedly there are 13 women, 8 children.” And he offers to give you a phone number. You say: “Probably don’t need it but go on.” Why was it your view that you didn’t need phone numbers for people on a boat?
A. Because we didn’t get involved in that side of things. So the coastguard — when they were receiving phone calls from the migrant vessels, it was the coastguard that was receiving the phone calls, so they’re obviously logging the numbers. And then part of the process was when the migrant vessels were picked up, part of the process was they would request the Border Force crew to check with the migrants if any of them had made a phone call and then they would, you know, cross-reference any phone numbers. So that’s — but that was done through the coastguard. The coastguard would speak to Valiant or whichever boat it was direct and request that information.
Q. Were there ever any circumstances in which Border Force would call a boat directly?
A. Not in relation to phone numbers. Not that I was aware of.
Q. Have you ever yourself made a call directly to a small boat to obtain more information?
A. To a small boat, no. Never, no.
Q. I think these are the numbers for the people on the boat is my understanding.
A. Yes, yes, that’s —
Q. Would you ever call a boat yourself? No.
A. Yes — no, no, we wouldn’t do that. That would be a coastguard job.
Q. Would you ever call a coastguard to request more information proactively about an ongoing incident?
A. Yes, we would request updates, or if we saw something on their tracker which we wanted, you know, further information on, then we would contact the coastguard.
Q. Thank you. Looking down at the bottom of the page, we can see Mr Downs saying: “It’s a dinghy and they think it’s in good condition.” And then if we turn over the page {INQ007648/4}, we can see you seeking some more information and then five entries down, you say: “Okay, we’ll plot it up and look at getting an asset tasked to it then if it’s in UK waters.” And you go on to say it’s probably going to be the Valiant because they are the primary responder.
A. Mm.
Q. Who actually made the decision which asset to task within Border Force or whether to task an asset in response within Border Force?
A. So for that particular shift, that would have been a discussion between me and Karen, once the coastguard had requested an asset was tasked. From the day’s planning report, we obviously knew which was the primary asset on standby. There was always two vessels on standby, but we knew which was the primary boat. So once the decision was made that tasking the boat was appropriate, once that decision was made, then we would do so.
Q. Is that something you remember doing or would that just be your normal practice in response to an incident like this?
A. That was our standard practice.
Q. Standard. Do you remember now what information you told Karen Whitehouse in order to assist with making that decision? What information from this call did you share with her?
A. We would have reviewed the whole — the conversation.
Q. Are you confident now that you told her everything that you had been told on that call?
A. Yes. Yes, I would have told Karen anything and everything that was relevant to our — to the request and any decisions that were required.
Q. You say “would have”. Again, are you saying that’s your standard practice or you actually remember doing that on the night?
A. I can’t remember the night specifically, but I would be confident from the way we worked what information would have been discussed.
Q. Could we turn back to her statement, her first statement, 10135, please, at paragraph 16, which I think is page 6 {INQ010135/6}. In paragraph 16 — and you can have some time to read this if you like — Ms Whitehouse is talking about the different types of information that would be relevant to share, what information is relevant for making tasking decisions. So she talks about the co-ordinates; the number of persons on board, which she says is relevant to determining the appropriate asset; the time of the sighting; the course; the direction; the speed; mitigating factors like children being on board. She mentions the type of boat and says: “… anything else which would assist BFMCC in terms of allocating an asset and would assist the BFM crew in locating and identifying the boat.” And then she says: “Essentially we took as much information as we could from [HM Coastguard] because when we contacted our vessels we knew they would ask for the information.” Is that something you agree with in terms of what the relevant information was to obtain?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that the information you should have been asking coastguard for as standard in responding to these incidents?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. She goes on to say at the top of the next page {INQ010135/7}: “In November 2021 some of this information would initially be entered manually into the officer’s daybook. Relevant information would be transferred onto the BFMCC spreadsheet log.” We know you weren’t using your daybook at that time, so I think we need to look at the log, if we can, which is 471 {INQ000471/1}. So this is the covering email for that document sent by Karen Whitehouse at 1.51 on the morning of 24 November. You can see it is circulating Operation Deveran live updates. The spreadsheet itself is at 472 and if we could turn to that, please {INQ000472/1}. Thank you very much. We can see the time of that spreadsheet at the top in blue: “[TIME] 01:50].” So this is the first Border Force tracker circulated following that call with HM Coastguard timed at 1.50. We can see that the coordinates from the call have been entered here and the description states for Incident C for Charlie: “No asset with event. Believed to already be in UK waters. Valiant called.” Do you remember now who made that entry?
A. I don’t remember specifically, no.
Q. Okay. We have some information from that call with HM Coastguard here. We have the co-ordinates, for example. We have the fact that Valiant was being called, believed to already be in UK waters. But there’s important information from that call missing from this spreadsheet, isn’t there?
A. This spreadsheet, there is a — as the column says there, there is a brief description, an outline of — of the event. So not all the details would have necessarily been put in at that stage. Some of it would have been added either later, but, yes, I — I can’t recall otherwise.
Q. I want to ask you about some specific pieces of information. So this document doesn’t record, for example, that there were 13 women on board, eight children, 14 people with life jackets, that it was a dinghy which was underway, in good condition, any of the other identifying information obtained by you on that call, does it, Mr Willows?
A. It doesn’t, no.
Q. You have told us you weren’t using your daybook to record relevant facts. You were putting those relevant facts in the Border Force tracker. Where are they?
A. So most of the details that would have been passed by the coastguard on the telephone were on their tracker, so if further details were required, they could have been taken from the coastguard tracker, and this — this live update spreadsheet was just a snapshot of the activity that was going on. This wasn’t being used by the commanders of the vessels. They were receiving all their live updates from the coastguard direct once they were tasked to an event. So this actual report was just an overview which was being sent to our seniors and the RCCU who were responsible for deploying the shore-side response. So all the details may not have been recorded on here as it was just an overview at the time.
Q. But, Mr Willows, you have told us this is what you were using to record your relevant facts, your decision-making, instead of your daybook, but the information you should have been putting in your daybook, it’s not here, is it?
A. It’s not. It’s not on that spreadsheet at that stage, no.
Q. Are you suggesting it was input at a later stage?
A. No, I don’t know.
Q. Did you consider that information — so, for example, the composition of the boat, how many people were wearing life jackets, whether the boat was underway — to be important information that needed to be recorded?
A. All that information would have been passed directly to the Border Force vessel that was tasked to the incident. It would have been provided to them by the coastguard direct, you know, on the radio. So it wasn’t — it wasn’t essential for the purpose of this live update. The essential information was being passed direct to the assets that were tasked.
Q. But, Mr Willows, it was yourself and Ms Whitehouse who tasked the Valiant to respond to this incident, wasn’t it?
A. We gave them the initial tasking, but the coastguard would then give them the specific information relating to the incident that they were tasked to.
Q. We have just been through paragraph 16 of Ms Whitehouse’s statement, which lists the relevant information to share with the Valiant at tasking, and you have told me you agreed that that was important information to share, but that wasn’t information which you and Ms Whitehouse shared with the Valiant?
A. I don’t recall what was specifically told on the — when they were phoned and tasked. I can’t comment on that.
Q. Do you remember whether it was yourself or Ms Whitehouse who actually tasked the Valiant that night?
A. I can’t — I can’t recall without seeing the transcripts.
Q. Okay. On that call at around 1.20 with HM Coastguard, it doesn’t seem like you are working through a sort of structure or a list or a checklist of questions and information to be obtained. Did you have any guidelines for what information you should be seeking to obtain and record?
A. Again, from the SOP, there would have been guidelines on what information to ascertain.
Q. Within the SOP that we looked at —
A. I believe so.
Q. — previously? Can we turn to {INQ000507/1}, please. This is the next — the covering email for the next Border Force tracker live update being circulated and this one is timed at 2.43, so we are about an hour and 20 minutes on from that initial phone call we were just looking at. If we turn to 508 {INQ000508/1}, please, we should see the spreadsheet itself and at the top, timed at 2.50. We know it was actually sent before 2.50, but it is sent hourly, I understand, so this is the 2.50, if I can put it that way.
A. Mm.
Q. And the entry for Charlie now says: “Valiant attending. ETA 1 hr to location. Now a Mayday.” Do you remember now who wrote that entry, whether it was yourself or Ms Whitehouse?
A. I don’t recall, no.
Q. The entry mentions that Charlie was now a Mayday. Did you hear the Mayday yourself?
A. No, because that would have been broadcast on VHF, which we didn’t have access to.
Q. Do you remember now how you learnt that Charlie was a Mayday?
A. From seeing the transcript of the phone call, I believe I had seen reference to it on the coastguard tracker, so I phoned the coastguard for an update and part of that conversation was around the Mayday issue.
Q. Could we turn, please, to the text of the Mayday itself, which is at {INQ007660/1}. Very efficient indeed. Timed at 2.27, so before the spreadsheet we have just looked at. If we turn to the next page {INQ007660/2}, we can see the text of the Mayday Relay that was broadcast. In the second paragraph, we can see that it says Charlie is: “Taking water and requiring immediate assistance.” Can you remember if that was something you were aware of at the time?
A. So we wouldn’t have heard this broadcast. This was obviously on VHF, so we wouldn’t hear those broadcasts made by the coastguard and we weren’t — to my recollection, we weren’t aware of the immediate assistance that was required at that stage. That was the coastguard carrying out their SOLAS responsibility, making that broadcast.
Q. I think we can take this down now. Thank you. You have got an asset which, according to the tracker we have just looked at, is estimating about an hour to get to the location. We know, in fact, the Valiant did take almost exactly one hour then to get to the Sandettie region. This broadcast says immediate assistance is required. If you had heard that Mayday, if you had known that Charlie required immediate assistance at 2.27, do you think you might have reassessed whether your asset provision, the decisions you had made about the assets to send, were sufficient?
A. So that — ultimately, that is a coastguard decision to make. They were obviously aware of what assets we had available. They had asked for Valiant to be tasked. We had phone calls with them since the initial tasking. If they felt it was necessary for additional assets to be tasked, that would have been down to them to make that request either for us to deploy another Border Force asset or an RNLI asset. Also, that — them broadcasting that Mayday Relay, that goes to all ships in the Dover Straits. They all have a legal responsibility to respond to that broadcast. So if there were — if there were any commercial ships in that vicinity, they would have been legally obliged to respond as well and report to the coastguard. But as far as assets and taskings were concerned, if they felt it necessary that another asset was required, they would have made their request to us. They — it’s happened previously when we have got one boat out, but then they become aware there is multiple events and they require additional resourcing, then they would make that request, but the request wasn’t made that night.
Q. Mr Willows, you were a trained mariner. I appreciate some time before this, but you had the training. You knew about SOLAS obligations.
A. (Nods).
Q. And in this situation, you have a boat requiring immediate assistance and an asset that isn’t going to be there for another hour.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. My question to you was: if you had known that, would you have reassessed the situation and the need to provide further assets? I am asking about you and what you would have done.
A. No, not necessarily. Valiant was en route, yes, from a Border Force perspective and it was going to take her an hour. To deploy another asset, it would probably take them two hours to get there. So a Border Force asset, another — an additional Border Force asset wouldn’t have got there any quicker than Valiant was going to get there. That’s why they — that’s why I am saying that’s why I assumed they made the Mayday Relay broadcast because they were trying to see if there were any other assets closer to the scene than Valiant was, with the expectation that they would have responded themselves.
Q. Okay. Let’s turn to the next call, please. About 20 minutes after the tracker we were just looking at was circulated, you took part in a call with HM Coastguard. Can I take you to {INQ007602/1}, please. This is the transcript of a call between yourself and someone called Neal Gibson at 3.11 on 24 November 2021. If we turn to the second page, please {INQ007602/2}. Mr Willows, looking at this now, are you able to say whether in fact this was you on the call?
A. Yes, I believe I have heard this recording, so yes, that was me.
Q. It looks like here you are making the call to HM Coastguard. They say: “… good evening …” You say: “[Yes] … it’s … Border Force Maritime Command here.” They say: “… how can I help?” So you have made this call. What made you pick up the phone and call coastguard?
A. So I believe this is the phone call which refers to the Mayday broadcast and I was enquiring as to what the situation was.
Q. So if we look at the transcript, I think originally, you were asking about two incidents called Bravo and India and you say: “… just looking at your tracker, which we can view …” So confirmation you can see the tracker: “… incidents Bravo and India, can you confirm if they’ve both been picked up by the French and being returned to France or what’s the score with …” And Mr Gibson confirms that they are likely to be repeats of Incident Charlie. He says: “… the numbers match up … the story matches as well.” And he tells you that you have had the same boat calling regularly. Was that something that was unusual, to have one boat calling multiple times and have to work out whether calls related to a single boat?
A. No. My understanding is that would happen on a regular basis. You would get multiple people from the same vessel making multiple phone calls, which made the coastguard’s role, I think it’s got to be said, incredibly difficult, so for them to try and differentiate between all events that were being reported. But yes, no, it wasn’t — it wasn’t unusual. That’s what — that’s what happened on a regular basis.
Q. And it wasn’t part of your role to try and distinguish which calls related to which incident?
A. Correct, no.
Q. Understood. If we can turn to the next page {INQ007602/3}, we can see Mr Gibson says: “At this point in time, Valiant is proceeding to Charlie, which is southwest of the Sandettie Lightvessel at the minute.” And you say: “Is that still a Mayday situation at the moment or not …” So at that stage, as you have indicated, you knew that Charlie was a Mayday situation.
A. (Nods).
Q. And he says: “… they’ve told me it’s full of water.” Pausing there, was that new information to you at that time? Can you remember?
A. I can’t recall specifically. I don’t know. I can’t remember.
Q. In the Mayday broadcast, the Mayday Relay, there is a reference to Charlie taking on water, but here, “full of water” means something different, doesn’t it?
A. If that was the — if that was the case, then yes.
Q. Did you understand that to be different, taking on water? The Inquiry has heard some evidence that it’s relatively common that boats take on some water. Here you are being told Charlie is full of water.
A. Yes. Well, obviously we — we couldn’t, you know, say one way or another if that was the — if that was the case. Yes, as you said, the boats, generally speaking, yes, were very poor quality and, yes, they would normally ship a lot of water. But yes, we couldn’t comment on this specific situation there.
Q. What do you mean when you say, “We couldn’t tell one way or the other if that was the case”? Here you are being given information by HM Coastguard about the state of the boat, aren’t you?
A. I believe they are reporting — well, they are advising us to what they have been told by one of the people on the boat.
Q. Is that something you accept and used to inform your response or is it something you are sceptical of? You are questioning: is that really true?
A. Well, primarily, it’s down to the coastguard, yes, as part of their overall assessment of the incident and the situation. Obviously, if they felt that it was in real distress, then that’s when and why they would broadcast a Mayday and ask for assistance from any other vessels, you know, close by.
Q. Setting aside the coastguard for a minute, I want to understand what you thought when you got this information, and I appreciate if you cannot remember, please do say. There is no criticism for being unable to remember. I want to understand what you can recall.
A. Right.
Q. When you found out that Charlie was full of water, did that change your assessment of the urgency of the situation, of this incident?
A. Well, from our point of view, Valiant was tasked and Valiant was en route. There was nothing else, you know, that we could have done at that stage. Like I say, it was the — the situation was overall managed by the coastguard. So we had tasked and deployed our asset and she was on the way to the scene, so there wasn’t — you know, there wasn’t anything else that we could have done at that stage.
Q. Once again, I am not asking what you wanted to do or what you thought you should do. I am asking about your assessment of the urgency in the situation. You find out that we have got a boat now which is full of water. Does that change your understanding of how urgent this is; whether it is an emergency, whether there is people in distress? I am talking about you and not the coastguard. I know you can’t speak for another organisation. What did you think?
A. Well, I can’t recall the night in question, so I don’t — I don’t recall, you know, the conversation specifically, but, as I say, the Valiant was en route. There was nothing else that we could have done at that stage. We tasked our asset and they were on their way to the scene.
Q. Looking back at the transcript, Mr Gibson says: “… they’ve told me it’s full of water. The reason I did the full Mayday broadcast was to get a certain vessel which is painted grey and there was a French flag at the back of it to attend … However, they’ve basically completely ignored a SOLAS Mayday distress call …” Again, you have just told us you knew there was a Mayday Relay and, therefore, that other vessels were going to attend. Here, you are finding out that, in fact, that Mayday broadcast has been ignored. Did that change your assessment of the situation?
A. Well, again, there’s nothing we could do in response to that. Issuing Mayday broadcasts like that was part of the coastguard remit and it’s not something that we — we got involved in. So no, there was nothing else we could have done at that stage.
Q. Mr Willows, my question isn’t what did you do or what could you have done. My question is about your assessment of the situation. What did you think about the risk, the urgency of it, about Charlie and what dangers Charlie might have been in? I want to understand what was in your mind when you learnt that the boat was full of water, you knew that the Valiant was a considerable distance away and you knew now that the Mayday Relay had been ignored. What did that make you think about this incident?
A. Well, again, Valiant couldn’t have gone any faster, so there’s nothing we could have done that would have got our asset there any quicker. Like I say, that would have been down to the coastguard to consider deploying a lifeboat if they could have got there quicker, but that’s not a decision for us to take. We had Valiant tasked and that was our — our remit.
Q. Mr Gibson goes on to say at the bottom of that paragraph: “… once the Valiant has dealt with Charlie, there could well be some other vessels … in that area.” You say: “Same area, yeah, okay, that’s fine. Well, we’ll wait and see what the sort of numbers are and whether Valiant can deal with that.” Then you say: “… we don’t want to call any other assets out just yet, but we’ll wait and see what develops.” And then Mr Gibson says: “That’s the dream, isn’t it, don’t get more than one out.” And if we turn to the next page {INQ007602/4}, right at the top — forgive me, I think there is more up at the top, is there? Thank you. If we turn to the next page, you are then being told about helicopter rescue. You have heard Mr Gibson say the dream is to get one asset out. Was that your understanding at the time; that there was — the ideal was to only ever have one asset responding?
A. So that statement is basically referring to resource management. We obviously had limited assets working on Op Deveran at that time and, obviously, they only had — they were restricted with how many hours they could work, etc, how long they could go to sea for. So we wouldn’t want to send more than one asset to sea unless we had to. Otherwise, you are wasting hours that a vessel could be at sea when they weren’t required. So it was all about resource management at the end of the day.
Q. Can we turn to your statement please, which is {INQ010214/4} at paragraph 11, page 4. You are explaining there your response in this call and you say: “[HM Coastguard] did not ask me to task an asset during the call; if they had done so then I could have considered the request together with Karen as the higher officer.” But that’s not quite what we have seen in this call, is it? When Mr Gibson raised the fact that there were other boats in the area, you say, “We don’t want to call any other assets out just yet”. So you are making a decision about whether or not you want to call assets out in response to additional boats in the area in the course of that call.
A. No, I think if you read — if you listen to that conversation and read that conversation, that was a two-way conversation. He said there were potentially other boats in the area; again, potentially, because they had already identified duplicates during that night already, so they didn’t know for definite if or how many other boats there were out there. So it’s in that situation where you wouldn’t want to task vessels without knowing that there were definite other migrant vessels there.
Q. Okay. Why don’t we go back to the transcript Page 4 {INQ007602/4}? So if we carry on, Mr Gibson gives some information about helicopter rescue, says: “… 163 is going to come and help us … with the search.” And in your statement, you have said that you understood that the helicopter would be about 15 minutes to reach the Sandettie area. In fact, if we look here, Mr Gibson says the helicopter is lifting in 30 minutes. Did you understand that the helicopter was going to take 15 minutes to come?
A. I don’t recall. I can’t remember.
Q. Okay. If we carry on, page 4 of the transcript — it’s this page — bottom of that first paragraph, Mr Gibson says they have got a WhatsApp position for Charlie. Why didn’t you ask for those co-ordinates at the time?
A. Sorry, where’s this? What part?
Q. So there is a first chunk from Neal Gibson, two paragraphs.
A. Yes.
Q. Top of the second one: “So, we’ve got the WhatsApp position which is Charlie …”
A. Yes. So whether they passed that to — Valiant was obviously en route, so the coastguard would have passed any update precision direct to Valiant, which was standard procedure.
Q. Was that something that you knew at the time had been done?
A. No, not — no, I can’t recall. I can’t comment on that, no.
Q. We can see in the other calls you are asking for coordinates and you’re recording them in the spreadsheet. Why didn’t you do that here?
A. As I say, the standard procedure would be that the coastguard, as soon as they — if they had a different or updated position from an earlier one, they would obviously pass that to any assets which were en route.
Q. Looking then at the next section of the transcript, Mr Gibson says: “… the Flamant has got — it was alongside one with 30 in it and there’s another one with 40, so that would be potentially 110, worst-case scenario, which is probably pushing our luck for Valiant.” You say: “Oh yeah.” At this point, you are being told by HM Coastguard that there are more persons in the area requiring rescue than the Valiant’s maximum capacity. We know the Valiant could take 100 and he is saying 110: “… potentially 110 … which is probably pushing our luck for Valiant.” And you agree. You say, “Yeah”. Is that right?
A. So a couple of things there, then. So all numbers at that stage are estimates. They are based on the initial reports of the incident, so it depends where that information has come from. So basically, those figures are not likely to be very accurate. Obviously, Valiant’s capacity at that stage was 100. If the — the actual number of migrants might have only been 100 and even if it was 110, Valiant would potentially either manage to get that number — squeeze that number on board anyway, or if there was more than that, then the coastguard would need to request or deploy additional assets, whether it was Border Force or RNLI.
Q. So in each of these instances, for the 30 and the 40 and the different boats being calculated, the number might not have been accurate?
A. Yes, that’s correct, especially at nighttime, because sometimes the reports of incidents or events — initially, reports would come from passing commercial ships and their estimate — of course, you don’t know what range they are actually seeing it from — could be — you know, the estimate that they have given for numbers could be well out for the actual number on board. So that’s why you would always have to take initial reports of numbers on board, shall we say, with a pinch of salt until they are actually intercepted and picked up. Actual numbers sometimes would differentiate, you know, substantially.
Q. So it could be considerably less, but it could, in fact, be more than is being assessed here.
A. Correct.
Q. And in that scenario, if it is correct or, in fact, if it’s an underestimation, there are a number of people in the Channel classed as being in distress and we don’t have sufficient assets to take them. That was the position, wasn’t it, Mr Willows?
A. That’s potentially the case, but, again, that would be down to the coastguard to make that assessment and request additional assets. That wasn’t our decision to take. They were — they had all the information and it would be their assessment and decision around what assets were currently tasked. That phone conversation didn’t at any stage result in a request for additional assets.
Q. In this transcript, Mr Gibson says: “… [it’s] probably pushing our luck for Valiant.” You say: “Oh yeah.” And he says: “Fingers crossed the French can’t count.” And if we turn to the next page {INQ007602/5}, you say: “Right, yes.” You were betting, banking, relying on the possibility that this intel being provided to you was wrong: “Fingers crossed the French can’t count.” Is that right?
A. As I said earlier, that whole issue is around resource management, so you wouldn’t want to send any other assets out to sea unless you knew categorically that there were too many for Valiant to deal with initially. Otherwise, your — the knock-on effect is going to be the next day when you know it is going to be busy during the daytime and you are not going to have enough assets for daytime. So until you knew there was a necessity for assets to be tasked, that’s the way — that’s the way it worked at the time. There were limited — limited resources and you had to manage it one way or another.
Q. Because if you are wrong and the French can count and there are 110 or more people in the Channel, there is no one available to take them, is there, because there is only one asset tasked with a max capacity of 100?
A. Yes, but like I say, that wasn’t our assessment or decision to make.
Q. You have told me that you were concerned that if you tasked an asset, there might not be enough for the next shift. Was the reason why you didn’t say, “Hey, Neal Gibson, why don’t you consider tasking another asset if there is more than the Valiant can take” because you believed there were insufficient assets to cover the two periods?
A. Well, it wasn’t our role to offer assets. The coastguard knew what assets were available. They were, in effect, co-ordinating and running all the events, so it was their decision. It was down to them to assess and make the decision as to whether or not there were enough assets tasked or not.
Q. But you have just told us you had a concern about whether there would then be sufficient assets for the following day, and your role and the role of Karen Whitehouse is the management of Border Force assets; isn’t that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. So did you have a concern that there would be insufficient assets to meet the demand?
A. That concern was always there.
Q. Okay. At this stage, why didn’t you have a discussion with Karen Whitehouse about this? We can see all of this happens in the course of a call. Why didn’t you turn to the person you have said was your line manager, more senior than you, and say, “Look, they are saying there’s 110. We know that it could be inaccurate. It could be more, could be less. Should we task another asset? Should we say to coastguard, ‘Is this enough?'”
A. Well, we would have had that discussion when I came off the phone no doubt and, as I have said, it was down to the coastguard to make that request in the first place.
Q. But we have just seen you saying to the coastguard, “We don’t want to call any other assets out just yet”. Why would they ask if you have said, “We don’t want to do that”?
A. And the coastguard were in agreement with that statement during that conversation. They were fully aware of the resource available as well, so it was — it was what it was. There were only finite resources available and until you knew you needed for definite more assets, you wouldn’t send them out.
Q. Mr Gibson then goes on to go through the different boats that are in the Sandettie area in this transcript. He uses the French numbering system. We can see he talks about, down at the bottom: “… 10 and 11 are pretty much slap bang on the Sandettie.” So 10 and 11 he says are in UK waters and then pretty much slap bang on the Sandettie. He talks about 3 in the middle. He says 3 is: “… south of Valiant, in the same sort of place as Charlie …” And we know that 7 is Charlie. If we turn to the next page, page 6 {INQ007602/6}, we can see “Uh huh” at the top, and then you say: “Yeah, they’re certainly all in the same vicinity …” So from this, at this stage, you have been talked through one by one. 10, 11, 3 and 7 are all in the Sandettie area; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. That’s important information to know for determining what assets might need to respond; would you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you record that information, Mr Willows?
A. I can’t recall categorically. That information would presumably have on the coastguard tracker at that stage.
Q. I am asking about your recording, Mr Willows, not the coastguard’s recording.
A. Okay. Well, whether it’s on our live update or not, I can’t recall.
Q. Did you tell Karen Whitehouse that were those four boats all in the Sandettie area, the area that the Valiant was going to?
A. We would have discussed what the telephone conversation was about when I came off the phone, so yes, we would have both been aware of what the situation was.
Q. Again, you are saying “would have”. Do you remember now whether you did?
A. I don’t recall night in question, no.
MS WOODS: Sir, we are coming up to the hour mark, but I only have, I think, probably 10 minutes left. I wonder if it is worth pushing through, if you are amenable.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, I think so. Let’s get it finished, yes.
MS WOODS: Thank you very much. I want to understand about the recording of this information from this call. It is quite a considerable chunk of information we have just been through piece by piece. Could we turn to the next live update, which is {INQ0005440/1}. That’s the covering letter again, covering email, from Karen Whitehouse at 3.50, and if we turn to INQ000451, the spreadsheet itself{INQ000541/1}. Now, looking at this, we can see that some changes were made to this tracker, the Border Force tracker, as a result of that call because we can see that Bravo and India have been marked as duplicates. It says, “Duplicate of C”, can you see, under B and I?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that something that was input by you or Karen Whitehouse? Can you say either way?
A. I can’t say for definite, but if Karen was sending the live updates, then I assume Karen had updated the live update.
Q. But if we look at the row for Charlie at this time, there have been no changes. There is no text in red and the “Brief Description” section is exactly the same as it was before that 3.11 call.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. It doesn’t say Charlie is full of water. It doesn’t say there are potentially 110 people in the Sandettie area needing rescue, and it doesn’t say no other vessels are responding to the Mayday Relay or the Mayday Relay has been ignored by the vessel it was directed to. Why wasn’t this written down, Mr Whitehouse — Mr Willows? Apologies.
A. Well, as I say, it’s — it reflects that Charlie was a Mayday at that stage. Valiant would have been passed directly by the coastguard the locations of any — of any other incidents, so they would have been aware direct from the coastguard what other incidents were potentially out there apart from Charlie. And, yes, apart from that, I can’t — you know, can’t comment on anything else there.
Q. Could we go to INQ000572 {INQ000572/1}, please. I think this is the next live update Border Force tracker. I think we can skip the covering email and go straight to the document itself. This is timed at 4.50 at the top, we can see, and there has now been new information added to the box for Charlie. It says: “Vessel found and Valiant embarked a number of migrants.” Again, can you help us with who wrote that into the spreadsheet?
A. Well, again, if Karen sent the email, then I would assume that Karen had updated the tracker.
Q. Okay. Do you remember now how the boat that was intercepted by Valiant was identified as Charlie? Where did this information come from?
A. Well, we wouldn’t make the — we wouldn’t ascertain which vessel was which on (inaudible). That was where, as I said earlier, the coastguard would ask the crews for details of numbers on board. If they had telephone numbers, that’s when they would start cross-referencing contact numbers. Yes, that wasn’t our remit, to ascertain which was which. Like I say, on some shifts, there would be, as there was here, multiple reports of boats and multiple boats actually interdicted [sic], but it wasn’t our role to ascertain which was which.
Q. Just to confirm, do you remember now where that information came from, whether it was from the tracker or from another source?
A. No. Presumably the coastguard tracker was updated to reflect it in some way, so we would have been, one way or another, told by the coastguard that Charlie had been intercepted.
Q. And we can see that an M or Mike number has been added into the spreadsheet for Charlie. It’s been given the number M957. Can you help us with who assigns an M number?
A. So it is the MCC role. That’s the reference number for our case register, just a sequential number for the next boat that’s interdicted.
Q. But would that be yourself or Karen Whitehouse?
A. So whoever was running the case register. So if Karen was running the logs that night, Karen would have issued the M number.
Q. Is that what the role of an MCC select officer is? There is an entry on the case register — I don’t think we need to go to it — that says that you were the MCC select officer for M957. Is that that role?
A. Yes, I can’t recall where it says “select”, but yes, there would be a drop-down option and, yes, MCC obviously would be one of the drop-down options.
Q. Okay. We know that over the course of the early hours of the 24th that Valiant intercepted a total of three boats, two in the Sandettie area and one in a different part of the Channel. We have heard on the call at 3.11 that you had been told that there were four boats, 10, 11, 3 and 7, in the area requiring rescue. Why was Valiant allowed to return to port with only three of those four intercepted?
A. Well, again, that’s a coastguard decision. Once they’ve — yes, when they can return to port, that’s not an MCC decision. That’s a combination of if they have reached their — their limit for number of migrants on board or the assessment that there’s no outstanding vessels. But that’s not an MCC decision.
Q. So you have been told there are four out there and you know at that point that Valiant has found three. Are you saying it’s not your role or responsibility to say, “Hang on, I think we might have missed a boat here”?
A. Well, I don’t know if it was — maybe the coastguard thought there was another duplicate. They had already identified duplicates from earlier in the evening, so maybe they had decided that four was in fact three. I don’t know. I can’t comment on that, but that’s one possible scenario.
Q. I want to ask you about the end of your shift. Do you remember giving a handover to the next shift that night?
A. Standard procedure is for a substantial lengthy handover between shifts.
Q. Mr Willows, do you remember giving a handover that night?
A. I don’t recall the night, so no.
Q. It therefore follows that you can’t help us with what information was or wasn’t shared with whoever was coming in for the next shift.
A. Not categorically, no.
Q. And you don’t have any written records of what was said or shared on the handover.
A. No, no.
Q. We know that there was information that was shared with you on various calls through the night that was never input into the tracker or the spreadsheets and that you weren’t using your daybook. Can you tell us now, given that information wasn’t recorded in writing, whether or not that was shared with the next shift?
A. All — all relevant information would have been shared with the oncoming shift.
Q. But you can’t say for certain because you don’t remember.
A. No, but as standard procedure, that would have been the case.
Q. Mr Willows, is it right you weren’t on shift the following day when the recovery operation took place?
A. I was back on duty that night.
Q. Back on duty the night of the 24th?
A. Correct.
Q. But not during the day of the 24th?
A. No. I had just finished the night shift.
Q. When did you first realise that Charlie, the mass casualty situation which happened during the day on the 24th, was the same boat that had — you had been dealing with on your shift on the night of the 23rd/morning of the 24th?
A. I don’t recall when we sort of became aware of — obviously I was aware that day of the incident, what had happened, but I don’t recall when I was — when I became aware, you know, which event it related to.
MS WOODS: Thank you, Mr Willows. I don’t have any further questions. Thank you, chair.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Thanks very much, Mr Willows. Thanks for your evidence. I am grateful. We shall have a short break, but can we continue with Mr Downs? Yes, okay. Fine, let us do that. (The witness withdrew) (12.09 pm) (A short break) (12.20 pm)
MR STUART DOWNS (affirmed)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Good afternoon, Mr Downs.
A. Afternoon.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Ms Moffatt has got some questions for you. If you could just read the affirmation first.
Questions by MS MOFFATT
MS MOFFATT: Can you please state your full name?
A. Yes, Stuart Martin Downs.
Q. And you have made a witness statement dated 1 December 2024 which runs to 35 pages; correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And in November 2021, you were employed by His Majesty’s Coastguard; correct?
A. Yes. Her Majesty’s Coastguard then, but yes.
Q. At the time, correct.
A. HMCG.
Q. And you joined HMCG, HM Coastguard, on 15 March 2021 as a trainee MOO or maritime operations officer.
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you left HM Coastguard’s employment on 13 June 2022.
A. Yes.
Q. So starting with your role, you have told the Inquiry you completed the standard MOO training package in October 2021.
A. (Nods).
Q. If I could just put your statement on the screen, so this is Inquiry number {INQ010208/2}, paragraph 6. You list there the formal courses completed in parts by a trainee MOO.
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Is that what you meant by the standard training package?
A. It is, yes.
Q. In November 2021, you were in a team that was led by the search and rescue mission co-ordinator or SMC, Neal Gibson.
A. That’s correct.
Q. That was team 3.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And Mr Gibson has described the qualifications status of those in his team in his statement, so perhaps let’s put that on the screen now, please, {INQ010392/24}, paragraph 55. So paragraph 55, please. So let’s look at that paragraph. Starting on the second line, he says: “My SAR team that night consisted of [you ], a MOO-T … and [the trainee] who was also a MOO-T …” So MOO-T is the trainee —
A. Yes, there’s only ever one MOO-T. Though it says MOO-T and then the abbreviation in full, it’s actually just the one maritime operations officer training.
Q. I will just get to that in a minute. Let me just —
A. Oh, right.
Q. I will just read a bit more. So he says: “One MOO was on annual leave, and another MOO was off sick.” So you were a bit short-staffed: “At the time, Stuart [you] was partially qualified, holding a Communications ticket, which met the minimum requirement for staff counting. However, he had not yet completed his Incident Response qualification, the final step to becoming fully certified.” And then it goes on to talk about the trainee, who was a full trainee. So he is essentially comparing the full trainee, which was the person who had only been with coastguard for 30 days, I think, at the time, and you had the communications qualification, but not the incident response qualification.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Is that right?
A. That’s correct. I understand that I completed that in February 2022, so three months afterwards, after this event.
Q. And was there anything that a — I don’t know if it’s right to call someone without that qualification a trainee MOO or a MOO, but is there anyone — anything that that person who didn’t have the incident response qualification could not do as a result?
A. I don’t think formally. Structurally, the — once a person had the — slightly reversing that, once you had the comms ticket, then you could — were able to do or be engaged in all activity, but I still wasn’t qualified in mission co-ordination or any of that sort of format. I believe that came with the incident response part, which was February 2022.
Q. So is that a way of saying that there were a few things that you couldn’t do, but you could answer calls, 999 calls, because you had the communications ticket?
A. Yes, basically act as an assistant for the SMC, yes.
Q. But would agree that you weren’t fully qualified at —
A. Yes, I hadn’t done that course by then.
Q. And just to confirm then, we saw in your statement, paragraph 6, that you confirmed that those were the core modules. Would incident response be additional to that?
A. Additional — incident response was in addition to — once I started on the programme, the courses I listed were the ones that I was advised were core ones and incident response was added as an additional one. When it was decided to add that on for all MOOs, whether it it’s — exactly what date that was decided, when that was instigated, I don’t know, but when I started on the programme, the ones listed were the ones to be qualified and then they added in the incident response section. When they did that, I don’t know.
Q. So you became fully qualified in February 2022, I believe —
A. That’s correct.
Q. — and undertook the incident response qualification. And as someone who was partially qualified, did you receive any extra support from HM Coastguard?
A. In what way, sorry?
Q. Well, from extra supervision or any other type of support.
A. No, it all went through the SMC, so the SMC was the linchpin to the whole (inaudible).
Q. And in terms of the physical layout of the operations room in Dover, where were you sitting in relation to Neal Gibson and the trainee?
A. Neal would be roughly sat on the side of the room, about where you are now, and then the trainee MOO was sat to my — to my left, where I would to be left now, and I was sat to their — next side, so —
Q. Further up the room?
A. Further up the room. So yes, Neal was desk-wise almost as far from — so — because there was only three desks on that side, so Neal, the trainee MOO and then myself in a similar distance that you have got here.
Q. And how would you and the others in the team communicate and share information whilst you were working?
A. Primarily — if it was busy, then primarily it would be via ViSION, but also trying to overhear what was going on with what other people were doing, what other activity there was. So via ViSION, but trying to talk to each other in person in the room.
Q. I want to now turn to your experience and training regarding small boats in November 2021. You have already told us that you started in March 2021.
A. Yes.
Q. So between November and March of that area, had you previously worked shifts that were with significant small boat activity?
A. Yes.
Q. And in general terms, insofar as it’s possible to say, how common an occurrence was it between March and November 2021 to have a heavy shift in terms of small boats?
A. I would say it was fairly common.
Q. And in terms of how you learned about responding to small boats, let’s look at your statement again. So 010208, paragraph 9, please {INQ010208/3}. You say there paragraph 9, first line, no formal training for responding to small boat incidents and, second line, you said that you were told this was the case because small boat crossings were a relatively new phenomenon; correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Just for completeness, do you recall attending a presentation at Dover in summer or autumn 2021 about small boat search and rescue?
A. No, I do not.
Q. You go on in your statement to explain how you did learn about search and rescue for small boats. So paragraph 10, as we can still see on the screen, and paragraph 11, you say that you can’t recall any Standard Operating Procedures specific to small boat search and rescue, but you say you would have read them on the coastguard information portal, if they were there. And the coastguard information portal was an intranet; is that right?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And there was an element of self-learning, then.
A. Oh, yes, that’s correct.
Q. And other than the intranet, the coastguard information portal, was there any other way in which information or guidance about small boats was shared or cascaded at Dover?
A. Verbally or vicariously through experience.
Q. Through experience. Let’s get on to that. If we could just go to 13, bottom of the page, you say that Neal Gibson gave you an overview about small boat work in your first week and, second line, you say: “The approach to these incidents was based on what people had picked up on the job and the practice had evolved from there.” So would it be fair to say that insofar as your experience goes, the coastguard’s approach to small boat work was primarily learned and taught on the job by those doing the operational work at Dover?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And would it be fair to say as well that the practices developed as people had learned and things had — experience had been gained in the ops room at Dover?
A. That’s correct. The way things occurred was evolving.
Q. In terms of communicating with those on board small boats, the Inquiry has heard from several of its witnesses about the difficulties in communicating with those on board, including language difficulties, difficulties relating to patchy mobile phone signal, calls cutting out. In terms of the language barrier, how often, if at all, did you use interpretation services?
A. Not at all.
Q. And why was that?
A. I wasn’t aware that it was available and also, actually, there generally wasn’t — on the phone call, the calls quite often cut out. There wasn’t time to actually — of trying to work out what language. Also, the person that called generally understood enough English to get some information from, but there wasn’t — there wasn’t generally time on the call to get more information, because the phones cut out quite often.
Q. So you didn’t know, no time on the call and also no need because there was enough English for you to —
A. Yes.
Q. — make sense.
A. Yes.
Q. Insofar as you can answer this, did you know if others in Dover were aware of coastguard’s interpretation services?
A. I don’t know.
Q. In terms of difficulties around patchy mobile signal and calls cutting out, how common a problem was this?
A. It was very common.
Q. Had you received any guidance from HM Coastguard about how to mitigate the problems associated with calls dropping out?
A. To try to encourage the caller to dial 999, because that sometimes gave us a position of where the boat was using the 999 system. So that was the guidance in relation to this particularly.
Q. Where did that guidance come from?
A. That, again, was the same. It was shared, as far as I know, around — verbally around the control room.
Q. So, again, it was people learning —
A. Learning by experience.
Q. Learning by experience and then passing it on to trainees?
A. Yes.
Q. And just so we are clear, dialling 999, why would that assist?
A. Dialling 999, the computer system is set up — a very good system. It would try to — using where the mobile phone signal was pinging the respective mobile phone telephone masts, the computer would try to work out where the position was. So, for example, we used that to find a gentleman that was lost, thought he was on the White Cliffs, but was actually in the middle of Leicestershire. He had Alzheimer’s. But when he called from the 999 system, we were able to find out instead of being on dark cliffs, he was actually in a rugby field in Leicestershire and was able to speak to Leicester Constabulary, who went to assist him. So we tried to use the same technology if someone’s stuck on the cliffs or on the shore. The closer you are to the coast, the more accurate it is. But that was one chance to try to get a geolocation for somebody; that you could utilise the systems. They didn’t rely on them knowing where. They — as I say, this gentleman thought he was on the cliffs, but he was in Leicestershire. So that’s how — that’s why that was useful.
Q. You have mentioned that it would be more accurate the closer you were to land.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Obviously, these — the people on board the small boats that were calling you were actually in the middle of the sea and sometimes around the median line.
A. Sometimes, but they would get as close to the — to the port of Dover. Below the White Cliffs would actually make a beach landing. So it — at that time, people would regularly make it across to the shore in the UK as well, so it was a — sometimes they were quite close to the coast, sometimes quite a distance.
Q. If they were close to the coast, it might work. Close to the median line, were you aware of any limitations around calling 99?
A. The further away you were, the less well it would work, but that was — without that, then you had nothing. At least it was an option.
Q. And would you, for example, prioritise getting certain bits of information? If you were aware a call was going to cut off, would you prioritise getting — I don’t know — name, phone number, passing the coastguard mobile phone? How did that work did?
A. Yes.
Q. You have an order of priority?
A. Yes, generally, tried to find out if they called before, so you knew how many boats you were looking for. Tried to find out where they had set off from, where — what time that was so you could try and work out where they had perhaps got to, knowing what time they set off, how fast — roughly how fast they were going. As I say, the colour of the boat, if they could see anything else around them, because we try and triangulate from them, if they could see another vessel. Some — some merchant vessels, like MSC, the company, for example, it has “MSC” painted in large letters down the side. If they could see another large ship and see some writing on it, you could then find the large ship and then work out in relation to them where they were, so …
Q. Was that an order of priority? Because given me lots of things that you would want to find out that is the SOPs, for example, but did, in your head, you think, “Well, I need to get this in order to — a phone number, for example, to make sure that I can call this person back afterwards” or …
A. Yes, quite — if there was to be a phone number, it would appear on the screen. The large one was actually to try and get the — initially the name so that you knew which incident that you were dealing with. Otherwise, we are going to divert resources looking for boats that didn’t exist. If you’re looking for — if five people from the same boat had called, you’re now looking for five boats instead of looking for one, so you’re perhaps diverting resources away from being able to conduct an effective rescue because you are looking for boats that don’t exist.
Q. So name was important —
A. So name —
Q. — location —
A. — (overspeaking) the boat, the location, yes, the colour of the boat, distance times. So sometimes, it varied from call to call in that it depended what the person was offering you. So if they were offering you certain information to start with, you would go with that as opposed to interrupting them and saying, “Well, I’ll come to that later”. No, if they offered you some — a description, for example, of the number of occupants, etc, that might come early on. That’s another way of trying to identify the vessel. So if they offered it first, so some would be tailored towards —
Q. It would be responsive to —
A. Responsive to the caller, yes.
Q. — what the caller was also saying.
A. So …
Q. So you and others at HM Coastguard have told the Inquiry that callers from small boats exaggerated their level of distress.
A. That’s correct.
Q. That’s right, isn’t it? And was this something that you and colleagues at Dover ever discussed?
A. It — yes, it probably did come up in conversation quite a bit because some of the things which were said, for example I do remember raising one. A gentleman called me and said a lady was unconscious at the bottom of the boat, she was in the water. So I asked him, “Take her out of the water so she’s not lying in the boat. Why is she unconscious?” “She’s broken her arm.” “Well, how can she be unconscious if she’s broken her arm?” “I don’t know. I’ll ask her.” “So she’s not unconscious then.” So just in that one phone call that stood out because obviously she wasn’t unconscious. But then other times there would be reports of lots of activity going on in the boat and when the rescue vessel got there it wasn’t the case.
Q. If you could just look at paragraph 132 of your statement. We’ll just wait for that to come up on the screen {INQ010208/31}. So second line of 132, you say you learnt how to deal with the content of calls from small boats. The third line; that about a week into starting your shift, you were advised what callers would say. So that was about March 2021.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Yes. And who told you what callers would say?
A. Neal Gibson was the team leader that briefed us on this, but then others corroborated that.
Q. And what were you told about what callers would say?
A. That it would generally be overstated that the boat — the boat was sinking, people were drowning, the make-up of the people on the boat, the state of people, that people were giving birth or — at the time on the boat, etc. So that it would be overly — whatever was going on would be overstated.
Q. You were told to expect exaggeration?
A. Yes. And also there would be some — some of the calls would be abusive to you and blaming you for not actually coming to get people, although you didn’t necessarily know where they were. But to be — in order to generate a response, but there was going to be a response anyway because you are in a small boat in the Channel, but to be aware that you would be called sometimes abusive — you would receive abusive calls sometimes, but also that what was going on was probably being overstated.
Q. Did that influence how then you responded to calls if you were told that they might be abusive and would be exaggerated?
A. Obviously it made it more difficult to deal with the abusive side because you are trying to get the information. So that was, could be frustrating because you are trying to get information to bring the aid to them, but you would still try to find out information so resources could be vecting in by the SMC to actually effect the rescue. So did it — did it stop you doing the activity in relation to actually being practically doing it? No. It wasn’t necessary, it didn’t need to be abusive. Just phone me up and say, “We are in a dinghy, in a boat, in the Channel” and being co-operative would have — would have made it easier to have found the information. But did it stop us trying to deal with the rescue? No, it didn’t.
Q. If we look at 127 of your statement you say that in your experience the majority of callers from small boats exaggerated their level of distress. When you say “majority”, are you saying insofar as that’s possible to say, are we talking more just over half or are we talking nine out of ten for example?
A. Nine out of ten.
Q. You also refer to leaflets given to those up in small boats with pictures to explain what to say and who to call. What was the context in which you saw those leaflets?
A. Sorry, how do you mean context?
Q. So who had them? Was it coastguard that had them? How did you get those leaflets?
A. Oh, no, the criminal financial investigation from — side took photographs because when the boats were recovered they would take the photographs or the cutter crews may or the CTV crews might get that. Where the origin of the particular leaflets came from I don’t know other than it was part of when the vessels were recovered that the information was gathered then.
Q. Did coastguard hold copies of these leaflets?
A. I saw it electronically, so I would take it that it was held by — I don’t know who owned the electronic version of —
Q. But it was emailed to you?
A. — obviously it was a photograph, it was a photograph of a leaflet. How I came, how I came to see it, whether it was e-mailed to me or shown to me, I can’t recall that.
Q. You don’t know if it was emailed to you?
A. No, I don’t know.
Q. And how did you know, you have said they had pictures on them telling people to exaggerate, but how did you know those pictures were telling people to exaggerate? I am finding it difficult to understand what picture could show that.
A. It showed sort of the journey, if you like, from sort of getting in the boat and then a picture of, like, the White Cliffs, which would be referred to in the phone calls as white mountains, and then with a picture with a boat through it, shows if it was sinking and with the image “999” and a picture of the phone, and then a helicopter, I think. I can’t remember all the pictures, but it was, if you looked at it, the picture was sort of when you — and it showed the Channel with the — from recollection it showed the Channel with the median and then basically and then another image once you are beyond that, that’s when to make the calls. I can’t remember all the pictures, but that was the general gist of it. So it was pictorial. It didn’t matter what language the person with it spoke. The image portrayed that.
Q. To me, from what you have just described, it doesn’t sound to me like that would necessarily mean it was telling them to exaggerate. For example if they had a boat sinking and a 999, could it not also mean if your boat is sinking then you should call 999?
A. It could.
Q. Yes. Did you personally agree with HM Coastguard’s policy that all small boats, due to factors such as their inherent unseaworthiness, overcrowding, should be classified as in distress?
A. It wasn’t really my position to make a view — take a view on that. They were dealt with as if — as they were in distress.
Q. And how do you think that the belief that you and others held about exaggeration, nine times out of ten from small boats, impacted on how calls from them might be dealt with and assessed?
A. They were dealt with — dealt with in line with the normal search and rescue process. In fact, as I just mentioned the fact that somebody’s in a boat in the Channel would still bring a response.
Q. Was anything that was said to you — so if a boat, a caller on board said, “I was sinking”, would that be treated at face value?
A. Yes. As far as I am aware, we’d still send the resources to go and deal with it.
Q. You say in your statement that it was fairly impossible for the call taker to work out whether a small boat was actually in imminent danger or not. So despite this, were you supposed, nonetheless, to record everything that was said at face value?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Let’s move on now and talk about staffing and resources at Dover. The Inquiry has heard evidence about staff shortages in Dover in 2021.
A. Yes.
Q. Are you aware of that?
A. Oh, yes. Yes.
Q. And how, if at all, were you affected by the staff shortages and resource problems?
A. In relation to the —
Q. In relation to maybe altered shift patterns, being asked to do overtime. I think you changed your team, you went because of staff shortages, as I understand it?
A. Sorry, I was going to say in relation to dealing with incidents, then, yes, it was perhaps less people, less experienced people — there were less more experienced people to learn from to see that. So as a MOO, when I was a MOO trainee, before completing all the courses, you would still be actively involved in incidents. In relation to actual cover then yes, I was moved from one team to another to cover gaps because the retention rate was so poor. I was moved to try and cover some gaps in a particular team.
Q. Did you ever feel overwhelmed?
A. Oh, yes. Yes. Yes, we were.
Q. Let’s look at your statement again, paragraph 43, please {INQ010208/9}. So third line right at the bottom. You say it was concerning that the systems at MRCC Dover had not really adapted to deal with it, it being the increase in small boats and the combination of that and the staff shortage. Can you explain what you mean by the systems at Dover not having adapted to deal with the volume?
A. I think because the vessel — incidents were dealt with as standard incidents, those standard incidents were geared towards dealing with perhaps two tankers colliding in the Channel, where you knew where the incident was, they were going to be reporting. So something that was more in line with JESIP, joint emergency services interoperability principles, and the joint decision model, something more aligned to that, that could cope with multiple incidents of an unknown number, an unknown location would be — that’s an adaptation that I would have thought would be developed.
Q. So you thought the system itself perhaps couldn’t handle this new type of search and rescue?
A. That’s correct.
Q. You say later in your statement that you did raise some concerns regarding work practices, but you don’t think your observations were well received. Why do you say that?
A. Well, maritime operations officer is an administrative officer in the civil service structure, so very junior and so their observations were — I just — they were sort of maybe noted, but not moved on, so …
Q. I see. So you felt that the junior level of your role meant what perhaps you weren’t best placed to be making these types of observations —
A. That’s correct.
Q. — or raising concerns?
A. That’s correct.
Q. You also say there was high turnover of personnel and the staff retention problem at Dover at 2021. Insofar as you are able to say, do you know why this was the case?
A. Quite often it gets brought up around the pay and the conditions and that other people — people move because other agencies can pay more. But then also I think the working structure, the culture, etc. So there’s a host of reasons. Also it’s quite a — it’s a very junior position, perhaps quite a lot of responsibility so people maybe move on to do other things. People seem to stay about a year is the average. Some people stayed a lot longer, but …
Q. And when you refer to the working conditions and culture, what does that refer to? The volume of work, the —
A. The volume of the work, the whole — the whole package, the whole experience for want of a better expression of the way it’s structured in relation to managing the incidents, the training programmes, etc.
Q. Was this something that was specific to Dover in your view? I mean, perhaps you are not able to answer but was this the case for all MOOs across the coastguard network?
A. I haven’t worked at other locations and I would take it that the other locations didn’t really have the small boat volume, so it would have affected them less. Also perhaps some are more geographically remote so whereas Dover is obviously in the southeast, it’s got lots of opportunities for work elsewhere, whereas perhaps Stornoway for example is more remote, perhaps less opportunities to move to other locations.
Q. And then you say paragraph 47 {INQ010208/10}: “The staffing levels and what organisationally H.M. Coastguard was comfortable with surprised [you].” And then you refer to routine remote cover, which we will come on to. So essentially, and I think you might have told me this already, is it fair to say that in your view coastguard didn’t have adequate systems in November 2021 to deal with both the surge in number of small boat crossings and the staff shortage at Dover?
A. Yes.
Q. Let’s move on to remote cover. We can stay on paragraph 47. The second line you talk there about zone flexing. By zone flexing you mean coastguard’s practice of the remote involvement of one MRCC or the JRCC in the work of another?
A. That’s correct, except that zone flexing can either be 2009 zone picked up and managed from a completely an entire zone was picked up and managed from a completely different location or included support from another location. So people —
Q. Yes.
A. — could either be geographically at the same place, picking up an entire zone or geographically at two different places. So the two are quite different.
Q. So it’s two different things and both things happened on the night in question because when initially you had your break and Neal Gibson went and covered VTS, Vessel Traffic Service, the whole, all the work at Dover moved to the JRCC and then when Neal Gibson came back, remote SMC cover ended — sorry, then when you came back from your break it was remote SMC and then when he came back from VTS, then essentially SMC went back to him but the JRCC remained involved. So there were various parts of network flexing in Dover on the night in question?
A. That’s correct.
Q. You refer to Humber in paragraph 37 and you say that they were involved on numerous occasions.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. Was this also the case with the JRCC, that you were used to them being involved?
A. Yes. Humber and JRCC were the ones we linked with most, sometimes other stations, but generally Humber and JRCC. Humber is in the same division, so we tend to have more links with them.
Q. How frequently was it that another MRCC or the JRCC were remotely involved with Dover’s work in 2021?
A. It seemed to be fairly normal. I couldn’t tell you what percentage it was but it — doing that, on days when that occurred that didn’t surprise me.
Q. Did you receive any training or guidance on any adaptations that should be implemented when there was a remote SMC or when you were working with another MRCC?
A. No.
Q. Moving on to paragraph 49 {INQ010208/11}, you say first line, that whilst there were comments from others about short staffing, any concerns about this were, in your words, covered off with remote support via the zone flexing. When you say “others”, do you mean other staff at Dover? So the paragraph —
A. Yes, yes, I believe so. Yes.
Q. — starts: “Others did comment …”
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Yes. And then you refer to it, the answer being it would be “covered off” using your words in the statement with remote support. How effective a solution in your view was zone flexing or remote support?
A. If there’s the entire zone moved to a completely different geographical location it was self-contained, then that wasn’t an issue. It was as if that, the own — home station, if you like, was managing its own patch because everybody’s in one room and could communicate. When it was split it was difficult for example if the SMC or another element such as channel 16 was on location and you were somewhere else. Then that made it more — it made it more complicated because also you couldn’t hear what was going on, you couldn’t get the situational awareness of what was happening. So when they were there and trying to assist it actually made it more difficult because the — the better one was where the entire zone was picked up and moved as opposed to a mismatch — part being in one location and part being in another.
Q. So you could miss things by not being physically present in the operations room?
A. That’s correct.
Q. When you say it actually made it more difficult, can you explain that?
A. Well, because you didn’t have that shared situational awareness, so the — it made it certainly more difficult as well as for operators, also for the SMC because you couldn’t actually perhaps overhear parts of the conversation, direct people, see where people were struggling. It was more difficult to do it and it added in another — perhaps on a busy night it added another link in the — another communication to be done and then trying to brief that person to then come back again. Whereas if when it was done all in one geographic location they would probably be aware of what you were about to brief them and could understand what was happening and so it just added another leg.
Q. It took more resource?
A. It took more resource to actually make the zone flexing part work. When it was perhaps there to assist, sometimes it actually made it more complicated.
Q. It hindered sometimes. Moving again to paragraph 52 of your statement, you explain how when you were a trainee you dealt with an incident involving a fatality with help only from another trainee. Was this a small boat incident?
A. No, it wasn’t.
Q. And you say you had the assistance only of another trainee also on duty at Dover. Was there no remote —
A. There was remote, but actually at Dover just the two of us.
Q. I see. Finally on resources at Dover, let’s look at what you say at paragraph 53, the first line. You say in your view staffing shortages did affect Dover’s ability to respond to small boat activity and then you refer, at line 2, to not necessarily being able to follow all the relevant processes. You give an example of mission statements, the plans of action on how to respond to an incident being recorded after the event because of the volume of calls. Was this the main example of where the standard operating procedures could these could not be followed due to volume of calls or?
A. I think, yes. It was quite common for mission statements and thing to be done a bit later because everybody knew what the reactions — you know, which resources had been sent. But actually physically typing in the mission statement when you have active 999 calls, communications to be done, if there weren’t enough — without enough people to actually do that task the process would be clunky. So you didn’t necessarily have the time to do that part. You still would assign the resources, but the way it was documented —
Q. Where would the main — how would that impact? Would it be mostly problematic if it was someone remotely trying to understand what was going on, or would it affect people in the operations room physically present as well?
A. It wouldn’t affect it that much in that — so, for example, if a cutter or a lifeboat was assigned to an incident the tasking for that would be recorded, so it would be recorded into that asset’s entry so you could see that a lifeboat, or whatever, had been tasked. But the actual almost double-keying of listing it again in a mission statement would take place was later —
Q. The mission statement would be the thinking, the rationale, the planning?
A. It’s largely identifying what each resource was then going to do in that incident, but that could be captured elsewhere as a free text option.
Q. So are you saying that you weren’t following standard procedures, but it wasn’t having a material effect on prosecuting the mission?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. And if a tactical commander, for example was trying to oversee or do a RAG review, would they then be able to do that without it being recorded?
A. They would be able to see which assets — because you could see which assets were being assigned and what the assets were doing. So if you looked at the incident you would be able to see that.
Q. You also say line 5 that the SMC would be answering calls, monitoring VHF because of the volume of work rather than focusing on the role of the SMC. Did that happen often in your experience?
A. Yes. It was quite an impossible position for the SMC.
Q. Then you say in line 7 that {INQ010208/12} the call volume was so great that it almost paralysed the HM Coastguard operating structure, as that structure could not cope with the volume of information that was incoming. It’s quite strong language “almost paralysed”. In your view, was remote support from other MRCCs or the JRCC able to mitigate what you have just described?
A. To a certain extent, but not fully.
Q. Then you say third line from the bottom, still on the same paragraph: “We became accustomed to this, but it did mean that we could not action things as perhaps would have been optimal because the resources were not there to do [it].” So would it be fair to say that you and others at Dover became accustomed to not being able to follow all HM Coastguard’s Standard Operating Procedures because of the combination of volume of the crossings and also the lack of resource or staff at Dover?
A. Yes. We tried to follow the process as best as possible but some of the perhaps tidying up, by putting things in the mission statement, that might come later but you would still assign the assets and deal with the incident that was going on.
MS MOFFATT: Sir, I don’t know if now is a good time before I turn on to the night in question.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: It probably is. We will have a break and we will come back just before 2 o’clock, five to 2. Thanks very much. (12.56 pm) (The lunch break) (1.54 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, Ms Moffatt.
MS MOFFATT: I am going to turn imminently to the events of the night in question. Before I do, I just want to cycle back to a couple of things we talked about before lunch. The first is in terms of what you have told me about feeling overwhelmed sometimes whilst working at Dover, in the context of the staffing shortage and the volume of small boat crossings, how often did this happen?
A. I couldn’t — it would be difficult to give a percentage, but it wasn’t uncommon that the (inaudible) until news of what occurred many days later broke. It didn’t seem particularly different to normal.
Q. And did you do anything about it?
A. In — in what regard?
Q. Did you raise it with anyone? Did you say to Neal Gibson or someone above him, “I am feeling overwhelmed on a relatively regular basis”, for example?
A. Oh, yes, the processes were (inaudible) and also, that it was — yes, we were overwhelmed at times and the resourcing levels, as I said in the statement, weren’t really adequate to deal with — the system and resources weren’t adequate to deal.
Q. And then when I asked you about concerns that you had raised, you said your role was very junior and so you weren’t likely to be listened to.
A. Yes.
Q. Just going back a step, how did you raise your concerns?
A. Verbally with the team leader, or if we had visitors, as in visiting.
Q. Visiting?
A. Within — seniors within the coastguard.
Q. Senior management?
A. Yes. If we had the opportunity to speak, then we would.
Q. And what response did you get, if any?
A. That they were aware of the staffing shortages. There was going to be a recruitment programme. They were coming up with plans. That’s the way it was. Small boats was an emerging thing. In maritime terms, as I said in the statement, it was — in their opinion, it was, you know, a young phenomena.
Q. Let’s turn now to the night in question. So 23/24 November on that night shift, the operational team at Dover consisted of you and Neal Gibson. That’s the operational, because obviously we know there was a trainee who was non-operational at that time.
A. Yes.
Q. You were supervised by Neal Gibson.
A. That’s correct.
Q. In your statement, you said your role as a MOO was essentially information gathering, as you understand it. You would capture information to enable the SMC, Neal Gibson, to review it and make decisions.
A. Yes, to act as his assistant, basically.
Q. Yes, and it would — when you say information would be captured, would that be in ViSION in the tracker?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Those were the two written documents. And the Inquiry has heard some evidence that it was difficult, due again to the volume of small boats, to keep ViSION completely updated as to what was happening. Was that something that you could recognise?
A. Yes, that probably connects to the comments about, for example, mission statements, trying to keep that part of the process up to date, yes.
Q. So things would be added late.
A. Oh, yes, it wasn’t uncommon to see mission statements being added just before an incident was closed because it had already been dealt with.
Q. In addition to things being added late, would sometimes things not get added at all, or was that not something that you recognise?
A. I don’t know on the individual cases. As far as myself would be concerned, if I was aware of it, it would be entered.
Q. And in terms of how the work on each shift was divided up, in your statement you have said that each shift would split 1.5 hour slots and that you would do a different task in each hour and a half, essentially, so answering routine calls for hour and a half, monitoring VHF for hour and a half. Is that right?
A. Yes, they’d be an hour and an half slots. You may end up being on routines for three hours, but they were divided into an hour and a half building blocks, if you like.
Q. So that kind of leads to my next question, which is: on the night in question, from what I understand, it appears that you’re answering calls all night. You weren’t monitoring VHF because that had gone to the JRCC; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Was it unusual that you would be doing the same task all night or was that something that you’d become accustomed to?
A. I’d become accustomed to it.
Q. And there was the full trainee present, as we have discussed, and Neal Gibson has told the Inquiry that that person had been with coastguard with only 30 days at the time. Is that your recollection also?
A. I don’t know the number of days, but yes, a month or more.
Q. And you say in your statement that the trainee operated the WhatsApp account —
A. Yes.
Q. — on the coastguard’s iPhone or mobile phone since she was not able to answer the 999 calls, not having a communications ticket, as you have referred to it, and that was a logical division of labour. Who allocated that role to her?
A. I can’t remember. I can’t remember who allocated it specifically. It was probably the SMC, but I couldn’t say for certain. But apart from the 999 calls and listening to VHF, then the MOO trainees in apprenticeship sort of learned by doing, were actively involved in things.
Q. Could it have been you that allocated the role to her or was that not something that a MOO would be able to do?
A. I wouldn’t be able to allocate it to her. I could encourage her to — perhaps to do it. Whether — who specifically assigned it I don’t know, but I wasn’t there to task her, but to support her in sort of — in the sort of coaching or mentoring.
Q. It was the SMC that would do the allocation of roles?
A. Allocation of duties was SMC, yes.
Q. And did she or you receive any training on how to use the mobile phone that you are aware of?
A. No.
Q. Did you yourself monitor or operate the mobile phone that night?
A. No, I don’t believe that I did.
Q. And during the shift, were you aware of the mobile phone ringing perhaps in the background?
A. I don’t really — I can’t recall it. I can’t recall hearing it ringing, no.
Q. In your statement, you say you had been briefed not to answer any calls to the mobile phone.
A. That’s correct.
Q. And who briefed you not to answer the phone, the mobile phone?
A. I can’t remember specifically who it was, but that was the operating procedure because it was there only to get WhatsApp messages, because they were insistent that calls went through the ICS system and the mobile phone didn’t, so don’t answer it because it’s not getting recorded.
Q. So that’s what you understood to be the standard procedure.
A. That’s correct.
Q. The mobile phone should not be answered.
A. Correct.
Q. And the trainee also made a call to French coastguard at 1.06 on the night.
A. Yes.
Q. We will look at it later, but do you know who asked her to call Gris-Nez, the French coastguard?
A. Not for certain, but it may have been me because, as I say, the process was to learn by doing, so making an outgoing phone call to get some information from the French would be a normal part, because she wasn’t precluded from doing that. That was — that was — the training process was to learn by doing, like an apprenticeship.
Q. So, as you said, you thought she was permitted to do this. That was your understanding.
A. Yes. The only thing she wasn’t permitted to do was 999 calls and VHF.
Q. So you didn’t recognise her role as being one of essentially observing someone who had been in the coastguard for —
A. No, having been a MOO trainee myself until only a couple of weeks — a few weeks before, then no, the MOO trainee was actively involved what was going on. It was learn by doing. So, as I say, the only things that she’s precluded from was that, because when I was in the same position, we also undertook activities —
Q. You were doing the same?
A. Yes, exactly.
Q. So fair to say that it was normal, in your experience, for a trainee MOO to make calls to MRCC Gris-Nez, the French coastguard?
A. Yes, it — yes.
Q. And you have said in your statement that the trainee was answering routine calls because there was no one else to take them, and you also say that there were multiple calls going unanswered due to demand out stripping capacity.
A. Yes.
Q. What about remote support from the JRCC? How did that fit in? Did they —
A. Well, they —
Q. Sorry, go ahead.
A. Sorry, yes, as I say, the SA could answer calls which were unanswered, because if somebody logged in at another location as Dover, then the phones for Dover would ring for them also —
Q. So, sorry, if Dover couldn’t answer, the JRCC would definitely pick it up? Is that how it worked?
A. Not definitely pick it up, but if somebody was logged in anywhere in the network as Dover, then it — their phone should ring as if they were physically at Dover. They’d also interact on the phone and answer, as I say, as Dover Coastguard. So it should do that, but obviously, if there were more calls coming in, then that could occur. Then they perhaps wouldn’t. But also, the 999 calls should trip over — should be a spillover, but that didn’t always work, so sometimes the excess 999 calls would go to another location, but didn’t always work.
Q. And the calls going unanswered, are you talking about 999 calls, calls from Dover port, coastguard mobile phone?
A. I can’t recall specifically, but if there was multiple 999 calls, then you would have run out of people to answer them.
Q. And in terms of communicating with your colleagues on the night, how would those of you in the operations room at Dover communicate? Was there time to speak between calls? Would you update each other?
A. It varied as the night progressed, but where opportunity was, then you would try to communicate. But it wasn’t always possible, no.
Q. In terms of communicating with those at the JRCC, who had maintained involvement in Dover’s work, how did that work?
A. There was an iPad which we had set up so that it was — kept an open call between JRCC and Dover.
Q. Is that TalkBox?
A. No, that’s a separate —
Q. That’s a separate thing.
A. — separate thing. There was the TalkBox or the iComm system, so it would be via the TalkBox, the iComm system or the standalone iPad. One of the calls I did take from Tom Barnett for Neal was — came through via the iPad.
Q. So it was a direct way — a direct line, essentially, between —
A. Yes, trying to sort of keep — as best you could, an open —
Q. An open line?
A. An open line to them, yes.
Q. How often were you in contact with Tom Barnett, let’s say, from JRCC?
A. I can’t recall the number of times I spoke to him.
Q. And in terms of your situational awareness on the night, were you aware that the planned fixed wings surveillance flight didn’t happen?
A. I was aware there was an issue with the aircraft, yes.
Q. And you also didn’t receive the French tracker until slightly before 1.00 am, whereas information on it showed that the French had already been aware of some boat activity since the evening, 9.00 pm.
A. Yes.
Q. The Inquiry has seen evidence that delay from the French in sending a tracker was a common or relatively common occurrence in 2021. Were you aware of that?
A. Yes, they seemed to send it a little bit later than you — than perhaps might have been preferred. Not always, but quite often it was the case.
Q. And in your statement, you say that the relationship with French coastguard was reactive rather than proactive and if you saw, for example, a French Government vessel in French waters, you might call Gris-Nez to ask them if something was going on.
A. Yes.
Q. You didn’t call French coastguard earlier in the shift on 23 November. Do you know why you wouldn’t have done that?
A. Contact with them to do that would be directed by the SMC. I wasn’t asked to do that and there wasn’t any, say, indicators that there was small boat activity going on, as far as I can recall.
Q. And in your experience, had you got the tracker earlier, would Border Force surface assets likely have been tasked before any small boats got to the median line?
A. They may have been made aware, question — no, we would inform Border Force MCC and then they would have made a decision at what time to stand the crew up, because the crew obviously cover a two-week period, so they don’t want to raise them too soon because otherwise, you are using their hours. So they may not have mobilised them any sooner, but may have got a heads-up. But they wouldn’t be going to the median line to sit there and wait, no.
Q. Let’s now turn to talk about the calls that Dover started receiving on the night. So the first call from a small boat was just before half past midnight. You took it and it was Incident Alpha that you opened as a result. This was a call that cut off before it could be transferred to you, but the operator gave you a number. And then when you called it back, it was not a UK ringtone and the incident was downgraded from distress as a result of there not being a UK ringtone. Was that on the basis that it was considered to be in French waters because of the —
A. Yes, if it was in French waters, it’d be monitoring.
Q. But it was the ringtone that made you think it was in French waters?
A. Yes. There was nothing else to go on.
Q. What was your understanding of the accuracy of a ringtone to determine whether a small boat was in French or UK waters?
A. That it would — it would be lined up with the territorial boundary.
Q. Were you aware that it may not always be a reliable indicator of whether you had crossed the median line or not?
A. No.
Q. 1.06, the Dover Coastguard was first made aware of Incident Charlie, and this is a phone call that we have already spoken about between the trainee and MRCC Gris-Nez, French coastguard. The trainee said when she was interviewed by HM Coastguard for its internal review that she wrote down the notes of what she was told on this call on a piece of paper and you entered the information on ViSION and created the incident. Is that your recollection or does that sound likely to you?
A. I got the information that I put into ViSION from her, so that sounds likely, yes. I don’t recall the specifics of how it was done, but that’s where I got the information from.
Q. Let’s just look at the ViSION log. So this is the Charlie log {INQ000237/1}. There we go. Page 1. So we see there at the bottom of the page at 1.15 the first entry opening the incident. And then if we go down to page 3 {INQ000237/3}, bottom of the page, at 1.19, you record the information that had been received on the call from the trainee and at the bottom of the page, you see there, last words: “Dinghy appears in good condition.” Did you discuss the contents with the trainee, the contents of the call that she had had with the French at 1.06?
A. Exactly what we discussed, I can’t recall.
Q. You can’t.
A. But the information I got is from what she passed me from the call.
Q. Did you become aware at any point that the information “dinghy appears in good condition” was incorrectly recorded against Charlie?
A. No. Well, no, because that’s why I was briefed that it was a — in relation to that incident, Charlie, the information she passed me, because obviously now you can look at the transcript perhaps and look at that, but at the time, obviously I have only got the information that she’s told me. So that’s the information she told me that had come from the French.
Q. And after entering the information on the log, at 1.20, so a minute after, you called Tom Willows at Border Force and you relayed the information from the same call at 1.06 and, again, you said, “Think it’s in good condition”. And, again, did you tell Border Force this because of what you got from the trainee?
A. Yes, that she had got from the French coastguard, yes.
Q. So it would be right to say that at this point of the night at around 1.20, you understood that Incident Charlie was in good condition based on what you understood the French to have told the trainee?
A. Yes.
Q. After this, we know that Dover received distress calls from those on board Incident Charlie. Are you aware of a call at 1.48 of around 20 minutes with Neal Gibson, the SMC, and the 16-year-old boy called Mubin or possibly known to you as “Moomin”, who was known to Dover to be on board Incident Charlie?
A. I was aware that he was — subsequently was —
Q. That’s a subsequent call —
A. — aware that he was talking to somebody called Moomin. Whether that’s —
Q. So that was a subsequent call. Sorry to interrupt you there. There’s a subsequent call that you discuss in your statement, but there was a first call at 1.48. If you’re not — if you don’t remember that one, then that’s —
A. No, no, I remember I was — so recall I heard him talking to somebody. That’s why I became aware of him talking to somebody called Moomin. What boat that was on and what the position was in relation to that I don’t know. I just was aware that I heard him using that — that name.
Q. So you overheard part of it because you were sitting proximate to Neal Gibson —
A. Yes.
Q. — but it wasn’t discussed with you.
A. No.
Q. And you are aware, I think, that a Mayday Relay was then broadcast off the back of that call.
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware that it was broadcast because of what Neal Gibson had heard on that call or was that not something you were aware of?
A. I wasn’t aware of that. Later on, I understood from Neal that he was doing it because he wanted the Flamant to respond to the incident. But why he chose to do a Mayday Relay — he took the call, chose to do a Mayday Relay. I was doing what I was doing. He is the SMC. I really didn’t discuss it.
Q. Was it usual that he wouldn’t tell you what he was doing or talk through his reasons with you?
A. He was SMC. I was his assistant. So he was the one making the decisions.
Q. Let’s go down to page 5 of the log, look at the Mayday Relay quickly. Then, sorry, actually bottom of the page of 6 so 2.24, so just down one page. So, actually, sorry, probably — there we go {INQ000237/6}: “… Small craft with 40.” And then next page, we see the rest of the Mayday Relay, I think, {INQ000237/7}, the position — gives the position the coordinates, next to the Sandettie Lightvessel: “… taking water and requiring immediate [assistance] any vessel that can assist to contact Dover [Coastguard].” In your witness statement, you say that you became aware of the Mayday Relay when you heard Neal Gibson making it on the radio. It was, in fact, the JRCC that broadcast the Mayday Relay. Is it likely that this is what you heard?
A. No. When I heard Neal Gibson talking about a Mayday Relay, I must have heard him talking to Tom Barnett or somebody at JRCC about — because I just heard “Mayday Relay”. But we wouldn’t have — I don’t believe we would have heard channel 16 and the broadcast of the Mayday Relay, because that was being monitored —
Q. By the JRCC.
A. — by the JRCC. So what I may have heard — because, as I say, it is like the length of this room away from me. I may have heard him talking to them about doing a Mayday Relay as opposed to him saying “Mayday Relay”, because he was doing his part and I was doing what I was doing.
Q. You say it was an unusual step in your statement.
A. Yes.
Q. Had you previously experienced a Mayday Relay whilst you had been working at the Dover Coastguard in relation to small boat search and rescue?
A. No, I don’t think so.
Q. And you have said that Neal Gibson didn’t discuss his reasons for broadcasting the Mayday Relay. You do mention that later, he told you about the Flamant and you came to understand that was why.
A. Yes, later on from him, that that’s why he was doing it.
Q. And what did you understand about the status of Incident Charlie from the Mayday Relay? What did it tell you about —
A. That he obviously had some concerns for the vessel.
Q. Did, at that point, you believe there was an emergency?
A. There was certainly a — well, yes, otherwise he couldn’t have the — wouldn’t have done the Mayday Relay. Something going on that he needed additional assistance for and he was asking for that.
Q. Let’s turn back to the calls. They kept coming in. And you, as the only MOO in Dover, that was your main role in the night’s events; is that fair to say? Taking the calls, logging it in ViSION and the tracker.
A. Yes, so probably, yes.
Q. Let’s look at the transcript of a call at 2.25. So this is {INQ007654/1}. Just before the first Mayday Relay was broadcast at 2.27, you took a call with someone who said he was called Jonas, as recorded in the logs, or perhaps Jomash here on the first page of the transcript. If we could go to page 2, please, {INQ007654/2}, you say there: “Hello … Coastguard.” Caller says straight away, halfway down the page: “We need a rescue boat, please. We are sinking. We almost sink.” In response, you tell him to tell those around him to stop shouting. You ask his name. He tells you. And then if we go on to page 3 {INQ007654/3}, you ask where he is. You say: “… whereabouts are you?” And he’s unable to tell you beyond being in the middle of the sea. So after some confusion, some inaudible parts, he then tells you that the boat has lost its engine. You see down the bottom, you say: “What did you lose?” “The engine is open … we lost our engine and we don’t know our direction.” Page 4, please {INQ007654/4}, you ask where and when he left. He tells you Dunkirk, 9.00 pm. Page 5, please {INQ007654/5}, you ask whether he phoned anyone apart from coastguard. He says no right at the top there, although the sentence then trails off. And then still on page 5, you ask whether he can see any ships. He says he can see a big ship to the left, but far away. You ask about lights. And then, page 6 {INQ007654/6}, it cuts off and you can only get limited information on the call from the operator. So we see there at the bottom, you have got the UK operator coming in and you can only get a service provider of Vodafone and what the phone is called, which isn’t a telephone number, as I understand it. So this was around five minutes. You didn’t attempt to get a WhatsApp position or a geolocation position from the caller. Can you tell me why that was?
A. Yes. It cut out before I could do it.
Q. Is it right that without having a position, you wouldn’t have been able to work out what ship he could see, for example?
A. Yes. No, if he could see the ship — as I mentioned earlier, some of the ships have large lettering. Some of the companies have large letters down the side. So it wasn’t uncommon to ask if they could see a ship. If they could, did it have any lettering? So MSC, whatever. You could then look on CSCOPE or MarineTraffic to see where MSC — a vessel with “MSC” on the side would be and then you could work out in relation to where that was to where they were. So asking about vessels or — and the lights also, because they have coloured sequences, the lights in the Channel. So if they can see — like the foreign lightvessel, for example, has got a set sequence for the light that it emits. If they can see a set of coloured lights and can tell you what that frequency is in relation to where they are, you can then work — because you know where that is. You can then work out from there where they are. So that’s all aimed towards trying to find out where they are.
Q. So that was your aim in asking whether you could see ships and the lights, but unfortunately, this person couldn’t give you any information that could identify a ship —
A. That’s correct.
Q. — or lights. So without that, it would be impossible — without a geolocation information from WhatsApp or on Google Maps, you wouldn’t able to find out what the ship was without him telling you.
A. No, that’s correct. With the MSC, or whatever, or Costco or any of those large companies or the cross-Channel ferries, then yes, we’d be able to work out where they are then in relation to that —
Q. But in this case, it wasn’t possible.
A. In this case, he couldn’t give the name.
Q. You didn’t ask for a phone number from this caller. Why was that?
A. I guess because we got cut off before we got to this stage. As I said earlier, they’re giving information, so you’re trying to follow the natural flow of what is going. Because on English isn’t their first language, so trying to keep the conversation going in a way that they obviously could understand.
Q. Would you have asked had you not got cut off?
A. Yes, and kept the conversation going until we actually got the information we needed.
Q. We know from the Incident Charlie log that Neal Gibson identified this call as coming from Incident Charlie, the incident for which the Mayday Relay had been broadcast. Let’s bring that up again, so {INQ000237/9}, please. If we go to page 9, at 2.48 in the morning, top of the page, you can see there Neal Gibson writing the entry about the Jonas call and it includes information that, “We are sinking”, that they can see a big ship, and it’s identified as a repeat of Charlie. Insofar as you are able to answer, do you know why this call was made a repeat of Charlie? What was it about the call that —
A. I don’t know, sorry.
Q. Would you agree that the information that HM Coastguard had from the call at face value was that Incident Charlie was a sinking small boat?
A. From that information, yes.
Q. “Yes” is that?
A. Yes, from that information, but …
Q. And would you agree that the language “We are sinking, we almost sink” is not ambiguous?
A. It isn’t, but it’s not uncommon to receive that as a message when they weren’t.
Q. But taking the call at face value —
A. Yes.
Q. — it’s consistent with the content of the Mayday Relay broadcast that Charlie was taking on water and in need of immediate assistance.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe then that Incident Charlie was sinking and in real and imminent danger as a result?
A. It was obviously — it was obviously of concern enough for the SMC to do a Mayday Relay, which is unusual. So yes, it was in a more precarious position than ordinarily we had come to expect.
Q. Just after you come off the call with Jonas or Jomash, at 2.31, Neal Gibson took his second call with Mubin, and this is the one that you talk about in your statement.
A. Oh, right, okay.
Q. And you say that Neal Gibson was speaking with a raised voice. The call was animated and that you told Tom Barnett at the JRCC that Neal Gibson was having a row with the caller. Given that coastguard had information that the small boat on which Mubin was board was sinking at face value, it’s difficult for me to understand why you would be having a row with a caller from that small boat. Are you able to assist on that, having been there during the night?
A. I don’t know what — obviously Neal (inaudible) — he is trying to bring the assistance and he’s being — he can’t do this when he’s talking to somebody who is passing information that they have given already. But exactly what is in his mind, I can’t comment, obviously.
Q. Was it something out of the ordinary to hear coastguard staff, in your words, having a row with small boat callers?
A. Asking people to stop shouting or to keep quiet, that was normal because there would be lots of noise in the background and you couldn’t hear what was going on. If you listen to the transcripts, you could hear that, actually, it’s difficult to hear. So asking people — trying to get people to …
Q. Is that what you meant by having a row? That he was —
A. Yes, he was trying to calm everybody down in a raised voice to be overheard above the noise of the phone, that you’ve got to keep — otherwise, you can’t assist because you can’t hear. You can’t work out what’s going on.
Q. Around 10 minutes later at 2.42 in the morning — we can take this down from the screen, thank you — Neal Gibson spoke to French coastguard about Incident Charlie and in the course of this call, French coastguard told Neal Gibson that those on board had said, “Help me, help me, help me. We are in the water.” Were you aware of this call?
A. I don’t recall being aware of it, no.
Q. Did Neal Gibson tell you that the information from Gris-Nez was that there were potentially people in the water?
A. No, not that I recall.
Q. The next calls in the chronology are two calls that you took the first at 3.06 and the second at 3.12, and let’s look at the transcript of the 3.06 call first, so this is {INQ007657/1}. We see there the time and your name. If we go to page 3, which is where the transcript starts {INQ007657/3}, you see there the operator stating there was no number displayed.
A. Yes.
Q. So they hadn’t been able — would this be a 999 operator?
A. Yes, if it is on to the coastguard rescue, it’s a 999 call. If it is UK coastguard, it is a routine call, and the operator would only come on if there was a 999 call and they would be there throughout —
Q. So this is a 999?
A. Yes.
Q. And the operator states there’s no number displayed, but the operator had guessed that this was for coastguard despite the caller not asking directly for coastguard. You say: “… good guess …” And then you start speaking to the caller from the small boat. About halfway down on page 3, caller says: “We are in the middle of the sea.” They go on to say — you say: “Okay, go on.” “Yeah, we are on our way to England and our boat, we lose our (Inaudible) — we are sinking. (Inaudible) part of our body is in the sea and it is very cold.” There’s then some information about who was on board, so bottom of page 3 and top of page 4 {INQ007657/4}, and then if we could go on to page 4, there is some confusion about trying to provide numbers and then the call cuts off and then you see the operator and you ask for details on the call. So the caller told you in that call that part of his body was in the sea and the small boat was sinking. Was this something that you believed at face value?
A. Saying that, I’ve got no reason to disbelieve it other than that’s quite a common thing for people to say and there were other calls that night saying similar things —
Q. But you —
A. — that clearly weren’t sinking.
Q. Sorry, say that again?
A. Clearly weren’t — the others weren’t — now with hindsight, looking back, you can see that the others that also said they were sinking or in difficulty weren’t sinking or weren’t in difficulty when they came across. But we responded to the incidents based on the information that was reported, so taking the information. They said they are sinking, said they are in the water, gets dealt with that way.
Q. You created a new incident for this call, but you didn’t give it a phonetic alphabet reference and you closed it as a repeat of the migrant admin log. Let’s look at the admin log where that’s recorded, so {INQ000235/1}. You know what I am talking about when I say the migrant administration log?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you just explain your understanding of how that should be used?
A. There was administrative messages around that for the small boat activity for that particular watch, as far as I was aware.
Q. Why would you have put that call into the migrant administration log?
A. I don’t know, but I couldn’t — wouldn’t be able to close it and sort of move it around without the SMC say-so.
Q. Let’s look at the entry. So at page 7 {INQ000235/7}, the entry is at 3.22. There we see at the top — we see you recording that the caller didn’t ask directly for the coastguard and you have recorded what they said about losing the engine, who was on board. You didn’t record that the caller said that he was sinking and part of his body was in the sea. Why was that not recorded?
A. Obviously I have put there are people in the sea. Also obviously now we have got the benefit of listening the transcript. I am trying to remember what was said in the call. Fine. Now, having the transcript, you can read exactly what was said, but at the time, you are listening to noisy, noisy background, what was said, so I may have missed that part of the message. So with the transcript now, it’s easy to look at that, but at the time, trying to listen to the garbled messages, the wind noise, the noise of the background, etc, it is difficult. So maybe I missed that part.
Q. But you have pointed out that you said there were people in the sea at the bottom, even if you hadn’t perhaps strictly recorded entirely what he had said. You have told me that Neal Gibson would have been the one who would have decided to close it as a repeat —
A. Yes.
Q. — of the migrant admin log. Are you able to tell me why it was closed as a repeat of this migrant administration?
A. I don’t know. I don’t know, sorry.
Q. Just a final point. All the entries on ViSION in relation to this incident are by you. Is there any chance that Neal Gibson may not have been aware of this or was that not how it worked?
A. No, no, it was — as a MOO, I wouldn’t have had the authority to shut it down.
Q. The caller here has before told you they were sinking and partially in the water. Did you consider that this call resembled the other call from Incident Charlie that we have just looked at, the call with Jonas or Jomash and the Mayday Relay?
A. It was similar, but it’s similar to other calls that night as well. On other calls on other occasions, the messages were fairly similar.
Q. Let’s now look at the call at 3.12. So you took this more or less directly after the 3.06 call. So {INQ007658/2}, please, and there we see the time, date, you and the caller, page 2. You say: “… what’s the problem?” After introductions. The caller says: “In the water … in the water.” You ask whether the caller had just called, but the speaker either doesn’t hear or doesn’t understand. You ask where the caller is. The caller is unable to say beyond that he’s in the water. You see there at the bottom, you say: “Whereabouts in the water are you?” And he says: “In the water, in the water.” “Yeah, but where in the water? Where are you near?” “(Inaudible).” Next page, please {INQ007658/3}. So you say: “Where are you?” He says: “… Finished …” And asks for coastguard to come. You say that you need to know where they are before you can come. Caller appears to misunderstand and starts giving information about people on board. We see some numbers there. You tell him to stop shouting. The caller doesn’t hear or doesn’t understand. You repeat not to shout and the caller continues giving numbers. Page 4 {INQ007658/4}, you then try to get a description of the vessel. Caller says that he doesn’t understand, repeats it’s finished. Middle of the page, you then ask again: “Whereabouts are you?” And he says: “What you say?” You say: “Where are you? Where are you?” He says he doesn’t understand and you then say to dial 999 as that might give a position. Caller again asks for help. Page 5 {INQ007658/5}, you say: “Okay, where are you?” He says: “On the water, on the water.” You say: “Okay, whereabouts in the water?” He says: “In the water.” You say: “Okay, I get you’re in the water, but whereabouts? It’s a big, big sea.” He says: “Please can you help me? I am finished … finished can you please? Hello?” You say: “Yeah … yeah whereabouts are you? The English Channel is a big place. Hello?” He says: “Finish, finish … finish.” You say: “But where are you?” He says: “On the water, on the water.” You say: “I know you’re on the water. You don’t need to keep shouting at me that you’re on the water. I know that. But whereabouts on the water?” He says: “England water, England water.” Page 6, please {INQ007658/6}: “Yeah, yeah.” You say: “Whereabouts?” “Yeah, yeah …” “Whereabouts are you in the English waters?” “Yeah, yeah, English water.” You then tell him to hang up and dial 999 as that might give you his position and when he says it’s not working, then, page 7 {INQ007658/7}, you say that it’s probably because he’s still in French waters, and the call ends with him saying, “No”. So you have said in your statement that it was extremely important to find the location of a small boat; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And it’s right in this call, I think, that you were trying to get information about his location and this is presumably why you were asking him, “Where are you?” The caller couldn’t give you any information, any precise information; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You didn’t ask him to share his location using WhatsApp or try to guide him through Google Maps. Is there a reason why you didn’t do that as a priority given his inability to give you any meaningful information about where he was?
A. No, as you said, I’ve just come from — straight from another call and getting similar information, trying to work out what they have got. Perhaps I could have asked him to dial 999 sooner because obviously, as I explained, trying to get — dial 999 is a way of trying to get that information, because with the systems, it may give us a better location. So also, it is quite common. People say they are in the water when they mean they are in a boat which is on the water. So from experience, people say it quite often, “We are in the water”. When you actually drill down into it, they are not actually in the water. They are in a boat which is on the water.
Q. So it is a language problem —
A. It’s quite common.
Q. — as opposed to exaggeration, potentially.
A. Yes, that particular part, but people saying that they are sinking, they’re all going to die, there is lots of women and children, pregnant people on board, etc, then when you get there, it isn’t, that’s quite normal. But obviously, in this one, as you say, I have just come from the other call. If you listen to the tape — the transcript is easy to read and think: well, what about this point? You look at things saying: well, what about doing this? What about doing that? When you actually listen to the — to the tapes, you can hear — you say it earlier. You’re trying to keep the — engage them in conversation, trying to get some information, but then — and try to — okay, where? “Well, we have just left Dunkirk or we’ve just left Calais or we’ve just left the Pan or wherever”, it gives you a bit of a clue. But yes, I could have perhaps asked dial 999 sooner.
Q. And his name? Might you have asked his name sooner?
A. Yes, I could have done.
Q. And telephone number?
A. Could have done.
Q. At the end of the call, as you have told us, you asked him to dial 999. You say you could have done that earlier. Now, how likely was it, in your view, that that would work? You had just been on a 999 call where it wasn’t possible to get any information.
A. It may have — it may have worked. I’ve got nothing else. He can’t give me the latitude and longitude. He can’t tell me where they are in relation to France or the UK, other than between the two. So any options going — we are actually trying to help people and actually trying to bring the rescue to people, so we are trying to elicit the information. We know the people — somebody is in distress or in trouble. We want to bring help to them. Actually, we are trying to find out the information. It’s not the case of, oh, we are not — it’s not that we are not interested. We are interested and we do want to bring the care, but trying to get the information is difficult. So yes, with hindsight, it is fantastic and, yes, maybe could have asked the questions in a slightly different order, but at the time, if you listen to the transcript — listen to the recording, that seems — it seems logical or appropriate at the time, but obviously you can always review things and come back, oh, we could have tried this or could have tried that.
Q. You say that in your statement that asking them to call 999 was not part of your formal training, but it was a standard practice.
A. Yes.
Q. Correct? Was it a standard practice — had you learned it from others at Dover? Was that where —
A. Yes.
Q. And the call ends with you telling the caller that if his phone is not connecting to 999, as we have seen, he is probably still in French waters. In your statement, you say you would often explain to callers — tell callers they were still in French waters if a 999 call did not connect.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes. Again, did you learn this as part of any formal training or was it a practice picked up at Dover?
A. It’s a practice at Dover, because obviously, the more we had to try and work out — because even just narrowing it down to they are in the French side, that gives you at least an indicator of which side of the Channel to start looking for people. It wasn’t that we — and then we could perhaps alert the French to that. But that — yes, that was a practice at Dover.
Q. In your view then, was the ability to connect to the UK 999 system a reliable indicator of which side of the median line the small boat —
A. As far as I was aware, yes.
Q. And as with the 3.06 call, you created a new incident for this call. No phonetic alphabet reference again and it was again closed as a repeat of the migrant administration log. If we could just go back to that log again, so {INQ000235/6}, entry at 2.22 — sorry, yes, 2.21. That’s right one. You record there what happened on the call: “… I am in [the water].” “Where are you?” You record in brief form the contents of the call. You may again not be able to answer this, but why was this never assigned to any incident?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Again, was Neal Gibson informed about this call?
A. I would take it, yes, because I wouldn’t be able to shut — to close a log without the SMC saying so.
Q. So even though you are entering the information, he will have had to authorised it in order for you to do so.
A. I can’t see it would have been different, no.
Q. And did you consider that this call resembled the other calls from Incident Charlie?
A. All the calls, whichever boat, tend to resemble them, a similar message.
Q. Following these calls, did you understand that there was a small boat sinking and that those on board were fully — sorry, in imminent danger of fully entering the water?
A. I understood that there were the reports of that, but as I said, most boats most evenings would say exactly the same or very similar.
Q. So are you saying that you are unsure or that this was a case of exaggeration?
A. I don’t know. We’re obviously still treating it as an incident, but experience showed that once you got to an incident, it was rarely as catastrophic as it was being made out, but it would still be treated as if it was.
Q. No further calls that night from Mubin, Jonas. Why did you believe the calls stopped?
A. Normally, they stopped once people were collected by Border Force or a lifeboat asset. That was normally the reason why they stopped.
Q. Did it ever cross your mind that they might have stopped because the small boat had become swamped or people had entered the water?
A. Not for a specific case, no, because that’s not what the — no, it didn’t.
Q. I want to just now turn to the identification of the three small boats embarked by the Valiant on the night.
A. Okay.
Q. So let’s turn up the Charlie ViSION log, {INQ000237/11}, from page 11, please. So we can see there Neal Gibson’s entry at 3.50 that Valiant was on scene with the first small boat, which was stopped in the water. And then at 03.56, we see your entry providing the Mike number. That’s the number for Border Force that was sprayed on the vessel.
A. Yes. Well, we didn’t provide the Mike number. That’s from Border Force.
Q. Sorry, you are entering the Mike number in the ViSION log.
A. I meant — that’s me recording the message I can hear between Border — Border Force MCC talking to Valiant, so I have entered into Valiant’s — the asset Valiant entered in the message, because one of the things we did where we could, if you heard a transmission between one resource to another resource, you would capture the message that they had passed, so typing into Valiant the resource from MCC, what MCC was saying to Valiant. That’s why that was in there.
Q. Oh, I see. That’s why it says from MCC, because essentially, you are listening into someone else’s call and recording it.
A. Yes, that’s it. MCC are talking directly to Valiant and when you can hear, you do it for the incidents, coastal teams, etc. If you overheard a message between one asset to another, as best you could, you could type that into that log. So try to capture as much information as possible. So yes, that’s why it is Valiant, from MCC to Valiant. That’s my number.
Q. Then 4.16, bottom of the page, Neal Gibson says: “Persons on board … haven’t spoken to [coastguard that] evening.” The next page, page 12 {INQ000237/12}, 04.36, again Neal Gibson: “All … disembarked … marked and strobe …” And then 04.45 — sorry, then — yes, 04.45, you then add information about the Valiant going to a new position from the helicopter, R 163. And 05.21, we see there again you recording that the Valiant was engaging that vessel, and you provide the location coordinates. And, actually, everything else on this page is all you entering it. Then 6.07 at the bottom there, you see the third tasking in the vicinity of Southwest Goodwin, which, as I understand it, is a different area from the Sandettie area, so Valiant then moved off. Next page {INQ000237/13}, at 6.31 there, you see you again entering from MCC M959. So, again, would that have been you overhearing MCC speaking to Valiant?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you agree that on the face of the Charlie log, the entries from 3.50 in the morning until 6.45 in the morning record the three vessels embarked by the Valiant, the Mike numbers for two of them, the first and the third, but at no point is there any positive identification of any of those small boats as being Incident Charlie?
A. Not that I am aware of. Obviously, the Valiant entries for the asset — if you enter information into an asset, if the asset’s assigned to an incident, it automatically populates the incident that it’s assigned to. So just on this case, Valiant was assigned to Incident Charlie. Every update that goes in a separate screen into Valiant’s asset, all those updates will automatically go into the log that the assets assigned to, so —
Q. It is the system doing it.
A. Yes —
Q. It’s not you choosing to put it in a Charlie log. The system sends it into the —
A. Correct, so I — because you can see that — from that, from the fact it says “Valiant” in the column, you see — where you see my name and then “Valiant” —
Q. Yes.
A. — where “Valiant” is in the column, that’s because I made the entry into Valiant’s — updating the asset, updating the information from the asset, and because it is assigned to an incident, the computer automatically populates the incident it is assigned to. So that’s not me doing it for that incident. It is me updating the asset and information from them and then the computer is automatically updating that incident.
Q. Would you agree that looking at the log and seeing everything — three small boats recorded on this log is capable of causing some confusion perhaps if you are not in the operations room or someone coming in on the next day looking at this?
A. It could do. That’s why earlier, I sort of said using JESIP and a joint decision-making model, perhaps recording things in that format for specific incidents and perhaps having a box that you could tick to update automatically an incident and the assets assigned to as opposed to it just being part of the programme, that it just did update the incident, it would change the process.
Q. Is this part of the reason why you thought coastguard systems weren’t designed or weren’t capable of managing the small boat —
A. Yes. Yes, because generally, say you’ve got a person who’s fallen down a cliff, a coastguard team, a helicopter sector are all assigned to that incident. So any update they pass is going to be connected to that incident because they’re only dealing with the one. Obviously, on this — this and other small boats, they’re dealing with multiple incidents, but the system, while it is assigned to a particular incident, is going to start updating that incident with everything to do with that asset.
Q. As we have seen, just looking at again those entries from 03.50 til 06.46, none of them are recorded as a small boat that’s swarmed or sinking or people in the water. Did you know on the night which of the small boats embarked by the Valiant was Incident Charlie?
A. I didn’t know, no. The SMC would keep track of that.
Q. And from your knowledge of what was happening in the operation room on the night, do you know why there was no written record that Incident Charlie had been rescued by the end of the night watch?
A. I don’t know. Again, that’s a matter the SMC would be overseeing.
Q. You have told the Inquiry that when you finished your shift on 24 November, you believed that all vessels had been accounted for. Can you explain why you believed that?
A. To the best of my knowledge, for example, Rescue 163, so the helicopter call sign R 163, Rescue 163, is assigned to dealing with search and rescue. It would be coastguard 163 if it wasn’t. So Rescue 163 was out doing search and rescue missions. My understanding was it went to look for three small boats in a particular area and had found three small boats in that particular area. So as far as I was aware, there weren’t any outstanding. But the actual conduct of all the missions would be down to the SMC, but as far as I was aware from the information I would overhear, everybody was accounted for.
Q. So you sent the helicopter. Helicopter hadn’t found a sinking small boat, so your assumption or your conclusion was that —
A. Well, I hadn’t sent the helicopter to the small boat.
Q. Sorry, Dover Coastguard had sent —
A. Yes, but my understanding was that it has gone to look for three small boats. It found three small boats. As I said before, most of the small boats report that they are in more severe distress than they were, so finding an asset — finding a small boat that wasn’t in that much distress in line with — compared to what had been reported was normal. It had been sent to look for three boats. It found three boats, my understanding is. So the correlation and connection of the incidents to each other, that’s a matter that the SMC would oversee.
Q. But the calls you had taken, for example, from Jomash or Jonas, that was identified as Charlie, had told you that it was sinking, the Mayday Relay identified a small boat taking on water and in need of immediate assistance, none of the small boats embarked by the Valiant found by R 163 were in that condition, so what happened to that small boat?
A. I don’t know. As I said, all the — 99% of the small boats will report they are in a much more serious condition than they — adverse condition than they are. So finding boats which weren’t anywhere near as badly as was being reported was normal, so there was — and obviously, in relation to boats, small boats, you don’t know how many have set off. You don’t know how many you’re looking for. You are trying to piece — and with no air assets, apart from the helicopter doing its search, you’re — you are trying to work out from all that what how many incidents you have actually got. So you don’t know how many have set off. It’s not like you’ve set off on a cruise from one location to another where you know it starts at this time and finishes this time. So you don’t know how many you are looking for really because you don’t know how many started. You’re getting multiple calls from multiple boats all saying that they are in a worse position than they actually are, but they are treated as if they are in a sinking position. How they get correlated, how they get closed off, etc, that’s — the SMC would do that. But as far as I was aware, the boats we were looking for had been found, but my view on it or opinion on it wasn’t relevant because I am in the part of — the decision of what had been found or not was a matter for the SMC, not for a MOO.
Q. But in terms of your state of mind, your — your belief at the end of the night watch, did you believe that those on board Charlie, the Jonas call, for example, had he exaggerated their level of distress and in fact they were not sinking, whereas they said they were?
A. My belief was that we’d recovered and rescued everybody that we had gone to look for or were looking for. As I say, it was normal that people would overstate the level of distress that they were in, so I had nothing to tell me any different. And I wasn’t overseeing directly the actual resources. Sorry, I can’t — as far as I was aware, we had managed throughout the busyness of the night, etc, to recover and rescue everybody that we thought we were looking for. We didn’t know — I didn’t know — I wasn’t aware. I thought we had managed, actually, to achieve success all round and had recovered everybody, because we were trying to find everybody. The questions and resources, etc, are — we worked very hard to try and resolve this. It’s — being in a small boat in the English Channel is going to be in a difficult position, so actually trying to (inaudible) is something you are trying to resolve. No matter what the state people said the boat was in, you still would try to resource it and rescue it. It wasn’t a case of, “Oh, no, it is going to be better than they said, so we won’t”. No, everybody is trying to rescue and do the recovery. So — and as far as I was aware, that night — again, you don’t know how many have set off, so you don’t actually know how many to account for. It’s not like it’s — I don’t know. Somebody hasn’t given you a list of: these are the people that have started off. You’ve got to find people. You don’t know how many you are looking for.
Q. But if you sent out a helicopter and a helicopter — to look perhaps for a sinking small boat and the helicopter didn’t find it, you might assume, with the history of what you knew about exaggeration, that actually perhaps it wasn’t sinking in the first place.
A. If it was sinking, you’d be finding debris or — etc, but the search pattern, the — the assignment of the rescue helicopter to the incident and a search pattern that’s matching the SMC and the Rescue 163 crew, exactly what they thought, what they found, etc, that interpretation was not something that I would have been involved in. That’s something that the SMC would do. It’s not a MOO’s task.
Q. Before the break, you talked about those on board small boats being coached or told to exaggerate their situation. Did you and others at Dover ever consider that those on board, not being mariners, in an inherently perilous situation, given the nature of the small boats, may have genuinely believed themselves to be in grave danger perhaps more than objectively was the case?
A. Yes, you are going to be in a difficult position, but to say the boat’s sinking or there’s pregnant people on board and they are actually giving birth now, when you get there and it’s a boat full of males, clearly that’s an exaggeration. So yes, there were exaggerations, but, you know, claiming — the lady that I mentioned earlier where they said, “Oh, she’s unconscious, I’ll talk to her”, well, she’s clearly not unconscious then. So yes, it’s going to be a difficult position. It would be very unpleasant, and that’s obviously why HM Coastguard classified vessels as being in distress. But when you have got, as I say, reports of pregnant people, people actually giving birth at the time, people unconscious or with various injuries, and you get there and actually that’s not the case, so clearly there were — some of the calls were exaggerated.
Q. Were you involved in any handover to the day watch on 24 November?
A. No, that would be the SMC to SMC.
Q. Do you recall whether Neal Gibson or anyone at Dover gave a handover to Richard Cockerill when he started his shift at 5.00 am?
A. I don’t recall that, no.
MS MOFFATT: Thank you, Mr Downs. I don’t have any further questions for you. Sir, I don’t know if you have any.
Questions by SIR ROSS CRANSTON
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Mr Downs, you mentioned earlier in the evidence about this leaflet you saw —
A. Yes.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: — with the figures drawn and so on. You don’t have that any more?
A. I don’t, sorry, no. I don’t know who — I saw it at Dover Coastguard. Who had it where it came from, I’m not sighted on, sorry.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: No, okay. Well, Mr Downs, thanks very much for your evidence. It has been very helpful, so thank you very much indeed. We will have a break and then we will have Mr Cockerill. (The witness withdrew) (2.52 pm) (A short break) (3.03 pm)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Mr Cockerill, good afternoon. Mr Davies has got some questions for you, but could you firstly read out the affirmation?
MR RICHARD COCKERILL (affirmed)
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, thank you. Mr Davies.
Questions by MR DAVIES
MR DAVIES: Mr Cockerill, could you start please by repeating your full name for the transcript?
A. Richard Michael William Cockerill.
Q. Thank you. Thank you, Mr Cockerill, for coming to assist the Inquiry today and thank you for providing a witness statement running to, I believe, 34 pages and signed by you, I think, on 31 October 2024; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. I want to start, please, by asking you a few questions about your career in the coastguard and your qualifications, if I may.
A. Okay.
Q. So starting with when you joined the coastguard, His Majesty’s Coastguard, 2012 I believe that was, and you joined as a coastguard watch assistant.
A. Correct.
Q. Am I right in thinking that’s not a position which exists today?
A. Correct.
Q. And has since — it is described — correct me — as an entry level position.
A. Correct.
Q. But since then, you have progressed through the ranks of the coastguard, taking the level of senior maritime operations officer in 2016; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you obtained your SMC qualification shortly thereafter in around May 2017.
A. I can’t remember the exact date, but that sounds about right, yes.
Q. And, finally, you were promoted to your current position of team leader in June 2021; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And on the night of the events the Inquiry is looking into, you were a leader of a team at the JRCC in Fareham; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, could I just ask you, please, the difference between the team leader position and the SMC role? Am I right in thinking the team leader is a pastoral line management position whereas the SMC is a qualification and an operational role in a search and rescue mission?
A. That’s correct, yes.
Q. Is that a fair summary?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And looking at that distinction, if you are in work at the JRCC, are you always the SMC, if you are in, or could you be the team leader, but doing administrative functions, for example, or something of that nature when someone else of equivalent rank would be the SMC?
A. Correct. An SMC could be done by — or is a qualification that could be gained by a senior maritime operations officer, which is a role below a team leader, and the team leader is, as you say, a line management role, and we wouldn’t always assume the role of an SMC on a watch. It would be done by different people at different times to — to ensure that they can maintain their competencies.
Q. Thank you. And when you qualified as an SMC, were you given any specific training in relation to small boats search and rescue?
A. At the time I qualified, no.
Q. And am I right in thinking you are required by His Majesty’s Coastguard to re-validate that qualification every five years?
A. Correct.
Q. And am I right in thinking you re-validated your SMC qualification in around March 2023?
A. That would sound about right, yes.
Q. When you did that re-validation exercise, were you then provided any specific training in relation to small boats search and rescue?
A. No. The re-validation process is slightly different to when you take it for the first time.
Q. What are the differences, please?
A. It — the re-validation process is looking at your competency to be able to manage a search and rescue operation and your ability to search and plan appropriately. There is no wider learning, as far as I can remember, with regards to refresher things. The small boats training is more an ongoing process.
Q. I see. Thinking more generally, what formal search and rescue training in relation to small boats did members of the JRCC receive?
A. The specific training would be through the production of Standard Operating Procedures and updates using the coastguard information portal, known as “hot topics”. That’s the training that we have received.
Q. Do you recall ever receiving a presentation or something of that sort around August/September 2021?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Okay. Thank you. Thinking now about the relationship between the JRCC and MRCC Dover, please, I am right in thinking the JRCC is the default zone flexing station for the entire coastguard network; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And that would apply to MRCC Dover as much as any other MRCC.
A. Correct.
Q. Now, in terms of the support that can be provided as part of the zone flexing function, is it just SMC support that can be provided remotely or, for example, could a SMOO or a MOO operate remotely and controlled by an SMC somewhere else?
A. Yes. So the support that can be provided can be anything from monitoring an individual channel, such as channel 16, right all the way up to actually taking an entire station offline and it being managed remotely.
Q. And thinking about your experience at the JRCC, across 2021, how frequently were the JRCC being asked to cover remotely for MRCC Dover, that you can recall?
A. It certainly happened. I can’t remember as to how frequently, but it was certainly something that was not uncommon.
Q. And in relation to that cover, are you able to assist the Inquiry with how much of it related — or indirectly or directly related to small boats?
A. The remote assistance that was offered would normally have been to take their default SAR zones. The small boats would then be done specifically by the operators at Dover.
Q. Did coastguard officers at the JRCC notice any change to their working patterns as a result of the increase in small boat crossings?
A. Sorry, did the operators at the JRCC —
Q. Yes. For example, were you being asked to cover so much that it affected your work patterns at the JRCC?
A. I think because we were the default for the network, we were used to taking additional functions, additional zones on a regular basis from the network, so it didn’t really have an impact on us, I don’t think.
Q. And in your view, was the zone flexing system an effective way of providing cover to MRCC Dover in relation to small boats?
A. I think the way the network operates, yes, it is effective. It does what it’s designed to do.
Q. The Inquiry has heard a lot of evidence about how important it is to be in the room and the information that’s communicated orally between those involved in a search and rescue mission.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you think that’s a possible limitation of remote cover; that your — that the SMC might not be part of that dynamic, if I can put it that way?
A. Being a remote SMC does have its challenges. It is certainly more difficult to maintain overall situational awareness being remote. That’s not to say it doesn’t work. It can be effective, but it’s no substitute for actually being there.
Q. If I could just explore with you some of those challenges. What do you think they are, in terms of your answer previously?
A. I think being there, you pick up on phone calls, radio communications that, being remote, obviously you are not privileged to. So you tend to lose the feel of what’s actually happening in the room. You are relying on being told information rather than actually hearing it yourself firsthand.
Q. So if something — you may perhaps, for example, lose a sense of urgency of a particular phone call, for example, if you were remote that someone else had taken, for example.
A. You could do, yes.
Q. I want to ask you now, please, about the migrant admin ViSION log. That is {INQ000235/1}, please, if we could just bring that up. This is a document which you are familiar with. Am I right in thinking that?
A. Correct.
Q. And this is where I believe, and correct me if I am wrong, incidents, small boats incidents, which were unable to be attributed at the moment they were received, the details of those incidents were placed into this log rather than, for example, a log with an alphanumeric reference number; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And could we please next bring up your statement at {INQ009634/19}, please. You describe at paragraph (f), subparagraph (f) there, that you wouldn’t typically access information in the admin log if you were acting as an SMC. Was that your own practice or was that something that was recognised across the coastguard — the SMC function across His Majesty’s Coastguard to be the appropriate way to treat this migrant admin log?
A. I think the contents of what goes in the administration log you would be told about verbally. So as an SMC, you would — I would hope that I was being told everything that is being put in that log verbally. The purpose of that is to record it as well, so that there is a written record of it. But as an SMC, it’s not something, as I say, that you would access regularly because you would — I would hope that the information that’s going in there would have been told to me by another means.
Q. So when you say “verbally”, thinking about your position at the JRCC —
A. Yes.
Q. — remote from MRCC Dover —
A. Yes.
Q. — how do you mean “verbally”?
A. So if I was remote SMC at the JRCC, I would use what we call a TalkBox, which is an internal communications method using the coastguard communications system, and I would be in regular verbal contact with whoever was in the room. And if I was operating remotely, it may be something that I would look at more frequently, but if I was actually within the room, then I would expect to be told it verbally. I think a lot of it depends on where you are based. If you are within the room, obviously you are party to the conversations, but remotely, it is probably something that you would more look at frequently.
Q. I understand. Thank you. I want to talk to you now about the provision of cover to MRCC Dover that you gave prior to 23 and 24 November 2021. I would like to start with first your understanding of what the staffing situation was at MRCC Dover. Did you have any sense of that prior to the events of 23 and 24 November?
A. I think MRCC Dover had its challenges in maintaining suitable staff numbers, which was borne out by the amount of support that was offered and given throughout the course of the year, be it a lone operator or two. I think things were starting to increase, were starting to get better.
Q. How did you become aware of those difficulties, if you don’t mind my asking? Was it through colleagues? Word of mouth?
A. I mean, the way the national network works is that we would be asked by the network commanders to offer Dover assistance or to take a zone off of them and add it to our usual zones. That generally is how we were aware of it.
Q. So an increase in frequency of being asked to offer support to MRCC Dover?
A. Correct.
Q. Could we bring up please {INQ000233/10}. This is the network management log for the 24 November 2021. Can we just move to the bottom of the page, the very last entry, it looks like it’s cut off. There we are. You can see your name at the bottom there and you are referred to in this log as: Op Deveran support. Could you help the Inquiry, please, with what was Operation Deveran support?
A. Operation Deveran was the — was what was used to describe small boat activity. The Op Deveran support was me being present at MRCC Dover in person for a period of time to observe and learn firsthand how it was dealt with within the ops room in MRCC Dover.
Q. I see. Could we bring up, please, {INQ000409/1}. It’s a spreadsheet so I think we will need the native version, please. As we see at the top left there this is the Dover watch bill. Could we please go to row 85 of this spreadsheet? Thank you. Now, your name appears there with your colleague at the JRCC Tom Barnett as red days. Was red days here the same thing as Operation Deveran support? Was it referred to as red days as well as Operation Deveran?
A. Sorry, which, which red days are we referring to?
Q. Forgive me. It’s row 83 just by the cursor there?
A. Okay.
Q. Just above your name. Was your Operation Deveran support role ever colloquially referred to or otherwise as red day support?
A. Not that I’m aware of.
Q. Okay. So could we move in the spreadsheet, please, to column “WQ”, please. Thank you. This appears to be the first day on which this red day support was provided. Was this a time when you were at MRCC Dover in person?
A. No, that would have probably been when I was present at the JRCC.
Q. Okay. Perhaps just taking a step back. How would one be selected to provide Operation Deveran support?
A. It would be determined by the network commanders on the day to see if we had a suitable number of SMCs and who in the network would be available. Dover support primarily came from the JRCC and MRCC Humber, so they would look to free up an SMC at the JRCC or Humber to be able to provide SMC assistance to Dover if it was an SMC in particular that they required.
Q. Yes. We can see it on the left-hand side of the screen there that in fact there is a range of qualifications, MOOs and SMOOs, etc. So on this first day that it appears this support was being provided — well, first of all, does the September dates that we see here accord with your recollection of when you first started providing support to MRCC Dover?
A. I’m afraid I can’t recall that.
Q. Can you roughly remember when, when it started in your career?
A. It — it was in 2021 is, is the most I can narrow it down to I’m afraid.
Q. Okay. Well, let’s just stick with this spreadsheet for the moment. It seems to record your attendance or your cover rather to MRCC Dover. You don’t recall the first day that we see here that’s highlighted?
A. I’m afraid not.
Q. If we scroll along, please, if we could highlight row 85 so we can see Mr Cockerill’s days and just scroll along, please, until we come to the next entry. There we are. We see another entry there 25 September — 26 September rather, 27 September again please onwards and then on the 9 October and finally can we move forward please to the 22 November. There is a little bit of a gap here which we will come to. So this period of time is where you were stationed at MRCC Dover —
A. Correct.
Q. — around the time of the events with which the Inquiry is concerned. Prior to this period, we can see that you were providing this cover to MRCC Dover on five occasions. Does that accord with your recollection of the amount of cover you provided; there was perhaps a handful of times before you eventually —
A. Yes, it would.
Q. Do you see that?
A. It would be about right, yes.
Q. I gather from your statement that you provided to the Inquiry this was the first time, 22 November that you had been there in person, is that right?
A. That I recall, yes.
Q. That you recall, okay. You may be able to help with this, but you may not. Could we just go back please to the beginning of the spreadsheet, well, to the September dates we were looking at previously. Perfect. Most of these entries are day entries apart from the four nightshifts we see here, not for you. Are you able to assist with why most of the red day cover that was provided to MRCC Dover was during the day when the Inquiry has heard quite a lot about calls which were coming through in the early hours of the morning and would be covered by a night shift. So, why were they day shifts please?
A. I would say predominantly the reason would be because the boats would leave the shore under cover of darkness with a view to arriving into the middle of the English Channel for about daybreak or just after. So most support was required for when UK assets were actually going to be engaged in operations.
Q. I see. So the focus was on supporting the operation of assets rather than the call collection phases perhaps, is that fair?
A. I think it would depend on the assessment as to how busy it was expected to be.
Q. So prior to the first time you provided this cover, were you given any training about what to expect at MRCC Dover?
A. I wasn’t given any specific training that I can recall. That was one of the reasons for my attendance at Dover, was to gain experience and understand how it was happening. Most or all of the support prior to that had been as a remote SMC that I can recall.
Q. And can you help us with this please. How did it come to be that you were going to be there in person? Did you volunteer?
A. I requested it, yes.
Q. You requested it. Why? Why?
A. To help me get a better understanding of the types of calls that were received, how they were taken and as a remote SMC, as I stated earlier, you miss a lot of the conversations that happen in the room and a feel for it. So my attendance at MRCC Dover was to provide me with that understanding of the types of phone calls you get, how often they are which you don’t always understand as a remote SMC.
Q. So this was something you requested of your own initiative. Were you encouraged to do it by those above you or was this something which was suggested to you to be a good idea or was it your own idea that you wanted to do this?
A. I can’t — I can’t recall. The idea of me going was certainly not put off. It was encouraged. I can’t remember specifically whether it was something that I was directed to do, but it was something that I certainly volunteered to do.
Q. I understand. Thank you. So can we go to {INQ006233/1}, please. This is a request for overtime at MRCC Dover that went out I believe on a wide circulation, all stations, requesting support for the week with which the events took place. Am I right in thinking, based on what you have told us today, that your presentation at Dover had nothing to do with this request for overtime, your physical presence at Dover I should say — we will come to the time you started in a moment — but your physical presence was nothing to do with this request for overtime. You were going to be there in any event?
A. I was going to be there whether this — yes.
Q. This was preplanned since when?
A. I can’t remember the timescale that it was preplanned, but it certainly will have been a few weeks beforehand.
Q. Do you recall personally seeing this email at the time?
A. I — yes, I am aware of the email.
Q. And when you saw the email, what action did you take, if any?
A. When this email came out, this is when I discussed the ability to start earlier to assist night shift. As I said earlier, the vast majority of the work, the help that was required, was during the day shift which is why that particular week I was working four days in a row. If I had have worked the night shift it would have been for a period of 12 hours which would have taken me out of 24 hours of day shift work. So I suggested a 5:5 to help assist the night shift at the end of the night and then be around to assist the day shift for the majority of the day.
Q. Around that daybreak period that you referenced earlier.
A. Yes.
Q. You mentioned discussing this email. Who did you discuss it with, please?
A. I can’t remember who exactly it was I discussed it with.
Q. Might it have been the small boat tactical commander George Papadopoulos?
A. It could have been. It might have even been Duncan Ley, it might have been the originator of the email himself. But I can’t remember specifically who it was, but it was agreed.
Q. During that discussion, did the person who you spoke to about it tell you anything about the red day forecast, for example that had happened on the 22 November, that it was going to be a busy period at Dover?
A. My recollection is that when I started on the Monday, we were aware that it was going to be a challenging week. The actual numbers was unknown but we were aware that it was amber and red days, yes.
Q. Could we please go back to the spreadsheet {INQ000409}, please. Thank you. Can we go to the November dates, please, 22 November, please. We can see two comments on the boxes of the 23rd and 24th. Could you just hover the cursor over the first box on the 23rd please, the red dot, or expand it so we can see the comment, thank you. So this is a comment as you indicated, early finish on the 23rd to allow enough rest before a 5 o’clock start shift on Wednesday.
A. (Nods).
Q. As part of the discussion — you received this on the 22nd you worked the day shift. Was there any discussion of skipping the following day shift and then working the night of the 23rd rather than simply starting early and working day shifts if you understand my meaning?
A. Not that I can recall, no.
Q. Okay. And was it your suggestion to start early or was it something that was suggested to you?
A. I think it was my suggestion, if I remember correctly.
Q. If we can take that off the screen, please. Thank you. Can we bring up your statement, {INQ009634/13}, paragraph 28. You explain what your role was at MRCC Dover in that paragraph. You say you attended in an observational capacity supporting/observational capacity as a maritime co-ordinator, which is essentially the same function as a MOO. Why are you referred to, if you can assist with this, please, as a maritime co-ordinator rather than a MOO? What attracts that different title?
A. The maritime co-ordinator is also referred to as a mission co-ordinator. Again it’s a lower qualification to the SMC, but the maritime co-ordinator was part of my role, the vast majority of my role on the days there was exactly to co-ordinate assets, which is essentially what I was doing.
Q. If I could put it another way. So how is it different to a MOO and why does it have a different name?
A. I suppose it’s used to differentiate because I am a team leader, so it’s to differentiate that I am not a MOO, I am a team leader. But at that time, I was not operating in the capacity as a team leader, but as a co-ordinator.
Q. You go on to say in paragraph 29 that neither Neal Gibson or James Crane took a break and so you weren’t required to provide cover. Had you anticipated perhaps providing cover to them?
A. It — it was a possibility. If it would have happened, it meant that I was suitably qualified to cover their breaks. As it is, they didn’t and so I wasn’t required to.
Q. So, in principle, even though you were there in an observational capacity you could have if need required act as SMC?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you act as an SMC at any point during your shift?
A. No.
Q. Could we bring up, please, {INQ000258/1}, please. This is incident Tango. Could we go to {INQ000258/5}, please. The reason that I want to take you to this, it’s because we can see an entry midway down the page here from George Close at 11 minutes past 10 in the morning and he conducts a RAGs assessment, which the Inquiry has heard about, and refers to you as the SMC in relation to that exercise. Can you help us, please, with why he considered you to be the SMC at this point or in relation to this particular entry?
A. The only reason, the only thing I can suggest for what is because I worked closely with George Close at the JRCC and that’s the role that he was familiar in which I operated. So that’s the only reason I can think because we did have a conversation that day on the telephone. I can only assume that that was an assumption on his part.
Q. Can we go to {INQ000235/1}, please, which is the admin log we have previously seen, and at {INQ000235/13}, please. We can see an entry from you at 9.31, an SMC comment. Why does it appear as an SMC comment in relation to your name when you weren’t acting as the SMC? Are you able to help with that, please?
A. I can only assume that that’s an error on my part in that I was used to putting SMC comments in incidents, and working at pace I can only assume that I’ve actually misused the wrong, the wrong tag for it.
Q. Would you consider an entry like that to possibly confuse —
A. I can.
Q. — someone?
A. I can understand how it may be confusing, yes.
Q. And can we go back to your statement please at paragraph 51, {INQ009634/29}. Thank you. Sorry, it’s actually paragraph, yes, the end of paragraph 51: “The closure of an incident requires authority from a SMC. As explained earlier in my statement …” You go on to say: “I cannot recall if I had a conversation with James Crane in relation to the closure of Incident Alpha 1 as a repeat or whether I authorised myself as SMC to close this incident.” So even though you weren’t the SMC, you appear to have acted with the authority of an SMC. Was that something that would happen if you had that qualification?
A. Looking at that entry, I can’t remember the specifics of it which is why I was unsure as to how it was closed. But I think the incident that I closed I would have informed the SMC about that incident and sought his authorisation for it to be closed.
Q. There was only one dedicated SMC if I could put it that way.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And you were there in an observational capacity, although SMC qualified. Why not have two SMCs? Why not have James Crane or Neal Gibson and you dividing up the work in the ops room? Why is that not possible or was it possible?
A. Usually where you have multiple operations in different parts of the country yes, it would be sensible for — to have a different SMC for each incident. However, the small boats is multiple events of one incident, so to maintain that situational awareness it does help to have one SMC in charge of them all.
Q. So the particular challenge of small boats, is that what you are saying, means it is beneficial to have one person with oversight of everything that’s happening?
A. Yes. Due to the number of incidents that can be created, it helps if you have that overall situational awareness if you have just the one person in charge making the decisions.
Q. I want to talk to you now about the events immediately prior to your watch on 24 November. We have seen the entry you can take the statement off screen, please. We have seen the entry from George Papadopoulos on the watch bill discussing your early start and early finish the day before so that you were sufficiently rested. You describe in your statement how 23 November was a day which you worked at MRCC Dover?
A. Correct.
Q. And it was a busy shift, in your words. You say that you worked 7 to 7 that day, is that something you recall happening?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you say it was a busy shift, do you mean it in relation to small boats incidents or other work with which MRCC Dover was concerned?
A. That, I’m afraid, I can’t recollect.
Q. If I were to suggest to you that there were in fact no small boats incidents on the 23rd of November, does that accord with your recollection of what happened or can’t you say one way or the other?
A. I can’t remember. There’s nothing that stands out specifically about the 23rd.
Q. Is it possible that you are perhaps mistaken about the level of activity on the 23rd or how busy your shift was or do you remember that quite clearly?
A. I — I — I can’t remember the level, I can’t recollect the level of work that was involved. It might not have been relevant to small boats, but I — there probably would have possibly was other things going on. It might have been reviewing or discussing small boats activity. I’m afraid I can’t recollect.
Q. Okay. And are you certain that it was definitely a 7 until 7 shift on 23rd of November?
A. Having seen the entry, I can’t recollect what time it was I actually finished on the 23rd.
Q. Okay. And when you were about to start your shift on the 24th, did you feel sufficiently rested and —
A. Yes.
Q. — able to take on what you were about to take on? Okay. I want to talk to you now about the moment just before you entered the ops room at 5 am. At that moment, before you walked through the door, were you expecting to receive a handover from Neal Gibson?
A. I wasn’t expecting to receive a handover. That is usually given when you change over a full watch shift. I would have expected a brief of what was ongoing, if there was anything ongoing, but not a full handover.
Q. When you say a “full handover” you mean a presentation, a PowerPoint presentation?
A. Correct.
Q. Were you expected — would you expect to, at that time, did you expect to have been told of something like a Mayday that had been previously issued during the shift?
A. If it was still ongoing, I would have expected to be told.
Q. Any vessels or incidents in significant distress, would you expect to have been told about that?
A. Yes. If they were in the process of an active SAR operation, yes.
Q. Had you — have you previously, in your coastguard career, begun a shift without a formal handover?
A. Not that I can recollect.
Q. Did you have any reservations about beginning a 12-hour shift without receiving a full handover?
A. No.
Q. Why was that, please?
A. I — in my experience, I would be quite comfortable to be able to pick up incidents as they are happening, if they are ongoing, to be able to read them and be able to just carry on without a full handover.
Q. So turning to the night and the moment you enter the ops room. What’s the atmosphere like when you walk in?
A. My recollection is, is that it was quite calm, it was quite relaxed. There was no immediate incidents going on that required a vast amount of, of actions. There was some ongoing incidents which were coming to conclusion when I arrived in the ops room.
Q. Could we bring up {INQ006802/1}, please. This is the version of the tracker at 03:37 am, it is the tracker that immediately preceded the start of your shift. The next one occurs at 18 minutes past 5. We can see here there are eight open incidents. In your experience, was that a significant number of small boats incidents to be outstanding when you started your shift?
A. It’s not uncommon from my recollection.
Q. And thinking about the room and the team in the room, we have got these eight open incidents, a single SMC, Neal Gibson, a single MOO and a trainee MOO, and of course yourself. And just to situate ourselves in the chronology of what happened, R 163 is out on search and rescue missions and the Valiant was tasked as well. Other witnesses have impressed upon the Inquiry how it was quite a busy night and does that accord with your recollection at all?
A. As I say, when I went in, when I started my shift, the Valiant was in the process of recovering three migrant vessels and Rescue 163 was carrying out an observational sweep and wasn’t involved in, in active rescues at the time. It was more a case of looking for migrant vessels which we were unaware of.
Q. So you enter the operations room. The first thing you do, what’s that? Do you go to Neal Gibson first? Do you go to your desk first and logon? Talk us through your first moments in the operations room.
A. The first thing to do would be to — I did was find an empty desk to log in to load up all the various pieces of software we require. Whilst those are loading, I would have expected to be told by Neal what I needed to do to familiarise myself with what was ongoing at the time.
Q. And what do you recall from that conversation?
A. Unfortunately not very — not a lot.
Q. Did he draw any particular incidents to your attention that you remember?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. And logging on and that business, how long would that usually take you?
A. It takes a few minutes to — for the various pieces of software to come up and position them on screens, how you feel comfortable with them. So two or three minutes to organise your desktop.
Q. And then do you recall how long the conversation with Neal Gibson last add at all?
A. I’m afraid I don’t, no.
Q. Could we bring up, please, {INQ000235/9}. I believe this is the first ViSION log entry you make in what the Inquiry has received. 18 minutes past 5, so starting your shift at 5 and there being eight ongoing incidents. You can’t have spent any longer than 18 minutes looking at them before you started getting about the business of recording things in KRAKEN. Is that something that sounds like your experience or do you think you spent longer going through ViSION logs or preparing for what you were about to do over the next 12 hours?
A. I am not sure what the other people — depending on what other people in the ops room were engaged in, I might have taken that call because there was nobody else to do it. I can’t recall what happened between 5 o’clock and 5.18 I’m afraid.
Q. When Neal Gibson asked you to familiarise yourself with what was happening operationally, how did you do that?
A. It would have been a case of looking through the open incidents to read through to see which assets were engaged in operations with which incidents and where they were as well.
Q. This might sound like a silly question but I am going to ask it anyway. You wouldn’t have checked any incidents that would have been marked as closed to — to reassess —
A. No.
Q. — them or look at the detail of them?
A. No.
MR DAVIES: No. Okay. Sir, it’s been 45 minutes. Would it be a convenient moment to have a short break, there is not much longer?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: How much do you think you have got?
MR DAVIES: 15, 20 minutes, I think.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Is that all right with the shorthand writer, another 15 minutes? Is that all right with you, Mr Cockerill? Okay, yes.
MR DAVIES: I am grateful. Could we turn to your statement please at {INQ009634/1}, paragraphs 46 and 47, please, {INQ009634/25}. Thank you. This is the part of your statement where you discuss how you weren’t aware of the following, this entry, in the migrant admin log from the maritime tactical commanders. Are you able to explain why you didn’t see that if you read the ViSION logs before you started your shift?
A. Reading the ViSION logs would be reading the open incidents. It wouldn’t — I wouldn’t have gone through the admin log all the way back up to when it was opened. At best, it would have been from the point at which I signed into the system. Review of the ViSION logs would have been the actual open incidents that they were engaged in operations at the time.
Q. In your experience, were the messages of maritime tactical commanders known to you to be recorded in the admin log in this way?
A. In my experience, the network commanders put comments in the network management log rather than the admin log. That would be my experience. Having not done many small boats prior to November 2021, it’s not something I am overly familiar with, with them putting comments in.
Q. And no one specifically drew your attention to the concerns of the maritime tactical commander —
A. No, not that I am aware of.
Q. — when you started your shift?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Given you hadn’t received a proper handover, did you not consider it more important to read all of the available information on ViSION that you could see rather than rely on the sort of summary Neal Gibson had given you?
A. I think my recollection is that because we had assets out at the time, it was more important to familiarise myself with the incidents that they were dealt with — dealing with immediately at that time. Whilst that was ongoing, I don’t recollect going back through and looking at other things after the — after I had familiarised myself with those events.
Q. With hindsight, should you have read this log in a little bit more detail?
A. If I was the SMC, probably. But the admin log is more there to record things that are not attributable to a specific incident. As an SMC you would probably be aware of them, as I explained, from — by other means more often verbally. In hindsight yes, it probably would be a good idea to go back through and look at it.
Q. My final question on this. We saw earlier how you closed Incident Alpha 1 as a repeat and the unattributed incidents which come in are placed in this log. If you hadn’t read this log thoroughly as a call taker, which you were acting as, would you not be at a disadvantage not having seen all the other information that had been unattributed to marry these pieces of information up? Do you see my meaning?
A. Yes. At the time of ongoing incidents, looking for corroborating incidents to marry up with other open incidents would be low down on the priority list because we would be dealing with live and SAR operations.
Q. I see. Thank you. I want to ask you now about your specific knowledge of Incident Charlie during the hours of your shift. What was your understanding of that incident when you started your shift?
A. It was one of the ongoing incidents that Valiant was engaged with at the time I started my shift is my understanding.
Q. And what was your understanding of Incident Charlie at the start of the day shift, for example, at 7 am?
A. My understanding was it had been finalised with Valiant recovering the vessels.
Q. Could we please bring up the tracker, {INQ006802} again, please. Did you review the tracker when you started your shift or just the ViSION logs?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Okay. Sorry, could we bring up {INQ006802}. You see the entry “M957” against Incident Charlie. This is the version of the tracker that would have been available to you?
A. (Nods).
Q. Did that have any impact on your understanding of the status of Incident Charlie when you started the shift?
A. If it’s been allocated a M number, that would indicate that Border Force vessel has recovered the vessel.
Q. And to you oncoming, had you looked, had you seen this document you would have believed that the incident was closed?
A. Correct.
Q. The Inquiry has heard evidence about the belief within His Majesty’s Coastguard, members of His Majesty’s Coastguard that calls from small boats exaggerated the level of distress they were in. Is that your understanding of the calls which come from small boats?
A. It is, yes.
Q. What’s the basis for that, please?
A. During prosecution of incidents, comments had been made with regards to various states of persons onboard those vessels. Once those vessels had then been recovered by UK assets the situations described onboard didn’t match what the SAR assets recovered when they arrived on scene, for instance unconscious people or people in the water. When they actually arrived on scene and started to board them, there was no signs of distress or any persons in the water.
Q. The Inquiry has also heard about some of the issues with language barriers of call taking. Could we bring up your statement, please, {INQ009634/32} at paragraph 60. It’s something you talk about here. You describe it as one of the biggest challenges in relation to small boats incidents. Could we go, please, to {INQ010695/1}. This is a call that you took at 11.30 on the morning of the 24th. If we could scroll down, please, to the third page, please, okay. So the male speaker of this call says: France, no, please, please (inaudible). You say: No. Male speaker: All you did please, please help please. And then you say: This is not the police. Is this an example of the kind of thing you are talking about in your statement when you describe language barriers?
A. Correct.
Q. Clearly a misunderstanding here about what the caller has — is saying?
A. (Nods).
Q. And were you aware at the time of any standard operating procedure or guidance or training about how to deal with an example such as this of a language issue?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. And so you weren’t familiar with the language line?
A. Yes, the language line is an option we have. However, if I remember correctly, that is reliant upon having a contact number to be able to call them back or keep them on the phone. It can be quite a time-consuming process to establish which interpreter is required for the language they are speaking.
Q. Final topic. I want to talk to you about the closure of ViSION log incidents. {INQ010349/1}, please, if we could bring that up. This was a message we can see at the bottom originally from George Papadopoulos to James Crane and it is a generic entry to be used in the ViSION logs where there are limited — which are unresolved essentially at the time at the end of the shift. If we scroll up, please, we can see that it’s sent to you at 5.41 in the evening of 24 November. The first question about this document. Were you still at work at 5.41?
A. I don’t believe so, no.
Q. Okay. Are you able to explain why this was sent to you if you weren’t still working?
A. I can’t comment. No, I’m afraid not.
Q. Was there any discussion in the operations room that you recall before you left about the use of this statement?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Have you ever used this to close a ViSION log incident and I say this because, having reviewed the incident logs, there’s no indication that you did in fact use this?
A. No, I have no recollection of using that.
MR DAVIES: Those were the questions I had for you, Mr Cockerill, thank you. Chair, do you have any further questions?
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: No, I don’t thank so you very much indeed, Mr Cockerill. The evidence has been very helpful. Now, next, I know everyone is working at pace and under pressure so I was discussing earlier with Mr Phillips and Ms Le Fevre about next Wednesday and we thought it better not to read out the statements but to make them available on the website. You could perhaps explain when we are going to do that, when we are in a position to do that.
MS LE FEVRE: Yes, Chair, that will take place in the course of the fourth week of our hearings in stages. So there will be tranches probably on Tuesday and the Wednesday and the Thursday, the final three days of our hearings, and we will publish the balance of the witness statement evidence we hold in that fourth week.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes. We just thought it was, in terms of preparing evidence and preparing the closings, it was better to use the Wednesday that way. So I hope that’s acceptable. Is there anything more about next week that we need to —
MS LE FEVRE: No, thank you, chair. We just wanted to confirm that the Inquiry won’t sit on Wednesday.
SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Yes, of course. Yes. Thanks very much indeed and thanks again, Mr Cockerill. (4.01 pm) (The Inquiry adjourned until 10 o’clock, on Monday, 17 March 2025)
I N D E X
MR THOMAS GREGORY WILLOWS ………………………………1 (affirmed)
Questions by MS WOODS …………………….1
MR STUART DOWNS ……………………………….89 (affirmed)
Questions by MS MOFFATT ………………….89
Questions by SIR ROSS CRANSTON …………..170
MR RICHARD COCKERILL ………………………….171 (affirmed)
Questions by MR DAVIES ………………….171